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Researchers all around the globe have not yet come to an end as regards the supposed positive impact of 
traditional performance management systems in healthcare, and some research has shown that, paradoxically, 
performance management policies do not always lead to improved hospital performance. Despite the extensive 
research identifying the “pitfalls” of the NPM reforms around Europe and the unintended consequences for 
hospital staff and patients, little is known about the mechanisms that caused those negative effects, which 
essentially creates a research gap worth investigating. This PhD study tries to address this gap and show why do 
traditional PM Systems in healthcare not always lead to improved performance, by outlining the unintended 
consequences of the Greek healthcare reform in a public hospital. By conducting empirical research using a case-
study, and by adopting a systemic perspective, this research addresses this gap and sheds light on how hospital 
performance is perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and what mechanisms drive its dynamic 
behaviour.  Following a systemic approach, the selected case study - which is a real hospital in the Greek 
Healthcare system - allowed us to investigate the causing mechanisms of the negative consequences of the Greek 
healthcare reform on the performance of the case hospital. In doing so, we framed our analysis using the Dynamic 
Performance Management methodology. 
Recently, researchers have started to see those negative outcomes as “system pitfalls”, occurring from the 
non-linear interconnection and the dynamic interaction of the different elements and factors that comprise the 
health system and the healthcare institutions, i.e., their structure, the policies implemented, the behaviour and the 
decisions of healthcare workers and patients inside this system. The implementation of a systemic performance 
assessment methodology in Healthcare is sponsored by many recent scholarly contributions in the field (Arnaboldi 
et al., 2015; Costanza et al., 2014; Bivona, 2010, 2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Noto, 2020; 
Davahli et al., 2020; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer et al., 2009; Helal, 2016; Renmans et al., 2017; Mwita, 
2000; Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). Adopting a 
systemic perspective means taking as a unit of analysis the organisation as a whole, and not one unit or department; 
acknowledging its internal and external environment and culture in which health care is performed; and 
considering the concurrent existence of the pitfalls documented as inherent to the structure of the system and the 
policies implemented. Studies using such a methodology would be necessary in order to address the gap in existing 
knowledge, as well as to support policy-makers in designing better, more quality-oriented healthcare policies, 
interventions and reforms in the future. 
The purpose of this study was to empirically conceptualise a qualitative model of hospital performance as 
perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and use the DPM analysis in order to help policymakers in 
Greece re-design performance management policies and foster hospital performance. We adopted a systemic, 
participatory, inductive and dynamic approach by combining the Group Model Building and System Dynamics 
methodologies into the Dynamic Performance Management approach (Bianchi, 2016). Other research traditions 
identified in our study are the Stakeholders Theory and Participation. All those approaches stand in the 
constructivist side of the continuum as research approaches, because they all consider realities as subjective, 
2 
 
complex and multi-layered, actively shaped by perceptions and opinions of stakeholders (De Gooyert, 2019; Lane 
& Schwaninger, 2008). Mixed methods were used to facilitate our approach, combining primary qualitative data 
from two Group Model Building sessions; four open, unstructured preliminary interviews; and seven semi-
structured, disconfirmatory interviews; with secondary, qualitative and quantitative data from a scoping literature 
review and from a critical literature review; as well as from official, open-access, online text-documents and 
closed-access, internal text-documents of the hospital’s interdepartmental communication. 
An open call for participation in the research was sent by email to around 70 different hospitals in the cities 
of Athens and Thessaloniki in Greece, and the gatekeeper was identified. Starting from the gatekeeper, snowball 
sampling was used to select 10 participants in the case hospital for the Group Model Building (GMB) sessions, 
including at least one person from each main key-stakeholder category that our extensive stakeholder analysis 
identified (i.e., managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients), with the purpose of “eliciting” their mental 
models and “capturing” them in a qualitative system dynamics model (causal loop diagram). Four of the 
participants were also interviewed before the GMB sessions (face-to-face, one-to-one preliminary interviews). 
Convenient sampling was used in order to identify seven more public hospital stakeholders from other public 
hospitals in Greece for the disconfirmatory interviews. The data analysis included a Scoping Review of the 
International Literature of Performance Management in the Health Sector; a Critical Review of the Literature on 
the Greek Healthcare Reform; a Stakeholder Analysis; a Narrative Analysis of Preliminary Interviews and 
Documents; a Qualitative System Dynamics Analysis (Causal Loop Diagram) of the Simplified version of the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance created during the GMB sessions; and, finally, the Dynamic 
Performance Management (DPM) analysis.  
The GMB sessions helped hospital stakeholders gain a better understanding of what hospital performance 
is in a more systematic way; define it; show its trend (dynamic behaviour) in the hospital during the last decade 
in a diagram; and conceptualise it as a system, depicted as a qualitative system dynamics model of hospital 
performance (CLD - Causal Loop Diagram). The two final versions of this CLD Model (i.e., the Conceptual and 
the Policy Models of Hospital Performance, available in Appendixes 21 and 22 respectively and thoroughly 
described in terms of the variables and links they contain in Appendix 24) are the main outputs of the GMB 
sessions, and formed the basis of our analysis and research findings. The Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance is a CLD model that depicts the actual structure of hospital performance and can be used to explain 
its currently low levels, whereas the Policy Model of Hospital Performance is extended to incorporate the policy 
structure, i.e., the changes in the system structure which are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, 
in order to improve hospital performance. 
Hospital performance was defined by the participant stakeholders as the provision of patient-centred care 
to the patient, with safety (for the patients and the staff); responsibility (adherence to protocols, proportions and 
procedures) and dignity (nice and clean facilities, reduced waiting times and no informal payments). The historical 
trend of the Hospital performance in the case hospital was also depicted in a diagram over time called Reference 
Mode (available in Appendix 19). The Reference Mode created and agreed upon by the participants showed that, 
despite the counterintuitive negative outcomes documented, the level of the overall performance in the case 
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hospital has been slightly increasing after the healthcare reform and is now stabilizing. Our research showed that 
the Performance Management policies introduced during the Greek healthcare reform had a negative impact on 
many aspects of hospital performance in general, and in our case hospital in particular. The new policies 
undeniably contributed to the reduction of hospital spending, but they simultaneously contributed to the 
deterioration of hospital service quality. Goal-setting, the main PM strategy followed by Greek public hospitals 
according to Law N4369/16, is until today not properly implemented in the case hospital and managers seem to 
treat performance objectives as completely separated from performance and quality, and to consider them totally 
outside of their everyday tasks. Those findings of the preliminary interviews and documents analysis were 
validated from the findings of the pretests, conducted before the GMB sessions.  
Four of the goals that were set by the division managers of the case hospital came up during the GMB 
sessions and were integrated in the CLD model that the participants built: Standardization of the nursing forms of 
the nursing departments and units; Standardization of clinical procedures; Use of an Information System in the 
Interdepartmental Communication; and Application of digital signature and electronic document management. 
We combined our findings from the documents’ analysis with the descriptions of those goals, as set by the division 
managers, and we informed them with the findings from our DPM instrumental and objective analysis, which 
allowed us identify the activities and the resources that are needed for the achievement of each of those four goals. 
In that respect, we found that apart from the “tangible” strategic resources identified by the managers of the case 
hospital (e.g., financial and human resources) as essential in the achievement of each of those four goals, 
Management Capacity - which is an intermediate, administrative product of the hospital, built by the public 
workers - was equally necessary.  
Out of all the unintended negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform documented in the literature, 
we found the following seven negative outcomes to be present at the case hospital: (1) Low Quality and Safety of 
Services perceived by health workers and patients; (2) Low Patient Satisfaction; (3) Informal Payments; (4) High 
Mortality Rates; (5) Numerous Medical Errors; (6) High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections 
Rates; (7) Low adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. Regarding those seven negative 
outcomes, the analysis of the simplified version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Quality which the participant 
stakeholders created during the GMB sessions at the case hospital, showed that:  
(1) Low Quality and Safety are mostly associated with the variables Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & 
Quality of Life and Complications of our model, and can be explained by the dominance of the balancing loops 
B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, and B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, 
both of which cause those two variables to decrease as in the Limits to Success archetype, resulting at less Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher 
Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to lower Survival Rate and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life 
after treatment (Dynamic Hypothesis 1). 
(2) Low Patient Satisfaction can be explained by the dominance of the loops B1 – Word of Mouth & Waiting 
Times, B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, and B4 
- Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, all of which lead to a gradual decrease and 
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stabilisation of Patient Satisfaction and of Hospital Reputation in the long run as in the Limits to Success 
archetype, resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Informal Payments for 
early Surgery/Admission longer Waiting List for Surgery or Admission, longer Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient 
Services and, finally, to lower Survival Rate and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life after treatment. 
(Dynamic Hypothesis 2). 
(3) The existence of Informal Payments can be explained by the Loop R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption, 
which leads to a perpetual increase of private spending and to the outspread of corruption between the case hospital 
doctors, given the good reputation of the case hospital and the long waiting lists that are already in place. This 
phenomenon is sustained by the current policies in place, which favour the creation of long waiting lists. However, 
this phenomenon is also sustained by factors external to the case hospital and to our model, such the relative 
tolerance of the Ministry of Health and of the authorities, and the widespread idea between patients in Greece that 
informal payments are necessary for a timely and proper treatment. (Dynamic Hypothesis 3). 
(4) High Mortality Rates can be explained by the Loops B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, and B4 - Actual 
Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and 
stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols in the long run as in the Limits to Success archetype, resulting at less Proper Communication & 
Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial 
Infections Rate, and, finally, to higher Failure & Mortality Rates. (Dynamic Hypothesis 4). 
(5) Numerous Medical Errors can be explained by the Loop B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, which leads to 
a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run as in the Limits to Success archetype, resulting at higher Difficulty of 
Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs and, finally, 
to more medical, nursing and patients’ Errors (Dynamic Hypothesis 5). 
(6) High Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant bacteria Infections Rates can be explained by the loops R5 – 
Multidrug Resistance in the General Population and B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols, both of which cause Nosocomial Infections to increase in the long run, resulting at more Complications 
and higher Multidrug Resistance in the General Population (Dynamic Hypothesis 6). 
(7) Low Adheremce to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols can be explained by the loop B4 - Actual 
Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at 
a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype, resulting 
at increased Difficulty of Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, low Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard 
Procedures & Digital Forms and, finally, to low Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. 
 In order to test those seven hypotheses, a quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, as 
that would enable us to run simulations and test our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop 
dominance. Such a model is out of the scope and purposes of the present, qualitative study and is not included, 
but is recommended for future research. However, we used the Dynamic Performance Management analysis as 
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an alternative method, in order to:  (1) identify Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and End Results of 
hospital performance and show their role in the hospital performance management and measurement; (2) show 
how the time factor influences the overall hospital performance;  (3)  understand the contribution of each one of 
the four hospital divisions (the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical division) 
on the End Results (i.e., the final hospital services produced); (4) allow the division managers to start concentrating 
on the core intermediate, administrative products that divisions are required to deliver on the process that leads to 
the final end-results; (5) map the ultimate and intermediate services value chain provided to both external and 
internal users of the case hospital; (6) make performance measures (i.e., the drivers and end-results associated 
with the delivery of products) explicit and then link them to the goals and objectives of the division managers of 
the case hospital; (7) discuss the insights that the DPM analysis offers us for a sustainable Performance 
Management in Greek public hospitals in general, and in the case hospital in particular. 
The identification of Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and intermediate End Results, as well as 
the different views that our DPM analysis offered (i.e., instrumental, dynamic, subjective, objective) provided the 
hospital decision-makers with signs of potential future shift in End Results, and can help public hospital managers 
in Greece interpret and calculate the consequences of an incident or the implications of a policy; show possible 
discrepancies on performance; and try to mitigate it. The performance measures we identified could be helpful to 
foresee possible changes in the financial and clinical results of public hospitals in Greece. When framed in a wider 
sense than budgetary control, transaction cost drivers can provide hospital managers and policy makers in Greece 
with valuable information for strategic planning, such as the opportunity to identify trade-offs in space and in time 
(e.g., higher costs for investments and for managerial capacity building in the short-run, versus investments in 
equipment, ICT, and facilities that would increase performance in the long run). Thus, the performance 
management policies adopted at the case hospital during the healthcare reform ( i.e., structure and process reforms 
undertaken) and their overall impact for Greek public hospitals’ outputs and outcomes, can now be examined 
through a different “lenses” by the hospital managers; lenses that will allow them overcome the seven 
counterintuitive, negative outcomes documented, and align the hospital’s and the different division’s and 
departments’ goals and actions to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness, along with better hospital service 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
In chapter 1 we introduce our research study. More specifically, we briefly explain the research context and 
focus; we indicate the research planning, scale and resources; and we provide the PhD thesis outline and a brief 
presentation of all the thesis chapters. 
 
1.1 Research Context 
The importance of Performance Management (PM), the iterative process towards the achievement of the 
institutional goals and the enhancement of the institutional outputs and outcomes, has been well documented in 
the public administration literature during the last few decades as a way to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, 
promote, celebrate, learn, and improve (Behn, 2003, p.586) public services and, ultimately, public value and 
quality of life (Bovaird & Gregory, 1996; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003, 2009; Halachmi & Bouckaert, 1996). 
Acceptance and appreciation of performance measures in the public sector is at large a consequence of the New 
Public Management (NPM) approach that is gradually being adopted from governments and states worldwide 
(Gruening, 2001; Pollitt, 2007), in their attempt to change their bureaucratic models and move towards an 
administrative modernization (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003; 
Elg et al., 2013). During the last two decades, public sector organisations including hospitals and other public 
healthcare providers have begun focusing more on outputs, incentive schemes and productivity rather than 
complying to laws and regulations, and the NPM reforms have provided public managers with the tools to pursue 
efficiency and results (Bianchi, 2013, 2016).  
Research during the last few decades has illustrated the undoubted value of performance management in 
the health care sector. PM is generally believed to positively affect the sustainability and the quality of health 
systems and organisations, as many studies have shown positive correlations between PM, clinical performance 
and financial performance (Al-Habib, 2020; Lega et al., 2013; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD], 2019; Smith et al., 2009; World Health Organisation [WHO], 1986, 1999, 2010a, 2018a). 
In the healthcare sector, however, financial indicators are not enough to describe the overall performance of 
hospitals, because of the many particularities of healthcare which are not found in other sectors of production and 
services (Ravish, 2018; WHO, 2010b). Unlike in other industries, healthcare managers’ goal is threefold: improve 
patient’s health and well-being; maximise patient’s positive experience of treatment; and minimise costs (Song & 
Tucker, 2016).  
The economic recession of the last decade resulted in reforms of the public sector worldwide, with the 
purpose of reducing expenses and improving efficiency of government and public institutions. In the public 
healthcare sector, reforms mainly focused on improving performance in terms of: achieving better financial 
results; setting goals and responsibilities across the hierarchical structure of healthcare organisations; and 
maximising outputs, such as number of patients treated and services provided (Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Noto, 
et al., 2020).  Budgetary Control was one of the first PM tools introduced during those reforms, and is still widely 
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used by many countries including Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Norway 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020). Particularly since the onset of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, 
many governments started to re-centralize powers and implement control mechanisms aimed at identifying 
performance standards and at spending thresholds by introducing cutback management policies, i.e., policies 
which are contributing to a transition towards lower levels of activity and resources usage (Noto et al., 2020).  
However, in many cases such policies resulted in increased workload, with fewer and demotivated staff, 
increasing levels of stress and fatigue, high absenteeism and labour turnover, while the bureaucracy of the audit 
society in which boxes must be ticked to demonstrate compliance with targets is continuing to grow (Arnaboldi 
et al., 2015; Funnell, 2015; Kaupa et al., 2020). Although the scale of public hospitals and primary care entities 
and the complexity of financial management of the public sector leads public service entities to rely their PM 
Systems solely on budgetary control, experience has proven that this strategy is rather narrow-sighted; provides 
rough cost control ignoring all the non-financial aspects of performance; and may contribute to adverse effects 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020). 
  
1.2 Research Focus 
Although there has now been more than 40 years of experience with PM in the public sector, major 
challenges are still present and the expected enhancement in performance, accountability, transparency, service 
quality and value for money have not yet been fully realized (Noto et al., 2020; Fryer et al., 2009). There are 
success stories documented in a unit-level or in a departmental-level, but when looking at the organisation as a 
whole those successes turn into failures (Fryer et al., 2009). A growing part of literature states that - despite their 
compliance with well-established processes of care - traditional performance management policies might not 
affect or even deteriorate hospital performance and quality of healthcare services (De Vos et al., 2009; Nolan & 
Berwick, 2006; Werner & Bradlow, 2006; Werner et al., 2008a, 2008b; Wright & Hershman, 2014).   
A special concern started to be raised by many researchers and leading scholars in the public PM field 
(Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; Bovaird, 2005; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003, 2009; Fryer et al., 2009; Jarrar and 
Schiuma, 2007; Verbeeten, 2008) regarding the trade-off between short term and long-term goals that is apparent 
in all public organisations, but has even more detrimental, life threatening consequences in the healthcare 
institutions (Verbeeten, 2008). Furthermore, a wide range of negative consequences and “pitfalls” arising from 
the implementation of PM techniques have been identified in the public healthcare sector, one of the most 
significant ones being the sub-optimization problem, i.e., concentrating on enhancing one aspect of healthcare 
without taking into consideration the impact on other components of the healthcare system or organisation 
(Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). This problem is particularly relevant for public hospitals, because of the multifaceted 
and complex structure of hospital services, and because outputs and outcomes of hospitals are always a product 
of continuous and strict collaboration between different units, departments and professionals (Vainieri, Noto, et 
al., 2020; Noto et al., 2020).  
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All those findings tell us that traditional PM systems have often failed to enhance the performance of public 
healthcare institutions, but they tell us little about the causes of this failure. Furthermore, despite the extensive 
research identifying the “pitfalls” of the NPM reforms around Europe and the unintended consequences for 
hospital staff and patients, little is known about the mechanisms that caused those negative effects, which 
essentially creates a research gap worth investigating. Thus, the main research question that this research study 
tries to address is “Why do traditional PM Systems in Healthcare not always lead to improved performance?”.  
More recently researchers have started to see those negative outcomes as “system pitfalls”, occurring from 
the non-linear interconnection and the dynamic interaction of the different elements and factors that comprise the 
health system and the healthcare institutions, i.e., their structure, the policies implemented, the behaviour and the 
decisions of people - healthcare workers and patients - inside this system, etc. For example, using a system 
approach to PM, Boland and Fowler (2000) demonstrated that performance measurement can create feedback 
loops that result in a spiralling decrease in performance. Seemingly, Al-Habib (2020) noted that cost cutting 
without taking into account the unintended effects may be dangerous and self-destructive, contributing to 
“spurious savings” and constrained treatment capacity with reduced accessibility. He concluded that future 
research should focus on shedding light to the "black box" of the healthcare process and the value-creation within 
this process, with a special attention on the outcome variables.  
The implementation of a systemic performance assessment methodology in Healthcare is sponsored by 
many recent scholarly contributions in the field (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Costanza et al.,  2014; Bivona, 2010, 
2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Herrera-Daza, 2009; Bivona & Noto, 2020; Davahli et al., 2020; 
Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer et al., 2009; Helal, 2016; Renmans et al., 2017; Mwita, 2000; Noto et al., 
2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). Adopting a systemic perspective 
means taking as a unit of analysis the organisation as a whole, and not one unit or department; acknowledging its 
internal and external environment and culture in which health care is performed; and considering the 
interconnected and the concurrent existence of the pitfalls documented as inherent to the structure of the system 
and the policies implemented. Studies using such a methodology would be necessary in order to address the gap 
in existing knowledge regarding the causing mechanisms of the negative consequences of the healthcare reforms, 
which is necessary for policy-makers to design better, more quality-oriented healthcare policies, interventions and 
reforms in the future.  
This case-based research project addresses this gap by shedding light on how hospital performance is 
perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and on what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour). 
This research study will attempt to address the above-mentioned research question by conducting empirical 
research using a case-study and adopting a systemic perspective. More specifically, it will try to answer why do 
traditional PM Systems in healthcare not always lead to improved performance by outlining the unintended 
consequences of the Greek Healthcare Reform in a public Hospital. Following a systemic approach, the selected 
case study - which is a real hospital in the Greek Healthcare system - will allow us to investigate and test the above 
research question. In doing so, we framed our analysis using the Dynamic Performance Management methodology 
22 
 
(Bianchi, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2016; Bianchi et al., 1998; Bivona, 2015; Bivona & Montemaggiore, 2010; Cosenz 
& Noto, 2016). 
The purpose of this study is to empirically conceptualise a qualitative model of hospital performance as 
perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and use the DPM analysis in order to help policymakers in 
Greece re-design performance management policies and foster hospital performance. Thus, this research 
attempted to address the following research questions: 
1. How do stakeholders define hospital performance? 
2. What are the main feedback loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders? 
3. How can those feedback loops explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform? 
4. What are the main strategic resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main 
performance drivers that are impacting intermediate products and end results?  
5. What are the practical implications of the study for policy design in Greek public hospitals? 
 
1.3 Research Planning, Scale & Resources  
This research project, as any research project, consumes resources for its implementation, particularly: time, 
budget, people involved (researchers) and their skills. For this section, we followed the categorisation of 
Denscombe (2012, pp.109-130).  
As this research is carried out as part of a PhD dissertation, the only researcher involved in the actual 
implementation of the research, the data collection and analysis and in the writing-up of the thesis was the PhD 
candidate. Advice and direction were provided by her supervisors, Prof. Enzo Bivona (University of Palermo) and 
Prof Etienne Rouwette (Radboud University of Nijmegen). The researcher’s salary throughout the three years of 
her PhD was fixed, as a scholarship provided by the University of Palermo. All arrangements for her long stays 
abroad, and all the costs for accommodation and meals were covered by the researcher herself.  
Researcher’s skills are a vital resource when it comes to research, just like time and money is. Such 
necessary skills might include qualifications and professional skills which would help at gaining access to 
particular settings and people and at having the kind of insight about the situation that is crucial for the success of 
the research project (Denscombe, 2012, p.118). One major thing to consider is the relevance of the researchers’ 
background in respect to the research objectives and setting. In the present study, the case of a Greek public 
hospital was chosen for conducting the research, and Performance Management is central to the research purposes. 
This is all very relevant to the researcher’s background and knowledge, as the researcher and PhD candidate, Miss 
Angeliki Lenakaki, has specific education in management (Degree in business administration) and in hospitals 
management (Master’s Degree in Health Services Management) and has worked for two full years as a Director 
of a Greek public hospital. Thus, she is very familiar with the theory but also with the practical aspects, the deficits, 
the procedures and the laws that apply to the Greek national health system and the Greek public hospitals. Her 
network and status as a former hospital director also helped her at gaining access and trust by the hospital board 
who authorised her to conduct her research in the case hospital. Furthermore, during the first two years of her PhD 
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studies she had intense coursework for two full semesters in the University of Palermo on Public Management 
and Performance Management systems in the public sector. 
Another major factor to consider would be the capabilities and skills of the researcher to conduct qualitative 
research in general, and System Dynamics research, in particular. During her two Master Degrees, the researcher 
conducted two different qualitative research studies for her two Masters’ Theses, and had substantial lessons in 
qualitative and quantitative research methods as well. Furthermore, during the first two years of her PhD, the 
researcher focused on learning the System Dynamics methodology and the Group Model Building technique by 
taking part into intense coursework abroad, in two acknowledged European Universities where those 
methodologies are taught. More specifically, she spent one full semester in the University of Bergen (Norway), 
learning the System Dynamics methodology through intense coursework, and two full semesters in the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands), learning the Group Model Building (GMB) technique through intense 
coursework and participation in the facilitation of a number of GMB projects of the Radboud Management School. 
This led to a mastery of the methods and procedures she would have to use during the data collection (Group 
Model Building sessions) and data analysis (System Dynamics Modeling) of this research. 
The time span of the research was exactly three years, equal to the duration of the PhD Program in System 
Dynamics of the University of Palermo, starting 1st November 2017 and finishing 31st October 2020. Because of 
the coronavirus epidemic, the deadline for the submission of the thesis was extended to 31 March 2020. The final 
draft of the PhD thesis had to be submitted on 18th April 2021, in order to be corrected and properly defended 
within the new time horizon.  
Because of the special nature of this PhD course, which entails intense coursework during the first two full 
years on the System Dynamics and the Group Model Building Methodology, time allocated to the research project 
itself was not always the same. More specifically, during the first year an average of eight hours a week was spent 
on the research, rising to an average of 16 hours a week in the second year and finally to a minimum of 40 hours 
a week during the third and fourth year. This is because during the first two full years of her PhD the researcher 
had to travel every five to six months and follow intense coursework in the University of Palermo, in the University 
of Bergen (Norway) and in the Radboud University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands); thus, she had limited time to 
devote to research. The researcher focused on learning the methodology during those first two years by taking part 
into intense courses abroad in three different countries where the methodology is taught. Thus, the time devoted 
to the actual research had to be combined with the time devoted to lessons and to administrative procedures, 
practical arrangements and preparations for her stays abroad. Although time consuming, this led to a mastery of 
the methods and procedures she would have to use during the data collection and data analysis, thus no time was 
spent on those issues during the third year. Furthermore, it also led to a better time management during the last 
year that the actual research was implemented, as she knew better how much time she would have to devote on 
data collection and analysis, and to each stage of her research.  
The time plan had to be carefully thought in advance, and iteratively revised every two months 
approximately. This is because of unexpected events (i.e., due to the coronavirus emergency) or delays that 
occurred related to administrative restrictions and research authorisation procedures, and because time devoted to 
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research had to be combined with time devoted to courses and to administrative procedures, practical arrangements 
and preparations for the stays abroad. Literature was constantly reviewed, and the research proposal was constantly 
informed by the new knowledge acquired in each stage, and finalised in the beginning of the third year. The scale 
of the research project is depicted on the Figure below. The main and secondary activities undertaken in each 
stage of the research are presented on the Figure below, and are also analytically described in Appendix 25. 
 
Figure 1. The Scale of the Research Project 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline  
Chapter 1 provides the research context and the research focus of this PhD research study; presents the 
research planning, scale & resources and the thesis outline.  
In chapter 2 we provide the literature review of the research study, and we present the research gap, the 
research questions, aim and contributions. More specifically, in the section 2.1 we introduce Performance 
Management (PM) in the Public Sector and we present some common definitions. Then we discuss the New Public 
Management move and we analyse the New Public Management Reforms of the public sector that took place 
during the last forty years. Finally, we present the most recent trends in PM in the public sector, and among them 
we highlight PM through the lens of the Systems Theory. In section 2.2 we present PM Systems in the public 
sector and, specifically, in the public healthcare sector. First, we present the main concepts and definitions related 
to PM Systems in public healthcare institutions and then we discuss how PM Systems are related to clinical 
outcomes and quality of care; we present the most advanced PM Systems and Performance Indicators used in 
public healthcare institutions nowadays; and we analyse the healthcare reforms undertaken by some countries for 
the adoption of PM Systems in the healthcare sector. Finally, in section 2.3 we present some international evidence 
on the unintended consequences of such reforms and PM systems in healthcare, and then we move on to present 
and explain the research gap, the research questions, aim and contributions. 
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In chapter 3 we introduce the research methodology and approach followed. More specifically, we present 
the philosophical stance of the study, the methodological approach (i.e., the Dynamic Performance Management 
approach) and the research strategy undertaken, and we briefly discuss the five research traditions identified in 
our study and their key features. Finally, we explain how we combined those traditions to facilitate our research 
purpose and how we integrated them in our research design, and we outline the most important methodological 
choices undertaken.  
In chapter 4 we analytically present and describe the methods used to conduct our research. More 
specifically, we describe the data sources (i.e., literature, documents, participants); the data collection methods 
(i.e., documents collection, preliminary interviews, planning of GMB sessions, disconfirmatory interviews) and 
the material prepared and used for the data collection;  the procedure of the whole research project in general and 
of the GMB sessions in particular; the procedures undertaken regarding gaining access to the case hospital; as 
well as the methods used for the data analysis. 
In chapter 5 we discuss the main reasons for choosing our research approach, methodologies and methods, 
and for the methodological decisions in conducting our research study and in combining those methodologies to 
facilitate our research purposes. More specifically, we discuss the suitability of the methodological approach and 
research strategy to the research purpose; the feasibility of the chosen methods and their implementation; some 
ethical considerations; the rigour of the study; and finally, some limitations of the study stemming from the 
research methodology chosen. 
In chapter 6 we introduce our case study and we present the Greek Healthcare Reform and its negative 
consequences on hospital’s performance and, more specifically, on our case hospital’s performance. As the focus 
of this research study is to contribute to identifying pitfalls and unintended consequences following the decision 
to adopt a PM System in healthcare organisations, we reviewed the Greek Healthcare Reform that has been 
recently implemented in public hospitals to improve performance of the Greek public healthcare sector. Therefore, 
we investigated the main pillars of the Greek Healthcare Reform and outlined the main unintended consequences 
reported by scholars. This chapter outlines the negative consequences of the Greek healthcare reform in Greek 
public hospitals in general and shows the limits of traditional PM at the case hospital in particular, while it also 
demonstrates the need for a dynamic performance management in the public healthcare sector. Thus, this chapter 
sets the grounding for the analysis and findings that will follow in the next chapters. 
Chapter 7 corresponds to the first research question of our study, namely: How do stakeholders define 
hospital performance. To answer this question, we conducted the GMB sessions in the case hospital, first in order 
to help hospital stakeholders gain a better understanding of the low hospital performance of the hospital in a more 
systematic way, and second to help them collectively - through structured activities and facilitated discussions - 
define it; show its trend (dynamic behaviour) in the hospital during the last decade in a diagram (Reference Mode); 
and conceptualise it as a system, depicted as a qualitative system dynamics model of hospital performance (CLD 
- Causal Loop Diagram) perceived by hospital stakeholders during GMB sessions. The two final versions of this 
CLD Model, i.e., the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (analytically discussed in chapters 8 and 9) and 
the Policy Model of Hospital Performance (analytically discussed in chapter 11) are available in Appendixes 21 
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and 22 respectively, and thoroughly described in terms of variables and links in Appendix 24. Those two models 
constitute the main outputs of the GMB sessions and will form the basis of our research analysis and findings, 
presented in the following chapters of this thesis. The Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (which is 
analytically discussed in chapters 8 and 9) is a CLD model that depicts the actual structure of the system at hand 
and can be used to explain the current low hospital performance, while the Policy Model of Hospital Performance 
(which is analytically discussed in chapter 11) is  a CLD model that depicts not only the actual structure of the 
system at hand, but also the changes in the system structure which are necessary, according to our participant 
stakeholders, in order for performance to improve.  
Chapter 8 corresponds to the second research question of our study, namely: What are the main feedback 
loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders. In order to answer this question, in chapter 8 
we analyse the structure of a simplified version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance that the GMB 
participant stakeholders created, in terms of model loops. As the original model that our participants created 
(available in Appendix 21) contains a significant number of loops, and it is impossible to explicitly present and 
discuss all of them, the researcher created a simplified version by erasing some of the variables and causal links, 
in order to make it possible to identify and analyse the most basic feedback loops of the model. In section 8.1 we 
present this Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, we explain how we created it, and then we go 
on to present and explain the reinforcing and the balancing feedback loops identified in this Simplified Conceptual 
Model in the next two sections. The reader of this chapter should have in mind the Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance (available in Appendix 21) and turn to the models’ documentation (available in Appendix 24) every 
time that something is not clear. In Appendix 24, all the model variables and causal links of all the CLD models 
we created (Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, 
Policy Model of Hospital Performance) are analytically presented, explained and discussed. 
Chapter 9 corresponds to the third research question of our study, namely: How can those feedback loops 
explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform. In order to answer this question, in 
chapter 9 we tried to explain each one of the seven main negative outcomes of the reform identified in the case 
hospital which we identified through the preliminary interviews and documents analysis in chapter 7 (i.e., Health 
Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low Safety; Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments; High Mortality 
Rates; Numerous Medical Errors; High Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant bacteria Infections Rates; Lack of 
Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols) with one Dynamic Hypothesis which we formed based on the model 
loops we identified in chapter 8 (available in the sections 8.2 and 8.3), and we show how each of the seven 
counterintuitive negative outcomes documented can be explained by those hypotheses. 
Chapter 10 corresponds to the fourth research question of our study, namely: What are the main strategic 
resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main performance drivers that are 
impacting intermediate products and end results. In order to answer this question, in chapter 10 we performed the 
DPM analysis to identify those resources, drivers and indicators and show their role in the hospital performance 
management and measurement. More specifically, in the section 10.1 we used the DPM instrumental view to 
identify Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and End Results of hospital performance. Then we moved on 
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to operationalise the instrumental view from Static to Dynamic in the section 10.2, as the “time” factor is important 
for our analysis, and is not easy to grasp by the static instrumental DPM view. In the section 10.3 we cascade the 
DPM instrumental view from the hospital level to a divisional level, in order to understand the contribution of 
each one of the four hospital divisions of the case hospital which we mentioned in chapter  6.2 (the Medical, the 
Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical division) on the End Results (i.e., the final hospital 
services produced) and allow the division managers to start concentrating on the core intermediate, administrative 
products that divisions are required to deliver on the process that leads to the final end-results. This assessment 
provides the ground for the objective view of DPM, which is analysed in the section 10.4, used to map the ultimate 
and intermediate services value chain provided to both external and internal users of the case hospital. In the 
section 10.5 we present the subjective DPM view, which is a synthesis of the instrumental and the objective view, 
and requires that performance measures (i.e., the drivers and end-results associated with the delivery of products) 
are made explicit, and are then linked to the goals and objectives of decision-makers of the case hospital, which 
we identified in chapter 6, section 6.2.1, through our documents analysis.  
Chapter 11 corresponds to the fifth research question of our study, namely: What are the practical 
implications of the study for policy design in Greek public hospitals. In order to answer this question, in chapter 
11 we summarise and discuss - using the existing literature - our findings and insights that the CLD models and 
the DPM analysis provided us with, for the sustainable improvement of the performance of the case hospital and 
of other public hospitals in Greece. Furthermore, we use our findings to give practical recommendations to policy 
makers. 
Finally, in chapter 12 a number of recommendations for future research are identified, along with a number 
of limitations. In addition to the limitations related to the research methodology and design, described in chapter 
5.5, this chapter discusses the limitations stemming from the scope of the present research and the model boundary, 




CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In chapter 2 we provide the literature review of the research study, and we present the research gap, the 
research questions, aim and contributions. More specifically, in the section 2.1 we introduce Performance 
Management (PM) in the Public Sector and we present some common definitions. Then we discuss the New Public 
Management move and we analyse the New Public Management Reforms of the public sector that took place 
during the last forty years. Finally, we present the most recent trends in PM in the public sector, and among them 
we highlight PM through the lens of the Systems Theory. In section 2.2 we present PM Systems in the public 
sector and, specifically, in the public healthcare sector. First, we present the main concepts and definitions related 
to PM Systems in public healthcare institutions and then we discuss how PM Systems are related to clinical 
outcomes and quality of care; we present the most advanced PM Systems and Performance Indicators used in 
public healthcare institutions nowadays; and we analyse the healthcare reforms undertaken by some countries for 
the adoption of PM Systems in the Healthcare Sector. Finally, in section 2.3 we present some international 
evidence on the unintended consequences of such reforms and PM systems in healthcare, and then we move on to 
present and explain the research gap, the research questions, aim and contributions. 
 
2.1 Introduction to Performance Management in the Public Sector 
The importance of Performance Management (PM), the iterative process towards the achievement of the 
institutional goals and the enhancement of the institutional outputs and outcomes, has been well documented in 
the public administration literature during the last few decades as a way to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, 
promote, celebrate, learn, and improve (Behn, 2003, p.586) public services and, ultimately, public value and 
quality of life (Bovaird & Gregory, 1996; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003, 2009; Halachmi & Bouckaert, 1996).  
The term PM System is a recent concept that emerges from previous studies on Management Control 
Systems (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018), where by management control researchers of the time referred to a 
pragmatic concern for results, obtained through people (Hofstede, 1980). Management control, in that sense, is 
the mechanism through which managers make sure that resources are being utilised efficiently and effectively by 
people in the organisation, towards the direction of the organisational targets. Control is considered essential 
because individuals are considered bounded by personal limitations, perceptual and cognitive biases and thus they 
do not always do what should be done, or what would be best for the organisation by themselves (Hofstede, 1980). 
Management and control is essential to make sure that people are doing well, as people might lack understanding, 
capability, education or important information which does not allow them to perform efficiently; and even if they 
do not lack any of that, they might still be unwilling to do the task assigned to them properly because of hidden 
agendas and personal goals that are not in line with the organisational ones (Merchant, 1982). Control in this sense 
is considered essential for the proper accomplishment of the organisational goals, but there are different kinds of 
control among which a manager can choose. In order for managers to decide upon the right method of control 
(i.e., routine control, expert control, judgemental control, trial-and-error control, intuitive control) for a given 
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activity in the organisation, four factors were considered critical: the ambiguity of the organisational objectives; 
the ability of measuring the outputs; the clarity of the effects of management interventions; and whether the 
activity is being repeated or not (Hofstede, 1980).  
Later on, when computers and electronic databases started to be present in public sector organisations, 
control systems started to focus on the feedback mechanisms structured to maintain a predictable purpose 
efficiency, according to the regulations of the regional management authorities (Simons, 2007). The term Control 
Systems became a synonym of the information systems used by the public administrators to track and adjust the 
deviations of the corporate performance from the pre-set efficiency criteria (Simons, 2007). Control Systems, in 
that sense, were essential because of the complexity of processes in the organisations which obliged employees to 
take a sheer number of decisions by themselves. Senior management needed control systems to track down those 
decisions and make sure that they are consistent with the organizational goals (Simons, 2007).  
Despite the different terms used throughout the years, and despite the different focus that the research in 
the field undertook, PM studies in the public sector has always been about the continuous strive towards 
enhancement, while respecting the different values, regulations and the specific complexity of the public sector 
organizations (Bianchi, 2013). 
 
2.1.1 Definition of Performance Management   
PM has been gaining prominence since the 1980s, and during those years it has been defined in many 
different ways in the literature. Thus, the definition of PM is not based on a particular factor or a short-term 
objective; it is a normal and ongoing process where frequent evaluation is carried out to ensure that sufficient 
intervention or adjustment is taken where applicable (Lee, 2019). For instance, DeNisi and Pritchard (2006) 
describe PM as “a broad set of activities aimed at improving the performance of employees", while Vignieri 
(2018) defines it as “a management style aimed at setting goals and ensuring that such targets are achieved 
through a planning and control cycle, embodying a set of activities, tools, and mechanisms intended to measure 
and evaluate results to continuously improve performance”. 
 International literature on PM appears to be generally twofold and concentrate either on operational control 
or on defining core facets of PM, such as evaluation, incentives, training and growth (Kloot & Martin, 2000; Stiles 
et al., 2015). As a consequence, PM definitions are also divided into two separate groups, the first one used mostly 
by scholars and the second one used mostly by professionals. Academics tend to define PM as a procedure, 
whereas practitioners tend to define it as a toolbox of practices aimed at enhancing employee productivity 
(Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019). The academic concept of PM as a process could be generalized as the use of 
performance assessment to cause meaningful improvements in the organisational culture, structure and procedures 
by setting goals, assigning and distributing resources, advising managers to either affirm or adjust existing policies 
or program guidance to reach the goals, and sharing achieved results with stakeholders (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 
2020). 
Scholars and professionals have come up with a broad number of PM frameworks throughout the years 
which, again, could be divided into two basic categories:  3Es and IOO frameworks (Boyne, 2002).  3Es refer to 
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models and frameworks that have economy, efficiency and effectiveness in their core, while IOO refers to the 
ones that focus more on input, output and outcomes (Bianchi, 2013, 2016). Seemingly, performance in public 
organisations has been broadly associated with productivity, on the one hand, and with public value on the other. 
Despite the different definitions and frameworks, we could say that PM simply is important in organisations 
because “you can’t manage what you don’t measure”1. Thus, PM has its roots in Performance Measurement (i.e., 
collecting and comparing data regarding various aspects of an organization’s performance) and, in that sense, 
Performance Measures are the metrics based on which data is collected, whereas Performance Indicators are the 
benchmarks used to assess performance (Behn, 2003).  
 
2.1.2 New Public Management & PM Public Reforms  
Acceptance and appreciation of performance measures in the public sector is at large a consequence of the 
New Public Management (NPM) approach that is gradually being adopted by governments and states worldwide 
(Gruening, 2001; Pollitt, 2007). NPM considers users of public services as “clients” and public organisations as 
“businesses”, whereas the key assumption is that effectiveness and efficiency can both be achieved in the public 
sector by borrowing management techniques and processes from the private sector (Osborne, 2006; Bovaird et al., 
2015). The basic premise underpinning the NPM trend is that private sector companies appear to be more agile 
and effective than the public sector ones, and this is what marked the transition from the conventional to the 
modern public administration starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Gruening, 2001).  This momentum contributed to the New Public Governance, after the governments 
of New Zealand and Australia entered the NPM movement and institutional changes on the agendas of most OECD 
countries followed (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  NPM Reforms focused on the adoption of private sector 
management policies and strategies in order to increase productivity and efficiency and reduce costs, while also 
they became the threshold for starting rewarding employee performance rather than seniority, which had 
historically been the basis for promotion and compensation of public workers (Lee, 2019).  
NPM can be broadly described as a set of management practices and tools which focus on efficiency and 
productivity (Pollitt, 2007). Subsequently, performance is a vital aspect of the NPM and PM Systems essentially 
became one of the distinguishing features of the NPM reforms worldwide (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). During the 
last two decades, more and more public sector organisations have started focusing on taking note of management 
techniques and processes from the business sector. The claim “do more for less” has inspired NPM Reforms in 
public organisations around Europe and the world, leading the public sector to use practices and efficiency metrics 
of the private sector (Bianchi, 2013). Western policymakers have begun focusing more on outputs, incentive 
schemes and productivity rather than complying to laws and regulations and the NPM reforms have provided 
public managers with the tools to pursue efficiency and results (Bianchi, 2013, 2016).  
The motives for the emergence of the NPM, the related reform initiatives and the degree to which they are 
successfully applied internationally has been widely researched, along with the effect of the 2008 global financial 
 
1 A quote attributed to Peter Drucker, arguably the world’s most famous management consultant of all times. 
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crisis on the roadmap for public policy change (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) are 
heading to the core of the matter as they say it's no longer feasible for governments to retain, for a very long time, 
the amount of public funding that financial investors and global markets perceive as “imprudent”, and the 
willingness of national governments to tax is no longer as flexible as it once used to be. Nowadays, there is 
definitely a quest for more productivity in government operations, which explains the fact that the majority of 
public sector reforms have been a top-down rather than a bottom-up process. Policymakers have shifted - at least 
in part - from influencing public policy to inspiring managerial change and interventions. The same can be said 
for the position of the media and the effect that they have had, and still have, on the restructuring of public 
administration. The relationship between citizens and civil servants has also changed, as the pressure for 
accountability and transparency of public operations has grown, partly as a consequence of the increase in social 
networking (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). 
Several researchers have documented that PM programs that employ "best practice” techniques have a 
positive effect on the performance of public sector organizations, while also it has been noted that public sector 
agencies should use PM to show productivity and efficacy in their operations; increase results; and allow 
management to make choices, because PM acts as a preparation, collection and management mechanism to assist 
the agency in recognizing best practices and innovative concepts (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Naturally, the idea 
of PM in the public sector and of PM tools such as the famous Balanced Scorecards  (Bianchi & Montemaggiore, 
2008; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005; Koumpouros, 2013) became central to the NPM 
approach and PM essentially became the first major step that governments and states should undertake in their 
attempt to change their bureaucratic models and move towards an Administrative Modernization (Bouckaert & 
Halligan, 2007; Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003; Elg et al., 2013).  
However, there is no universal recipe for successful public management reforms and none of the NPM 
practices can be considered universal. Multiple control variables have been explored for their effect to performance 
and their relevance to the effectiveness of modern public management practices - such as, for example, fiscal 
arrangements and their effect on the quality of public services (Cheng et al., 2020) - but when inappropriately 
applied or incompetently implemented, they can lead to significant disadvantages (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Bivona, 
2010, 2015; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer et al., 2009; Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; 
Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Thus, the kind of measures that the corporate world uses to evaluate successful 
businesses cannot be considered ideal for the public sector, not to mention that for-profit organisations 
fundamentally have different purposes than the non- profit and public ones, and “different purposes require 
different measures” (Behn, 2003, p.587).  
 
2.1.3 Recent Trends in Performance Management in the Public Sector 
Performance management is still today highly relevant in the public sector, in periods of increasing demand 
and diminishing funding for public institutions. Nowadays, more and more focus is being given to the reliability 
of performance management systems themselves; to the management styles used in the public administration, 
including modern public governance and neo-weberian techniques; to the various success concepts;  to the output 
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assessment methods, using priority measurement, creation of metrics, data processing, review and reporting; as 
well as to the “perverse effects” of the usage of performance metrics (Van Dooren et al., 2015). 
Behn (2003) identified eight fundamental reasons why public organisations should measure their 
performance: to evaluate how the public organisation performs in relation to other similar entities; to control if 
public workers are doing their job properly; to ensure efficient budgeting, in the sense that  public money is spent 
well; to motivate the various stakeholders, the workers, the managers and the public in order to act to the advantage 
of the public organisation; to promote accountability of the organisation to decision makers, stakeholders, the 
press and the citizens; to celebrate critical milestones successfully accomplished; to learn from experience and 
decide which methods best suit the organisation and lead to better outputs; and to improve processes and results 
by looking at the past mistakes and doing things differently onwards. In several respects, public administrators are 
much more agile when choosing performance metrics than their private-sector counterparts, because in public 
organisations there are no universal metrics (Behn, 2003). Unlike private-sector managers, who have to comply 
with performance measures such as Return on Equity and Growth in Market Share, public officials are the ones 
who have both the potential and the obligation to choose the targets, the metrics and the performance standards. 
Furthermore, public managers should take into consideration the political complexities of measuring performance, 
as the political appointees, elected officials, senators, budget authorities, the various other stakeholders, partners, 
citizens and the media might have a word on that and, to some extent, they can “pre-set” performance indicators 
and impose them to the public officials (Behn, 2003).  
 In spite of the ongoing academic debate of whether transferring practices from the private to the public 
sector is right or not, research has shown that there are indeed core differences between public and private 
institutions, and those differences should be taken into consideration when designing policies and reforms to 
improve efficiency of public administration.  For example, public agencies tend to be more hierarchical than 
private ones, and public administrators are shown to be less “materialistic” and less organisationally engaged 
than their peers in the private sector (Boyne, 2002). According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) it is not feasible to 
review public administration reforms without taking into consideration the political-administrative and 
bureaucratic nature of a nation’s arrangements. This is because national particularities and cultural differences 
affect the choice and execution of governance reforms and, thus, the challenge of what to measure and how still 
remains (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Seemingly, O'Toole and Meier (2014) indicated that the context (i.e., 
situational opportunities and constraints that influence the occurrence and the sense of organizational behaviour, 
processes, functions and relationships) is a significant aspect that impacts the public sector performance because 
it mediates the interaction between management and efficiency.  
Context greatly affects the operational activities of HR, contributing to inconsistent execution of tasks, low 
quality of services provided or even low performance (O'Toole & Meier, 2014). The public sector is fundamentally 
dynamic and, at any given moment, the national and political environment affects management, in the sense that 
management decisions are dependent on political and social demands imposed on them (Lee, 2019). This can 
trigger contradictions between objectivity and what is believed to be the “standard”, which may be arbitrary. Thus, 
contextual considerations cannot be ignored, as strategic decisions and procedures in the public sector can be 
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heavily impacted (O'Toole & Meier, 2014). Among external environmental factors, the patronage of government 
leaders and the power of the public and the media are found to have a beneficial effect on the performance of the 
public organisations (Moynihan & Pandey, 2004; Peters & Bianchi, 2020). Furthermore, among internal 
management decisions, the capacity to build a “developmental” workplace culture; to concentrate on outcomes 
by objectives’ transparency; and to decentralize decision-making authority are all found to be positively related to 
public organizations’ performance (Moynihan & Pandey, 2004).  
 Literature has demonstrated that organisations with specific goals, targets and priorities are doing better 
and, as goal-setting in the public sector is much vaguer than in the private sector (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005), 
this relative uncertainty hinders performance. Setting specific targets and making expectations explicit is required 
by public sector managers to help workers properly grasp what needs to be done and contribute to better results 
(Lee, 2019). Supportive corporate environments, combined with specific priorities and missions, are crucial for 
inspiring workers to succeed and this is where management plays an essential role in determining the culture of 
the company (Moynihan & Pandey, 2004; Peters & Bianchi, 2020). Adherence to organizational requirements and 
reporting is essential in the public sector to maintain oversight and accountability, with national and other 
regulations permeating the biggest part of the public agencies' processes (Kalgin et al., 2018).  
Finally, the usage of an Outcome-Based Approach of PM (Bianchi, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2017; Bianchi & 
Montemaggiore, 2008; Bianchi & Peters, 2016; Bivona et al., 2019; Borgonovi et al., 2018) is recently highlighted 
to frame and determine the desirable results of the policies implemented, so as to enable policymakers not just to 
recognize short-term but also long-term effects. Outputs could be defined as the short-term end-results or products 
of a given policy, reform or intervention (e.g., number of patients admitted and treated, number of crimes solved, 
number of students graduated), whereas Outcomes refer to some long-term end-results which, unlike outputs, are 
hard - if not impossible - to be measured and directly documented (e.g., reputation, quality of hospital services, 
appropriateness of diagnosis and treatment,  quality of education or level of knowledge of the students graduated) 
(Boland & Fowler, 2000; Sloper et al., 1999). Thus, public agencies should better develop Outcome Indicators 
and use them for their performance control processes (Bianchi, 2012, 2015, 2016; Bivona, 2015; Bivona, & 
Cosenz, 2017a; Linard et al., 2002).  
According to this stream of research around outcome-based PM, public performance should be viewed not 
only from the standpoint of a particular unit or agency, but also from an inter-institutional standpoint (Bianchi, 
2010, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2017). This decisively helps public organisations and decision makers deal with wicked 
issues, as much of the government planning nowadays all over the world is concerning wicked social problems: 
problems underlying elevated risk and ambiguity, and a high degree of interdependence between the factors that 
influence them, including multi-level, multi-actor and multi-sectoral problems (Borgonovi et al., 2018).  Such 
problems cannot be grouped within the boundaries of a particular agency or be assigned to separate layers of 
government or ministries, but they should rather be dynamically defined (Borgonovi et al., 2018). In fact, unlike 
traditional PM approaches, outcome-based PM in the public sector uses Systems Theory to grasp performance 





2.1.4 Performance Management in the Public Sector through the Lens of the Systems Theory 
Regardless of the lack of a clear connection with systems theory, public governance has long been inspired 
and influenced by it, as public organizations function under both external and internal limitations and there are 
numerous social structures even within the internal environment of a public agency that can be seen as systems 
and subsystems. Context is an essential aspect of systems, in which the interdependence between the internal and 
external environment of a public organisation influences how it functions, due to the differing flows of individuals, 
services and knowledge (Forrester, 1958, 1961, 1992; Scott et al., 2016). The simplicity or sophistication of a 
system depends on the number of components it encloses and the relationships between them (Jackson, 2000). 
The organisation and the external world have a fragile relationship and one should also account for the 
unpredictable and indefinite relationship of untransparent systems (Bedeian, 1990; Thompson & McHugh, 1995). 
In open systems, organisations are continuously trying to maintain a reasonably secure compromise and the sense 
in which they function affects what their steady state is, which compares with the supposed definite equilibrium 
in closed systems (Koehler, 1981). 
The performance of a public entity responds to feedback from internal and external contexts and this 
feedback is also an important part of the philosophy of systems (Lane et al., 2010; Senge, 1989). Feedback acts as 
a reciprocal flow of impact in a system and - since nothing is ever affected in only one way in systems (Richardson, 
2009) - feedback can be seen as both the cause and the effect of a change. A Feedback Loop in a system arises 
when a shift of a variable causes a circular shift in other variables and eventually feeds back to trigger further 
change in the initial variable (Forrester, 1961; Richardson & Pugh, 1981). Feedback loops are characterised as 
positive or reinforcing and as negative or balancing, although positive feedback is not always “good” and negative 
feedback is not always “bad” for the organisation’s performance (Senge, 1990; Senge & Forrester, 1980). 
According to Jackson and Schuler (1995) a public entity itself is a system that relies on the society for inputs 
(e.g. labour, raw resources, etc.), and then creates products (e.g. commodities, services) that are traded or 
circulated back to the society through the community and the community systems in place. Thus, environmental 
adjustments can contribute to subsequent operational changes and vice versa, although it would be wrong to claim 
that systems make only optimal decisions (Lee, 2019). In the real world, organizational adjustments rely on the 
policies and systems that are in place to address environmental changes; to incorporate them into their policies 
and reforms; and to foster organizational change, accountability and performance (Bianchi, 2010; Bianchi et al., 
2010). Thus, system theorists take the view that organizations should not seek for the “best” or “optimal” solution, 
but should instead be ready to adjust enough to a “good enough” solution to achieve their purposes (Bianchi et al., 
2010). In other words, we would say that there are no optimal solutions to wicked problems but only good enough 
ones, and the choice among different policies and reforms should be based on the deep understanding of the short-
and as well as the long-term implications of the intended policies and, thus, on the performance of outcomes, 
rather than on the performance of outputs (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2012, 2014; Bivona & Montemaggiore, 2010). 
Outcome-based PM in the public sector differs from traditional PM approaches as it uses systems theory to 
grasp the performance dynamics and their long-term effects on outcomes (Bianchi & Montemaggiore, 2008; 
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Bianchi & Peters, 2016). Using this methodology, public organisations can substantially improve in their: local 
strategic planning; democratic policy and inter-institutional cooperation; monitoring of problems and of negative 
counterintuitive consequences from various public sector domains; approaches and tools that decision-makers use 
in tackling the complexities of performance-based governance in the public sector (Bianchi & Tomaselli, 2015; 
Borgonovi et al., 2018). Over the past decade, a variety of nations have begun to implement more systemic and 
outcome-based interventions for PM in the public sector, in order to strengthen cohesion and cope successfully 
with wicked issues (Bivona, 2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Herrera-Daza, 2008, 2009; 
Borgonovi et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2020).  
 
2.2 Performance Management Systems in the Public Healthcare Sector 
Despite the rapid progress of social and economic sciences in recent decades, the global economy continues 
to suffer the costs of recessions, unemployment, inadequate regulation of the financial markets and 
mismanagement of firms, public institutions or even entire sectors. States and countries worldwide recognise the 
need for monitoring, measuring and evaluating the results of public institutions to help them make better decisions 
on the allocation of the scarce public resources, and to continuously improve their services to citizens. In the sector 
of public health - where the economic decisions of today affect not only the country's prosperity of tomorrow, but 
also the citizens’ well-being, quality of life and even survival - this need becomes even more crucial.  
Public healthcare systems nowadays are struggling with sustainability (i.e., maintaining quality and 
coverage of the population at an affordable cost) because costs have been rising due to the aging population and 
the rapid technological progress, which calls for a continuous renewal of the biomedical and technical equipment 
of healthcare organisations in order to meet the increasing patients’ needs (Lega et al., 2013). Particularly after 
the financial crisis of the last decade, maintaining the financing thresholds appropriate to the technology 
innovation curve, the demographic-epidemiological curve and the citizens’ expectations became a challenge for 
all healthcare systems around the globe (Lega et al., 2013). Societies nowadays push healthcare providers to reduce 
prices; politicians demand wider access and improved quality of services; and the NPM view of the patient as 
“customer” calls for greater responsiveness and efficiency of health services, more modern facilities and more 
efficient management of patient flows (Lega et al., 2013). Thus, unlike in other industries, healthcare managers’ 
goal is threefold: improve patient’s health and well-being; maximise patient’s positive experience of treatment; 
and minimise costs (Song & Tucker, 2016). 
 
2.2.1 Concepts and Definitions related to PM Systems in Public Healthcare Institutions 
Hospital performance can be described on the basis of the achievement of a set of goals, either clinical or 
managerial. The end result of hospital performance is, of course, treating patients and ensuring health and quality 
of life, but there are many intermediate products related to the process, the structure or the outcomes which play 
an important role in the overall performance (Donabedian, 1988; Ravish, 2018; WHO, 2010b, 2012). For instance, 
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a substantial aspect of PM in the healthcare sector is the Performance Appraisal or Performance Review, i.e., the 
formal procedure of evaluating performance of employees (Madlabana et al., 2020).  
The World Health Organisation defines PM in Healthcare as the continuous process for the identification, 
measurement and improvement of the performance of individuals, of teams, and of the healthcare organisation as 
a whole, through the coordination of all the activities according to the strategic goals (WHO, 2010a). Although in 
the literature of the performance of healthcare institutions the terms PM System, PM Method and PM Practice are 
interrelated and somehow mixed, there are some significant differences between them. Madlabana et al. (2020), 
for example, make a distinction between PM methods and PM practices in healthcare. They define PM methods 
as particular procedures, processes or tools used to consolidate data on the performance of staff, whereas they 
define PM practices as the actual application and use of a PM method, as opposed to theories relating to it. The 
term PM System is an even broader term which, in our view, encompasses both PM methods and PM practices, 
and goes further to encompass any other tool, software or hardware used in the implementation of PM in public 
healthcare institutions. PM systems in public hospitals, for example, include not only the software and hardware 
used to store, monitor and process clinical data, but also the protocols, the practices, tools and methods used by 
clinicians, nurses, health workers and administrative staff to handle patient flows; to admit and discharge patients; 
as well as to record and communicate with other departments and/or other entities outside the hospital (Vainieri, 
Noto, et al., 2020).  
 
Figure 2. Definitions related to Performance Management. Source: Madlabana et al. (2020, p. 3) 
 
 
The development of performance improvement in the health sector is strongly connected to the notion of 
quality, as performance seems to reflect the capacity of an organisation to produce sustainable outcomes with 
emphasis on both the quality of the process and the quality of the results, and for this reason modern visions and 
definitions of Healthcare Performance include the management of operations, services and resources used to 
produce those end-results (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Song and Tucker (2016) recognised the importance of a 
comprehensive, system-level approach to PM in health care institutions, and defined performance improvement 
as a structured approach that uses repeated cycles of hypothesis testing to discover how processes can be modified 
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so that they produce output that meets the performance target (Song & Tucker, 2016). Their view and definition 
is very close to our view of the PM in Healthcare, and to the purposes of this research study.  
Finally, it's worth mentioning that the PM is growing and changing as the organisations and the human 
needs grow and change. Thus, it is no wonder that the emergence and the gradual change of the definitions and 
the meaning of performance in healthcare organisations is a consequence of the NPM movement, of the various 
advancements in other production sectors, and of events such as the Covid-19 pandemic which quickly shape 
public opinion and require for immediate policy making towards more resilient and adaptive healthcare systems 
(Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 3. The evolution of Performance Management Systems. Source: Vainieri, Noto, et al. (2020, p. 2). 
 
 
2.2.2 PM Systems, Clinical Outcomes and Quality of Care 
Research during the last few decades has illustrated the value of PM in the healthcare sector. PM is generally 
believed to positively affect the sustainability and the quality of health systems and organisations (OECD, 2007; 
Smith et al., 2009; WHO, 2010a, 2018a). Many studies have shown positive correlations between PM on the one 
hand and clinical performance on the other hand, while clinical performance is found to be positively correlated 
to financial performance (Al-Habib, 2020; Lega et al., 2013; OECD, 2019; WHO, 1999, 2010a, 2018a).  
However, in the healthcare sector financial indicators are not enough to describe the overall performance 
of hospitals, because of the many particularities of healthcare that is not found in other sectors of production and 
services. For example, the goals of the medical services are usually not specified, and it is very difficult - or 
sometimes impossible - to measure the social insurance utility and benefit over the out-of-pocket payments 
(Ravish, 2018). PM in general uses the 3E's (i.e., economy, efficiency, effectiveness) to describe performance of 
the non-financial outcomes (Ravish, 2018), but in the healthcare sector there is a huge discrepancy between outputs 
and desired outcomes. Thus, performance measures should better concentrate on patient-centred outcomes, both 
short term and long term, to ensure quality of care for patients. For example, although cancer therapy costs can be 
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significantly reduced without any doubt by avoiding needless screenings, examinations and treatments, it is also 
true that for potential cancer patients improving quality in and of itself may not lead to meaningful reductions in 
cost (Wright & Hershman, 2013). 
Subsequently, performance of healthcare institutions must be treated as a multidimensional marvel where 
financial indicators are only one part of it, and viability (i.e., integrating different viewpoints of different 
stakeholders) and proficiency (i.e., taking into account process and education perspectives) are other, equally 
important parts (OECD, 2019; Ravish, 2018). Thus, more and more countries and “umbrella” bodies within the 
healthcare sector have begun to underscore the value of a multi-dimensional assessment of performance in 
healthcare, including patient, staff and other stakeholders’ evaluations (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). PM systems 
such as the famous Balanced Scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) are being adopted by healthcare institutions 
all around the globe, giving to public managers the possibility to combine financial and non-financial performance 
metrics in the light of the overall performance, and supporting strategic goal-setting, management and monitoring 
of strategy implementation across the organisation (Behrouzi et al., 2014; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005; Lin et al., 
2014).  
Performance of healthcare organisations is shown to be particularly sensitive to leadership styles, 
management strategies and methods used; managers’ personality characteristics and behaviour; and culture and 
values of the organisation (Al-Habib, 2020; Lega et al., 2013), although there are still controversial opinions on 
what kind of professionals should lead healthcare institutions and what type of management style should better be 
followed. Al-Habib (2020), for example, conducted a systematic review on the literature around leadership and 
management styles in the healthcare field and their relation to performance, and found some proof that hospitals 
run by doctors perform better than others. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the development of performance 
improvement in the health sector is strongly connected to the notion of quality - as performance seems to reflect 
the capacity of an organisation to produce sustainable outcomes with emphasis on both the quality of the process 
and the quality of the results - and for this reason modern visions and definitions of healthcare performance 
includes management of operations, services and resources used to produce those end-results (Vainieri, Noto, et 
al., 2020).  
The intrinsic notion that PM of hospital outputs leads to improved quality of healthcare services is still well-
established among scholars and public health institutions. Quality in general, as perceived by users of a service, 
has five dimensions: reliability, empathy responsiveness. assurance, tangibility (Fayek, 1996; Parasuraman et al., 
1985). Donabedian (1988) was the scientific father of this notion, setting the foundations of how quality in 
healthcare is still today defined, considered and measured. According to his conceptual model, healthcare quality 
has three dimensions: structure (human, economic and other resources); process (patients-providers contacts and 
relations) and outcomes (patients’ level of health). Thus, quality-related measures are classified accordingly into 
those three main categories: structure measures, process measures, and outcome measures (Donabedian, 1988).  
Since 1988, researchers have expanded Donabedian’s work on how to more effectively develop, define and 
implement performance measures in order to promote health system as a whole (Smith et al., 2009) and improve 
quality of health services (De Vos et al., 2009; Mainz, 2003). As a result, the structure, process and outcome 
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measures of the Donabedian Model are nowadays encompassed in many of the so-called Quality Performance 
Management or Total Quality Management frameworks which, in effect, are PM systems with a more “holistic” 
perspective and a special focus on quality improvement. Such systems, especially created for health care 
institutions’ evaluation and heavily used by public hospitals and other public healthcare providers for quality 
improvement purposes, include the famous ISO2 , PATH3, and CAF4 frameworks. Those frameworks are nowadays 
used by a number of public hospitals and primary care centres around the world for monitoring and assessing 
current performance; identifying weaknesses and setting goals for quality improvement; creating policies and 
planning interventions for quality improvement; as well as to inform external audiences and stakeholders 
(Fadlallah et al., 2019; Scanlon et al., 2001).  
According to Werner et al. (2008b) performance measures may be correlated to improved performance for 
two different reasons: first, because measuring by itself directly improves performance of the activities that are 
measured and, second, because those measures might act as indicators of the performance of other activities that 
-although not directly measured- also contribute to the improvement of the overall performance. In their study, 
Werner et al. (2008b) found proof that process measures of quality indeed act as intermediate indicators of 
performance of unmeasured outcomes which are more important than the measured ones, in the sense that their 
impact on the overall performance and quality of healthcare services is bigger. 
 
2.2.3 Modern PM Systems & Performance Indicators in Public Healthcare Institutions  
PM Systems in general are oriented towards continuous enhancement: enhancement of performance; 
enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness; enhancement of outputs and outcomes of public sector institutions 
and organisations. Organizational efficiency has been a central objective that public healthcare reforms have been 
trying to improve, with PM systems presumably being able to help (Bianchi & Peters, 2016).  
As mentioned above, PM Systems in public hospitals include not only the software and hardware used to 
store, monitor and process clinical data, but also the protocols, the practices, the tools and the methods used by 
clinicians, nurses, health workers and administrative staff to handle patient flows; to admit and discharge patients; 
to record and communicate with other departments and/or other entities outside the hospital (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 
2020). Furthermore, a user-friendly hospital data-management software that incorporates accurate electronic 
records of patients along with robust data gathering tools seem to be necessary for the monitoring of hospital 
performance and for the deduction of reliable conclusions, both for external and internal use (Botje et al., 2016). 
According to Arnaboldi et al. (2015) the most common PM systems and technologies that are used in the public 
healthcare sector include: Budgetary Control, KPIs and Benchmarking, Balanced Scorecard, Lean Management 
and Managerial Checklists. PM systems such as the famous Balanced Scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) or 
the ones that are more concentrated on the aspect of Quality of Care such as  ISO, are adopted by healthcare 







; Lin et al., 2014). BSC adoption has expanded in more and more countries over the last decade, from China (Lin 
et al., 2014) to Greece (Grigoroudis et al., 2012; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005) and is shown to improve 
performance when properly implemented. PM systems and performance measures in general provide a universal 
basis for benchmarking and research, as they facilitate measurements and comparisons of efficiency, productivity 
and quality of outcomes of different healthcare providers (Donabedian, 1988; Mainz, 2003; Scanlon et al., 2001; 
Xenos et al., 2017).  
According to Madlabana et al. (2020), who conducted a systematic review of the existing literature on PM 
practices among nurses in primary care, PM systems support three different functions: the strategic, the 
administrative and the developmental function. More specifically, the strategic function of PM systems involves 
pursuing the strategic goals through the alignment of those goals with the targets set for individual performance.  
The administrative function of PM systems involves the provision of critical data to assist managers in making 
crucial choices upon salaries, pay raises, bonuses, promotions and other rewards, and in mentoring workers on 
how to enhance their performance on a continuous basis. Finally, the developmental function of PM systems 
involves the availability of feedback on the progress of PM interventions and on the individual assessments of 
performance, which enables corrective actions to be taken promptly and assists the identification of supplementary 
measures to boost performance (Madlabana et al., 2020).  
PM systems are based on measurements of inputs and outputs, combined in such a way that they form ratios 
or Performance Indicators which readily compare performance with a pre-set standard. As a consequence, a wide 
number of performance indicators for hospital care such as Average Hospital Stay, Nosocomial Infections Rate, 
Hospital Mortality Rates and Nurse-Patient Ratio or Doctor-Patient Ratio, developed according to the standards 
of WHO, OECD and Eurostat (OECD, 2007, 2019; WHO, 2012), are today adopted by almost every country all 
over Europe and the world and encompassed in their national PM systems. Hospitals and other healthcare 
providers are evaluated upon those measures through data collection, internal and external inspections, and there 
is a growing demand on Hospitals worldwide to report performance information in order to increase external 
accountability (Botje et al., 2016). Apart from the external reporting, performance indicators are necessary also 
for the internal monitoring of public hospitals’ performance, which may also act as a way to enhance service 
quality and increase the overall hospital performance when the right data are gathered and used properly, in order 
to support the hospital’s quality management practices (Botje et al., 2016). Proactivity of hospital managers, the 
level of engagement of the medical and the nursing staff and the reward systems linked to the PM systems of the 
hospital are shown to be the key to this process (Botje et al., 2016). 
Rahimi et al. in 2017 attempted to identify and organise in a comprehensive way the most suitable Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) for hospitals, using an extensive literature review that identified 218 hospital 
performance indicators, followed by the experts’ panel and Delphi methods to select the 22 most critical ones, 
which they divided into four categories based on the four BSC perspectives (Rahimi et al., 2017).  Those 22 KPIs 
included, among others, the average length of stay, the bed occupancy, the mean length of stay in the emergency 
department, the mortality rate, the bed turnover, the discharge with personal satisfaction, the (ER) waiting time, 
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the hospital infection rate, the clinical errors, the patient satisfaction, the cost of drags and materials, the personnel 
costs, the staff turnover, and the facilities for families and visitors, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Hospitals. Source: Rahimi et al. (2017, p. 23). 
 
 
Health workers’ motivation, commitment and performance has been described as a significant factor of the 
overall hospital performance (WHO, 2012, 2016). The shortage of skilled healthcare staff in public hospitals, 
especially in low-income countries, and the extra burden that this shortage creates to the available staff along with  
the fragmentation and lack of coordination of the healthcare services; the ineffective use of resources;  the low 
quality of clinical data collection and management; as well as with a number of other work-related factors (e.g., 
the appreciation by managers, colleagues, and the community; the organisational justice; the job stability and 
training) have been identified as co-determinants of health-workers’ performance (Mensah et al., 2016; Suifan, 
2019; WHO, 2012, 2016; Zaadoud et al., 2018). Hospital staff is composed of many different professionals and 
stakeholders, with nurses being the larger population arithmetically. Nurses are the chief component of the hospital 
workforce and, thus, successful hospital PM interventions heavily rely on nurses' skill and commitment to provide 
quality health care services. A well-implemented PM System may become a vital asset in ensuring that nurses are 
inspired, empowered and encouraged, as well as properly educated, trained and compensated (Madlabana et al., 
2020).  
One of the most distinctive managerial competencies refers to the capacity to design the vision, mission, 
long-term strategic goals and the effective diffusion of all those inside the healthcare organisation for the 
empowerment of the staff. Thus, information sharing, engagement of mid and low-level managers and the ability 
of top managers to communicate efficiently the goals and strategies are found to lead to enhanced hospital 
performance (Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019). Engagement of doctors is critical for the success of any PM system 
(Botje et al., 2016; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018) and in order to engage clinicians, hospital managers need to 
provide them with appropriate, structured and continuous flows of information on performance outcomes, 
priorities and operational goal-setting (Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019). PM Systems could enormously help in this 
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regard, as they could provide managers and clinicians with readily usable data for performance improvement in 
the organisation and facilitate performance benchmarking. 
 
2.2.4 Healthcare Reforms for the adoption of PM Systems in the Healthcare Sector 
The economic recession of the 1980s intensified international markets’ competition and resulted in reforms 
of the public sector worldwide with a dual goal: reducing expenses and improving efficiency of governments and 
public institutions (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). As a result of this massive move towards modernisation, and in 
order to respond to the pressures for sustainability, PM soon became relevant in the public healthcare sector, 
especially for public hospitals and primary healthcare centres (Elg et al., 2013; Werner et al., 2008a).  
A massive wave of healthcare reforms started to be planned and implemented in most western countries 
during the last four decades in order to increase performance of those structures (OECD, 2007; WHO, 2012). The 
first healthcare reforms mainly focused on improving performance in terms of achieving better financial results; 
setting goals and responsibilities across the hierarchical structure of healthcare organisations; and maximising 
outputs, such as number of patients treated and services provided (Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  
The goal of those reforms was to address the limitations of the conventional bureaucratic paradigm that public 
healthcare organisations initially followed, and set productivity and effectiveness as the primary goals to be 
achieved by hospitals and health centres (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  
According to Song and Tucker (2016), a successful PM reform in healthcare includes major changes to the 
basic business model of a healthcare organisation. Such changes should include the internal processes of service 
provision and a more innovative patient handling, which entails a higher level of flexibility and effectiveness of 
the interaction between patients and healthcare staff for improved results (Song & Tucker, 2016). Less effective 
reforms concentrate on the performance of a unit or department, rather than on the organisation as a whole, and 
such attempts might even have unanticipated, detrimental consequences on the overall performance (Song & 
Tucker, 2016). According to Arnaboldi et al. (2015) the most common PM systems and technologies that are 
introduced in the public healthcare sector through the healthcare reforms include: Budgetary Control, KPIs and 
Benchmarking, Balanced Scorecards, Lean Management and Managerial Checklists. However, all of those 
technologies come with a number of drawbacks, which are briefly presented in the next few paragraphs. 
Budgetary Control was one of the first PM tools introduced during the reforms of the public healthcare 
sector, and is still widely used by many countries including Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Finland and Norway (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020). Particularly since the onset of the 2008 financial 
and economic crisis, many governments started to implement control mechanisms aimed at identifying 
performance standards and spending thresholds and introduce cutback management policies (Noto et al., 2020). 
Cutback generally refers to policies which are contributing to a transition towards lower levels of activity and 
resources’ usage (Noto et al., 2020). There are three main cutback management approaches: linear cuts, targeted 
cuts and the quest for productivity and efficiency gains (Ongaro et al., 2015; Pollitt, 2010). Linear cuts simply 
involve applying proportionally equivalent budgetary cuts in all public organizations affected by the policy. 
Targeted cuts suggest that certain organizations or industries should suffer bigger cuts than others affected by the 
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same policy. The third approach suggests that budgetary control policies should provide budgetary gains or 
rewards relative to an improvement in performance (Noto et al., 2020; Pollitt, 2010).  
The integration of budgetary control in hospitals and other healthcare institutions acknowledges the 
importance of the financial health within the public sector organizations. It also reflects the centrality and 
interconnection of the budgetary mechanism with almost all the financial operations of public sector organizations 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Although the scale of public hospitals and primary care entities and the complexity of 
financial management of the public sector leads them to rely their PM Systems solely on budgetary control, 
experience has proven that this strategy is rather narrow-sighted; provides rough cost control ignoring all the non-
financial aspects of performance; and may even contribute to adverse effects (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 
2020). Furthermore, research has shown that in many cases the budgetary control was accompanied by the lack of 
ability to refine the historical-based budget setting practices by introducing activity-based measures, which 
essentially compromised the rigour of the budgetary control as a PM tool (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020; 
Stuckler et al., 2017).  
The accomplishment of budgetary balance may be seen as a kind of progress but in reality it is a constraint, 
and it certainly is not synonymous neither to the provision of quality services, nor to the efficiency or effectiveness 
of the health organisation’s operation (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Research has demonstrated many cases where the 
implementation of linear and targeted cutback management policies might have created several unintended 
consequences for the efficiency of health systems and for the public governance economic growth (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015; Legido-Quigley et al., 2016). Thus, many of the early adopters of budgetary control began 
to underscore the value of a multi-dimensional assessment of performance in healthcare, and more and more 
countries and “umbrella” bodies within the healthcare sector worldwide gradually turned to more sophisticated 
PM systems such as the BSC or the Lean Management.  
Experience with those multidimensional PM systems, however, has shown that they also might lead to 
unintended consequences. BSC, for example, has been criticized in that its four dimensions (financials, internal 
processes, customers and learning) undervalue the complexity of most public healthcare organizations and provide 
nothing more than lists of indicators (Hoque, 2014; Norreklit, 2000). A number of concerns have been expressed 
also in respect to the application of Lean Management in the healthcare sector (Kinder & Burgundy, 2013; Radnor 
& Osborne, 2013), including the fact that constant emphasis on cost reduction negatively impacts the safety of 
healthcare services; that the high interdependence of the different units and departments that are involved in the 
production of healthcare services may contradict the standardization of procedures that the Lean Management 
entails; that concentrating on the performance of single units and divisions undermines the overall performance; 
and that such an approach is doomed to fail (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). For instance, this approach did fail when 
implemented in the English National Health System, without the availability and pre-existence of well-designed  
information systems at project level, inter-unit level and organisational level to support Lean Management 
processes, and given its piecemeal application without an overarching service model to inform its adoption and 
design (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). 
44 
 
Effective implementation of PM Reforms is equally important to the effective planning, and quite 
challenging as well, as even a well-planned reform if not properly implemented will not lead to enhanced 
performance (Song & Tucker, 2016). As Bouckaert and Peters (2002) famously quoted, “Performance 
measurement and management can resolve certain problems but also can create new problems. Having a range 
of new management practices in place with inadequate or even counterproductive performance measurement and 
management systems may be worse than having had no reform at all”. Song and Tucker (2016) reviewed the 
literature around successful PM of Health service organisations and identified a number of common models used 
in PM of the Healthcare sector, which they criticised according to their feasibility and implicit assumptions. They 
synthesized their findings into a more inclusive and comprehensive model which they named Model of 
Transformational Performance Improvement (Song & Tucker, 2016). This model includes six components: 
specifying and discussing a system-level goal; designing and implementing system-level performance measures; 
recognising and handling interdependencies; choosing a set of initiatives consistent with the system-level goals; 
developing an infrastructure for transformation; implementing, promoting and maintaining changes (Song & 
Tucker, 2016).  
 
Figure 5. Performance Management Technologies. Source: Arnaboldi, Lapsley & Steccolini (2015, p. 8). 
 
 
Song and Tucker (2016) also discuss common barriers to Successful Implementation of PM Reforms in 
healthcare institutions. They identify four main categories of barriers: barriers related to the internal environment 
(mainly insufficient physicians’ and senior managers’ support); barriers inhibited to  the external environment 
(such as the legal environment, negative press about medical errors, payments and profitability); barriers related 
to the implementation process (e.g., when the final users of a new technology are not the ones who asked for it; 
when there is no reliable feedback on the progress and results of the reform available to the implementation team; 
when there is insufficient training and technical support for the new process or technology to the staff); and barriers 
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to the reform itself ( i.e., when it  is overly complicated, and when the necessary infrastructure is not in place) 
(Song & Tucker, 2016).  When the PM reform is on a new technology and it was decided by the managers rather 
than by the users (top-down approach), then: (1) users/workers are not part of the design of the new PM System 
and there are more chances that it will be unreliable, defective or not helpful to them, and (2) users are not the 
ones who asked for the new technology, thus they will reject it and continue doing the work as they used to (Klein 
& Knight, 2005; Song & Tucker, 2016). Seemingly, Botje et al. (2016) found that Dutch hospitals frequently 
neglect to utilize performance measurements in their internal quality management, and thus PM is not used to its 
maximum potential. They also found that it is crucial for hospitals to invest in a robust information system as well 
as to link human resource policies with performance indicators. Unfortunately, it is also true that whatever the PM 
system applied, it would still have to refer to the budgetary system, considering its centrality in the operation of 
the public sector organizations; a dimension of performance management that is sometimes ignored and is neither 
easy nor straightforward (Arnaboldi et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 6. Common barriers to successful implementation of PM reforms in healthcare institutions. Source: Song & 





More recently, researchers have begun to turn their focus on the importance of including patient, staff and 
other stakeholders’ evaluations (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  Alasow et al. (2019), for example, have outlined the 
importance of the government and other agencies’ involvement in the establishment of PM Systems in Somalia to 
increase the performance of health staff and improve the delivery of public health services. According to Zaadoud 
et al. (2018), public healthcare systems and organisations are complex systems characterized by: several 
procedures and structures within them that are not standardized and are quickly changing;  numerous workers of 
different professions  and continuous evolution of professions within the system; exceptional sociology, 
particularly in the field of the division of decision-making forces within the system; the quality of the services 
provided by practitioners, that  patients cannot correctly appreciate; difficulties to recognize and measure the 
impact of PM systems and interventions on quality of services. It is now considered essential to plan PM reforms 
thinking of the organisation as a whole, in order to anticipate and take into consideration also disruptive behaviours 
and  traditional obstacles such as resistance to change in public healthcare  institutions, using Outcome-Based,  
and Dynamic PM interventions that promote the implementation of more versatile and far-reaching governmental 
structures to address those complex problems (Bianchi, 2010, 2012, 2015; Bianchi & Rivenbark 2012, 2014; 
Bianchi & Tomaselli, 2015; Bivona, 2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Herrera-Daza, 2008, 2009; 
Borgonovi et al., 2018; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020).  
 
2.3 Unintended Consequences in adopting Performance Management Systems in the Healthcare 
Sector: Some International Evidence 
Potential ineffectiveness of PM Systems was identified early on in the performance literature, when still 
academics were talking about management control systems. Hofstede (1978), for example, wrote about “the 
poverty of management control philosophy”, emphasising the fact that different processes require different control 
measures to be successfully implemented. Seemingly, Merchant (1990) was the first to identify the unintended 
negative implications of financial controls on “management myopia” (i.e., focussing on short term targets at the 
expense of the long-term objectives) and the deliberate manipulation of performance measurements by managers 
to present better performance.  
Unintended consequences can be broadly defined as the reactive sub-version, intentionally or 
unintentionally, put in place by managers and decision-makers at various levels in order to ‘hit the target’ even 
though ‘missing the point’, or to reduce the performance where targets do not apply (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Noto 
et al., 2020). Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) in their famous article “The performance paradox in the public sector” 
argued that there is only “a weak correlation between performance indicators and performance itself”, because 
performance indicators tend to deteriorate over time and gradually lose their significance as performance metrics, 
making the gap between real and recorded performance bigger and bigger. They presented a number of examples 
from public sector organisations where output measurements contributed to detrimental effects on performance 
and concluded that the public sector has a number of features and attributes that create a particularly high 
probability of the Performance Paradox to happen (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Among those features are: (1) the 
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big gap between the imprecise policy priorities established by the politicians and their translation into strategic 
goals and operational objectives set by the public officers. This translation is rather unclear and there is a lot of 
space for inconsistencies - sometimes deliberate ones - because this ambiguity helps politicians satisfy different 
stakeholders; (2) the absence of impending bankruptcy, despite the existence of gaps between expenses and 
revenues; (3) the fact that most public sector organizations have difficulty in calculating the precise cost of their 
goods and services, partly due to the fact that generation and use of public services happen simultaneously; (4) 
the fact that the work of civil servants, unlike private-sector employees, is significantly influenced by the 
interaction of public bureaucracies with political interests which are vague, complex and dynamic, creating a 
challenge for public workers to not only satisfy citizens but also recognize and integrate those interests in ways 
that maintain electoral authority and minimize political disparities; (5) the fact that there are no true penalties for 
public service organisations and their managers, which paves the door for them to manipulate data without any 
consequences. Furthermore, manipulation or distortion of performance data cannot be proven by the government 
alone, without the contribution of the policy-implementing agencies which have the privilege of owning the expert 
knowledge on policy implementation; (6) the fact that the structure of the public sector favours the creation of 
monopolies, which cannot be evaluated as there is no other similar organisation to compare performance with, 
and are hard to be substituted in case they do not perform well (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). 
Bouckaert and Peters (2002) came to very similar conclusions, recognising that PM systems can easily 
become dysfunctional, technically weak, with low validity and reliability and low legitimacy. They state that even 
if all the prerequisites for effective PM (i.e., emphasis on users of the PM system, execution plan, development of 
an appropriate measurement system, goal setting, compatible and effective inspection processes and a 
performance-oriented management framework) were adequately satisfied - which, of course, is not always the 
case - still “paradoxes, dilemmas, contradictions, and trade-offs emerge during implementation” (Bouckaert & 
Peters, 2002). Some of those unintended consequences that they identify in public organisations include: (1) 
Political challenges created by the fact that costs of PM projects are more apparent than the often intangible, yet 
anticipated gains of performance-based management; (2) Political challenges created by the trade-off between 
quantity and quality, as with a given amount of resources can be produced better quality services for less people 
or lower quality services for more people; (3) Problematic resources allocation between public organisations, 
especially in periods of crisis and focus on expenditure reductions where performance is used as a contrasting 
criterion of capital distribution; (4) The danger for politicians and managers of losing the “big picture”, by paying 
attention to details and less important activities which can be directly measured and controlled (i.e., focus on 
outputs) rather than on what really matters, which in the public sector is usually the social value of the services 
produced (i.e., outcomes) which is something that cannot be easily measured nor controlled. As the authors quote, 
“a helicopter view is competing with a detailed and sometimes myopic frog view”; (5) The danger of public 
managers and workers of demoralising and losing motivation when comparing themselves to better performers, 
although it is just not feasible for all public organisations to become best performers; (6) The problematic 
relationship between performance, satisfaction and trust by citizens, stakeholders and public managers, which is 
further complicated by propaganda and political talk which distorts and invalidates perceptions and expectation 
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of public institutions’ performance; (7) The conflict between performance and transparency, which potentially 
creates political tensions and might lead to hiding or not monitoring errors or information of low performance 
(Bouckaert & Peters, 2002). 
Sanger (2012) adds more pitfalls on the list, by researching public organisations with elected or politically 
appointed leaders, such as municipalities. In those organisations, additional problems can occur from the fact that 
political officials and their appointees come and go, while civil servants stay. Public managers are civil servants 
who might -for political or other personal reasons and agendas - pay lip service while preparing for the next 
election (Sanger, 2012). Finally, their research showed that the economic crisis in the U.S. in 2009 led to budget-
cuts in the public sector, which was translated into service-cuts, wage-cuts, recruitment freezes, lay-offs and major 
staff reduction in most public institutions; increased pressures at work and reduced efforts regarding PM by public 
officials; as well as reduced or no investments in PM systems in order to cover more urgent needs (Sanger, 2012). 
Fryer et al., (2009) conducted a literature review and identified three broad categories of PM pitfalls in 
public institutions:  technical pitfalls (i.e., merely technical aspects related to the choice of indicators and methods 
of data gathering, of the information systems used, the analysis and validation systems incorporated, etc); system 
pitfalls (i.e., problems related to aligning PM systems with the “bigger picture” and with pursuing the long-term, 
important goals that create value for citizens); and involvement pitfalls (i.e., problems that arise from the 
involvement of various stakeholders, politicians, public officials and others in the PM implementation). As far as 
this last category is concerned, Diefenbach (2009, p.905) quoted that “NPM’s impact on employees and corporate 
culture of public sector organisations comprises a whole range of negative psycho-sociological and 
organisational effects such as: increase in occupational stress, illness, low morale, decline in job satisfaction and 
motivation, alienation, fear, resentment, the distorting intellectual effects of writing for audit, a competitive, 
adversarial and punitive ethos, as well as wasteful, stressful, over- bureaucratic, and expensive audit procedures, 
increased tensions, more distrust between people, forms of symbolic violence and institutional bullying, a rougher 
working climate, an invisible net of managerial power and domination”. Seemingly, Murphy (2018) identified 
four main pitfalls of PM: the distribution of performance; the persistent weaknesses in establishing reliable and 
valid performance measures; the low usefulness of performance feedback to employees; and the low usefulness 
of performance measurements to organisations. He proposes that organisations should give up on routine 
assessment of results and turn to “softer” leadership and coaching approaches.  
Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) have conducted probably the most inclusive work until today in reviewing 
and theorizing the pitfalls of PM systems, their causes and their effects on individuals and organizations. They 
concluded that the most significant unintended consequences of PM include gaming, data manipulation, selective 
focus, illusion of control and relationships change. They argue that these consequences are a side-effect of some 
restricting factors of the public sector, such as indifference, mistakes, short-term priorities, core values, self-





Figure 7. Conceptual framework of the unintended consequences of Performance  
Management Systems. Source: Franco-Santos & Otley (2018, p. 60). 
 
 
Bevan and Hood (2006) in their study identified many of the negative consequences documented above, 
presenting evidence from the public healthcare sector in England. According to their findings, English public 
health service authorities and officials that are gathering performance data do not use them in practice for 
performance improvement purposes. They found that, paradoxically, all those measurements are completely 
detached from the real decision-making; that selective reporting is a persistent temptation for public healthcare 
organisations managers; and that fear of exposure of mistakes committed and of the criticism or the legal 
consequences that might follow creates incentives for gaming, manipulating or distortion of the information and 
the data gathered. Seemingly, Chang (2006) mentions the case of waiting lists for surgery in public hospitals, 
which the government tried to reduce by starting measuring the average time in the list and linking hospital 
managers’ performance on those measurements. The managers indeed managed to improve the waiting times but 
this improvement was made on the cost of the real patients’ needs, by giving priority to simple surgeries and 
making the patients with significant surgeries, such as hip replacements, wait longer than before. 
Other paradigms of deviant behaviour (Fryer et al., 2009) in the public healthcare sector reported by PM 
scholars (Chang, 2007; Bevan & Hood, 2006; Fryer et al., 2009) include:  (1) Manipulation of goal-setting, by 
establishing too easy goals and working just to reach those goals, ignoring other, potentially more important 
factors; (2) Manipulation of the data gathered (if the real performance is lower than the target set) or  intentionally  
under-performing  (if the real performance is higher than the target set) in order to perform around the benchmark 
and not much higher or much lower; (3) Emphasis on reaching goals at the cost of other (unmeasured) factors that 
would might create real value for patients; (4) Manipulation of the selection of measures and performance metrics 
by public managers, so as to affect the measurements to their advantage (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Chang, 2007; 
Fryer et al., 2009). Examples of such behaviours include: emergency calls being downgraded in order to 
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circumvent time limits; cancelation of follow-up appointments to make sure that the waiting time for all first-time 
appointments is within the performance targets; accident and traumatised patients not entering the ER but waiting 
in the ambulances, so that the waiting time in the ER does not exceed the targeted one; surgeons not accepting any 
more patients towards the end of the financial year, in order not to augment costs; trolleys in corridors being 
considered as beds, so as to present higher numbers of admitted patients;  and public doctors with long waiting 
lists starting to eliminate patients from the list by seeing them privately, gaining out-of-pocket money from those 
patients for doing what should be done in a public care setting without an extra charge for the patients (Bevan & 
Hood, 2006; Chang, 2007; Fryer et al., 2009; Ranade, 1994). 
Arnaboldi et al. (2015) have documented significant failures of existing practices in NHS in England, when 
hospital managers get so over-concerned around performance measurements and targets accomplishment that they 
lose sight of the more important concerns of the hospital’s purpose and efficiency. Noto et al. (2020) analysed 
data of a regional health authority in Italy and found that although Italian regional health services have succeeded 
to minimize workforce expenses – achieving the performance target set – management of their overall expense 
was not completely addressed. Overall, the initiative adopted by the central government had the consequence of 
restricting the decision-making power of the regional authorities, motivating them to transfer funds from 
manpower to the procurement of extra services (Noto et al., 2020).  Seemingly, Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) 
mention the example of a UK hospital trust where “the overreliance of senior staff on the hospital’s PM System 
led to an organizational culture focused on doing the system’s business (i.e., hitting performance targets) resulting 
in patient neglect and high mortality rates. Paradoxically, a system aimed at facilitating the delivery of high-
quality patient care and healthy lives ended up creating the opposite results”. They raise awareness that this case 
is not an unusual one, and that similar negative effects are reported in the PM literature and practice (Franco-
Santos & Otley, 2018). 
 





For most public institutions, such as public hospitals, the most vital resource is their human resources; their 
skills, experience and expertise, their managerial capacity for problem-solving and policy implementation 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015). In health and social services NPM reforms have resulted in increased workload with 
fewer and demotivated staff, increasing levels of stress and fatigue, high absenteeism and labour turnover, while 
the bureaucracy of the audit society - in which boxes must be ticked to demonstrate compliance with targets - is 
continuing to grow (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Funnell, 2015; Kaupa et al., 2020). Thus, according to Arnaboldi et 
al. (2015) “the single largest pitfall for performance management systems in public service organisations is a 
negative side-effect which undermines the motivation, morale and behaviour of human resources”.  
The high rate of failure and unintended consequences of PM systems in the private sector led in 2015 many 
major companies such as Deloitte, Microsoft and Google to change their PM Systems, with some of them (e.g., 
Accenture) deciding to even hold off on their annual performance report (Lee, 2019). This step away from 
conventional PM systems has intensified the social discourse as well as the debate in academia and mass media 
over the collapse of PM. However, PM is still present in the private as well as in the public sector, and it will 
continue to be present. Emergency occasions, such as the recent fiscal crisis of 2008-2009 and the latest COVID-
19 outbreak, emphasize that PM systems have a role to play in hospitals, but they should be designed in a way 
that they promote sustainability and resilience (Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Thus, instead of 
looking at PM systems as “collapsing” it might be better to look at PM systems as “evolving” (Lee, 2019). 
 
2.4 Research Gap 
Our literature review showed that although there has now been more than 40 years of experience with PM 
in the public sector, major challenges are still present and the expected enhancement in performance, 
accountability, transparency, service quality and value for money have not yet been fully realized (Fryer et al., 
2009; Noto et al., 2020). There are success stories documented in a unit-level or in a departmental-level, but when 
looking at the organisation as a whole those successes often turn into failures (Fryer et al., 2009). 
Seemingly, despite the worldwide establishment of the notion that PM in healthcare leads to improved 
services, it is still debatable among researchers whether PM systems in healthcare measure what really matters 
and whether they ultimately serve their underlying purpose, which in public hospitals should not be other than 
improving quality of care for patients (De Vos et al., 2009; Nolan & Berwick, 2006; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; 
Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Werner et al., 2008a, 2008b). A growing part of literature states that - despite their 
compliance with well-established processes of care - traditional performance management policies might not 
affect or even deteriorate hospital performance and quality of healthcare services (De Vos et al., 2009; Nolan & 
Berwick, 2006; Werner & Bradlow, 2006; Werner et al., 2008a, 2008b; Wright & Hershman, 2014).  A great part 
of this stream of research focused on the correlation between performance measurements and the actual clinical 
outcomes, by retrospectively comparing prior measurement scores with the actual clinical outputs and outcomes 
that were achieved later on. Werner and Bradlow (2006), for example, conducted an extensive study on 3657 
hospitals and found that outcome measures in hospitals do not significantly predict mortality rates. Similar studies 
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on chronic disease management (Nolan & Berwick, 2006) and cancer care (Wright & Hershman, 2014) have come 
to the same conclusion that outcome measures are not conclusively related to clinical outcomes. Seemingly, 
research that has focused on process measures (e.g. comparing infection-prevention measures and postoperative 
infection rates) has obtained results that cannot conclusively prove whether there is some effect of process 
measures on clinical outputs or not. All those findings clearly reveal that the previously supposed positive effect 
of traditional PM in hospitals on the hospital overall performance and enhanced quality of care is not any more 
given.  
A special concern started to be raised by many researchers and leading scholars in the public PM field 
(Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; Bovaird, 2005; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003, 2009; Fryer et al., 2009; Jarrar & Schiuma, 
2007; Verbeeten, 2008) regarding the trade-off between short-term and long-term goals that is apparent in all 
public organisations, but has even more detrimental, life threatening consequences in the public healthcare 
institutions (Verbeeten, 2008). Jarrar and Schiuma (2007, p.5) quote that “managers have become more focussed 
on obtaining immediate results, to the detriment of the long-term vision and ethos of the public sector.  In many 
respects, this change in the management style and system represents a shift in values from equity, security and 
resilience – features of the public sector – to efficiency and individualism”.  
Recent research on performance management has shown that ineffective measurement systems are not just 
useless but potentially dangerous, as they can substantially harm the organisation in many ways (Bianchi, 2010, 
2012, 2015; De Gooyert et al., 2019). Such ways are for example shifting the focus on unimportant elements at 
the cost of neglecting the important ones and driving people to manipulate resources in order to achieve intended 
results in the short-term, whereas creating catastrophic consequences in the long-term (Forrester, 1958; Senge, 
1990). Such trade-offs and common “pitfalls” of traditional measurement systems create a major gap between the 
desired, favourable outcomes and the documented, unfavourable ones (Bianchi, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016; Bivona, 
2015; De Gooyert et al., 2019; Forrester, 1958, 1961; Sterman, 1989, 2000). Furthermore, a wide range of negative 
consequences and “pitfalls” arising from the implementation of PM techniques have been identified in the public 
healthcare sector, one of the most significant ones being the sub-optimization problem, i.e., concentrating on 
enhancing one aspect of healthcare without taking into consideration the impact on other components of the 
healthcare system or organisation (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). This problem is particularly relevant for public 
hospitals because of the multifaceted and complex structure of hospital services, and because outputs and 
outcomes of hospitals are always a product of continuous and strict collaboration between different units, 
departments and professionals (Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  
All those findings tell us that traditional PM systems have often failed to enhance the performance of public 
healthcare institutions but they tell us little about the causes of this failure, which essentially creates a research 
gap worth investigating. Thus, the central question that this research study will try to address is Why do traditional 
PM Systems in healthcare not always lead to improved performance? 
Previous research on those negative outcomes mainly focused on statistical analysis and on the correlation 
between different factors of performance, hypothesising that there is a linear effect between performance of public 
healthcare services and some factors of the internal or the external environment. A variety of potential causes of 
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this effect have been proposed by different scholars, but all those findings remain scattered. Such causes include, 
for example, inconsistency between the culture of public organisations and the PM method itself; decrease of 
integrity and morale of the employees; and negative feedback loops (Fryer et al., 2009). Meyer and Rowan, for 
example, wrote in 1977 that evaluation and audit are official claims of social control that violate the presumption 
that public workers are behaving competently and in good faith, and that violation of this presumption 
fundamentally decreases integrity and trust (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Seemingly, Adcroft and Willis (2005) 
suggested that performance assessment undermines the integrity of public sector workers and transforms services 
into artifacts that run contrary to all reasoning around efficiency, resulting in low performance.  
More recently, researchers have started to see those negative outcomes as “system pitfalls”, occurring from 
the non-linear interconnection and the dynamic interaction of the different elements and factors that comprise the 
health system and the healthcare institutions, i.e., their structure, the policies implemented, the behaviour and the 
decisions of people - healthcare workers and patients - inside this system. For example, using a systems approach 
to PM, Boland and Fowler (2000) demonstrated that performance measurement can create feedback loops that 
result in a spiralling decrease in performance. Seemingly, Al-Habib (2020) noted that cost cutting without taking 
into account the unintended effects may be dangerous and self-destructive, contributing to “spurious savings” and 
constrained treatment capacity with reduced accessibility. He concluded that future research should focus on 
shedding light to the "black box" of the healthcare process and the value-creation within this process, with a special 
attention on the outcome variables. Instead of the item-by-item and composite measurement approach that was 
traditionally used to measure clinical outcomes, Nolan & Berwick (2006) proposed an all-or-none assessment of 
healthcare for process measuring, because “once an organization reaches a high score on the all-or-none measure, 
much of the variation in the delivery of care will have been removed, and the relationships between outcomes and 
other causal factors can be studied with much greater precision”.  
The implementation of a systemic performance assessment methodology in Healthcare is sponsored by 
many recent scholarly contributions in the field (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Costanza et al., 2014; Bivona, 2010, 2015; 
Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Herrera-Daza, 2008, 2009; Bivona & Noto, 2020; Davahli et al., 2020; 
Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer et al., 2009; Helal, 2016; Renmans et al., 2017; Mwita, 2000; Noto et al., 
2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). Adopting a systemic perspective 
means taking as a unit of analysis the organisation as a whole, and not one unit or department; acknowledging its 
internal and external environment and culture in which health care is performed; and considering the 
interconnected and the concurrent existence of the pitfalls documented as inherent to the structure of the system 
and the policies implemented. Vainieri, Noto, et al. (2020) propose that a holistic and more comprehensive 
approach to PM is required in order to “overcome a static representation of health systems both in terms of the 
components—i.e., to avoid that performance is conceived as the performance of a professional or a unit for a 
specific patient—and time—i.e., to prevent myopia in the delivery of healthcare services only on short-term 
impacts”. Seemingly, Arnaboldi et al. (2015) argue that PM in the public sector is far more complex than in other 
sectors (i.e., non-profit or private sector) thus the presumption within the existing literature that “the effective 
public manager exists and will deliver” is probably illusive. As Arnaboldi et al. (2015) suggest, “the underlying 
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dimension which makes performance management so difficult is the sheer complexity of - and the often over - 
simplistic approach to performance management in the public sector”. Arnaboldi et al. (2015) argue that for PM 
to be successful, especially in the healthcare sector, the adverse effects on human resource must first be managed, 
but they propose that this target should better be confronted through nuanced, empirical research with a systemic 
perspective (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). They also mention that “much of the existent literature on performance 
management tools and technologies seems to be based on specific applications of particular practices. There is 
much to be gained from closely grained case studies of practice. But it would be interesting to see studies which 
undertook a more holistic evaluation of performance management by paying attention to the details and instability 
of systems” (Arnaboldi et al., 2015).  
This research study will follow this suggestion and will attempt to address the above-mentioned research 
question by conducting empirical research using a case-study and adopting a systemic perspective. More 
specifically, it will try to answer why do traditional PM Systems in healthcare not always lead to improved 
performance by outlining the unintended consequences of the Greek Healthcare Reform in a public hospital 
through the DPM approach. 
As hospital performance is a quite broad and rather vague concept, for which existing definitions differ 
widely according to different stakeholder groups, hospital performance should be defined in a broader sense and 
analysed as a component of the healthcare system (De Gooyert et al., 2019; Meadows, 2008; Sterman, 1994). 
Thus, we need an approach that can give us the systemic view of the public hospital and the factors that affect its 
performance, as well as the perceptions of the various stakeholders in the hospital (healthcare workers, patients, 
politicians, managers, policy-makers). This leads us to the first research question: (1) How do stakeholders define 
hospital performance? 
Furthermore, there are many reasons why decisions in public hospitals are not implemented, such as 
resistance to change; not taking into account the political, cultural or institutional context; limited involvement of 
stakeholders in the decision-making process; short-sighted decisions and trade-offs between short and long term 
goals; lack of resources; political agendas; gaming and power differences; lack of follow-up measures. It is also 
true that the public health sector is characterised by multiple decision-making centres, overregulation, extensive 
political party's penetration in public management as well as irrational influences by labour unions (Economou, 
2010; Minogiannis, 2012; Theodorakioglou & Tsiotra, 2000), which are only some of the factors that comprise a 
complex, non-linear, multi-loop feedback system of the public hospital function. Such a system makes it hard to 
frame and analyse its long-term dynamic outcomes by traditional “static” approaches of performance management 
(Cosenz & Noto, 2016; Linard, et al., 2002). This leads us to the next two research questions: (2) What are the 
main feedback loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders? and (3) How can those feedback 
loops explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform? 
Moreover, it is now considered essential to plan PM reforms thinking of the organisation as a whole, in 
order to anticipate disruptive behaviours and take into consideration traditional obstacles such as resistance to 
change in public healthcare institutions, using outcome-based  interventions that promote the implementation of 
more versatile and far-reaching governmental structures to address complex problems (Bivona, 2015; Bivona & 
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Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona & Herrera-Daza, 2008, 2009; Borgonovi et al., 2018; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; 
Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020).  As Arnaboldi et al. (2015) note, “within many public services 
there are many short-term pressures to deliver. There is scope for the receptivity and feasibility of longer planning 
horizons in future performance management modelling”. Such dynamics of complex systems could be adequately 
modelled and analysed using the Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) approach (Bianchi, 2010, 2012, 
2015, 2016; Bianchi et al., 1998; Bivona, 2015; Bivona & Montemaggiore, 2010; Cosenz & Noto, 2016).  
The DPM approach provides a systemic perspective of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced performance 
in the public healthcare sector, and will enable us detect the causal links between strategic resources, outputs 
(short-term results) and outcomes (long-term impact on quality of services and value for patients). It will enable 
us identify the critical success factors leading to better hospital performance. It will reveal the drivers of 
performance and their effect on outputs and outcomes, and it will show us how those outputs interact with strategic 
resources, causing the overall performance of health services to increase or to deteriorate (value destruction or 
value creation). Exploring to what extent and through what mechanisms PM policies of public hospitals affect 
performance would target the gap identified in the relevant literature, and would create promising opportunities 
for a theoretical contribution.  Concurrently, such a research study would contribute to policy insights regarding 
changes in the legislative framework for PM in Greek public hospitals that would ultimately lead to improved 
performance of Greek public hospitals and better quality of healthcare services, essentially creating a practical 
contribution for policy makers and patients. This leads us to the last two research questions: (4) What are the main 
strategic resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main performance drivers that 
are impacting intermediate products and end results? and (5) What are the practical implications of the study for 
policy design in Greek public hospitals? 
As the focus of this research study is to contribute to identifying pitfalls and unintended consequences 
following the decision to adopt a PM System in healthcare organisations, we reviewed the Greek Healthcare 
Reform that has been recently implemented in public hospitals to improve performance of the Greek public 
healthcare sector. Therefore, we investigated the main pillars of the Greek Healthcare Reform and outlined the 
main unintended consequences reported by scholars. Despite the extensive research identifying the “pitfalls” of 
the NPM reforms around Europe which we reviewed in this chapter, and the unintended consequences for hospital 
staff and patients, very little is known about the mechanisms that caused those negative effects. Despite their 
undoubtable value, those early findings still leave many questions unanswered.  
To begin with, there is still no definite answer regarding the supposed positive effects of the PM policies 
implemented on the hospital performance, and this could be possibly seen as a consequence of the research 
methods used in the existing studies. As most of the existing research entailed statistical methodology and 
Bayesian analysis, the only result it could obtain was lack or proof of correlation between two variables, a PM 
indicator on the one hand and the documented hospital performance on the other.  Secondly, the existing literature 
has shown that the performance measures undertaken during the NPM reforms did not facilitate internal PM in 
hospitals, but it has revealed very little about the nature of the relationship between PM and hospital performance, 
or about the mechanisms that lie within this relationship and drive the dynamics between the two. This is again - 
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at least in part - a methodological pitfall, as a rather static methodology was used to analyse a dynamic, ongoing 
effect on quality of clinical outputs and outcomes which cannot be easily captured by a simple before-and-after 
evaluation design.  
Studies using a DPM methodology would be necessary in order to address the gap in existing knowledge 
regarding the causing mechanisms of the negative consequences of the healthcare reforms, which is necessary for 
policy-makers to design better, more quality-oriented healthcare policies, interventions and reforms in the future. 
This theory-oriented research project addresses this gap by shedding light on how hospital performance is 
perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour).  
Following a systemic approach, the selected case study - which is a real hospital in the Greek Healthcare system 
- will allow us to investigate and test the above research questions. In doing so, we framed our analysis using the 
DPM perspective. 
 
2.5 Research Questions  
The purpose of this study is to empirically conceptualise a qualitative model of hospital performance as 
perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and use the DPM analysis in order to help policymakers in 
Greece re-design performance management policies and foster hospital performance. Thus, this research 
attempted to address the following research questions: 
1. How do stakeholders define hospital performance? 
2. What are the main feedback loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders? 
3. How can those feedback loops explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform? 
4. What are the main strategic resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main     
performance drivers that are impacting intermediate products and end results?  
5. What are the practical implications of the study for policy design in Greek public hospitals? 
 
2.6 Research Aim 
The overall aim of this PhD research study is to contribute to the understanding of the performance of 
healthcare organisations by showing how to empirically conceptualise a comprehensive, context-specific model 
of hospital performance as perceived by hospital stakeholders, and by using this model to explain the 
counterintuitive negative outcomes of performance management policies on hospital performance in order to help 
policymakers design better, quality-oriented performance management policies and reforms.  
 
2.6.1 Internal Objective (Overall Research Contribution) 
This theory-oriented research project contributes to the broader field of performance management in the 
public sector by explaining the possible causes of the negative, counterintuitive outcomes of hospital performance 
management policies on the hospital performance. More specifically, the present study has the internal objective 
of extending the existing state-of-the-art of public hospitals management by addressing the gap in knowledge 
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regarding the possible causing mechanisms of the negative, counterintuitive outcomes of traditional performance 
management policies on the hospital performance, and it does that by shedding light on how the hospital 
performance is perceived by hospital stakeholders and on what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour). 
 
2.6.2 External Objectives (Scientific/Theoretical Contribution & Practical Implication) 
This study has a dual external objective with two main components: a scientific/theoretical contribution 
and a practical implication. First, this research aims to make a theoretical contribution to the public governance 
academic discussion, and in particular to the literature around Performance Management in the Public Health 
Sector, by building a comprehensive Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance that encompasses feedback 
mechanisms related to hospital performance, and use it to explain the dynamic impact of performance management 
policies in Greece on the hospital performance. This will hopefully open the way for researchers to use this 
approach in order to assess hospital performance management policies from an outcome-based perspective. 
Second, this research aims to make a practical contribution for policy-makers of the public healthcare sector in 
Greece, by helping them redesign the existing performance management policies and by providing them with the 
tools to create better, more quality-oriented policies, interventions, and healthcare reforms in the future. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In chapter 2 we reviewed the positive as well as the unintended, negative consequences in adopting 
Performance Management Systems in the public sector and, especially, in the public healthcare sector. Our 
findings revealed that traditional PM systems have often failed to enhance the performance of public healthcare 
institutions and that there is no consensus on the causes of those failures. Notwithstanding their undoubtable value, 
those findings still leave many questions unanswered. Furthermore, despite the extensive research identifying the 
“pitfalls” of the NPM reforms around Europe which we reviewed in this chapter, and the unintended consequences 
for hospital staff and patients, little is known about the mechanisms that caused those negative effects, which 
essentially creates a research gap worth investigating. Thus, the main research question that this research study 
tries to address is: Why do traditional PM Systems in Healthcare not always lead to improved performance? 
More recently, researchers have started to see those negative outcomes as “system pitfalls”, occurring from 
the non-linear interconnection and the dynamic interaction of the different elements and factors that comprise the 
health system and the healthcare institutions, i.e., their structure, the policies implemented, the behaviour and the 
decisions of people - healthcare workers and patients - inside this system, etc. The implementation of a systemic 
performance assessment methodology in healthcare is sponsored by many recent scholarly contributions in the 
field (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Costanza et al., 2014; Bivona, 2010, 2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 2017b; Bivona 
& Herrera-Daza, 2009; Bivona & Noto, 2020; Davahli et al., 2020; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer et al., 
2009; Helal, 2016; Renmans et al., 2017; Mwita, 2000; Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, 
Noto, et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). Adopting a systemic perspective means taking as a unit of analysis the 
organisation as a whole, and not one unit or department; acknowledging its internal and external environment and 
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culture, in which health care is performed; and considering the concurrent existence of the pitfalls documented as 
inherent to the structure of the system and the policies implemented.  
Studies using such a methodology would be necessary in order to address the gap in existing knowledge 
regarding the causing mechanisms of the negative consequences of the healthcare reforms, which is necessary for 
policy-makers to design better, more quality-oriented healthcare policies, interventions and reforms in the future. 
This case-based research project addresses this gap by shedding light on how hospital performance is perceived 
by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital and on what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour).  
Following a systemic approach, the selected case study - which is a real hospital in the Greek healthcare system - 
will allow us to investigate and test the above research question. In doing so, we framed our analysis using the 
Dynamic Performance Management methodology. In the following chapters we will explicitly present and 




CHAPTER 3 – INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In chapter 3 we introduce the research methodology and approach followed. More specifically, we present 
the philosophical stance of the study, the methodological approach (i.e., the Dynamic Performance Management 
approach) and the research strategy undertaken, and we briefly discuss the five research traditions identified in 
our study and their key features. Finally, we explain how we combined those traditions to facilitate our research 
purpose and how we integrated them in our research design, and we outline the most important methodological 
choices undertaken.  
 
3.1 Philosophical Stance 
The philosophical stance of any research study is formed by the ontology (i.e., the nature of reality), the 
epistemology (i.e., the nature of knowledge), and the methodology (i.e., methodological approach and research 
methods) that the researcher selects and adopts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Those elements define the way that the 
researcher views and interprets the reality; they define the assumptions and methods that the researcher uses in 
order to remove the complexity of the real world and try to give meaning to parts of it (Lincoln et al., 2011).  Four 
such philosophical paradigms have been outlined by Creswell (2014): postpositivism, constructivism, the 
transformative paradigm, and pragmatism.  
In this study, we adopted a systemic (Meadows, 2008), participatory (Kiraly & Miskolczi, 2019), inductive 
(Luna-Reyes & Anderson, 2003) and dynamic (Bianchi, 2016) approach by combining the methodologies of 
Group Model Building (Andersen & Richardson, 1997; De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; 
Richardson & Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996;), and System Dynamics Modeling (Forrester, 1961; Richardson & 
Pugh,1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000) into the Dynamic Performance Management Approach (Bianchi, 2016). Other 
research traditions identified in our study are the Stakeholders Theory (Bryson, 2004; De Gooyert et al., 2017; 
Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997) and Participation (King & Kraemer, 1993; Király & Miskolczi, 2019; 
Rouwette, 2016; Schweiger et al., 2018) research traditions. All those approaches stand in the constructivist side 
of the continuum as research approaches, because they all consider realities as subjective, complex and multi-
layered, actively shaped by perceptions and opinions of stakeholders (De Gooyert, 2019; Lane & Schwaninger, 
2008). This is well-summarised by the system dynamicist John Sterman (2002) in his famous quote “all models 
are wrong”, meaning that reality is much too complex to be modelled, and that all models are essentially 
simplifications of reality, even though quite useful to analyse and interpret it.  
This exploratory study went back to the roots of hospital performance and used the DPM approach based 
on stakeholders’ beliefs, experiences and perceptions of reality to identify its underlying mechanisms and to 
investigate whether and how the PM policies adopted in the hospital meet their underlying purpose of leading to 
better performance and quality of healthcare services for patients. Thus, constructivism is the paradigm that best 
suits our purposes as constructivism is “oriented to the production of reconstructed understandings of the social 
world”, valuing “transactional knowledge” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 92). 
60 
 
Despite the growing literature on DPM modeling in public entities, applications of this methodology in the 
public healthcare sector are limited (Costanza et al., 2014; Bivona, 2010, 2013, 2015; Bivona & Cosenz, 2017a, 
2017b; Bivona & Noto, 2020; Helal, 2016). Finally, in the Greek bibliography such attempts are completely 
nonexistent; all facts which essentially create promising opportunities for a theoretical contribution. 
 
3.2 Main Methodological Approach: Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) 
The so-called Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) approach (Bianchi, 2016) is a combination 
between traditional Performance Management in the public sector (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; Bouckaert & 
Peters, 2002; Elg et al., 2013; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005) and the System Dynamics (SD) methodology. It has 
already been successfully used to support decision-making processes in organisational, institutional and 
governmental settings (Bianchi, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2017; Bianchi & Tomaselli, 2015; Borgonovi et al., 2018; 
Munteanu & Newcomer, 2020; Noto & Noto, 2019), while it also permits engaging stakeholders both from the 
internal and the external environment of the organisation.  
The dynamics of complex systems could be adequately framed and analysed by the DPM approach, which 
provides a systemic perspective and a powerful set of tools for conceptualising and analysing them. The DPM 
approach can facilitate a systemic view of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced performance of services in the 
Greek public hospital, enabling us to detect the causal links between strategic resources, outputs (short-term 
results) and outcomes (long-term impact on performance factors). Furthermore, in accordance with the research 
traditions of Stakeholders Theory and Participation, we believe that stakeholders’ perceptions and involvement 
through the DPM approach are crucial for our research objective of “redefining” hospital performance by 
involving stakeholders in GMB modelling sessions, on the one hand, and facilitating change on the other hand. 
 
3.3 Research Strategy 
In accordance with De Gooyert (2016, 2018), this exploratory study used a case-based (Grounded Theory 
Building Strategy), which uses iteratively existing theory and case qualitative data for model building to make a 
theoretical contribution in the field of performance management in the public sector, using the Dynamic 
Performance Management approach.  More specifically, this theory-oriented research project used a case-study 
in order to shed light on how hospital performance is perceived by stakeholders in a Greek public hospital and on 
what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour). All those stakeholders’ perceptions were captured in a 
model, and the model was used in order to explain the documented, counterintuitive negative outcomes on the 
hospital performance which followed the Greek healthcare reform.  
We followed a qualitative approach, as the emphasis of our study was on eliciting knowledge stored in the 
mental models of participants and on knowledge-building (Turner et al., 2014). Through the modelling sessions, 
this knowledge was elicited and stored in the model of hospital performance, which is a qualitative system 
dynamics model showing the causal links between different variables related to performance (Causal Loop 
Diagram). Emphasis on causality is another reason why a qualitative approach was selected, as causality cannot 
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be easily inferred by merely quantitative approaches. A qualitative approach has made it easier to elicit and depict 
those causal relations between different factors, according to the participants’ experience, beliefs and perceptions.  
According to Yin (2009), case studies can be used in many different research contexts, but they are more 
useful in understanding how or why social phenomena occur. As the primary research question that this research 
study tries to address is “Why do traditional PM Systems in Healthcare not always lead to improved 
performance?”, the use of a case study seems the most appropriate research strategy for the explanatory purposes 
of our study. Although various other research strategies could be adopted to answer our research questions, the 
case-study was chosen as it enabled us to investigate, analyse and interpret hospital performance in its genuine 
context, from the individual viewpoints of the participant hospital stakeholders (Christensen et al., 2010; Creswell, 
2014). The case-study strategy also provided us with greater depth in the qualitative data gathered and in the 
exploration of the performance mechanisms.  
 
3.4 Research Traditions identified in the Study  
In this section we will introduce and discuss separately each one of the five main research traditions found 
in our study, and we will describe their key features. Those research traditions are the following:  
1. Dynamic Performance Management (Bianchi, 2016) 
2. System Dynamics (Forrester, 1961; Minyard et al., 2018; Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000) 
3. Participation (Green & Hunton‐Clarke, 2003; King & Kraemer, 1993; Király & Miskolczi, 2019; Schweiger 
et al., 2018) 
4. Group Model Building (De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; Richardson & Andersen, 1995; 
Rouwette, 2016; Vennix, 1996) 
5. Stakeholders Theory (Bryson, 2004; De Gooyert et al., 2017; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997) 
 
Dynamic Performance Management  
Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) is a non-conventional conceptual and methodological 
framework used to assist public managers and policy-makers design successful interventions for the sustainable 
enhancement of overall performance of public institutions and the provision of quality-services to citizens 
(Bianchi, 2016). As a method, DPM allows corporate decision-makers to establish causal processes that influence 
organizational outcomes over time, and it entails a selective and sequential form of examination. It draws its own 
principles from the research that has proven the lack of effectiveness of traditional, budgetary-control based PM 
systems, as these systems are no longer capable of delivering knowledge that can support: managing dynamic 
uncertainty, assessing intangibles, identifying delays, interpreting short-and long-term linkages, and establishing 
sound system boundaries and scope in strategic planning (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 71-72). 
Traditional approaches to PM rely on user experience questionnaires for PM improvement, which might be 
helpful in showing possible areas for improvement, but is certainly not enough to determine what actions should 
be taken exactly; how they should be implemented; and who should be involved. Such interventions typically 
concentrate only on the performance of the front-line operations of the public organisation, who work in the last 
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segment of a much longer service distribution structure: the “value chain” of the public institution (Bianchi, 2016, 
pp. 174-175). Assuming that enhancement of user satisfaction could only be the product of the attempts rendered 
by the front-line level units and employees may be deceptive. In reality, those entities are, in effect, 'clients' of 
other departments and units operating at higher levels of authority. Thus, traditional PM interventions are usually 
narrow-sighted and partially successful, as they have some positive impact only in the short-term and might give 
rise to a sense of discontent and loss of enthusiasm of the employees of the front-line units (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 
174-175). For all those reasons, the data gathered from questionnaires provide just a limited contribution to 
decision-makers in respect to the development of sustainable customer satisfaction initiatives and projects. 
Planning of successful PM initiatives and reforms should consider in the first place: (1) the process of services 
provision and the exact points where to intervene in this process; (2) what is the framework for the allocation of 
tasks, responsibilities and expertise affecting the process of public services production; and (3) who should be 
liable for the successful implementation of the intervention and the achievement of sustainable outcomes explicitly 
and implicitly related to the services provided (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 174-175).  
In order to deal with those issues, policy-makers and public managers should wear “proper lenses” to view 
the low user satisfaction reported; to interpret the negative consequences arising from the PM systems and policies 
implemented; to explain the feedback structure underlying low performance; and to define alternative strategies 
to change the PM structure and policies. To this end, DPM has been used to promote an interpretation of: (1) how 
end-results are influenced by performance drivers; (2) how those performance drivers can be influenced by policy 
levers to control strategic resource accumulation and depletion mechanisms, and (3) how the strategic resources, 
in turn, affect end-results, including not only the outputs of hospital services but - priorly and most importantly - 
their long-term outcomes, such as the patient satisfaction and patients’ health and well-being.  
 










Figure 11. The DPM Subjective View of Performance. Source: Bianchi (2016, p. 136) 
 
 
According to Bianchi (2016, p.81) “resource measures should not be confused with performance measures. 
There is a means versus ends relationship between the two”. In accordance with the DPM framework, the analysis 
of performance emphasises both end-results and performance drivers (Bianchi, 2016, p.81). Finally, there are three 
complementary, interconnected views in designing a DPM system for the sustainable enhancement of a public 
organisation, namely: the DPM instrumental view; the DPM objective view; and the DPM subjective view 
(Bianchi, 2016, pp. 71-72).  
 
System Dynamics 
System Dynamics (Forrester, 1961; Minyard et al., 2018; Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000) 
is a computer-aided, scientific methodology for policy analysis and design, developed initially during the 1950s 
by Jay Wright Forrester. System Dynamics (SD) methodology is suitable for understanding and analysing complex, 
dynamic problems, such as the ones encountered in social, corporate, industrial and economic systems, which are 




The purposes of SD studies vary between building theoretical understanding to implementing policies for 
improvement, and often include both.  Important elements in SD research studies include: empirical data to 
formulate the model and build confidence in the conclusions; the scope of research that captures important 
feedback; representation of the system structure, delays and nonlinearities; and the usage of behavioural decision 
rules (Richardson, 1991; Sterman, 1989, 2000). 
The SD methodology provides a systemic perspective and a powerful set of tools for conceptualising and 
analysing complex systems for management and change (Forrester, 1958, 1961; Richardson & Pugh, 1981; 
Sterman, 1989, 2000), which is relevant especially for healthcare interventions. In their article Community and 
programmatic factors influencing effective use of system dynamic models, Minyard et al. (2018) discuss why there 
is a great need for validated SD models especially in healthcare. According to the authors, “SD simulation models 
can help local partnerships build stronger collaboration, create shared vision, identify high leverage strategies, 
and explore collaborative investment opportunities”. SD is in fact a powerful tool to create shared understanding 
and meaning on the problem or on the system that needs to be changed, between stakeholders inside and outside 
traditional healthcare; between the private and the public sector; and between health professionals with different 
backgrounds.  
Especially in healthcare reforms, SD modelling can have a crucial role in simulating and testing the 
proposed policies and interventions before implementing them, which is much more effective and efficient, less 
expensive and less time-consuming than directly implementing a policy and waiting to see the results. Such kind 
of “direct experimentation” is also quite risky, not only in terms of money and time but - especially for healthcare 
interventions - in terms of deteriorating population’s health as well. In this regard, Minyard et al. (2018) state that 
in order “to meaningfully improve population health, communities must take a broader perspective and address 
the full scope of factors that drive wellness, including those outside of traditional health care”.  
 
Participation 
Participation (Green & Hunton‐Clarke, 2003; King & Kraemer, 1993; Király & Miskolczi, 2019; 
Schweiger et al., 2018) refers to the need of involving stakeholders in a process. SD has been a participatory 
approach since its birth, as Forrester has always involved stakeholders in his modelling efforts. Most SD 
researchers today agree that SD “might best be wedded to sociological theories that transcend the structure/agency 
divide and instead take a dialectical view of them” (Lane, 1992). However, there are many forms that participation 
can take, and many participatory techniques and tools are developed for researchers to pick from. Thus, the 
question becomes which of those techniques are most appropriate for certain cases, and upon what criteria one 
should choose. We based our choice on the framework of Király & Miskolczi (2019), where three different 
practices of participation identified in the literature, which are widely used by SD modellers, are compared: Group 
Model Building, Participatory System Dynamics Modelling, and Community‐based System Dynamics. Group 
Model Building was finally chosen as the most appropriate for our research purposes, and was used for the data 
collection and modelling process. The extensive analysis that we conducted in order to choose between those 
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techniques, and the reasons that made us choose GMB are presented in chapter 3.5.4. 
 
   Group Model Building  
Group Model Building (De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; Richardson & Andersen, 1995; 
Rouwette, 2016; Vennix, 1996;) is a methodology usually employed in SD studies that need stakeholder’s 
involvement. Group Model Building (GMB) is basically a widely recognised and well tested method for using 
stakeholders in the modelling process. System Dynamics methodology and its building blocks (i.e., instantaneous 
and accumulating causal relationships; feedback loops; non-linearities) is a fundamental component of GMB. 
However, an evenly important element is the participation per se, as in GMB studies the model becomes the 
means, not the end. 
GMB is a combination of system dynamics and facilitated participation. As previously remarked, system 
dynamics is used to tackle complex problems using both qualitative and quantitative modelling principles 
(Morecroft & Sterman, 1994). It is used to conceptualize the underlying feedback loop structure of the system at 
hand, in order to discover the potential repercussions of decisions over time (Sterman, 2000). The participation 
part of GMB is focused on information elicitation, exploring causes of action and evaluating policies between 
stakeholders. The modellers of GMB rely on quantitative data, written records and information contained within 
the mental models of the participant stakeholders, which represents the way someone perceives the reality (Huz 
et al., 1997). The main purposes of using GMB is to clarify the problem at hand by providing a systemic view; to 
foster understanding and consensus among participants through the alignment of participants’ mental models; and 
to create commitment to the results of the project.  
According to the founders of the GMB method (Richardson & Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996) the first two 
steps of SD modelling (i.e., problem identification and problem conceptualisation) have as a final product the 
Causal Loop Diagram (CLD): a qualitative SD model used for insight and discussion by GMB participants to 
enrich their view and understanding of the “whole” of the problem at hand. Vennix (1996) believes that the 
involvement of the problem owners (i.e., clients, stakeholders, etc) in the model building is essential for the model 
implementation and dissemination; thus, the design and delivery of a model made by the modeller alone would 
essentially false its purpose. This is why GMB is considered essential for our research purposes, despite the fact 
that involving a group of people with no knowledge of SD makes the whole research procedure more difficult and 
time consuming for the PhD researcher. 
Another important element of the GMB method is the nature of the problem, as it deals exclusively with 
“messy” or “wicked” problems. Wicked problems in everyday life, in general, and in organisations and 
institutions, in particular, are problems which are rather difficult to conceive and to solve; have no clear or straight 
answer and usually have their roots in human brain function (i.e., selective perception and memory, self-fulfilling 
prophecy, etc). Thus, in order to have a better view of such problems it is crucial to create a shared vision of the 
problem which encompasses all different views of the various stakeholders through the GMB approach 
(Richardson & Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996; De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019). The extensive 
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analysis that we conducted and the reasons that made us choose GMB for our modeling effort are presented in 
chapter 3.5.4. 
 
   Stakeholders Theory  
In order to identify the stakeholder groups that would best fit our research purposes, we drew from the 
literature of Stakeholders Theory (Bryson, 2004; De Gooyert et al., 2017; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997) 
which was first introduced by Freeman (1984) in his famous book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach. Stakeholders Theory (ST) is not a single theory but rather a big research tradition in management 
studies, which in general allows for acknowledging stakeholders in the decision making, managerial restructuring 
and other strategic processes. Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the organisation’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, pp. 46). In the public sector, definitions of 
stakeholders that are given by researchers vary from “people or small groups with the power to respond to, 
negotiate with, and change the strategic future of the organization’ to ‘those individuals or groups who depend 
on the organization to fulfil their own goals and on whom, in turn, the organization depends’ (Bryson, 2004).  
What is already obvious from those definitions is that on the one side of the continuum we have people or 
groups who depend on the organisation, whereas on the other side of the continuum we find people or groups 
upon whom the organisation depends.  This dichotomy is prevalent even in Freeman’s definition who talks about 
people who can affect on the one side and people who are affected by the achievements of the organisation. This 
dichotomy in stakeholders’ definition - which has in fact various implications for researchers’ and managers’ 
decisions when involving stakeholders - is nowadays recognised in the ST literature as the narrow vs the broad 
view of stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). In the narrow end of the continuum, stakeholders include only the 
ones that heavily affect the organisation; the shareholders. In the broad end of the continuum, stakeholders include 
even the ones that are slightly affected by the actions of the organisation, and have no power over it.  
The concept of power seems to be central in the literature around identification of stakeholders to be 
involved, thus we analysed it a bit further. Morality, obedience, power of discourse, circular and “soft” power and 
ethics are only some of the modern advances of the Weberian and - later on - the Foucauldian ideas of power, that 
comprised the basis for the current concepts and definitions of power (Hardy & Clegg, 2006).  According to the 
Weberian definition, power is embedded in organisational structure and represents a capacity embodied in a 
person who retains discretion over the application of that capacity (Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p.755), whereas for 
Foucault power comes with knowledge (Hardy & Clegg, 2006). Power, with all its inherent contradictions in 
definitions, remains relevant for organisational studies because concepts which are inherent to power - such as 
control, efficient and effective solutions to problems, conflicts and resistance - are widely investigated by scholars, 
as well as because social status and identity nowadays both affects and is affected by power in organisations 
(Hardy & Clegg, 1996). In this view, the power of quality managers of public hospitals, for example, can be 
approached from two different perspectives. On the one hand, those managers all have power over their 
departments and are legitimised to make day-to-day decisions regarding performance issues throughout the 
hospital, in other departments as well. This can be linked to the power definitions both by Weber and Foucault, as 
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quality managers have both the knowledge (Foucaultian definition) and the capacity (Weberian definition) to 
implement changes, and they have the expertise to identify where changes are needed. So, shall we include only 
quality managers as participants for our interviews and GMB sessions? This question, along with other questions 
related to how we chose our participant stakeholders will be addressed in the extensive Stakeholder Analysis we 
conducted, presented in chapter 3.5.4. 
 
3.5 Methodological Choices Undertaken 
3.5.1 Choosing between Theoretical and Applied Modeling 
According to De Gooyert and Größler (2018) there are many differences between applied and theoretical 
SD modelling. Those differences have several implications for the research design, and more specifically for the 
modeling steps that should be followed; for the data collected; and for the model boundary. If we take applied SD 
as one extreme of a continuum, and theoretical SD as the other extreme, then for applied SD the researcher should 
follow all the steps of the SD textbooks, collect empirical data on a specific case, and expand the system 
boundaries; whereas for theoretical SD the researcher does not need to follow all the steps of textbooks, may not 
always collect empirical data, and can have less broad system boundaries. According to the authors “it all depends 
on the purpose of the project and the usefulness of SD to achieve that purpose. Applied and theoretical studies 
have different purposes, either solving a client’s problem or contributing to understanding a phenomenon”. 
However, they acknowledge that - most of the time - research studies stand somewhere in between of those two 
extremes, and have both elements of fundamental or theoretical and of applied research.  
Our study, indeed, stands somewhere in between of those two extremes, and has both elements of theoretical 
and applied research, as it seeks to make a theoretical contribution on what is hospital performance and what 
dynamic mechanisms it is composed of, but at the same time it seeks to provide decision makers with tangible 
recommendations on specific changes that could foster hospital performance in Greek public hospitals. However, 
we find that this research is closer to the theoretical SD extreme, as the theoretical contribution it seeks to make 
on what is hospital performance is universal, whereas the practical contribution is much more context-specific and 
focused on the Greek paradigm. 
 





3.5.2 Modeling for a Theoretical Contribution 
De Gooyert (2016) identified five different purposes of using system dynamics for theoretical contributions. 
Building on the work of Harrison et al. (2007), De Gooyert (2016) adds to their list two more purposes, exploration 
and synthesis, which he identifies as relevant specifically for studies that use system dynamics for theoretical 
contributions, along with discovery, explanation and critique. Furthermore, in his systematic review De Gooyert 
(2016) classified the articles studied in three different ways: (1) quantitative (including numerical simulation runs) 
or qualitative (causal loop diagrams or stock and flow diagrams without simulation runs); (2) inductive (theory-
creating), deductive (theory-testing), or both; (3) according to the use or purpose of SD for theoretical contribution 
(exploration, synthesis, discovery, explanation, and critique). 
In a later published article, De Gooyert (2019) shows how the various choices and methodological decisions 
that SD modellers make “combine into three distinctive, internally consistent system dynamics based research 
strategies for theoretical contributions”, namely:  
1. Grounded theory building: starting from large amounts of qualitative data and iterating between theory and 
case data, lead to the development of qualitative models (causal loop and/or stock and flow), and thereby to new 
theory; 
2. Conceptual virtual laboratory: starting from existing theories and formalizing them to derive new insights. No 
empirical data are used. The focus is on quantitative modeling and scenario runs/sensitivity analyses; 
3. Phenomenon driven explanation: starting from empirical data, a quantitative simulation model is developed to 
replicate a Reference Mode5 of behaviour. In addition, what-if scenarios are run to develop new insights that go 
beyond the empirical data from which the study started.  
4. Management flight simulator: an SD model is used to test a hypothesis which is developed from an already 
existing theory. Statistical analyses are usually used to test these hypotheses, thus SD is only indirectly used here 
for proof or prescription (Harrison et al, 2007) rather than for building theory. 
Our research study seems to fall into the third category (i.e., Phenomenon driven explanation), as indeed 
we will start from empirical data to build a qualitative (CLD) model of hospital performance. However, our focus 
is mostly on setting the basis for creating a universal, context-free CLD of hospital performance in Greece, rather 
than a context-specific CLD for the hospital in which we conducted the case-study. Subsequently, we find that 
our research study as a whole rather falls on the first category (Grounded theory building). In fact, each of our 
research questions is identified to fall in a different category, as shown on the table that follows, but most of them 
(three out of five) fall into that first category of Grounded theory building (De Gooyert, 2019). According to the 
author’s suggestions for this first category, and in order to derive a model of hospital performance that will be less 
prone to context-specific factors, we decided to focus on collecting large and diverse amounts of qualitative data. 
 
5 A Reference Mode is a graph of a variable over time. Reference Modes are used at the beginning of System Dynamics Projects  






Figure 13. System dynamics-based research strategies for theoretical contributions. Source: De Gooyert (2019, p. 658). 
 
 
Another factor worth mentioning is the fact that in the same article, De Gooyert (2019) classified the articles 
studied in a very similar way: (1) quantitative vs qualitative; (2) theory building vs theory testing; (3) according 
to the SD use (exploration, synthesis, discovery, explanation, and critique). This classification is exactly the same 
as the above mentioned one, if we consider that theory building is, in se, an inductive approach while theory testing 
is a deductive one. Thus, we followed this same classification for our research purposes as well, and used it to 
identify how we will approach each one of our five research questions and to decide which research strategy 
applies best to each of them. In the next section we will show how, according to that strategy, we made the decision 
how to conduct data collection and data analysis for each of the five research questions.  
 
3.5.3 Choosing between different Participation Practices 
In the article Dynamics of participation Király & Miskolczi (2019) compare three main different practices 
of participation identified in the literature, which are widely used by SD modellers. Each method emphasises more 
or less some of the four key factors of participation, that the authors argue that one can use as criteria to choose 
among them. Those four factors-criteria are: the normative factor (i.e., participation is a democratic right); the 
substantive factor (i.e., participation produces better knowledge); the instrumental factor (i.e., participation 
improves the chance of success); and the transformative factor (i.e., participation improves social capital). 
Depending on those factors, the researcher can choose between the three main participation techniques identified 
in Király & Miskolczi (2019) study, namely: 
(1) Group Model Building: this is a professional and practical method, in which the focus is mostly on the 
substantive factor. In fact, Vennix (1996, 1999), one of the founders of this method, argues that the problem 
owners are the ones closer to the problem, thus eliciting their mental models is crucial for the success of the model 
building (substantive argument).  
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(2) Participatory System Dynamics Modelling: In this approach the focus is equally on all factors of participation. 
This approach is used for public policy decisions (e.g. in environmental wicked issues) and aims to involve 
stakeholders actively. The creation of a quantified, Stock-and Flow model is essential for this approach, as the 
emphasis is on testing different scenarios together with the stakeholders and then comparing and prioritising 
options based on the short-term and long-term outcomes of the different scenarios.  
(3) Community‐based System Dynamics: aims for the empowerment of (usually local) communities for the 
implementation of a policy, followed by long‐term and deep commitment from the researcher. That is because 
“decision‐makers” in fact cannot alone change embedded policy directions or challenge the status quo; they need 
social support among the citizenry. Thus, in this approach the focus is mainly on the transformative factor.  
In this research, the substantive factor is the most relevant for our purposes. But the substantive factor is 
present in all the three approaches above, so our decision cannot be based solely on that criteria. Thus, we turned 
to De Gooyert et al. (2017) who wrote about focusing on the decision-making organization versus focusing on 
stakeholder engagement. In our study, stakeholders would be involved only during the first stages of qualitative 
modeling of the hospital performance CLD, as the focus of the study was on inductively eliciting their mental 
models and information rather than on testing different policies. Thus, in our research a medium level of 
participation was indicated, and based on Green & Hunton‐Clarke’s (2003) framework medium levels of 
stakeholders involvement are associated mostly with “informative” and less with “consultative” purposes. Green 
and Hunton‐Clarke (2003) present a grid of typologies of participation based on the increasing levels of 
involvement of participants. Low levels of involvement are associated with informative and educational purposes; 
medium level of involvement is associated with consultative purposes; whereas high levels of participants’ 
involvement are associated with decisional purposes. Our research purpose in this study is mainly informative 
(i.e., defining hospital performance and identifying the mechanisms that comprise it) and to some extent 
consultative (i.e., providing stakeholders with new policy insights that would foster performance in healthcare 
services in the long term). Thus, a medium level of participation is indicated for our study, based on Green and 
Hunton‐Clarke’s (2003) framework.  
At a first glance, our research might seem more suited to Participatory System Dynamics Modelling, as it 
focuses on the public sector; or to community‐based system dynamics, as it suggests the implementation of a new 
policy.  However, in participatory system dynamics modelling the emphasis is on testing different scenarios 
together with the stakeholders and then compare and prioritise options, while in our study stakeholders will be 
involved only during the first stages of qualitative modelling of the hospital performance CLD, as the focus is on 
inductively elicit their mental models and information rather than on testing different policies. Seemingly, 
community‐based system dynamics focuses on the implementation of the new policy and presumes a long‐term, 
deep commitment from the part of the researcher, whereas in our research focus will be on the first stages of 
problem identification and system conceptualisation and the time constraints of the PhD program do not permit 
for a long-term commitment by the researcher. Furthermore, those last two approaches which are more focused 




Black (2013) used the theories of social construction, distributed cognition and boundary-objects to “add 
science to the craft of GMB”. She explained how SD models function as “boundary objects” under certain 
conditions and help visually in participatively create shared understanding and meaning. In his article The impact 
of group model building on behaviour, Rouwette (2016) also states that in GMB studies the researchers’ interest 
has shifted from the “participants as sources of information” (i.e., using participants to elicit their knowledge) to 
the “participants as recipients of information” (i.e., changes in participants’ knowledge and behaviour after the 
GMB, which is essential for the implementation of the model insights, recommendations and policies) and later 
on to  “participants as actively constructing information” (i.e., focusing on the participants’ behaviour during the 
GMB sessions and to the interaction between receiving and contributing information, in order to understand more 
of the underlying mechanisms that during the GMB sessions lead to changes in participants’ knowledge and 
behaviour).  
The decision by participants to share information during GMB is crucial to the modelling effort and, in 
order for this effort to succeed, interaction in GMB sessions is carefully structured in specially designed steps and 
procedures called “scripts” (Andersen & Richardson, 1997). Scripts are fairly sophisticated pieces of small group 
processes which - when placed together in a sequence - comprise a full modelling day and create products and 
deliverables (Andersen & Richardson, 1997).  In their article “Scripts for group model building” Andersen and 
Richardson (1997) give practical insights regarding preparation of the GMB sessions (i.e., planning, scheduling, 
roles that facilitators undertake, closing and summing up). They also analytically present some of the scripts that 
they have developed in more than 15 years of experience with GMB session, and make explicit to modelers how 
and when to use each one as a “best practice” for high-quality GMB sessions. We followed closely those 
suggestions in the preparation and planning of our GMB sessions, as we will analytically present in the chapter 
4.4.1. 
Finally, Scott et al. (2015) reviewed GMB papers between 2002-2015 to identify when and how GMB 
should be applied and improved. They concluded, among others, that future research should focus on studies with 
applied settings (e.g., field experiments on applied problems) and on studies that are augmenting survey results 
with more objective measures (e.g., pretests and posttests). Following Scott et al.’s (2015) suggestion of 
“augmenting survey results with more objective measures” in GMB projects, in this empirical study we prepared 
and used a pretest and a posttest, together with the CICC6 questionnaire in order to have an objective measure of 
validating the outcomes of our GMB sessions. We created the pretests and posttests beforehands, and we gave 
them to the participants right before and right after the GMB sessions to fill them in, so as to be able to observe 
and evaluate the differences in their answers. Both pretests and posttests consisted of the same two-pages, asking 
participants the exact same four questions, namely: to describe the main problem related to hospital performance 
that their department/division is currently facing; its causes; its consequences; and any actions for improvement 
 
6 As a means of better relating, understanding and evaluating GMB process elements and their effects, Vennix et al. (1993, 
2000) designed the CICC questionnaire, where each of the four letters represents one of the four scales of the questionnaire, namely: 
Consensus, Insight, Communication and Commitment to action (CICC). This questionnaire has been shown as an effective way to add 




they could think of. 
 
Figure 14. Choosing between different Participation Practices:  
Approach & Research Strategy per Research Question 
 
 
3.5.4 Choosing between different Stakeholder Categories (Stakeholder Analysis) 
We mostly agree with the view of Bryson (2004) that in the public sector it is wise to begin any stakeholder 
identification and analysis procedures with a more inclusive definition. Thus, we decided to adopt a broad view 
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in the hospital, in the PM system or in the healthcare system in general. Such people or groups of people involved, 
somehow, in the hospital performance include: hospital managers and quality managers, the hospital board of 
directors, administration staff, hospital workers, doctors, nurses, patients of different ages, patients’ families and 
friends, hospital suppliers and other external collaborators, NGOs relevant to health issues, workers’ associations 
and labour unions, journalists and press/media owners, politicians and decision makers, workers and managers of 
regional health offices and of the Ministry of Health. This list is very long, and we certainly could not afford to 
include all those people in our GMB sessions, thus we conducted a stakeholder analysis in order to decide which 
of those stakeholder categories are the most relevant and the most appropriate for our research purposes.  
In their article Reviewing the role of stakeholders in Operational Research: A stakeholder theory 
perspective, the authors (De Gooyert et al., 2017) discuss a framework - drawn from stakeholder’s theory - for 
appropriate selection and effective work with stakeholders in Operational Research studies and/or in 
organisations’ practice, such as during participative workshops. First, they try to answer why stakeholders’ 
involvement is crucial (instrumental versus moral stakeholder theory; focusing on trade-offs versus focusing on 
avoiding trade-offs; and focusing on the decision-making organization versus focusing on stakeholder 
engagement). Then they try to answer how stakeholders are more effectively involved and how we should better 
work with them, depending on the purpose of the workshop, the role of the analyst, the type of data used, and the 
intended results (optimizing, balancing, structuring and involving). Following their paradigm, and in order to 
choose among the options available the one that best suits our research objectives, we constructed a grid upon 
which we decided what stakeholders to involve and which participation practice to use. The intention here was to 
coherently and consistently answer three fundamental questions: WHY (for what reasons, with what purpose), 
WHO (what people and groups of people) and HOW (using what participation practice) to involve stakeholders. 
The third question “HOW” (using what participation practice) is already answered in chapter 3.5.4, where we 
analytically present the reasons why we finally chose Group Model Building as the participation practice to involve 
stakeholders in our research study. Now we will show the logic according to which we answered to the “WHY” 
and “WHO” questions. 
Bryson (2004) first proposed that stakeholders’ identification and analyses technique should be chosen 
carefully, depending on the context, the purpose, the expected results and other factors. In the public and non-
profit sectors, problems are almost always “wicked” as problem owners are diffuse in the society, and the 
responsibility of fixing those problems is also diffused in many groups and individuals, making it more difficult 
for decisions that satisfy them all to be found and – even worse – implemented. Seemingly, De Gooyert et al. 
(2017) claimed that stakeholders’ identification should be linked to the purpose of the workshop and the intended 
results. This means that we cannot fully answer the “WHO” question unless we first answer the “WHY” question. 
Thus, we first tried to answer the “WHY” question, i.e., for what reasons and with what purpose we are involving 
stakeholders in our research. We concluded that the main reasons for involving stakeholders in our study are: (1) 
Expertise and specific knowledge on aspects of hospital performance; (2) Support and consensus building on what 
is hospital performance and what are its mechanisms; (3) Better implementation; (4) Diversity of views and 
validation of the model through disconfirmation; (5) Improving relationships between stakeholders; and (6) 
74 
 
Understanding stakeholders’ needs and interests. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) propose that stakeholders’ identification and salience (descriptive theory) should be 
dynamically decided based upon the existence in a group of people of three attributes:1) legitimacy of their relation 
with the firm, 2) power to influence the firm, 3) urgency of their claim on the firm. By legitimacy the authors 
mean the “generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Mitchell et al., 1997, pp. 866); 
by power “the ability of those who possess it to bring about the outcomes they desire” (Mitchell et al., 1997, pp 
865); and by urgency the “degree to which stakeholders claim for immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, pp. 
867). We could think of legitimacy as a moral/ethical attribute of social responsibility (idealistic/ deterministic 
view of the world), whereas we can think of power and urgency as an amoral/unethical attribute of social 
responsiveness (imperfect/ stochastic -socially and behaviourally constructed - view of the world). Since, 
according to the authors, all three views (power, urgency, legitimacy) must be taken into account during the 
stakeholders identification, we should select and invite to the GMB sessions: stakeholders who should ethically 
or typically be present in the GMB sessions (legitimacy); stakeholders whose opinion really counts (power); 
stakeholders who are indeed interested in participating (urgency).  
Summarising and combining all the participation and stakeholder theories and criteria that the above-
mentioned studies provide us with, and in order to choose among the options available the ones that suits best our 
research objectives, we constructed a grid upon which we decided what stakeholders to involve and what 
participation practice to use. Again, the intention here was to coherently and consistently answer three fundamental 
questions here: WHY (for what reasons, with what purpose), WHO (what people and groups of people) and HOW 
(using what participation practice) to involve stakeholders. In the following grid we summarise the above-
mentioned stakeholder analysis, regarding the “WHY”, “HOW” and “WHO” questions. 
 


















































































































don't do sd in 
isolation" 









urgency have a 
higher interest in 
the problem, so 
they want to get 
info on the 
problem and they 
want to solve it) 

























Consultative GMB. The 
more likely 
they are to 
resist, the 
more I give 
them. If they 
are less 






and in the 
end. But the 







dont need to 
include people 
who cannot/have 





hospital workers, doctors, 































1.Power (but also 
frontline workers 
who will have to 
implement the 
change, have 
power to resist - 




NGOs relevant to health 
issues, workers’ 
associations and labour 
unions, journalists and 
press/media owners, 
politicians and decision 
makers, workers and 
managers of regional 
health offices and of the 



































hospital managers and 
quality managers 
administration staff, 
hospital workers, doctors, 


















(BUT only if 
I want to 




a GMB and 
invite them 





Not Urgency (but 
they might 
become urgent in 
the future, so I 
may want to 
involve them) 
hospital managers and 
quality managers 
administration staff, 
hospital workers, doctors, 


















Urgency NGOs relevant to health 
issues, workers’ 
associations and labour 
unions, journalists and 
press/media owners, 
politicians and decision 
makers, workers and 
managers of regional 
health offices and of the 





As mentioned already, we concluded that the main reasons for involving stakeholders in our study, 
answering to the “WHY” question, are: 1)Expertise and specific knowledge on aspects of hospital performance, 
2)Support and consensus building on what is hospital performance and what are its mechanisms, 3)Better 
implementation,  4)Diversity of views and validation of the model through disconfirmation, 5) Improving 
relationships between stakeholders, 6)Understanding stakeholders’ needs and interests. We decided that between 
those reasons, the most important ones for the purposes of our study are: 1) Expertise and specific knowledge on 
aspects of hospital performance, 2) Support and consensus building on what is hospital performance and what are 
its mechanisms, 4) Diversity of views and validation of the model through disconfirmation, and 5) Improving 
relationships between stakeholders. 
As obvious from the above grid, for those reasons the best-suiting approach is GMB, and the most relevant 
stakeholder categories are: hospital managers and quality managers, administration staff, hospital workers, 
doctors, nurses, and patients of different ages. Thus, our extensive stakeholder analysis identified those five 
stakeholder categories as the most appropriate for our research purposes:   hospital managers, doctors, nurses, 
paramedics and patients. 
 
3.6 Research Design 
Including the research methods that we used, our research purpose is informed as follows: The purpose of 
this case-based, theory-oriented research study is to: (1) Empirically conceptualise a qualitative system dynamics 
model or Causal Loop Diagram (Forrester, 1961; Richardson & Pugh,1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000) of hospital 
performance, as perceived by stakeholders of a Greek public hospital who are participating in Group Model 
Building sessions (Andersen & Richardson, 1997; De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; Richardson 
& Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996); (2) Use this model in order to explain the negative consequences of the Greek 
healthcare reform on hospital performance, and (3) Provide policymakers with the tools to re-design health 
policies in Greece using the Dynamic Performance Management approach (Bianchi, 2016). 
Furthermore, this research attempted to address the following research questions, where in parenthesis after 
each research question we note the corroborative type of knowledge that the research question is seeking to acquire 
(Denscombe, 2012, p.78).  
1. How do stakeholders define hospital performance? (Descriptive) 
2. What are the main feedback loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders? (Descriptive) 
3. How can those feedback loops explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform? 
(Explanatory) 
4. What are the main strategic resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main 
performance drivers that are impacting intermediate products and end results? (Explanatory) 
5. What are the practical implications of the study for policy design in Greek public hospitals? (Prescriptive) 
In their article Best practices in system dynamics modeling Martinez- Moyano and Richardson (2013) 
identified 72 best practices suggested by 25 experts in the SD field, and they grouped them by importance (average, 
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high, highest) into six categories, which represent the six stages of the SD modeling process. 27 of those practices 
were rated as the most important. Most of those 27 practices were taken into consideration during the whole 
research procedure of this study, i.e., while creating the interview guide; while preparing and conducting the 
interviews and the GMB sessions; and while analysing the data and drawing the conclusions. The six SD stages 
mentioned by Martinez-Moyano and Richardson (2013) are found in most SD textbooks under the same or similar 
names, and are followed by most researchers in the SD community. Those steps, which are followed in an iterative 
way, are adapted in our research study as follows: (1) Problem identification and definition, (2) System 
conceptualisation, (3) Model formulation, (4) Model analysis, testing & evaluation, (5) Policy analysis, and (6) 
Model use, implementation and dissemination.  
 
Figure 16. The six stages of System Dynamics Modeling. Source: Moyano & Richardson (2013, p. 108). 
 
 
Costanza and Ruth (1998) introduced a 3-step process for SD participatory modeling projects on wicked 
socio-economic problems: (1) Initial scoping and consensus building stage (initial model of high-generality, low 
resolution); (2) Realistic research modeling stage (collection of historical data for calibration, testing and analysis 
of areas of uncertainty); and (3) High precision management model stage (producing scenarios, adaptive 
management options and policy recommendations). The authors note that those three stages should be followed 
in this order, as jumping to conclusions before building enough consensus would probably be catastrophic for the 
project’s success, as well as that maintaining stakeholders’ involvement during all three stages is crucial for the 
success of the process. They also state that there is a trade-off between increasing the model’s resolution and 
complexity on the one side and keeping the model’s accuracy and predictability, on the other side; thus, we chose 
an intermediate resolution level in the second stage. Our research followed those three stages proposed by 
Costanza and Ruth (1998) combined with the six steps described above, although giving different attention to each 
of those stages as we will explain further on in this section.  In the following pages, we analytically present the 








Methods for RQ1: How do stakeholders define hospital performance? (Descriptive) 
In order to answer this research question, we followed an inductive approach and used divergent techniques 
of qualitative SD modelling in order to empirically conceptualise hospital performance as a system, perceived by 
the hospital stakeholders. The stages of SD modeling which correspond to this Initial Scoping & Consensus 
Building phase of modeling were: Problem Definition and Model Conceptualisation. More specifically, for the 
Problem Definition we: 
(1) Conducted a scoping review of the international literature of PM in Healthcare, in order to first identify and 
highlight gaps in the literature regarding the negative outcomes of PM policies on performance of Healthcare 
services; 
(2) Conducted a critical review of the Greek literature around the negative effects and consequences of the PM 
policies adopted by public hospitals after the Greek healthcare reform, in order to define the problem of low 
hospital performance and the Reference Mode; 
(3) Conducted a narrative analysis of the open-access documents collected and of the preliminary interviews 
conducted with four hospital stakeholders, in order to enrich and validate our critical review findings and 
strengthen our hospital performance definition through triangulation. 
For the Model Conceptualisation we: 
(4) Conducted an extensive stakeholder analysis, in order to decide upon the key stakeholder categories which 
better serve our research purposes, prepare and organise the GMB sessions, and prepare the first part of the 
Disconfirmatory Interview Guide; 
(5) Conducted GMB sessions (in Greek) with ten stakeholders of the case-hospital, in order to define hospital 
performance according to participant stakeholders and build the Scoping Model of Hospital Performance 
(divergent CLD version, created with stakeholders), which we translated in English. 
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Methods for RQ2: What are the main feedback loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by 
stakeholders? (Descriptive) 
In order to answer to this research question, we followed a deductive approach and used convergent 
techniques of qualitative SD modelling (Causal Loop diagrams) to empirically model hospital performance as a 
system perceived by the participant stakeholders. The stages of SD modeling which correspond to this Realistic 
Research Modelling phase were: Model Formulation & Calibration and Model Analysis & Evaluation. More 
specifically, for the Model Formulation & Calibration we: 
(6) Conducted Disconfirmatory Interviews (Andersen et al., 2012) with stakeholders of other Greek public 
hospitals in order to refine, enrich, strengthen and validate the Scoping Model of Hospital Performance (divergent 
CLD version, created with stakeholders of the case hospital); 
(7) Conducted a Critical Review of the international literature around the model variables, in order to validate our 
model variables, the causal relations and loops through triangulation; 
(8) Conducted a number of structure tests, in order to increase confidence in our model; 
(9) After validation and calibration, the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (Convergent CLD version) 
was created and took its final form, ready to be used as the basis for our model analysis. 
For the Model Analysis & Evaluation we: 
(10) Defined, explained and discussed all the model variables and causal links, according to the participant 
stakeholders; 
(11) Recognised, nominated, explained and discussed all the model loops, which constitute the mechanisms that 
the hospital performance is comprised of according to the participant stakeholders. 
 
Methods for RQ3: How can those feedback loops explain the documented negative outcomes of the 
Greek healthcare reform? (Explanatory) 
In order to answer to this research question, we also followed a deductive approach and used convergent 
techniques of qualitative SD modelling (Causal Loop diagrams) to analyse the hospital performance as a system, 
perceived by the hospital stakeholders. The stage of SD Modeling which corresponds to this Realistic Research 
Modelling phase was again the Model Analysis & Evaluation. More specifically, we: 
(12) Conducted a Critical Review of the Greek literature around the negative consequences of the healthcare 
reform, in order to gather and list all the documented counterintuitive negative outcomes of the current 
performance management policies on the hospital performance; 
(13) Conducted an Analysis of the loops of the model, in order to derive Dynamic Hypotheses that could explain 
the documented negative outcomes on performance. 
 
Methods for RQ4: What are the main strategic resources impacting hospital performance measures 




In order to answer this research question, we followed a deductive approach (DPM methodology) and used 
convergent techniques. More specifically, we:  
(14) Identified in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance the variables which constitute Strategic 
Resources, Performance Drivers, and End Results; 
(15) Identified in the Policy Model of Hospital Performance the variables which constitute Strategic Resources, 
Performance Drivers, End Results; 
(16) Transformed the Policy Model of Hospital Performance (Convergent CLD version) model into a DPM 
canvas; 
(17) Analysed it according to the Instrumental, Objective and Subjective DPM views. 
 
Methods for RQ5: What are the practical implications of the study for policy design in Greek public 
hospitals? (Prescriptive) 
In order to answer this research question, we followed a deductive approach and used prioritisation 
techniques of qualitative SD modelling (Causal Loop Diagrams) to empirically create and analyse the Policy 
Model of Hospital Performance, as deducted from the documents analysis. The stages of SD Modeling which 
correspond to this High Precision Management Model phase were: Policy Analysis and Model Implementation & 
Use. 
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In this study, we adopted a systemic (Meadows, 2008), participatory (Kiraly & Miskolczi, 2019), inductive 
(Luna-Reyes & Anderson, 2003) and dynamic (Bianchi, 2016) approach by combining the methodologies of 
Group Model Building (Andersen & Richardson, 1997; De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; 
Richardson & Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996;), and System Dynamics Modeling (Forrester, 1961; Richardson & 
Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000) into the Dynamic Performance Management Approach (Bianchi, 2016). Our 
main methodological approach, the so-called Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) approach (Bianchi, 
2016) is a combination between traditional Performance Management in the public sector (Bouckaert & Halligan, 
2007; Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Elg et al., 2013; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005) and the System Dynamics (SD) 
methodology. It has already been successfully used to support decision-making processes in organisational, 
institutional and governmental settings (Bianchi, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2017; Bianchi & Tomaselli, 2015; 
Borgonovi et al., 2018; Munteanu & Newcomer, 2020; Noto & Noto, 2019), while it also permits engaging 
stakeholders both from the internal and external environment. Other research traditions identified in our study are 
the Stakeholders Theory (Bryson, 2004; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997; De Gooyert et al., 2017) and 
Participation (Király & Miskolczi, 2019; King & Kraemer, 1993; Rouwette, 2016; Schweiger et al., 2018). All 
those approaches stand in the constructivist side of the continuum as research approaches, because they all 
consider realities as subjective, complex and multi-layered, actively shaped by perceptions and opinions of 




We followed a qualitative approach as the emphasis of our study was on eliciting knowledge stored in the 
mental models of participants and on knowledge-building (Turner et al., 2014).). Through the modelling sessions, 
this knowledge was elicited and stored in the model of hospital performance, which is again a qualitative system 
dynamics model showing the causal links between different variables related to performance (Causal Loop 
Diagram). Emphasis on causality is another reason why a qualitative approach was selected, as causality cannot 
be easily inferred by merely quantitative approaches. A qualitative approach has made it easier to elicit and depict 
those causal relations between different factors, according to the participants’ experience, beliefs and perceptions. 
In accordance with De Gooyert (2016, 2018), this exploratory study used a case-based (Grounded Theory 
Building) strategy, which iteratively uses existing theory and case qualitative data for model building to make a 
theoretical contribution in the field of performance management in the public sector using the Dynamic 
Performance Management approach.  More specifically, this theory-oriented research project used a case-study in 
order to shed light on how hospital performance is perceived by stakeholders in a Greek public hospital and what 
mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic behaviour). All those stakeholders’ perceptions were captured in a model, 
and the model was used in order to explain the documented, counterintuitive negative outcomes on the hospital 
performance which followed the Greek healthcare reform.  
According to De Gooyert and Größler (2018) there are many differences between applied and theoretical 
SD modelling. Those differences had several implications for the research design, and more specifically for the 
modeling steps that we followed, for the data collected and for the model boundary. Following the paradigm of 
De Gooyert et al. (2017) for appropriate selection and effective work with stakeholders, and in order to choose 
among the options available the one that best suits our research objectives, we constructed a grid upon which we 
decided what kind of stakeholders to involve; which participation practice to use; and how to implement this 
practice and involve them. Again, the intention here was to coherently and consistently answer three fundamental 
questions: WHY (for what reasons, with what purpose to involve stakeholders); HOW (using what participation 
practice to involve stakeholders); and WHO (what stakeholders or groups of stakeholders to involve). Our 
extensive stakeholder analysis and the grid created revealed that the best-suiting approach is GMB, and the most 
relevant stakeholder categories are: hospital managers and quality managers, administration staff, hospital 




CHAPTER 4 – DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS 
 
In chapter 4 we analytically present and describe the methods used to conduct our research. More 
specifically, we describe the data sources (i.e., literature, documents, participants); the data collection methods 
(i.e., documents collection, preliminary interviews, planning of GMB sessions, disconfirmatory interviews) and 
the material prepared and used for the data collection;  the procedure of the whole research project in general and 
of the GMB sessions in particular; the procedures undertaken regarding gaining access to the case hospital; as 
well as the methods used for the data analysis. 
 
4.1 Data Sources  
Mixed methods were used to facilitate our approach, combining primary qualitative data from two Group 
Model Building (GMB) sessions, four open, unstructured preliminary interviews and seven semi-structured, 
disconfirmatory interviews, with secondary qualitative data from a scoping and from a critical literature review 
and from official, open-access, online text-documents and closed-access, internal text-documents of the hospital’s 
interdepartmental communication.  
Literature: Qualitative data were initially drawn from the literature in order to present the state of the art 
in the field and point where the literature discussion is at the moment and identify gaps.  
Documents: The official, open-access, online, digital text-documents that we collected and used were 
circulars and other official documents regarding the legislation and implementation of performance management 
policies and policies for performance improvement in Greece, as well as documents and publications regarding 
targets and objectives of governing and regulating bodies. Those documents included circulars, official decisions, 
regulations and statements of performance targets, frameworks and objectives. The official, closed-access, paper-
printed text-documents of the hospital’s interdepartmental communication mostly regarded performance targets 
set by the different departments of the case hospital, and included minutes of hospital council’s meetings; decisions 
of the Quality Committee of the Hospital; and other official documents of the hospital’s official internal (intra-
departmental and interdepartmental) communication. 
Participants: All the participants were stakeholders of the case hospital, who necessarily needed to fall 
into the five stakeholder categories that our extensive stakeholder analysis identified, namely: hospital managers, 
doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients.  
Starting from the gatekeeper, who was identified through an open call for participation sent to many 
hospitals by the researcher, snowball sampling was used to select 10 participants for the GMB sessions in total, 
including at least one person from each main key-stakeholder category, all of whom were employees or patients 
of the case hospital. A group of ten employees of the case hospital (one hospital manager, one doctor, five nurses-
three of whom were managers of their nursing departments, one paramedic and two patients) joined each of the 
two sessions. We made sure that the group of participants included at least one person from each main key-
stakeholder category that our extensive stakeholder analysis identified, and that among those ten people there was 
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at least one representative of each of the four divisions of the hospital (administrative, technical, nursing and 
medical). Four of them (including the gatekeeper) were also interviewed before the GMB sessions (face-to-face, 
one-to-one preliminary interview). 
The GMB sessions were conducted a few weeks before the first coronavirus total lockdown in Greece and 
because of the coronavirus emergency (which prohibited further visits to the case-hospital or to other hospitals, 
and inhibited the possibility to continue the snowball sampling) we used convenient sampling in order to identify 
seven more participants for the disconfirmatory interviews. Those seven individuals were again public hospital 
stakeholders who fall into the five main key-stakeholder categories and each one of them works or has been 
hospitalized in a different public hospital. Thus, we had participant stakeholders from seven different public 
hospitals of different regions and cities of Greece (Heraklion Crete, Sitia, Thessaloniki, Athens, Giannena, Kavala, 
Kalamata) which strengthens the validity of our findings. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
Documents Collection: The official, open-access, online digital text-documents we used were found and 
downloaded from the websites of WHO7 and of the European Institute of Public Administration8, from the 
websites of the Greek Ministry of Health9, of the Greek Ministry of Finance10, of the Greek Ministry of Interior 
and Administrative Reconstruction11, from the websites of 1st and 2nd Health Regions of Athens12 and of the Greek 
National Quality Institutions ESYP13 and EKAPTY14, as well as from the website of the web-based repository of 
BI-Health15 and finally from the website of the case hospital16. Some of them were not easily accessible, so the 
 
7 Retrieved from: https://www.who.int/hospitals/management-and-quality/en/ 
 https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/107808/E89742.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
   https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/107808 
   https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/107591 
 
8 Retrieved from: https://www.eipa.eu/portfolio/european-caf-resource-centre/ 
 
9 Retrieved from: https://www.moh.gov.gr/articles/ministry 
https://www.moh.gov.gr/articles/news/4541-strathgikoi-stoxwn-kai-aksones-parembashs-toy-ypoyrgeioy-ygeias-gia-     
tis-yphresies-ygeias-ths-xwras-me-xronikh-periodo-efarmoghs-thn-trietia-2017-2020-raquo 
 
10 Retrieved from: https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/4369/2016 
 
11 Retrieved from: https://e-quality.ydmed.gov.gr/index.php,    
  https://www.ypes.gr/koino-plaisio-axiologisis-kpa-egcheiridio-kai-odigos-efarmogis/# 
  https://web.archive.org/web/20110117140328/http://www.gspa.gr/ 
  https://www.ypes.gr/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/20170804_odhgos_efarm.pdf 
 
12 Retrieved from: http://www.1dype.gov.gr/?page_id=424 
  https://www.2dype.gr/yphresies/oikonomiki-dieuthinsi/oikonomika-stoixeia 
 
13 Retrieved from: http://www.esyp.eu/ 
 
14 Retrieved from:  
  https://www.hellascert.gr/ta-meli/ekapty-ae-ethniko-kentro-aksiologisis-tis-poiotitas-kai-technologias-stin-ygeia-a-e/ 
 
15 Retrieved from: http://portal.bi.moh.gov.gr/ 
 




researcher identified them with the help of the gatekeeper who is the manager of the quality department of the 
case hospital. 
The closed-access, internal text-documents of the hospital’s interdepartmental communication were 
gathered by the gatekeeper (who is also one of the participants in the GMB sessions and an employee/ manager 
of the quality department of the case-hospital) and were sent as a scanned hard copy to the researcher via email. 
They are available in Appendix 16 and Appendix 17.  
Preliminary Interviews: Those were open, unstructured interviews, conducted with four of the hospital 
workers, including the quality manager and the gatekeeper. Those interviews had the purpose of getting in touch 
with the participants, understand the situation in the hospital and the challenges they face and decide upon the 
scope of the research and the procedure of the GMB sessions that the researcher would follow, e.g., weather to 
start from scratch or use a concept model17 (Richardson, 2013). No specific interview guide was used for those 
interviews. During the interviews, and according to the flow of the talk, the researcher asked from the participants 
to talk about: their everyday tasks; priorities and things which are considered important in their work; main 
challenges and problems they face in their work; performance issues they can think of in the department or unit 
of the hospital where they work. 
GMB Sessions: We decided to start from scratch our GMB sessions, and not to use a concept model18  
because it was considered important by the researcher that the group would “own” the model and that the concept 
model would not become an “anchor” (Richardson, 2013). Thus, starting from a concept model was considered 
too risky for the success of the process and was avoided, in order to keep the participants’ motivation, attention 
and originality of ideas, but also in order not to guide them in any way. Starting the model from scratch is also a 
way to verify our findings from the literature review and strengthens the external validity of our research results.  
For the preparation of the GMB sessions we used the preparation procedures and the Scripts for group 
model building proposed by Anderson and Richardson (1997) and by the Scriptapedia19. Scripts are fairly 
sophisticated pieces of small group process (Anderson & Richardson, 1997) that were placed end-to-end in a 
sequence in order to help the researcher prepare and facilitate the full two-day modeling conference of GMB 
sessions in the case. More specifically, we borrowed the  Preceding Scripts (Creating a Shared Vision of Modeling 





17 The concept models (Richardson, 2013) are, according to the authors, small models artfully designed to introduce elements of 
the system dynamics approach to participants in a group model building intervention and to initiate discussion. They are small, incomplete 
pieces of System Dynamics model structure prepared by the researcher or facilitator, to be used as a starting point for the Group Model 
Building sessions. They can be constructed in the form of a small, incomplete “Causal Loop Diagram” or “Stock and Flow model”. 
 
18 Concept models have the advantage of introducing participants to the problem at hand, to the iconography of System Dynamics 
and simulation software, and to motivate the group discussion on model conceptualization fast, without too many technical details and 
explanations. However, the use of concept models entail a number of dangers, as described in the article by Richardson (2013). 
 
19 Scriptapedia is a guide to Group Model Building, meant to be a widely available and conveniently edited book to promote the 
development of new scripts; the discussion of what works and what doesn't work; and the internationalization of the group modeling 




scripts, together with the following scripts, which we adapted according to our special needs and goals: Elephant 
Parable, Modeling Project Community Presentation, Hopes and Fears, Graphs Over Time, Variable Elicitation, 
Initial Policy Options, Nominal Group Technique, Creating Causal Loop Diagram from Variable List, Initiating 
and Elaborating a "Causal Loop Diagram", Next Steps and Closing, and Key Take-Away. 
Disconfirmatory Interviews: Those interviews mostly had the purpose of validating and increasing 
confidence in the model, by using stakeholders from different hospitals to “disconfirm” variables or links of the 
model created in the case hospital. An interview guide was used for those interviews, available in Appendix 10.  
Those interviews were composed of two different parts. The first part contained open questions on four 
different modules: (1) Performance Roles and Duties; (2) Performance definition and related variables; (3), 
Performance mechanisms; and (4) Performance measures. Those modules and the questions that each module 
contained were created based on the literature review and the preliminary results of our GMB sessions.  
The second part of the Disconfirmatory Interviews contained the discussion of the Scoping Model of 
Hospital Performance (i.e., the the divergent CLD model of hospital performance which was created by the GMB 
participants of the case hospital during the GMB sessions). Based on the interviewee’s agreement or disagreement 
on the causal relations and variables, we refined this model during the disconfirmatory interviews by deleting the 
causal relations and variables upon which the interviewees disagreed.  
Material: A wide range of documents and presentations were created to facilitate our research purposes. 
Since all our participants were Greek and all the interviews and GMB sessions were conducted in the Greek 
language, most of the material was translated in Greek for their convenience. The material created and used is 
presented in the list below and is available in the Appendixes of this thesis: 
(1) The material created and used for identifying the case hospital and the participant gatekeepers was a Call for 
Participants PowerPoint Presentation, available in Appendix 1. 
(2) The material created and used for sending the Formal Request for Access in the Case Hospital was an email, 
available in Appendix 2; an undersigned, official Request for Research Authorization, available in Appendix 3; a 
Signed Declaration of Research Ethics, available in Appendix 4; and a Signed Research Protocol, available in 
Appendix 5. The Formal Authorization of Conducting Research & Approval of Access in the Case Hospital is 
available in Appendix 6.   
(3) The material created and used for contacting the participants and organizing the GMB sessions was an email 
(available in Appendix 7), informing participants about the practicalities of the GMB sessions planned and the 
fact that some of them will be contacted privately to participate in the preliminary interviews the week before the 
GMB sessions.  
(4) The material created and used for the preliminary interviews was a Telephone Contact Guide, available in 
Appendix 8. 
(5) The material created and used for getting the participants’ consent and privacy statement was the Informed 
Consent & Privacy Statement Form, available in Appendix 9 (in Appendix 9a the Informed Consent & Privacy 
Statement Form is in English and in Appendix 9b in Greek).  
(6) The material created and used for inviting participants to the GMB sessions and informing them on the schedule 
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and content of those sessions was the Participants’ Agenda for the GMB Sessions, available in Appendix 11. 
(7) The material created and used for conducting and facilitating the GMB sessions was the PowerPoint 
Presentation during GMB Session 1 (available in Appendix 27) and the PowerPoint Presentation during GMB 
Session 2 (available in Appendix 28). 
(8) The material created and used for conducting the disconfirmatory interviews was the Interview Guide for the 
Disconfirmatory Interviews, available in Appendix 10. 
(9) The material that we created and asked from the GMB participants to fill in right before the beginning of the 
first GMB sessions was the Pretest Questionnaire – Initial Understanding of Hospital Performance, available in 
Appendix 12 (in Appendix 12a the Pretest Questionnaire is in English and in Appendix 12b in Greek).  
(10) The material that we created and asked from the GMB participants to fill in and hand in before the beginning 
of the second GMB sessions was the Participants’ Workbook, available in Appendix 15.  
(11) The material that we created and asked from the GMB participants to fill in right after the end of the second 
- and last - GMB sessions was the Posttest Questionnaire – Final Understanding of Hospital Performance, 
available in Appendix 13 (in Appendix 13a the Posttest Questionnaire is in English and in Appendix 13b in Greek) 
as well as the CICC Questionnaire – Evaluation of the GMB Sessions by the Participants, available in Appendix 
14 (in Appendix 14a the CICC Questionnaire is in English and in Appendix 14b in Greek). 
 
4.3 Access 
Ethics approval and special demands in terms of forms and authorisations are considered essential in 
healthcare research. As commonly, in our research as well, research and ethics approval required the development 
and submission of an “ethics protocol”, i.e., a separate form devised purely for the research purposes. Such forms 
pay detailed attention to the various ethical issues that might arise in relation to the research and are submitted for 
approval to Research Ethics Committees (Denscombe, 2012, p.132). 
Once we identified the case hospital (through the interest presented by the potential gatekeeper) we 
officially submitted a formal request to the Hospital’s Board of Directors (submitted in December 2019) for 
permission to conduct research inside the hospital. This email is available in Appendix 2. Because of the sensitive 
data this research involved, we were asked to submit a formal request for research approval and ethics approval 
to the hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee, providing them with the following additional documents, 
translated in Greek and undersigned by the researcher: (1) Researcher’s Statement (available in Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4) that the terms of personal data protection will be followed; that the names of the hospital and of the 
participants will not be exposed; and that the hospital will not be financially burdened by the research study; (2) 
University Certificate of Attendance, certifying the attendance of the researcher into a PhD position in the 
University of Palermo and specifying the research topic; (3) Research proposal and Ethics Protocol translated in 
Greek (available in Appendix 5); (4) Interview guide (available in Appendix 10). Both the Research and Ethics 
Committee and the Board of Directors of the hospital gave their consent to conduct the research and approved the 
researcher’s access to the Case Hospital (Formal Authorization available in Appendix 6). 
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4.4 Procedure  
The research was conducted over a sixteen-month period, from June 2019 until October 2020, while data 
collection took place over a five-month period (February-June 2020). Data analysis and drafting of the thesis 
report followed. 
In order to identify the case hospital where the GMB sessions would be conducted, we first created an open 
call for participation in the research (available in Appendix 1) and sent it to around 70 different hospitals in Athens 
and Thessaloniki, the two biggest cities of Greece. We then identified via telephone the manager of the quality 
department of the case hospital, who had got the email and was interested to participate and get her department 
and hospital - which is a public hospital situated in Athens - involved in the research. This individual was 
interviewed by the researcher (face-to-face, one-to-one preliminary interview), whereas she also helped with the 
authorisation procedures and played a key role as gatekeeper (Andersen & Richardson, 1997; Vennix, 1996) 
during the GMB sessions. Starting from this individual, snowball sampling was used to select 10 participants for 
the GMB sessions in total, including at least one person from each main key-stakeholder category that our 
extensive stakeholder analysis identified (managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients). 
After the completion of the authorization procedures, preliminary interviews (skype interviews, one-to-one) 
were conducted with three more participants, all workers of the case-hospital. The researcher communicated via 
emails and telephone with the participants (see Appendix 7: Email to Participants and Appendix 8: Telephone 
Contact Guide), in order to organize the practicalities of the preliminary interviews and GMB sessions. The same 
email was used to officially invite the participants to the GMB sessions and inform them on the schedule and 
content of those sessions (see Appendix 11: Participants’ Agenda for the GMB Sessions), as well as in order to 
give them instructions for filling in the questionnaires and the Consent Forms (see Appendix 9a: Informed Consent 
& Privacy Statement Form), and in order to hand out the material to them in the form of a pdf file. The gatekeeper 
helped at gathering the completed and signed documents from the participants in closed folders, and handed them 
in to the researcher before the GMB sessions.  
A series of two GMB sessions (each of them 5-hours long) on the topic “hospital performance” were 
organised at the case hospital, with the participation of ten case-hospital stakeholders and with the purpose of 
“eliciting” their mental models and “capturing” them in a qualitative system dynamics model (causal loop 
diagram). We started from scratch, without using any concept models (Richardson, 2013), simply by asking the 
stakeholders to define performance, and then step by step we identified variables and links. The researcher used 
two different PowerPoint presentations, one in each of the two GMB sessions (see Appendix 27: PowerPoint 
Presentation during GMB Session 1 and Appendix 28: PowerPoint Presentation during GMB Session 2) and a 
sequence of scripts (as described in section 4.2) in order to both facilitate GMB sessions and help participants start 
modeling. During the first GMB session, the researcher was mainly concerned with the identification of insights 
into the participants' perceptions, with the discovery of implications of the perceived behaviour of the system, as 
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well as with the development of a Reference Mode20 of behaviour and the construction of a feedback loop diagram. 
At the end of the first GMB session a work-in-process, “spaghetti” model was generated, which was simplified 
and calibrated by the researcher before the second session.  
The second session was a continuation of the first one, and it started by handing out a workbook (see 
Appendix 15: Participants’ Workbook) presenting the previous session’s model, refined by the researcher, to the 
participants. The workbook presented the whole model at the first page, and then the model was split in smaller 
parts in the next pages of the workbook.  The facilitator split participants into subgroups and encouraged them to 
work each group on one part of the model. In order to expand the model and insert policy structure in it, a list of 
ranked policy options was generated by the participants during the second session, based on the intervention points 
identified in the model. Only after the finalisation and consensus of the group on the model conceptualisation, the 
session focused on analysing the potential impact of external factors on the model created. Trade-offs between the 
short-term and the long-term effects on performance were investigated and implications and insights for policy 
interventions were discussed. As a final step, the policy interventions identified were presented using the DPM 
approach and mapping of the variables involved, so as to make plausible suggestions to managers for their future 
implementation. The final part of the second session was dedicated to policy evaluation during which the facilitator 
presented the final results of the model and explained how its behaviour changes under the effect of the different 
policies identified. This resulted in a list of model improvements which were taken into account by the researcher 
while creating the final model. The final product of the GMB sessions was the Scoping Model of Hospital 
Performance; a "divergent" version of the CLD model of the hospital performance as perceived by the GMB 
participant stakeholders. In Appendix 20 the evolution of the model-building during the GMB sessions is 
documented. 
After translating in English, simplifying and refining that model to make it more “presentable”, we 
conducted seven disconfirmatory interviews according to the methodology described by Andersen et al. (2012). 
Based on the interview guide that we created (see Appendix 10: Interview Guide for the Disconfirmatory 
Interviews) we conducted seven disconfirmatory interviews with stakeholders from seven other hospitals in 
Greece, in order to validate the model and create the "convergent" version of the model; the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital performance (including only the variables and loops which all stakeholders from all hospitals agreed 
upon).  
Disconfirmatory interviews were composed of two different parts, as we mentioned in section 4.2. During 
the first part of the interview, we worked inductively with the participants, asking them open questions on four 
different modules: performance roles and duties; performance definition and related variables; performance 
mechanisms; and performance measures. During the second part, we showed to the participants the divergent 
model of the hospital performance model and we worked deductively with them, asking them clarifying questions 
on how they perceive some variables and links of the model, and encouraging them to disagree openly. We asked 
 
20 A Reference Mode is a graph of a variable over time. Reference Modes are used at the beginning of System Dynamics Projects  




them to think for every link if it “always” happens as described in the model or if it “sometimes” happens, 
according to their experience; if the answer was “sometimes” then we deleted the link or the variable in question. 
In this way, based on their agreement or disagreement on some of the causal relations and variables, we refined 
the divergent CLD model of hospital performance by deleting the causal relations and variables upon which the 
interviewees disagreed, and we derived the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. Then we simplified that 
model as described in chapter 8.1, and created a Simplified Conceptual Model used to derive the set of hypotheses, 
conduct our analysis and answer our research questions. 
All interviews and GMB sessions were conducted in the Greek language for the participants’ convenience. 
Thus, most of the material was originally prepared in English and was then translated into Greek. The GMB 
presentations and authorisation material were created only in Greek.  All interviews and GMB sessions were tape-
recorded in order to be used during the analysis phase. VENSIM (Ventana) software was used to facilitate 
modelling during the GMB sessions, and both VENSIM (Ventana) and STELLA ARCHITECT (isee systems) 
software were used for the model analysis and for the presentation of the results.  
In the next two sections we will introduce the reader to the methods used for the design and preparation of 
the GMB sessions, we will report the actual process of background modeling and facilitation and the group 
dynamics between GMB participants will also be discussed. 
 
4.4.1 Design, Preparation and Logistics of the GMB Sessions 
As mentioned above, the research conducted at the case hospital was divided into two GMB sessions of 
five hours each, the first of which was held on the 26th February 2020 and the second one on the 28th February 
2020. The GMB sessions were successfully organised and implemented during the last week of February 2020 - 
just a few weeks before the first coronavirus lockdown in Greece. This section discusses the methods used for the 
design, preparation and logistics of the GMB sessions. 
Logistics and group composition: In total, two GMB sessions with an average duration of five hours per 
session were held at the conference hall of the hospital. A group of ten employees from the case hospital (one 
hospital manager, one doctor, five nurses-three of whom were managers of their nursing departments, one 
paramedic and two patients) joined each of the two sessions. We made sure that the group of participants included 
at least one person from each main key-stakeholder category that our extensive stakeholder analysis identified, 
and that among those ten people there was at least one representative of each of the four divisions of the hospital 
(administrative, technical, nursing and medical).  
Set-up: For the preparation of the GMB sessions we used the preparation procedures and the Scripts for 
group model building proposed by Anderson and Richardson (1997) and by the Scriptapedia, as we mentioned in 
chapter 4.2. More specifically, we borrowed and used the Preceding Scripts (Creating a Shared Vision of 
Modeling Project, Logistics and Room Set Up, Process Mapping, Scheduling the Day) and the Follow-up 
(Debriefing) scripts for the sessions’ preparation and set-up. 
Both GMB sessions were facilitated by the researcher herself, who had the necessary expertise in facilitation 
and SD modelling, acquired as described in chapter 1.3 through intense coursework and facilitation of other GMB 
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projects of the Radboud University of Nijmegen. The sessions were divided according to Sterman’s (2000) SD 
modelling process and designed using scripts (Andersen & Richardson, 1997). We decided to start from scratch 
our GMB sessions, and not to use a concept model, because it was considered important by the researcher that the 
group would “own” the model and that the concept model would not become an “anchor”. A Participants’ Agenda 
for the GMB Sessions (available in Appendix 11) was created and handed out a few days before the sessions, in 
order to introduce participants to the GMB sessions, let them know what to expect and inform them on the time-
schedule of the sessions.  Two PowerPoint presentations (available in Appendix 27 and 28), one for each of the 
two GMB sessions, were created and used during the GMB sessions to keep the workflow smooth, the participants 
focused on the task and to facilitate time management.  
Process Mapping: The goals of the first GMB session were to introduce participants to the GMB work and 
method; to help them better understand and articulate the problem of low performance in order to define hospital 
performance and its Reference Mode21 during the last decade; and to start modelling, focusing on the causes of 
the problem of low performance. We borrowed and used the following scripts during the session, which we 
adapted according to our special needs and goals: Elephant Parable, Modeling Project Community Presentation, 
Hopes and Fears, Graphs Over Time, Variable Elicitation, Nominal Group Technique, Creating Causal Loop 
Diagram from Variable List, Initiating and Elaborating a "Causal Loop Diagram"22. Those scripts helped the 
group gain insight into the other participants’ mental models and generate the Reference Mode of behaviour. 
The goals of the second GMB session were to continue modelling, focusing on the symptoms, effects and 
consequences of low hospital performance, and finalise the model by “closing the loops”; to identify intervention 
points in the model and use them to develop, discuss and prioritise alternative policies that would foster hospital 
performance; and to create an action plan of necessary next steps and follow up. We borrowed and used the 
following scripts during the session, which we adapted according to our special needs and goals: Nominal Group 
Technique, Initial Policy Options, Next Steps and Closing, Key Take-Away23. Those scripts helped the group 
discover feedback loops through causal connections; create step-by-step a causal loop diagram of hospital 
performance; and use it to formulate alternative policies to foster performance in their hospital. 
 
4.4.2 Facilitation & Background Modeling during the GMB Sessions 
GMB is a combination of System Dynamics (SD) and Facilitation. The SD approach is a set of principles 
that are used to tackle complex problems in systems with dynamic structure, using both qualitative and quantitative 
modelling principles (Morecroft & Sterman, 1994) to conceptualize the underlying feedback loop structure of the 
system at hand in order to discover the repercussions of potential decisions over time (Sterman, 2000). The 
facilitation part of GMB is focused on eliciting information, exploring causes of action and evaluating policies 
between stakeholders. The main purpose of using facilitation in GMB sessions is to clarify the problem of low 
 
21 A Reference Mode is a graph of a variable over time. Reference Modes are used at the beginning of System Dynamics Projects  
in order to depict the behaviour of a key variable over time. For more information, see:  
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.201.8533&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
22 See: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Scriptapedia 
23 See: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Scriptapedia 
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hospital performance by providing a systemic view; foster understanding and consensus among participants 
through the alignment of participants’ mental models; and create commitment to the results of the project. The 
modellers of GMB rely on information contained within the mental models of the participant stakeholders, which 
represents the way someone perceives the reality (Huz et al., 1997). 
The researcher’s goal as a facilitator in the GMB sessions was to help participant stakeholders understand 
and look from different perspectives the multifaceted problem of low hospital performance; help them listen and 
learn from each other’s experience and expertise; and combine the different perspectives in one shared model, in 
order to find a common ground for policy alternatives. Right at the beginning of the first GMB session, and given 
the sensitivity of the topic, the facilitator intended to inspire intimacy and a positive atmosphere by setting ground 
rules that aimed to create a feeling of safety and trust among the group, and second by carrying out warm-up 
exercises where participants could express their personal history in the hospital and their feelings about their work. 
Moreover, the facilitator made use of various facilitation techniques in the GMB sessions to ensure quality of the 
process. These included: use of nominal group technique to stimulate group individuality; direct questions towards 
reserved participants, in order to help them open-up; use of a structured agenda and scripts; and specific time for 
reflection on the process within every session. During the sessions, a second person was hired by the researcher-
facilitator to be present in the room and help her with technical issues (i.e., changing slides, making sure that the 
projector and computer works, etc) and practicalities (i.e., preparing food and drinks during the breaks), so that 
the facilitator could be focused only on the GMB process and on ensuring constructive interaction between 
participants.  
Both GMB sessions were mainly focused on eliciting qualitative information. Thus, part of the modelling 
was performed in between the sessions to save time for participants and keep the flow of the sessions. The 
improvements were based on information shared by the participants during the session, and were introduced and 
thoroughly explained to the participants after the breaks or at the beginning of the second session. It is important 
to address the fact that model building is an iterative process which often requires to take a step back and reconsider 
some assumptions. In between sessions (i.e., the day after the first session, and a day before the beginning of the 
second session) the facilitator (researcher) provided participants with workbooks (available in Appendix 15) which 
contained an overview of the refined model of the previous session and some parts of the model that needed further 
refinement by participants. 
As part of the process, the researcher also took notes on group dynamics. These notes focused on non-verbal 
communication and they helped us understand the emotional life of the group (Phillips & Phillips, 1993), yielding 
insights on the distribution of power and conflict. Indeed, one of the most important findings we managed to 
observe was the interplay between the individual and the group (Phillips & Phillips, 1993) as the group atmosphere 
changed when certain group members left the group for a while. To our knowledge, there was no conflict that 
escalated beyond task conflict (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019). In fact, there was overall a positive atmosphere, often 
accompanied with jokes and laughter, which boosted group work and sharing. If we take the framework of 
Belbin’s (2010) team roles, we can say that the team abounded with team players, monitor evaluators and 
specialists; while it lacked completers, finishers, shapers and implementers.  
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Right from the beginning it was clear that the participants differed in their tendency to take leadership in 
the discussion. These differences were visible along several aspects such as: their expertise in the topic; how often 
they spoke; how long they spoke for; whether or not they were looking for confirmation from others. There are 
multiple possible explanations. One might be the form of hierarchy. As one might expect from a public, 
bureaucratic organisation (Mintzberg, 1979) the position of each participant in the organisation’s hierarchical 
pyramid seemed to determine to some extent the tendency to take the lead in the discussion or to defer to the 
backseat. Also, individual characteristics like tendency to assertiveness might have played a role in the process. 
Although there were documented differences in the leadership roles in the sessions, the participants all indicated 
that their mental models were reflected in the model and that they felt satisfied with the facilitation and the process. 
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
Scoping Review of the International Literature of Performance Management in the Health Sector: A 
Scoping Review of the international literature of performance management in the public healthcare sector around 
the negative consequences of performance management systems was initially conducted. This extended review 
was conducted in order to present the state of the art in the field and point where the literature discussion is at the 
moment; to identify and highlight gaps in the literature; and to explain the need for the research about to be 
conducted. This review concluded that researchers all around the globe have not yet come to an end as regards the 
supposed positive impact of traditional PM policies and reforms in healthcare and that some research has shown 
that, paradoxically, PM policies do not always lead to improved performance of hospital services and sometimes 
even cause unintended consequences and deterioration of health services quality.  
Critical Review of the Literature of the Greek Healthcare Reform: After that, a Critical Review of the 
literature of the Greek healthcare reform (articles published between 2009-2020) was undertaken, focusing on the 
outcomes, effects and consequences of the healthcare reform for public hospitals’ performance in Greece. This 
review was conducted in order to identify observations and practical implications of the Greek healthcare reform, 
as reported by other researchers; to examine their relevance with hospital performance; and to compare different 
perspectives and views. More specifically, we critically reviewed, collected and listed the new performance 
management policies adopted by public hospitals after the reform, as well as the negative consequences of the 
reform as regards both the “hard” variables (describing structure and process of the delivery of care, such as 
personnel, equipment and management systems) and the “soft” variables (describing outputs and outcomes of the 
reform, such as patient satisfaction and mortality rates).  
All those unintended consequences that our extensive literature review identified were summarised and 
listed accordingly. Moreover, the information gathered (i.e., the negative outputs and outcomes listed) were used 
in order to create the Reference Mode of our case-study. This review clearly showed that the PM policies 
introduced in Greek public hospitals after the reform had a negative impact on many aspects of hospital 
performance, but the mechanisms that led to this deterioration of performance are not clear. Furthermore, this 
critical review concluded that better understanding of the mechanisms that led to those unintended negative effects 
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in the case of Greece is crucial for the design of better healthcare policies in the future, and for facilitating hospital 
performance in the long-term.  
Stakeholder Analysis: Our stakeholder analysis was not simply based on a power-interest matrix, as in 
most research involving stakeholders. Instead, it was based on an extensive framework that we created taking into 
account our reasons for involving stakeholders one by one; connecting those reasons with the different uses of 
stakeholders’ involvement (i.e., normative, substantive, instrumental, transformative use)  according to Király and 
Miskolczi (2019); and then connecting the different methods of involving stakeholders identified in the literature 
with the appropriate levels of Stakeholders’ Involvement (Green & Hunton‐Clarke, 2003) for each use. This 
analysis is analytically presented and explained in chapters 3.5.3. and 3.5.4.. 
Narrative Analysis of Preliminary Interviews and Documents: The preliminary interviews and 
documents were narratively analysed with open codes and axial codes according to Turner et al.’s (2014) approach.  
The narrative analysis of those open-access and closed-access documents which regarded the Ministry’s and the 
hospital’s performance objectives were used in order to create the Policy Model of Hospital Performance, while 
some other findings from the critical literature review were used in order to validate the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance as well as the Policy Model of Hospital Performance.  
Qualitative SD Analysis (Causal Loop Diagram) of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance 
created during the GMB sessions: For the model building and analysis we used mainly qualitative system 
dynamics modeling or Causal Loop Diagrams (Forrester, 1961; Richardson & Pugh,1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000), 
and we followed the six stages research approach identified by Martinez-Moyano and Richardson (2013) as 
described in chapters 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Mixed methods were used to facilitate our approach, combining primary qualitative data from two Group 
Model Building (GMB) sessions, four open, unstructured preliminary interviews and seven semi-structured, 
disconfirmatory interviews, with secondary qualitative data from a scoping and from a critical literature review 
and from official, open-access, online text-documents and closed-access, internal text-documents of the hospital’s 
interdepartmental communication.  
An open call for participation in the research was sent by email to around 70 different hospitals in Athens 
and Thessaloniki, and the gatekeeper was identified. Starting from the gatekeeper, snowball sampling was used to 
select 10 participants for the GMB sessions, including at least one person from each main key-stakeholder category 
that our extensive stakeholder analysis identified (managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients), all of 
whom were employees or patients of the case hospital. Four of them were also interviewed before the GMB 
sessions (face-to-face, one-to-one preliminary interviews).  
Two GMB sessions (5-hours long each) on the topic “hospital performance” were organised at the case 
hospital a few weeks before the coronavirus total lockdown in Greece, with the participation of the ten stakeholders 
and with the purpose of “eliciting” their mental models and “capturing” them in a qualitative system dynamics 
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model (causal loop diagram). We started from scratch, simply by asking the stakeholders to define performance, 
and then step by step identified variables and links. As commonly, in our research as well, research and ethics 
approval required the development and submission of an “ethics protocol”, i.e., a separate form devised purely for 
the research purposes. 
Because of the coronavirus emergency which prohibited further visits to the case-hospital or to other 
hospitals, and inhibited the possibility to continue the snowball sampling, we used convenient sampling in order 
to identify seven more participants for the disconfirmatory interviews. Those seven individuals were again public 
hospital stakeholders who fall into the five main key-stakeholder categories and each one of them works or has 
been hospitalized in a different public hospital. Thus, we had participant stakeholders from seven different public 
hospitals of different regions and cities of Greece (Heraklion Crete, Sitia, Thessaloniki, Athens, Giannena, Kavala, 
Kalamata) which strengthens the validity of our findings.  
The data analysis included a Scoping Review of the International Literature of Performance Management 
in the Health Sector; a Critical Review of the Literature on the Greek Healthcare Reform; a Stakeholder Analysis; 
a Narrative Analysis of Preliminary Interviews and Documents; and a Qualitative SD Analysis (Causal Loop 
Diagram) of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance created during the GMB sessions.  The 
disconfirmatory interviews mostly had the purpose of validating and increasing confidence in the model, by using 




CHAPTER 5 - JUSTIFICATION OF THE CHOICE OF METHODS  
 
In chapter 5 we discuss the main reasons for choosing our research approach, methodologies and methods, 
and the methodological decisions in conducting our research study and in combining those methodologies to 
facilitate our research purposes. More specifically, we discuss the suitability of the methodological approach and 
research strategy to the research purpose; the feasibility of the chosen methods and their implementation; some 
ethical considerations; the rigour of the study; and, finally, some limitations of the study stemming from the 
research methodology chosen. 
 
5.1 Suitability of the Methodological Approach & Research Strategy to the Research Purpose 
As hospital performance is a quite broad and rather vague concept, for which existing definitions differ 
widely according to different stakeholder groups, we needed an approach that can give us the systemic view of 
the public hospital and of the factors that affect its performance, as perceived by the various stakeholders. In 
accordance to the research traditions of Stakeholder’s Theory (Bryson, 2004; De Gooyert et al., 2017; Freeman, 
1984; Mitchell et al., 1997;) and Participation (King & Kraemer, 1993; Király & Miskolczi, 2019; Rouwette, 
2016; Schweiger et al., 2018), we found that stakeholders’ perceptions and involvement is crucial for our research 
objective of defining hospital performance, on the one hand, and facilitating change, on the other hand.  
We used a participatory technique known as Group Model Building (GMB) indicated for facilitating 
collective learning in projects with a systemic scope (De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert et al., 2019; Richardson 
& Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996) and a dynamic problem definition. Our problem of low hospital performance is 
indeed dynamic, as performance is in itself a dynamic concept which should be defined in a broader sense and 
analysed as a component of the healthcare system (De Gooyert et al., 2019; Meadows, 2008; Sterman, 1994). 
Furthermore, it is true that in the public healthcare sector a dynamic approach (Bianchi, 2016; Bivona, 2013; De 
Gooyert, 2018; Sterman, 2000) would be needed in order to easily grasp dynamics due to feedback processes (i.e., 
changes on a variable caused by changes on itself earlier in time), delays and non-linearities endogenous in the 
healthcare system which co-determine performance dynamics. Thus, adopting a systemic view (De Gooyert et al., 
2019; Meadows, 2008; Sterman, 1994) was more appropriate for our purposes. Especially in the case of Greece, 
the public healthcare system is characterised by multiple decision-making centres, overregulation, extensive 
political party's penetration in public management as well as truculent and irrational influences by labor unions 
(Economou, 2010; Minogiannis, 2012; Theodorakioglou & Tsiotra, 2000), which are only some of the factors that 
comprise a complex, non-linear, multi-loop feedback system of the public hospital. Such a system makes it hard 
to frame and analyse its long-term dynamic outcomes using traditional static approaches of performance 
management (Cosenz & Noto, 2016; Linard et al., 2002).  
Recent research shows that the dynamics of complex systems could be adequately framed and analysed by 
the so-called Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) approach (Bianchi, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2016; Bianchi et 
al., 1998, 2013; Bivona, 2013; Bivona & Montemaggiore, 2010; Cosenz & Noto, 2016). DPM is a combination 
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of traditional Performance Management in the public sector (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2007; Bouckaert & Peters, 
2002; Elg et al., 2013; Karra & Papadopoulos, 2005; OECD, 2007) and the System Dynamics (SD) methodology 
developed during the 1950s by Jay Wright Forrester, which provides a systemic perspective and a powerful set of 
tools for conceptualising and analysing complex systems for management and change (Forrester, 1958, 1961; 
Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000). The DPM approach will facilitate a systemic view of the 
mechanisms that lead to enhanced performance in the public healthcare sector, and will enable us to detect the 
causal links between strategic resources, outputs (short-term results) and outcomes (long-term impact on 
performance). It has already been successfully used to support decision-making processes in organisational, 
institutional and governmental settings (Davidsen, 1996; Bianchi et al., 2017), while it also permits engaging 
stakeholders both from the internal and the external environment.  
Adopting a systemic (Meadows, 2008), participatory (Kiraly & Miskolczi, 2019), inductive (Luna-Reyes 
& Anderson, 2003) and dynamic (Bianchi, 2016) approach will enable us apply our findings to the Greek paradigm 
and investigate whether and -if so- how does the Greek Healthcare Reform meet its underlying purpose of leading 
to better performance and quality of healthcare services in public hospitals.  
Moreover, we adopted the Grounded Theory Building Strategy (De Gooyert, 2016, 2018), which uses 
iteratively existing theory and case qualitative data for model building to make a theoretical contribution with 
system dynamics, and which allowed us combine the longitudinal with the cross-sectional data and the exploratory 
with the explanatory element in our research. More specifically, it allowed us to combine the longitudinal time 
frame of our literature review, which followed the historical development of public hospital performance in Greece 
over the last ten years (2009-2020), with the present-focused, cross-sectional, case-based, field data gathered from 
documents and stakeholders of a Greek public hospital, to plan future policies. Furthermore, it allowed us to 
combine the exploratory and explanatory element in our research, trying simultaneously to explain why the 
documented, counterintuitive negative outcomes on performance after the Greek healthcare reform emerged and 
what their underlying causes are, and build on a well-developed body of knowledge as well as field, case-based 
data to shed light on how hospital performance is perceived and what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic 
behaviour). 
 
5.2 Feasibility of the Chosen Methods & Research Implementation 
5.2.1 Risk Assessment  
Because of the special nature of the research (involving closed-access documents, sensitive patient data and 
health workers as participants) research approvals and ethics had to be carefully planned in advance. More 
specifically, the researcher had to investigate and get informed on the legal authorization procedures for research 
approval and ethics approval; address ethical issues and prepare an ethical statement; prepare an ethics protocol; 
prepare the formal request for permission to conduct research inside a Greek hospital, addressing the Hospital’s 
Board of Directors; prepare the formal request for research approval and ethics approval, addressing the hospital’s 
Research and Ethics Committee. 
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Furthermore, before the research implementation the researcher had to undertake a stakeholder analysis to 
identify which stakeholder groups should participate in each stage of the research; develop and send out the “call 
for participants” in order to identify the Case Hospital; submit the formal  request for a permission to conduct 
research to the Hospital’s Board of Directors; submit the formal request for research approval and Ethics approval 
to the hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee; prepare and submit additional documentation to  the Research 
and Ethics Committee of the hospital; receive research approval and Ethics approval; create the Interview guide; 
create the GMB presentation & agenda.  
Those procedures, together with the implementation of the research involving interviews and GMB sessions 
with many stakeholders, were time-consuming and, of course, could be easily altered, delayed or cancelled. Thus, 
a lot of proactiveness and planning ahead was necessary by the researcher in order to successfully complete the 
research, respecting all ethical and practical issues that arose. The extensive risk assessment that we undertook, as 
well as the measures and precautions undertaken based on this risk assessment for the protection of the participants 
in terms of potential harm, voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, identity, confidentiality, etc, are 
analytically presented and analysed in Appendix 26. 
 
5.2.2 Dealing with the Coronavirus Emergency 
Our careful risk assessment and all the precautions we took (available in Appendix 26) materialised as the 
coronavirus crisis burst out during our research implementation and threatened to defile all our efforts; get the 
GMB sessions cancelled; and delay indefinitely our research implementation. The relationship which the 
researcher had already built with the gatekeeper and with the participants, along with the legal bounds that she 
invoked (as all the authorisations were already in place) and the dexterity and perseverance with which he handled 
the issues and challenges that arose, was vital for the successful implementation of the research. 
The GMB sessions were finally conducted as planned at the case hospital, just a few weeks before the first 
coronavirus total lockdown of March 2020 in Greece. Follow up of the GMB participants, however, became 
difficult, because of the coronavirus crisis they had to deal with, the hospital overload and the ongoing lockdown. 
Thus, the disconfirmatory interviews, which the researcher was planning to conduct with health workers from the 
case-hospital, could no longer be conducted at the case hospital because of the coronavirus emergency which 
prohibited further visits to the case-hospital or to other hospitals and inhibited the possibility to continue the 
snowball sampling. 
Thus, another strategy was deployed by the researcher. She used convenient sampling in order to identify 
seven more participants for the disconfirmatory interviews, and conducted the interviews online and remotely 
through the Skype platform.  Those seven individuals were again public hospital stakeholders who fell into the 
five main key-stakeholder categories (hospital managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients) and each one 
of them works or has been hospitalized in a different public hospital. Thus, we had participant stakeholders from 
seven different public hospitals of different regions and cities of Greece (Heraklion Crete, Sitia, Thessaloniki, 
Athens, Giannena, Kavala, Kalamata) which is a fact that strengthened the validity of our findings. In this way, 
the researcher used the challenges that arose in a creative way, in a way that further strengthened the validity of 
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our research data and findings. 
5.3 Ethical Considerations & Statement of Research Ethics 
Although the responsibility for conducting research in an ethical manner always rests with the individual 
researcher, various codes of research ethics are available and provide guidelines that researchers can use to assure 
themselves that the design and conduct of their research meet appropriate standards (Denscombe, 2012, p.135). 
Thus, in order to assure that our ethical statement is being met throughout the research design, planning and 
implementation, this research has been conducted with respect to: the Academy of Management (AOM) Code of 
Ethics (2006), the System Dynamics Society Code of Conduct (V4.2 28/01/19) and the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). Both the Academy of Management Code of 
Ethics and the System Dynamics Society Code of Conduct resemble the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of 
Helsinki, although they give emphasis to different topics each.  Also, as most Ethics Codes, they both share the 
basic principles of research ethics upon which we based our ethical statement, presented in the next paragraph. 
Our ethical statement reflects the three basic principles of research ethics, namely: no harm to participants; 
voluntary consent; scientific integrity (Denscombe, 2012, pp.128-130), and is based on the five fundamental 
principles of the Ethics Assessment Committee Law and Management (EACLM) of the Radboud University of 
Nijmegen, namely: reflexivity and awareness; transparency; human dignity; protection of basic rights; and a fair 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of research24. Following those fundamental principles, as well as the 
guidelines for creating an ethical statement given by Denscombe (2012, p.133), the researcher and PhD candidate 
hereby states that:  
(1) She is fully aware of the ethical aspects of her research; willing to plan and conduct research in an ethically 
sound and correct way; and fully responsible to maintain appropriate standards of scientific and professional 
integrity. 
(2) She is completely open, honest, transparent and explicit regarding all the methodological decisions and choices 
she made, as well as regarding the research implementation, the data collection, analysis and dissemination. 
(3) She took measures to prevent that any moral or professional harm is done to participants, and to ensure that 
participation in the research study is voluntary and based on free and informed consent of the participants.  
(4) She fully respected privacy and confidentiality throughout the research, in order to ensure that all the 
participants’ and the organisation’s rights, interests and anonymity of identities and of the case hospital are 
protected. 
(5) She took measures to ensure impartiality and fair distribution of benefits and burdens of participation in the 
research. 
This research study involves primary data collection from human participants (using interviews and GMB 
sessions) and from organizations (using official documents produced by the hospital, the ministry of health and 
other public institutions) and, subsequently, this research belongs to the research types which require ethical 
approval (Denscombe, 2012, p.122). Furthermore, as our research is conducted inside the healthcare discipline, 
 
24 See: https://www.ru.nl/law/research/ethics-assessment-commttee/ethics-self-assessment-criteria/ 
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takes place inside a public hospital and involves participants’ and patients’ personal data, there is an extremely 
high sensitivity to research ethics, involving more than the minimal risks. According to Denscombe (2012, p.123) 
there are some kinds of research that require special care in terms of research ethics, and he identifies several kinds 
of research and information gathered, which are regarded as particularly sensitive. Our study, in fact, requires 
special care as it involves access to two of those sensitive research types that he identifies: 
(1) Research involving Personal Data & Confidential Information (access to records of personal or sensitive 
information concerning identifiable individuals). In fact, our research involves personal data of participant 
stakeholders. 
(2) Research involving groups where permission of a gatekeeper is required for initial access to members (i.e. 
where access to research participants is not possible without the permission of another person with appropriate 
authority). In fact, our research involves Group Model Building sessions and interviews with hospital managers, 
workers and patients, regarding issues they face at their workplace.  Thus, the permission of the hospital’s Board 
of Directors, and the consent of the Hospital’s CEO as a gatekeeper was essential to guarantee access to those 
individuals and to establish commitment to participate in the research project by them. 
According to Denscombe (2012, p.124) apart from the data collection - which in our case gives rise to 
ethical concerns - there can also be ethical issues regarding the subject matter involved, the purpose of doing the 
research, and the dissemination and use of the findings. In our case, only the dissemination and use of the findings 
is somehow relevant, as the name of the hospital and the names of the participants could be exposed during the 
writing of the thesis and the dissemination of the results. Following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130), an informal 
risk assessment was undertaken by the researcher in order to identify and consider during the research design 
phase any potential harm for the participants and the participating organisation resulting from the research. This 
informal risk assessment was conducted by means of thinking about a whole range of questions and “What if” 
scenarios in connection with the research proposal and design. Our extensive risk assessment, as well as the 
measures and precautions undertaken based on this risk assessment for the protection of the participants in terms 
of potential harm, voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, identity, confidentiality, etc, are analytically 
presented and analysed in Appendix 26.  
Potential risks were found to arise mainly from the nature of the data collected (personal data). Thus, the 
need for assuring security of collected data, and the need for keeping anonymity when disseminating findings was 
found as crucial. Furthermore, within the additional documents submitted to the Hospital’s Research and Ethics 
Committee was a statement signed by the researcher stating that the terms of personal data protection will be 
followed and that the names of the hospital and of the participants will not be exposed while reporting the findings 
from the research, neither for the writing of the thesis nor for any publications. Those documents were made 
available to all the participants as well. The researcher developed a plan for minimising those risks and guarantee 
anonymity, involving actions such as: replacing the name of the hospital by “the hospital” or “the case hospital” 
in all the transcripts and documents, and informing the research proposal, the interview, the telephone guide and 
all the materials accordingly, as well as by not revealing the names of the participants in any way.  
Consent was obtained directly from the potential participants, in physical form. Free and informed consent 
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was required, and a consent form was created and used. Regarding Data Protection25, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) contains all the general rules that the data 
processing must meet in Europe. The researcher followed all those rules and guidelines during the research study, 
in order to assure that data security will be safeguarded, and that the data protection and data privacy are secured 
in accordance with the European laws and standards. 
Finally, once we identified the case hospital through the interest presented by the potential gatekeeper, we 
first officially submitted a formal request to the Hospital’s Board of Directors for permission to conduct research 
inside the hospital. Because of the sensitive data that the research involved, we were asked to submit a formal 
request for research approval and ethics approval to the hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee, providing them 
with additional documents. Thus, the privacy rules of the hospital were fully respected. 
 
5.4 Rigour of the Study 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), reliability of a research study is critical for determining its value. 
Reliability, however, in a qualitative research study following the constructivism paradigm - such as the one that 
we conducted - takes the form of confidence to the model and trustworthiness to the research findings, because 
objectivity cannot be accomplished in such research paradigms (Cypress, 2017; Sterman, 2002). Instead, our 
qualitative analysis is valuable in its subjectivity, as participants are creating a model of shared or “collective” 
reality and are actively constructing meaning given to the performance indicators of the shared model. 
Trustworthiness in such a research context   requires the creation of: Credibility (i.e., trust in the 'truth' of the 
findings and observations); Transferability (i.e., proving that the findings are applicable in other situations as 
well); Dependability (i.e., proving that the findings are consistent and could be replicated); and Confirmability 
(i.e., proving that there is an adequate level of neutrality in the data gathered).  
Furthermore, one of the most important elements of any model-building project is establishing model 
validity. It is important to note that this process is not in a search for “hard” validation. There are two reasons for 
this. One is that no model is completely valid because all models are simplifications of reality and thus fail at 
representing reality in its riches (Sterman, 2002). For example, models created with the GMB approach are merely 
a representation of the mental models of the project participants (Vennix, 1996). Second, a model should only be 
considered valid or not in relation to its purpose (Barlas, 1996). Hence, the validity of the model is dependent on 
the purpose of the model, so that a model is valid if it is useful.  
Following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130), an informal risk assessment was undertaken by the researcher 
at the initial stages of the research design, in order to ensure scientific integrity throughout the whole research 
project, following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130). Some of the questions that this risk assessment tried to answer 
were: What research experience and technical skill does the researcher have, and is this suitable for the nature of 
the research envisaged in the proposal? What measures will be in place to support impartiality? Are there any 
 




vested interests in the findings or any other conflicts of interest? How will open dealings with participants and 
colleagues be encouraged? What avenues of communication will be open between researcher and participants? 
How will participants be able to check the credentials of the researcher? Are there any matters relating to 
intellectual property or ownership of the data that are likely to arise and, if so, how will these be dealt with? Based 
on this risk assessment (available in Appendix 26), the researcher undertook a number of measures and precautions 
to minimise the risk and assure research quality and scientific integrity. Following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-
130), those measures can be categorised as follows: (1) Measures for Ensuring impartiality; (2) Measures for 
Being honest and open; and (3) Measures for Upholding research integrity.  
Credibility and Internal Validity (i.e., trust in the 'truth' of the findings and observations) in our study was 
ensured by means of:  
(1) Prolonged Engagement26 and Persistent Observation27. The case of a Greek public hospital was chosen for 
conducting the research study using the DPM approach. This is all very relevant to the researcher’s background 
and knowledge, as the researcher and PhD candidate has specific education in management (Degree in Business 
Administration) and in hospital management (Master’s Degree in Health Services Management) and has worked 
for two full years as a Managing Director of a Greek public hospital. Thus, she is very familiar with the theory 
but also with the practical aspects, the deficits, the procedures and the laws that apply to the Greek health system 
and the Greek hospitals. Her network and status as a former hospital director also helped her at gaining access and 
trust by the hospital board who authorised her to conduct her research in the hospital. She spent a lot of time 
talking “off the record” with the gatekeeper, the hospital manager and some of the participants, both through skype 
and in the field, and conducted preliminary interviews with four persons, which helped the researcher develop 
relationships, mutual trust and “rapport” with the participants. For all those reasons Prolonged Engagement was 
ensured. Persistent Observation of our findings was ensured mainly by the rich, detailed qualitative data and the 
Thick Descriptions28 of all the model variables and links (see Appendix 24) and model loops (see chapter 8).  
(2) Triangulation29,  by using many different data sources (including interviews, GMB sessions, 
documents and the literature) for “cross-checking” and ensuring the robustness and internal validity of our 
findings. For example, the narrative analysis of the open-access and the closed-access documents which regarded 
the Ministry’s and the hospital’s performance objectives were used in order to create the Policy Model of Hospital 
 
26 Prolonged engagement refers to spending sufficient time in the field to learn or understand the culture, social setting, or 
phenomenon of interest. This involves spending adequate time observing various aspects of a setting, speaking with a range of people, and 
developing relationships and rapport with members of the culture. Development of rapport and trust facilitates understanding and co-
construction of meaning between researcher and members of a setting. For more details, see:  http://www.qualres.org/HomeProl-3690.html 
27 The purpose of persistent observation is to identify those characteristics and elements in the situation that are most relevant to 
the problem or issue being pursued and focusing on them in detail.  If prolonged engagement provides scope, persistent observation provides 
depth. For more details, see: http://www.qualres.org/HomePers-3691.html 
28 Thick description is described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a way of achieving a type of external validity.  By describing a 
phenomenon in sufficient detail one can begin to evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are transferable to other times, settings, 
situations, and people. For more details, see: http://www.qualres.org/HomeThic-3697.html 
29 Triangulation involves using multiple data sources in an investigation to produce understanding. Rather than seeing 
triangulation as a method for validation or verification, qualitative researchers generally use this technique to ensure that an account is rich, 




Performance, and some of our findings from the critical literature review were used in order to validate the 
Conceptual and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance. 
(3) Negative case analysis30 and Member-checking31. First, the Negative case analysis was applied in our research 
study by conducting disconfirmatory interviews with hospital stakeholders from other hospitals, in order to 
validate and increase confidence in the model created by the stakeholders of the case hospital during the GMB 
sessions. During the disconfirmatory interviews, interviewees were “disconfirming” variables and links of the 
model created in the case hospital, and we deleting from the model the causal relations and/ or variables upon 
which the external stakeholders (interviewees) disagreed. Member-checking was applied in our research by 
comparing the initial understanding of hospital performance of the case-hospital participants (deducted by the 
findings from the preliminary interviews and the pretests conducted before the GMB sessions) with their final 
understanding of hospital performance (deducted by the findings from the CICC questionnaire and the posttests, 
conducted right after the GMB sessions). 
Transferability and external validity (i.e., proving that the findings are applicable in other situations as well) 
of our research findings was ensured mainly by the rich, detailed qualitative data and the Thick Descriptions32 of 
all the model variables and links (available in Appendix 24) and model loops (available in chapter 8) which allow 
the readers interpret the results and see if they can be generalized to other contexts. Although generalizability is 
not the purpose of a qualitative analysis such as ours, we wanted our model to be “universal” for the Greek 
healthcare context and readily usable by other hospitals and policy-makers in Greece. For this reason, after 
building the model of hospital performance with the GMB participant stakeholders of the case hospital, we chose 
to conduct disconfirmatory interviews with seven different stakeholders from seven public hospitals of different 
regions and cities of Greece (Heraklion Crete, Sitia, Thessaloniki, Athens, Giannena, Kavala, Kalamata).  Those 
individuals were again public hospital stakeholders who fall into the five main key-stakeholder categories (hospital 
managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients) and each one of them works or has been hospitalized in a 
different public hospital. During those interviews, we refined the CLD model of hospital performance according 
to the interviewees’s views, by deleting the causal relations and variables upon which the interviewees disagreed. 
In this way, we strengthened the external validity of our model and findings, and created a "convergent" and more 
“universal” version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, including only the variables and loops 
which all stakeholders from all hospitals agreed upon and found relevant in their cases as well. Finally, we made 
sure that all the variables and links of our model are documented in the international and/ or the Greek literature 
 
30 Negative Case Analysis is a process for refining an analysis until it can explain or account for a majority of cases. It may be 
used to revise, broaden or confirm the patterns emerging from data analysis and involves searching for and discussing elements of the data 
that do not support or appear to contradict patterns or explanations that are emerging from the data analysis. For more details, see: 
http://www.qualres.org/HomeNega-3694.html 
31 Member Checks is when data, analytic categories, interpretations and conclusions are tested with members of those groups 
from whom the data were originally obtained. This can be done both formally and informally as opportunities for member checks may arise 
during the normal course of observation and conversation. Typically, member checking is viewed as a technique for establishing to the 
validity of an account. Lincoln and Guba posit that this is the most crucial technique for establishing credibility. For more details, see: 
http://www.qualres.org/HomeMemb-3696.html 
32 Thick description is described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a way of achieving a type of external validity.  By describing a 
phenomenon in sufficient detail one can begin to evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are transferable to other times, settings, 
situations, and people. For more details, see: http://www.qualres.org/HomeThic-3697.html 
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(each variable and link is documented in at least one published academic paper), which is a further sign of 
transferability and external validity. 
Dependability (i.e., proving that the findings are consistent and could be replicated) is ensured by the 
explicit descriptions of the research design and the research methods selected and used, along with the fact that 
the researcher is being open, honest, transparent and explicit in the present research dissertation regarding all the 
methodological decisions and choices she made, as well as regarding the research implementation, the data 
collection, analysis and dissemination. All those are facts of a good research practice and ensure that scientific 
integrity is being preserved throughout the research implementation. Furthermore, our explicit documentation of 
all the procedures as well as of the material that we created and used during the research (available in the 
Appendixes of the present thesis) are additional elements that strengthen the dependability of our findings.  
Finally, Confirmability (i.e., proving that there is an adequate level of neutrality in the data gathered) was 
achieved by a number of measures we undertook following Denscombe (2012, p.118). First of all, the researcher’s 
skills are a major aspect to consider when it comes to research quality, integrity and ethics, as those skills have a 
major impact on the quality of the data gathering procedures and, finally, on the quality of the data gathered. Such 
necessary skills that the researcher possesses included qualifications and professional skills which helped her at 
gaining access to the case hospital and the participants and at having the kind of insight about the situation that 
was crucial for the success of the project. 
One other major aspect to consider is the relevance of the researchers’ background in respect to the research 
objectives and setting, and the capabilities and skills of the researcher to conduct qualitative research in general, 
and System Dynamics research in particular. During her two Master Degrees, the researcher conducted two 
different qualitative research studies for her two Masters’ Theses, and had substantial lessons in qualitative and 
quantitative research methods as well. Furthermore, during the first two years of her Phd, the researcher focused 
on learning the System Dynamics methodology and the Group Model Building technique by taking part into 
intense coursework abroad in the Universities where the methodology is taught. More specifically, she spent one 
full semester in the University of Bergen, Norway, learning the System Dynamics methodology and two full 
semesters in the Radboud University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands), learning the Group Model Building 
technique and reviewing her research methodology by following specific courses on qualitative research methods. 
This led to a mastery of the methods and procedures she would have to use during the data collection (Group 
Model Building, interviews) and data analysis (System Dynamics Modeling) of her research. All those are facts 
that prove that the Interviews and the GMB sessions were conducted in the best possible manner, and are 
strengthening the confirmability of our study.  
Moreover, the researcher cooperated with the gatekeeper during the selection of participants for the 
interviews and the GMB sessions in order to ensure that the participant stakeholders who would be selected had 
already cooperation and relationships between them well-established, and that they share some kind of minimum 
commitment to fostering performance in their departments. This would prevent from involving participants with 
hidden agendas that would potentially create conflicts of interest during the GMB sessions. This could lead to 
deliberation and manipulation of the data produced by some of the participants during the interviews and/or the 
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GMB session, which would finally lead to biased or falsified research results. Furthermore, the informed consent 
was a prerequisite for all participants, ensuring their free will to participate, as well as that no pressure had been 
posed on them by their managers, for example. The fact that anonymity was ensured helped them at being honest 
and open during the interviews. Finally, the conduct of the disconfirmatory interviews and the fact that all GMB 
sessions were tape-recorded are also facts that reveal that the conclusions of the research study are influenced only 
by the participants and are not biased by the researcher’s interests.  
 
5.5 Limitations of the Research Methodology  
Apart from the usual limitations of qualitative research methods, including the lack of objectivity and 
generalizability (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2003), further limitations of this study lie in the fact that our project 
only led to the development of a qualitative, CLD model, due to the time constraints and the limited scope of this 
research study. Future research should focus on transforming the CLD (qualitative SD) model that we produced 
into a Stock-and-Flow (quantitative SD) model, to be used for experimentation and verification of our policy 
recommendations through simulation.  
Furthermore, the fact that the researcher cooperated with the gatekeeper for the selection of the participants 
and the use of the snowballing technique is simultaneously a benefit and a drawback for our research design. On 
the one hand, it benefited our research because in this way we ensured that the participant stakeholders who were 
selected had already well-established cooperation and relationships between them, and shared some kind of 
minimum commitment to fostering performance in their departments. Thus, it prevented us from involving 
participants with hidden agendas or conflicts of interest, which could potentially lead to deliberation and 
manipulation of the data for political reasons during the interviews and/or the GMB session, and finally lead to 
biased or falsified research results. On the other hand, however, it may have led us exclude from our sample some 
voices that might have been useful.  
Moreover, due to the time constraints, the covid-emergency and the costs involved, our research focused 
only on one country (Greece) and one hospital; it involved a limited number of participants and GMB sessions; 
and the analysis was conducted by the same researcher that conducted also the interviews and the GMB sessions. 
Future research could enable further validation of our findings through triangulation, e.g. by giving the data to 
other researchers to analyse them (Turner et al., 2014) and by repeating the GMB sessions with larger participant 
groups, ideally from different hospitals in Greece, and later on even from different countries, in order to refine the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance by disconfirmatory techniques (Andersen et al., 2012) and derive a 
more universal and generalizable model. 
Finally, following Scott et al.’s (2015) suggestion of moving from single cases to multiple cases in GMB 
projects, future empirical studies could adapt our research design and use a comparative, multiple-case-study 
approach to explore hospital performance mechanisms and dynamics.  Focusing on many different hospital cases 
and conducting GMB sessions in different European countries, for example, would enable comparative research 
into the systemic view of hospital performance as perceived by stakeholders in Europe. By including hospital 
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stakeholders from different countries and by conducting GMB sessions in different hospitals and settings, both in 
the private and in the public sector, this research would lead to a more validated, universal and context-free 
representation of hospital performance through disconfirmation (Andersen et al., 2012). 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
As far as the Suitability of the Methodological Approach and Research Strategy is concerned, we chose 
them as hospital performance is a quite broad and rather vague concept, for which existing definitions differ widely 
according to different stakeholder groups, and thus we needed an approach that can give us the systemic view of 
the public hospital and of the factors that affect its performance, as perceived by the various stakeholders. 
Moreover, the Grounded Theory Building Strategy we used (De Gooyert, 2016; 2018), which uses iteratively 
existing theory and case qualitative data for model building to make a theoretical contribution with system 
dynamics, allowed us combine the longitudinal with the cross-sectional data and the exploratory with the 
explanatory element in our research. More specifically, it allowed us to combine the longitudinal time frame of 
our literature review, which followed the historical development of public hospital performance in Greece over 
the last ten years (2009-2020), with the present-focused, cross-sectional, case-based, field data gathered from 
documents and stakeholders of a Greek public hospital, to plan future policies. Furthermore, it allowed us to 
combine the exploratory and explanatory element in our research, trying simultaneously to explain why the 
documented, counterintuitive negative outcomes on performance after the Greek healthcare reform emerged and 
what their underlying causes are, and build on a well-developed body of knowledge as well as field, case-based 
data to shed light on how hospital performance is perceived and what mechanisms drive its trend (dynamic 
behaviour). 
As far as the feasibility of the chosen methods and the research implementation are concerned, a lot of 
proactiveness and planning ahead was necessary by the researcher in order to successfully complete the research 
project respecting all ethical and practical issues that arose. Our careful risk assessment and all the precautions we 
took materialised as the coronavirus crisis burst out during our research implementation and threatened to defile 
all our efforts. The relationship which the researcher had already built with the participants, the legal bounds that 
she invoked (as all the authorisations were already in place) as well as the dexterity and perseverance in which 
she handled the issues and challenges that arose was vital for the successful implementation of the research. 
Our ethical statement reflects the three basic principles of research ethics, namely no harm to participants, 
voluntary consent, scientific integrity (Denscombe, 2012, pp.128-130), and is based on the five fundamental 
principles of the Ethics Assessment Committee Law and Management (EACLM) of the Radboud University of 
Nijmegen, namely: reflexivity and awareness, transparency, human dignity, protection of basic rights, and a fair 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of research33. In order to assure that our ethical statement is being met 
throughout the research design, planning and implementation, this research has been conducted with respect to 
the Academy of Management (AOM) Code of Ethics (2006), the System Dynamics Society Code of Conduct (V4.2 
 
33 See: https://www.ru.nl/law/research/ethics-assessment-commttee/ethics-self-assessment-criteria/ 
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28/01/19) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). Our 
extensive risk assessment, as well as the measures and precautions undertaken based on this risk assessment for 
the protection of the participants in terms of potential harm, voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, 
identity, confidentiality, etc, are analytically presented and analysed in Appendix 26.  
As regards the rigour of this study, in a qualitative research study following the constructivism paradigm 
reliability takes the form of confidence to the model and trustworthiness to the research findings, because 
objectivity cannot be accomplished in such research paradigms (Cypress, 2017; Sterman, 2002). Instead, our 
qualitative analysis is valuable in its subjectivity, as participants are creating a model of shared, “collective” reality 
and actively constructing meaning given to the performance indicators of the shared model. Trustworthiness in 
such a research context   requires the creation of: Credibility (i.e., trust in the 'truth' of the findings and 
observations); Transferability (i.e., proving that the findings are applicable in other situations as well); 
Dependability (i.e., proving that the findings are consistent and could be replicated); and Confirmability (i.e., 
proving that there is an adequate level of neutrality in the data gathered).  
Credibility and internal validity was ensured by means of: Prolonged Engagement and Persistent 
Observation; Triangulation; Negative case analysis and Member-checking. Transferability and external validity 
was ensured mainly by the rich, detailed qualitative data and the Thick Descriptions of all the model variables 
(available in Appendix 24); model links (available in Appendix 24); and model loops (available in Appendix 23 
and analysed in chapter 8), which allow the readers interpret the results and see if they can be generalized to other 
contexts. Dependability was ensured by the explicit descriptions of the research design and the research methods 
selected and used, along with the fact that the researcher is being open, honest, transparent and explicit in the 
present research dissertation regarding all the methodological decisions and choices she made, as well as regarding 
the research implementation, the data collection, analysis and dissemination. Finally, Confirmability was achieved 
by a number of measures we undertook, such as cultivating the researcher’s skills; ensuring relevance of the 
researchers’ background in respect to the research objectives and setting, and the capabilities and skills of the 
researcher to conduct qualitative research in general, and System Dynamics research specifically; cooperation 
with the gatekeeper during the selection of participants; ensuring informed consent and anonymity; as well as 
GMB sessions tape-recording to ensure that the conclusions of the research study are influenced only by the 




CHAPTER 6 – THE CASE STUDY 
 
In chapter 6 we introduce our case study and we present the Greek Healthcare Reform and its negative 
consequences generally on the performance of Greek hospitals and, more specifically, on the performance of our 
case hospital. As the focus of this research study is to contribute to identifying pitfalls and unintended 
consequences following the decision to adopt a PM System in healthcare organisations, we reviewed the measures 
of the Greek Healthcare Reform that have recently been implemented to improve performance of the Greek public 
healthcare sector. Therefore, we investigated the main pillars of the Greek Healthcare Reform and outlined the 
main unintended consequences reported by scholars. More precisely, in section 6.1 we present our findings from 
the critical review of the literature around the Greek healthcare reform and we describe the main pillars of the 
reform, the measures and policies adopted, the new legislative framework (Law N4369/16) for PM in Greek public 
hospitals and the reform’s documented negative consequences on public hospitals’ performance. In section 6.2 
we present our findings from the documents’ analysis and from the preliminary interviews we conducted with 
four stakeholders of the case hospital, and we describe the traditional PM at the case hospital. We show how the 
new measures and policies are incorporated in the hospital structure; how the new legislative framework (Law 
N4369/16) is implemented in the case hospital; we present and discuss the strategic & operational goals set by the 
hospital managers; and we analyse some practical difficulties in the traditional PM implementation at the case 
hospital. This chapter outlines the negative consequences of the Greek healthcare reform in Greek public hospitals 
in general and shows the limits of traditional PM at the case hospital in particular, while it also demonstrates the 
need for a dynamic performance management in the public healthcare sector. Thus, this chapter sets the grounding 
for the analysis that will follow in the next chapters. 
 
6.1 The main Pillars of the Greek Healthcare Reform: Findings from the Critical Literature Review 
6.1.1 The Greek National Healthcare System 
Greece is a member of the European Union (EU), since 1981 and a member of the Eurozone since 2001. It 
has a population of almost 11 million and, as in most southern European countries, public health is challenged by 
demographic changes such as the ageing population and the diminishing natural population growth (OECD & 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; OECD & European Union [EU], 2020). The 
economic and debt crisis of 2009 had a serious impact on the Greek economy, leading to more than 25% loss of 
the gross domestic product and to the adoption of three successive Economic Adjustment Programmes and large-
scale austerity measures implying significant reductions to public spending, including the spending of the Greek 
National Healthcare System (Economou, 2010; Economou et al., 2017).  
The Greek National Healthcare System (known as “ESY”, which stands for Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας) remains 
one of the least developed amongst OECD countries, with many gaps in the delivery, organisation and funding 
(European Commission, 2021). However, it has the leading place in the Greek healthcare system - especially when 
it comes to acute care - because it provides universal coverage to the entire population (OECD & EU, 2020). 
111 
 
According to the 2017 report of the European Observatory (Economou et al., 2017), ESY provides the whole 
range of primary, secondary and acute care through rural surgeries, health centres and public hospitals. The 
Ministry of Health is still the main responsible for the planning and regulation of the ESY and the healthcare 
sector remains highly regulated by the central government, in spite of the establishment of the seven Regional 
Health Authorities (known as YPEs) in 2004. These entities were supposed to take over the health care planning, 
organization and provision and lighten the burden of the Ministry. However, until today they have exercised only 
limited powers and mostly act as a mediator between the Ministry and the hospitals or the regional health centres 
(Economou et al., 2017; European Commission, 2021). 
Since 1990, the need for managerial and organisational reform has been recognised and initiated in Greece, 
in order to make the NHS more efficient and effective. During the last decades, Greece has incorporated the EU 
regulations and directives concerning professional qualifications of health personnel, medical equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, VHI and cross-border health care into the national legislation (OECD & European Observatory 
on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). However, intersectorality is still not well developed and health impact 
assessment measures are not systematically applied, while the Greek public health sector is still characterised by 
multiple decision-making centres, overregulation, extensive political party's penetration in public management as 
well as truculent and irrational influences by labor unions (Economou, 2010; Minogiannis, 2012; OECD & 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; Theodorakioglou & Tsiotra, 2000). Still today 
Greece has not developed adequate mechanisms for resources planning and allocation and the primary care system 
is still underdeveloped, creating major challenges in access, continuity of care and coordination as well as 
comprehensiveness of services for patients. The Greek health care system is strongly centred around hospitals, all 
of which provide both inpatient and outpatient services, operating simultaneously as primary, secondary and/or 
tertiary healthcare providers. Substitution policies to replace inpatient care with less expensive outpatient, home 
care and day care are barely existent and the degree of integration between primary and secondary care providers 
is low, leading to overcrowding in hospitals (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
2019). 
According to Economou et al. (2017), ESY is financed by the state budget via direct and indirect tax 
revenues and social insurance contributions. Health expenditure dropped rapidly during the economic crisis and 
health spending per capita in Greece is around 45 % less than the EU average in 2019. Furthermore, a very large 
share of spending comes from households, including informal payments, while spending on inpatient care is 
disproportionally dominant (Economou et al., 2017). The healthcare budget is set annually by the Ministry of 
Finance and divided into the different Directorates and services managed by the Ministry of Health. After the 
healthcare reform, the annual budget of each healthcare entity (i.e., hospitals, health centres) is proposed by the 
relevant YPE at the end of the previous fiscal year and based on the hospital spending of that same year, which is 
a measure that was adopted in order to limit expenses. Based on the suggestion of the YPE, a decision is issued 
by the health minister specifying and approving the annual budget for each entity. However, as charges for health 
services are calculated on the basis of a complicated reimbursement system and the reimbursement fees for the 
services have not been updated for years, hospitals and other public services run huge deficits every year which 
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are usually covered by the state budget in retrospect (Maniadakis, 2012; OECD & European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies, 2019). 
The staff of ESY (i.e., doctors, nurses, administrative and paramedic staff of the rural surgeries, health 
centres and public hospitals) are permanent, full-time public employees who are directly paid a fixed salary by the 
central government – as all public employees do - and do not burden the approved budget of the hospital or health 
centre where they work. However, the ministry gives the option to the health entities which need extra personnel 
to hire them under fixed-term contracts of employment and pay them from the entity’s approved budget (OECD 
& EU, 2018, 2020). 
 
6.1.2 The Greek Healthcare Reform: Measures and Policies adopted 
According to Minogiannis (2012), a healthcare reform in Greece was critical not only because the high 
health care expenditure of the previous years was largely responsible for the deflection of state finances, but also 
because the continuing recession absorbed funds and resources from the public health care system in order to help 
the population cope with the overall consequences of the Greek economic crisis of 2009. The Greek healthcare 
system was –and still is- characterized by fragmentation in coverage, funding and delivery mechanisms (Mossialos 
et al, 2005; Oikonomou & Tountas, 2011) while health policy in Greece "... is increasingly an elaborate structure 
of ideas set atop rather fragile pillars of political comprehension, and institutional capacity" (Minogiannis, 2012). 
Analysts agree that the scarce human and financial resources of healthcare in Greece have always been distributed 
following historical and political processes and have never been linked to performance standards (Kyriopoulos & 
Tsalikis, 1993; Mossialos et al, 2005; Oikonomou & Mariolis, 2009), which has prevented the Greek health system 
from presenting incentives for effectiveness and efficiency, and has led to inefficient management and decision-
making in all levels (strategic, supervisory, operational). When it comes to Greek public hospitals, those 
mechanisms are even more resistant to change, due to the bureaucratic and chaotic structure of the public health 
system in the macro-level and its incompetent administration in the micro-level (Economou, 2010; Minogiannis, 
2012). Thus, the healthcare reform had to focus not only on the reformation of the Greek health policy, but also 
on the redesigning of the existing decision-making mechanisms that would allow such a policy to be implemented 
in the micro-level administration of hospitals and other service units (Minogiannis, 2012; Theodorakioglou & 
Tsiotra, 2000). 
The set of reforms included structural and process changes in almost all aspects of the National Healthcare 
System, including public health expenditure and financing, management and delivery of care, workforce, services, 
pharmaceutical and health insurance policy and had a major impact on public hospitals function as well (Simou 
& Koutsogeorgou, 2014).  Hospital structure, payments, recruiting, administration, financing, procurement and 
monitoring were largely addressed by the reform. Hospital interventions after the financial crisis included services 
and procurement restructuring; closures of several primary healthcare units; extensive cuts in expenditure, budgets 
and staff salaries; limiting recruitment of healthcare personnel; introduction of a double-entry hospital accounting 
system; collecting data on activity and expenditures of hospitals on a monthly basis; obligation for regular 
publication of audited balance sheets; revision of pricing and costing mechanisms; use of a uniform coding system 
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for medical supplies; introduction of hospital payments via the diagnosis-related-group system; and the 
introduction of e-forms in hospital accounting (Economou et al., 2017; OECD & EU, 2020; OECD & European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014).  
 
6.1.3 The New Legislative Framework (Law N4369/16) for Performance Management 
The need for performance management in public administration was recently recognised by the Greek 
legislation in Law 4369 of the year 2016 (N4369/16)34, which in the article 22 provides that all public organizations 
must set objectives. More specifically, this law in the article 22 titled “Setting objectives”, provides that setting 
objectives is necessary in order to improve the efficiency and the collective action of the public administration, 
and in order to fulfil the mission of the public service and improve its response to the needs of the society. 
Law N4369 /16 recognises the need for performance management in all public institutions, and that the 
heads of all public organisations are supposed to set performance objectives starting from the strategic objectives 
of the relevant governing ministry or authority, as in paragraph 2 of the article 22.  Subsequently, performance 
objectives in public hospitals should follow the long-term, strategic goals of the Ministry of Health, as the Ministry 
of Health is the main government body responsible for governing and regulating the healthcare system of Greece 
and all the public health entities, such as public hospitals and primary healthcare services. More specifically, in 
the paragraph 2 of the article 22 it is mentioned that “Within the first week of October of each year, the Minister 
or the governing authority of each public entity shall notify and distribute to the relevant public services the 
strategic objectives of the service for the following year”. Thus, performance objectives in public hospitals cannot 
be outside or beyond the strategic planning and the long-term, strategic goals of the Ministry of Health. Those 
long-term strategic goals for public hospitals are therefore set by the Ministry of Health and the political leadership 
every few years. Currently there are three strategic objectives for the health services of the country, with a time 
period of implementation between 2017-2020, targeting quality issues, security issues, and patient satisfaction 
issues35. 
As mentioned above, the Law N4369 /16 provides that the strategic objectives of the Governing authority 
should be further specified and operationalised at a lower level. Thus, according to the Legislative Framework the 
long-term goals of the Ministry of Health should be fragmented and operationalised for all different public health 
 
34 See: https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/4369/2016 
35 The Strategic Goals of the Greek Ministry of Health for the period 2017-2020 are:  
1st strategic objective: Upgrading the National Health System and ensuring the right of citizens to universal and equal access to 
public structures, with safe and high-quality health care and reliable primary health care and public health services. 
2nd strategic objective: Improvement of the Management and efficient operation of the National Health System and of the Public 
Health Services, through transparent, democratic, participatory and technologically modernized and efficient governance, which promotes 
the evidence-based health care, respects  the dignity and the rights of citizens, and is subject to the principles of public accountability, social 
control and service planning, based on decentralization, sewerage and documented health needs of the population. 
3rd strategic objective: Sustainable financing of the National Health System and the public health services, with synergy of 
resources from the general taxation and the social Insurance System, with elimination of the "catastrophic" private spending of citizens and 
the economic obstacles to the universal coverage of the population, with substantial control of the induced demand, waste and corruption 
in the Health System and with additional - supplementary operation of the private sector in the direction of the full coverage of the citizens' 
health needs. 




services, (i.e. hospitals, primary health services, etc.) by the next regulatory public body in the hierarchy, which 
are essentially the seven Regional Health Authorities (known as YPEs).  As the public bodies that mediate between 
the Ministry of Health and the health services of each region of Greece, these entities were supposed to take over 
the health care planning and organization, and be responsible for the specification and development of health 
policies of public hospitals and health centres, lightening the burden of the Ministry and decentralising the control 
mechanisms from the central government to the Greek regions36. However, until today they have exercised only 
limited powers and certainly have not overtook an active role when it comes to setting performance objectives 
(OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). Subsequently, the entire responsibility 
for the goal-setting and performance management practically still lies at the discretion of each health entity’s local 
administration.  
 
6.1.4 The Reform’s Documented Negative Consequences on Public Hospitals’ Performance 
A systematic review of the literature published from January 2009 to March 2013 around the consequences 
that the financial crisis has had for health and healthcare in Greece concluded that “the recent efforts to reform 
the Greek National Health System have been focusing mainly on short-term effects by reducing expenditure, while 
the measures imposed seem to have dubious long-term consequences for Greek public health and healthcare” 
(Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Other studies showed that in public hospitals during the recession there were 
higher incoming patients and admissions rates, as patients could no longer afford private care (Simou & 
Koutsogeorgou, 2014); deficiencies in materials, equipment, and personnel (Economou et al., 2017);  negative 
results for hospital care output quality (Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018); deterioration of access to and 
provision of healthcare services, increasing out-of-pocket contributions, and growing monitoring and efficiency 
issues (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019).  
The set of reforms included structural and process changes in almost all aspects of the National Healthcare 
System and had a major impact on public hospitals function as well.  Hospital structure, payments, recruiting and 
financing were largely addressed by the reform, with the most substantial changes taking place between 2012–
2013. In that sense, the hospital function was mainly affected negatively by: (1) the cuts in hospital budgets and 
expenditure, a measure that prohibits investments in equipment and facilities and might also be linked with the 
documented deficiencies in materials and equipment; (2) closures of several primary healthcare units, which 
resulted in increased incoming patients and admissions rates at public hospitals; (3) a major shift from private to 
public when it comes to acute care, because of the economic pressures of households that could no longer afford 
private care, leading to even higher incoming patients and admissions rates at public hospitals; (4) restrictions in 
the recruitment of healthcare personnel, which resulted at serious understaffing of public hospitals; (5)  serious 
cuts in the salaries of healthcare personnel, which resulted in  job-dissatisfaction and low morale (Economou et 
al., 2017; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies, 2019; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). 
 
36 See: https://www.moh.gov.gr/articles/ministry 
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Furthermore, hospital salaries, administration, procurement and monitoring were largely addressed by the 
reform, with the most substantial changes taking place between 2012–2013. In that sense, the hospital function 
was mainly affected negatively by: (1) the serious cuts in the salaries of healthcare personnel and the job-
dissatisfaction that was caused; (2) the low nurses-to-patient ratios which became lower after the reform, and 
resulted in many of them applying for early retirement, leaving the remaining ones to work overtime in order to 
cover all necessary shifts, with fewer resources (e.g., drugs and sterilized equipment) and with fewer days-off; (3) 
the new obligations for reporting and accounting (i.e., double-entry hospital accounting system, regular 
publication of audited balance sheets, use of a uniform coding system for medical supplies, introduction of hospital 
payments via the Diagnosis-related group system, introduction of e-forms to hospital accounting) which resulted 
in increased workload for the remaining personnel; (4) the fact that the vast majority of public hospitals remain 
without clear performance objectives, planning or control, despite the existence of an explicit Legislative 
Framework for goal-setting (Law N4369 /16); (5) the fact that the vast majority of public hospitals still operate 
without actual quality control of procedures and services, despite the existence of Governing & Regulating Bodies 
for Performance Quality Assurance  such as the Ministry of Health, the Health Regions, the National Quality 
Institutions and the Quality Committees of Public Hospitals (Economou et al., 2017; Keramidou & 
Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; Simou & 
Koutsogeorgou, 2014). 
Especially for the healthcare personnel, the impact of the reforms was quite strong as they experienced 15% 
cut in all public sector salaries, abolishment of the thirteenth and fourteenth monthly salary and 10% cut in their 
pensions and increase in their retirement age from the age of 65 to the age of 67 (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). 
Furthermore, limiting recruitment of healthcare personnel led to understaffing of all public institutions and, 
subsequently, hospitals were constrained to operate with 10–40% fewer workers whose salary had been cut by 
40% in total (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014).  
Nurses were disproportionately affected by those measures, probably because the nurse-to-patient ratio was 
already low in Greek public hospitals (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). 
The new measures meant that graduate nurses would remain unemployed for up to four years upon graduation and 
that emergency nurses would have to work overtime, with fewer resources (e.g., drugs and sterilized equipment), 
with fewer days-off and lower salary than before the crisis, and with the prospect to work more years to receive a 
lower pension, which led many of them -together with many other healthcare workers- apply for early retirement 
(Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014).  
Moreover, Greece has the highest number of doctors along with the lowest number of nurses per capita 
among the OECD countries (OECD & EU, 2018, 2020), which causes operational and service distortions and 
supplier-induced demand phenomena (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). 
The undersupply of nurses is particularly pressing in Greek public hospitals. Moreover, only 1 in 16 doctors in 
Greece are general practitioners (GPs), compared to 1 in 4 on average in the EU (OECD & EU, 2018, 2020). 
Finally, there are imbalances between various specialties, and shortages of both doctors working in public 
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hospitals and GPs working in rural areas (Economou et al., 2017; OECD & European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, 2019). 
Furthermore, in 2015 there were 4.3 hospital beds per 1000 population according to the statistics of the 
World Health Organisation37 and in 2017 the number dropped to 4.2 – somewhat below the EU average of 5.0 - 
but physical and human resources are not equally distributed, both geographically and in terms of skills mix 
(OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). Of the 283 hospitals existing in 2014 
(excluding military and prison hospitals), around 60% of all beds were located in Attica (which includes the capital 
city of Athens) and Central Macedonia (where Greece’s second largest city, Thessaloniki, is located). Finally, the 
high intransparency and discontinuity of the system creates accessibility issues, while also there is a total lack of 
information accessible to patients in hospital care, as there are no information on costs or quality of services, 
medical errors, patient satisfaction, hospital clinical outcomes, hospital waiting times or comparative information 
about the quality of different providers (Economou et al., 2017; OECD & EU, 2018, 2020; OECD & European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). 
Despite the fact that it might still be early to judge the long-term outcomes of the reform, the early signs 
from the limited research that exists are alarming. More specifically, our review showed that after the healthcare 
reform, in Greek public hospitals: (1) hospital service quality significantly deteriorated, as reported both by nurses 
and patients; (2) hospital safety worsened and became poor or failing, as reported both by nurses and patients; (3) 
nurses’ burnout, job dissatisfaction, and intention to leave their work skyrocketed; (4) patient satisfaction 
decreased; (5) waiting lists and waiting times increased; (6) communication with nurses and doctors is considered 
inadequate by the patients; (7) the rate of under-the-table (informal) payments increased; (8) Hospital-related 
Mortality Rates increased; (9) Medical Errors significantly increased; (10) Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant 
bacteria Infections rates are extremely high; (11) Diffusion of clinical guidelines and treatment protocols remains 
weak (Economou et al., 2017; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; OECD & EU, 2018, 2020; OECD & 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). 
 
6.2 The Case Hospital: Findings from the Documents Analysis and Preliminary Interviews 
The public hospital where we conducted our research, which we will onwards refer to as “the case hospital” 
or simply “the hospital” (as our research protocol does not allow us to reveal neither the name of the hospital nor 
the identities of the participants) belongs to the 1st Health Region of Attica and - as most university hospitals in 
Greece - it consists of four divisions: the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical 
division. All four divisions are equal to each other, and each one has its own independent structure, departments 
and department supervisors, independent offices and staff. Each of the four divisions is managed by a division 
manager, and all of them are subordinated to the Deputy Executive Director, the Executive Director and the 
Hospital Board, which consists of the two directors and three other hospital employees as members. More 
specifically:  
 
37 See: https://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-GRC?lang=en 
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(1) The Administrative Division is currently divided into two sub-divisions: Administrative and Financial. Each 
sub-division includes its departments and independent offices.  
(2) The Nursing Division is currently divided into five sectors. Each sector covers the respective departments of 
the Medical Division sector. 
(3) The Medical Service consists of the Sectors and the Interdepartmental Departments. The sectors include the 
pathological, the surgical and the laboratory. The Interdepartmental Departments include the ER, the day care 
unit, the Mediterranean Anaemia unit, the prenatal diagnosis unit and the short hospital stay unit. In the Sectors, 
there are regular outpatient clinics of corresponding specialties with the specialties of the serving doctors in the 
Hospital. In addition to doctors, the positions of scientific, non-medical Staff (e.g., technicians, physiotherapists, 
chemists, biochemists, physicists, etc.) belong to the same department. 
(4) the Technical Service includes the Technical department and the Biomedical Technology department. 
According to the statement on its website, where the mission, vision and values of the hospital are declared, 
the mission of the hospital is “the provision of hospital care to every incoming person in need equally (in the 
sense of gravity, which requires that only cases of the same severity be treated equally) and regardless of 
economic, social, racial, religious or other discrimination”. The vision of the Hospital is “the provision of high-
quality health services to all incoming patients through the innovation and cooperation of its specialized human 
resources, in order to be recognized by patients, the community and the staff for its optimal operation and 
immediate service”. Finally, the values of the Hospital mentioned on its website are: (1) Ethics: the behaviour of 
each employee is sought to be manifested by moral practices such as selflessness, justice, respect for human 
beings; (2) Information: the hospital supports full and thorough patient information on their problem; (3) Support: 
support of patients and their families; (4) Professionalism: the professionalism of employees derived from the 
cooperative spirit, organizational logic, trust and mutual respect is promoted and recognized; and (5) Continuous 
improvement, in order to encourage creativity, initiative, innovation, monitoring and continuous self-assessment 
of the procedures and results of the Hospital. 
 
6.2.1 Strategic & Operational Goals at the Case Hospital 
Despite the practical difficulties in implementing the Legislative Framework of Law N4369 /16, some 
public organisations have managed – or at least have tried - to implement it with the support of the Ministry of 
Interior and Administrative Reconstruction in order to set objectives for their departments and units and start 
managing for performance. Among them, is our case hospital. The Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director 
and the board of the case hospital changed in the end of 2019. The period of service of the new board and directors 
is three full years (from December 2019 until December 2022). Right from the beginning of its 3-year period of 
service, the hospital board recognised the importance of complying with the legislative framework for 
performance management, and they initiated the implementation of the goal-setting procedure in the hospital as 
provided by Law N4369/16.  
The hospital managed to set performance objectives for 2020 centrally, as well as operational objectives for 
two of the hospital divisions (i.e., the Administrative/Financial and the Nursing division), as provided by Law 
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N4369 /16. Furthermore, the board decided that the rules and conditions set by the legislative framework should 
be complied with. For example, they voted that at the beginning of October of each year the hospital goals and 
priorities will be notified to the managers of the four divisions of the hospital and they, in turn, will need to 
determine the operational objectives and actions for the departments and units of the hospital under their 
supervision and notify the heads of the departments and employees by the end of December, in order for them to 
set goals as well. The direct subordinates of the central administration are the four division managers, who are the 
heads of the four divisions of the hospital (medical, nursing, administrative/financial, technical). According to 
Law N4369/16, each one of them needed to set goals for their division. Only two of them (the nursing division 
manager and the administrative/financial division manager) out of the four division managers officially responded 
to the central administration’s call and set goals for their divisions. 
During their first few board meetings, the hospital directors analysed the Health Ministry’s strategic goals 
and voted for the hospital’s goals and priorities for the next three years of their service. Those goals that the central 
administration set, and can be found at the hospital’s website, are: 
(1) The provision of primary, secondary and tertiary health care to the population of responsibility of the 1st health 
region of Attica, as well as to patients referred by other health regions. Health care is provided equally to every 
citizen regardless of their economic, social and professional status, in accordance with the rules of the National 
Health System and Social Security legislation. 
(2) The specialization, continuous education and training of doctors, nurses and other health professions, with the 
development and implementation of educational programs. The education of students of the medical departments 
of the University of Athens, as well as the students of other medical-related departments. 
(3) The development and promotion of health research. In this direction, the hospital implements and develops 
research programs and cooperates with other relevant bodies, as well as international organizations, scientific and 
research centres. 
(4) The cooperation with nursing institutions and other health units for the development and upgrade of the health 
care provided in general and in particular, with regard to the implementation of educational programs, as well as 
special programs for study and evaluation of health issues encountered in the 1st health region of Attica. 
(5) The implementation of new methods and forms of care, aiming at the effective promotion of citizens' health. 
(6) The development of procedures that facilitate the strategic goals set by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Solidarity, the 1st Health region of Attica and the Board of Directors of the Hospital. 
It is quite obvious that all the above mentioned “goals’’ cannot be considered performance goals but rather 
as the extension of the hospital’s mission. They are general and not explicit; they do not entail any time horizon 
and, most importantly, they do not include any performance target. Thus, they cannot be considered as a helpful 
guide or tool for effective performance management.  
According to the relevant internal documents collected and analysed (available in Appendixes  16 and 17) 
among the operational goals of the Nursing Division were: (1) safeguarding citizens’ and patients' right for 
universal and equal access to the hospital; (2) improving the quality of nursing services by redesigning services 
to ensure and document safety of citizens, patients and workers; (3) organizing and implementing educational 
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programs for staff development; (4) increasing satisfaction of internal and external patients of the hospital; (5) 
ensuring sustainability of the services provided with systematic monitoring of the basic aspects of activity: 
financial, anthropocentric, internal processes, development and learning. Again, those “goals’’ cannot be 
considered performance goals, nor a helpful tool for effective performance management.  
Finally, there were a few more goals set, which we consider a bit more specific and - although they also did 
not entail any time horizon or any performance target - could be considered a good start for PM in the hospital. 
Those goals were: (1) standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units; (2) 
standardization of clinical procedures; (3) use of an Information System in the interdepartmental communication; 
(4) application of the digital signature and electronic document management. 
 
6.2.2 Practical Difficulties in the PM Implementation 
Despite the goal setting procedure that took place in the hospital, and despite the existence of written 
statements of clear objectives in the nursing and administrative divisions, as described in the previous sections of 
this chapter, the preliminary interviews that we conducted with four of the participant stakeholders revealed that 
no further actions were taken in order to accomplish those objectives, neither by the managers nor from the 
employees of the two divisions.  
According to the participants, one reason for that might be that the Regional Health Authorities have failed 
to exercise their role of setting performance objectives, as we mentioned above. Thus, the entire responsibility for 
goal-setting and performance management practically lies at the discretion of the administration of each health 
service, i.e., the general and the department managers of the hospital. Subsequently, it is entirely up to the hospital 
managers to take action if they want to, if they can and if they are allowed to do so by the environment in which 
they operate. It can be that individual employees or department managers start such an action but, even in that 
case, it is purely a matter of initiative and competency between the levels of hierarchy of the organization, which 
is contrary to how the legislative framework (Law N4369 /16) provides that actions should be taken.  
Furthermore, the managers’ mental models, management approach and commitment seem to play a key 
role. The head managers of the divisions, departments and units of the hospital should embrace this idea of 
managing for performance and devote time to setting operational goals together with their employees, according 
to the goals of the central administration (executive directors and the board). Then they need to come up with an 
analysis of where they currently stand, where they we want to go, and how they can achieve it. However, due to 
the lack of time and/or competence, such an analysis is not always feasible.  
Another key difficulty, according to the participants, is the fact that the legislative framework (Law N4369 
/16) is intertwined with employee evaluation. According to Law N4369 /16, when the fragmentation of goals from 
the strategic to the operational level begins, and actions are taken from the higher towards the lower levels of the 
hierarchy, the head of every hospital department or unit is called upon to set goals for each employee, specifying 
time-schedule and performance indicators.  However, supervisors and managers are reluctant to strictly evaluate 
their employees and set specific goals, as that could negatively influence work relations and productivity and 
create hostility in the organisation. This might be attributed to the organisational culture of public hospitals (e.g., 
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often oriented to passively react to a growing backlog, rather than investigating what causes such a backlog and 
how to define proper targets to avoid it) and the pressure that health workers already face because of the 
understaffing that hospitals have undergone, as a consequence of the healthcare reform. 
It is worth mentioning that during our preliminary interviews with those two division managers (which 
happen to be 2 out of the four participants that we preliminary interviewed), we asked whether the goals were set 
solely by them or collectively by their subordinates and employees. The head of the administrative division 
responded that she wrote them down without any help, while the head of the nursing division said that she did it 
with the help of two other nurses- heads of nursing units. In both cases, no employees were involved. However, 
as we will see in the next sections, most of those objectives set by the division managers did come up during the 
GMB sessions as important ones for the improvement of the problem of low hospital performance, when the 
participants got deeper into the variables connected to performance. 
Our analysis revealed that participants seem to treat such objectives as completely separated from 
performance and quality, and regard them as totally outside of their everyday tasks. More specifically, none of the 
interviewees mentioned working on those objectives among his/her everyday tasks, and none of them mentioned 
their importance as one of his/her priorities. When asked about performance and quality, none of those objectives 
was mentioned by any of the participants. Furthermore, when they were specifically asked about the main 
challenges they face in their work, all of them talked about the understaffing as the main problem they face.  
Moreover, when we specifically asked the two division managers why those objectives were set instead of 
some others, they answered that on the one hand, they are obliged to set objectives and they know that they will 
be evaluated on the basis of the completion of those objectives. On the other hand, they do not have the power to 
solve their real problems, such as the understaffing, because this is something that is decided by the central 
government. Thus, they needed to set objectives that are “achievable” without the intervention of the Ministry of 
Health, and they believe there are “very few things they can do alone”. Thus, according to our view and analysis, 
they might have ended up setting “easy” and “doable” objectives, most of which, however, have little or no impact 
on performance.  Those findings are confirmed by a number of studies on “budgetary slacks” and performance 
failures in public organizations (Ajibola & Akinniyi, 2013; Andrews et al., 2006; Yılmaz et al., 2014) and reveal 
that goal-setting, the main PM strategy followed, is not successfully implemented and it certainly does not bring 
any tangible results for the hospital performance. If the objectives set have no connection with the real challenges 
and problems, and if employees are not part of the goal-setting procedure, then it is obvious that there is no base 
for pursuing goals and improving performance. Those findings of the preliminary interviews and documents 




Chapter 6 outlines the negative consequences of the Greek healthcare reform in Greek public hospitals in 
general, and shows the limits of traditional PM at the case hospital in particular, demonstrating the need for a 
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dynamic performance management in the public healthcare sector. Thus, this chapter sets the grounding for the 
analysis that will follow in the next chapters.  
Although the performance management policies adopted during the healthcare reform in Greece were 
generally considered inevitable and necessary, the overall impact of the reform seems to be a negative one for 
Greek public hospitals’ outputs and outcomes, and the major structural and process reforms that were introduced 
are not yet proven to have led neither to improved efficiency and effectiveness, nor to better results for patients. 
The new policies (i.e., structure and process reforms undertaken) undeniably contributed to the reduction of 
hospital spending, but they simultaneously contributed to the deterioration of hospital service quality. Despite the 
extensive research identifying the “pitfalls” of the Greek healthcare reform and the unintended consequences for 
hospital staff and patients (Aiken et al., 2012; Economou et al., 2017; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; 
Mitropoulos et al., 2018) very little is known about the mechanisms that caused those negative effects. 
The findings from the hospital documents’ analysis, pretests and the preliminary interviews of the hospital 
stakeholders are in line with the findings of our literature review, and of many other researchers who studied the 
results and impact of the Greek healthcare reform. The catastrophic impact of the Greek healthcare reform policies 
was obvious at the case hospital, as it seems to have undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the hospital; 
to have limited its ability to provide the best clinical outcomes possible according to its capacity and to have 
augmented the risks for patients. Finally, most of the policies identified by the participants during the GMB 
sessions are in line with the goals of the two divisions (administrative/financial and nursing divisions) proposed 
by the division managers, as found from our documents analysis and preliminary interviews, which is a form of 
validation of our Policy Model of Hospital Performance. More specifically, out of all the unintended negative 
outcomes of the reform documented in the literature that we presented in the section 6.1.4, we found the seven 
following negative outcomes to be present at the case hospital, according to the participant stakeholders of our 
GMB sessions: Health Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low Safety; Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal 
Payments; High Mortality Rates; Numerous Medical Errors; High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria 
Infections Rates; Low Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. 
All in all, the findings of the literature review of the Greek healthcare reform confirms our findings from 
the preliminary interviews and documents analysis at the case hospital, showing that hospital service quality has 
paradoxically deteriorated during the last decade (2009-2019) as a consequence of the new performance 
management policies implemented in the case hospital during the Greek healthcare reform, and that the 
mechanism that led to this deterioration is not yet clear. Better understanding of the mechanisms that led to those 
unintended negative effects in the case hospital is crucial for the design of better healthcare policies in the future, 
which will facilitate hospital services quality in the long-term.  
Despite the goal-setting procedure that took place in the hospital, and despite the existence of written 
statements of clear objectives in the nursing and administrative divisions, the preliminary interviews that we 
conducted with some of the participant stakeholders revealed that no further actions were taken in order to 
accomplish those objectives, neither by the managers nor from the employees of the two divisions. Furthermore, 
participants seemed to treat such objectives as completely separated from performance and quality, and totally 
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outside of their everyday tasks. According to our view and analysis, they might have ended up setting “easy” and 
“doable” objectives most of which, however, have little or no impact on performance.  Those findings are 
confirmed by a number of studies on “budgetary slacks” and performance failures in public organizations (Ajibola 
& Akinniyi, 2013; Andrews et al., 2006; Yılmaz et al., 2014) and reveal that goal-setting, the main PM strategy 
followed, is not successfully implemented in the case hospital and it certainly does not bring any tangible results 
for the hospital performance. If the objectives set have no connection with the real challenges and problems, and 
if employees are not part of the goal-setting procedure, then it is obvious that there is no base for pursuing goals 
and improving performance.  
Overall, our analysis showed that, unfortunately, Law N4369/16 is until today not properly implemented in 
the hospital. One of the reasons why this happens is that most of the “goals’’ set cannot be considered as 
performance goals but rather as the extension of the hospital’s mission. They are general and not explicit; they do 
not entail any time horizon and - most importantly - they do not include any performance target. Thus, they cannot 
be considered as a helpful guide or tool for effective performance management. Nevertheless, we identified four 
goals which we consider a bit more specific and - although they also did not entail any time horizon or any 
performance target - were considered as a good start for the DPM analysis that we conducted. Those goals also 
came up during the GMB sessions and were integrated in the CLD model that the participants built: (1) 
standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units; (2) standardization of clinical 
procedures; (3) use of an Information System in the interdepartmental communication; (4) application of the 
digital signature and electronic document management. All those findings of the preliminary interviews and 
documents analysis are validated from the findings of the pretests, conducted before the GMB sessions, presented 






CHAPTER 7 – MODEL CONCEPTUALISATION & VALIDATION 
 
Chapter 7 corresponds to the first research question of our study, namely: How do stakeholders define 
hospital performance. To answer this question, we conducted the GMB sessions in the case hospital, first in order 
to help hospital stakeholders gain a better understanding of the low hospital performance of the hospital in a more 
systematic way, and second to help them collectively - through structured activities and facilitated discussions - 
define it; show its trend (dynamic behaviour) in the hospital during the last decade in a diagram (Reference Mode); 
and conceptualise it as a system, depicted as a qualitative system dynamics model of hospital performance (CLD 
- Causal Loop Diagram). More specifically, in sections 7.1 and 7.2 we present the Shared Definition of hospital 
performance and its Historical Behaviour during the last decade (Reference Mode) respectively, as perceived by 
the hospital stakeholders who participated in our GMB sessions, and we discuss how this definition and Reference 
Mode was derived during the GMB sessions. In the section 7.3 and 7.4 we present the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance (i.e., a CLD model that depicts the actual structure of the system at hand and can be used 
to explain the current low levels of hospital performance) and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance (i.e., a 
CLD model that depicts not only the actual structure of the system at hand, but also the changes in the system 
structure which are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, in order for the performance to improve) 
and we discuss how those models were derived by the hospital stakeholders during the GMB sessions. Finally, in 
paragraphs 7.6 and 7.7 our GMB findings and models are evaluated and validated through other findings and 
triangulation techniques. More specifically, in the section 7.6 we discuss the evaluation of the GMB sessions and 
of the model created by the participants, through means of comparing the initial to the final understanding and 
consensus around hospital performance by the participant stakeholders, as documented in the findings from the 
preliminary interviews and pretests (conducted before the GMB sessions) on the one hand, and the findings from 
the CICC questionnaire and the posttests (conducted right after the GMB sessions). In section 7.7 we discuss the 
validation of the Conceptual and Policy Models of Hospital Performance through Triangulation (using our 
findings from the GMB sessions, literature, documents analysis and disconfirmatory interviews) and in terms of: 
structure verification, causal clarity and variable definitions. The two final versions of this CLD Model, i.e., the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (analytically discussed in chapters 8 and 9) and the Policy Model of 
Hospital Performance (analytically discussed in chapter 11) are available in Appendixes 21 and 22 respectively, 
and thoroughly described in terms of variables and links in Appendix 24. Those two models constitute the main 
outputs of the GMB sessions and will form the basis of our research analysis and findings, presented in the 
following chapters of this thesis. 
 
7.1 Shared Definition of Hospital Performance 
During the first part of the introductory GMB session, a short discussion led to a rough definition of hospital 
performance as “anything that leads to better care for patients”. During the second part of the introductory 
session, however, this definition was found to be partial and not inclusive, especially regarding the health workers’ 
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safety. As time constrained the discussion to provide a conclusive answer, we asked participants to split into 
subgroups and come up with one definition per subgroup. Then the group gathered altogether and connected all 
definitions, in a way that the information of all definitions was kept.  By the end of the introductory session, 
hospital performance was defined as “the provision of patient-centred care to the patient, with safety (for the 
patients and the staff); responsibility (adherence to protocols, proportions and procedures) and dignity (nice and 
clean facilities, access without waiting and without informal payments). Appendix 18 provides evidence on the 
individual definitions given by the participants during the sessions, as well as the shared definition they concluded 
at. 
Furthermore, during the first GMB session participants arrived at a unanimous conclusion regarding the 
feared and hoped future scenarios on how hospital performance will unfold. The hoped scenario showed a gradual 
growth of the hospital performance during the next decade, while the feared scenario represented the expectations 
by the participants of a less significant growth or a stagnation of the hospital performance during the years to 
come, a trend that is already ongoing during the years after the healthcare reform according to the participants. 
Nevertheless, despite the agreement on the hoped and feared scenario, participants revealed very different 
expectations from this project. Some participants focused their expectations on hospital outputs and clinical 
effectiveness (i.e., more appropriate diagnosis and treatment, less medical errors); some on hospital-related 
outcomes (i.e., increase of staff and patient safety and satisfaction, lower levels of nosocomial infections rate and 
of patient volumes); while others expressed their concerns about the hospital's negative impact on public health 
and on the catastrophic spending on health, due to the high diffusion of informal payments. The CLD model, thus, 
should aim at discovering how all those factors are interconnected and influenced by each other as parts of the 
same system: the system of hospital performance. Appendix 18 provides evidence on the hoped and feared 
scenarios given by the participants during the sessions. 
 
7.2 Hospital Performance Trend during the Last Decade (Reference Mode) 
The second element of this exercise was the creation by the participants of a shared graph over time that 
represented the performance evolution in the hospital during the last decade, i.e., over the period 2009-2019, which 
we will hereby refer to as the Reference Mode. A Reference Mode of behaviour is a graph of a variable over time, 
traditionally used at the beginning of System Dynamics Projects in order to depict the behaviour of the key variable 
over time (Sterman, 2002). The Reference Mode of behaviour has shown to be a useful tool for the purposes of 
GMB sessions. It serves as a basis for all discussions throughout the sessions, to develop the Causal Loop 
Diagram38  (CLD), which serves as a boundary object (Black, 2013) to the creation of shared meaning and 
understanding between participants regarding -in our case- the system of hospital performance. Our participant 
stakeholders became familiar with the reasoning of this goal very fast. After a short discussion and the explanations 
given by the facilitator, we asked participants to split again into subgroups and create one graph per subgroup, 
 
38 A Causal loop diagram is a diagram containing variables and causal links, used to display a sequence of cause and effect 




depicting the historical behaviour (2009-2019) as well as their predictions for the future in the form of the “feared” 
and the “hoped” scenario that we discussed earlier. Then we gathered altogether and connected all graphs, in a 
way that the information of all graphs was kept.   
The Reference Mode created and agreed upon by the participants showed that, despite the counterintuitive 
negative outcomes documented, the level of the overall performance in the case hospital has been slightly 
increasing after the healthcare reform and is now stabilizing. According to the participants, this is because of the 
gradual introduction of information systems and quality measures and protocols in public hospitals during the last 
decade, which were completely inexistent before. However, they still believe that the overall performance is rather 
low according to the new, updated international standards. Appendix 19 provides evidence and further 
explanations on the Reference Mode created by the participants during the GMB sessions.  
 
7.3 Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance 
After defining the concept of hospital performance and identifying its historical development over the last 
decade, the focus of the group moved to eliciting variables that are related to performance, in order to start building 
the CLD Model of Hospital Performance which is the main output of the GMB sessions. A Causal Loop Diagram 
is a diagram containing variables and causal links used to display a sequence of cause-and-effect relationships 
between variables of a system. This CLD formed the basis of our research analysis and results.  
The facilitator first asked from the participants to think of the causes of low performance of services, as 
they personally experience it. In the beginning, nominal group technique was used in order to prevent groupthink 
and stimulate divergent thinking according to Vennix’s (1996) suggestions. To simplify the task, participants were 
asked to list all the causes of low performance of services they could think of, and then write them down in the 
form of variables. Each participant was given a bunch of small (posted) papers, and they were asked to write only 
one variable per posted paper. Then, using again the nominal group technique, one by one the participants stood 
up and sticked their variables on the whiteboard while explaining its meaning. If other participants had a similar 
variable, they stood up and put it on top. Some of the elicited variables were directed to the so-called “parking 
lot”; a space on the whiteboard which included variables which are acknowledged to influence the system, yet 
they are out of the scope of the current project. 
The next exercise was about linking the variables, and in this way the construction of the CLD began. The 
CLD was constructed in three stages during the first GMB session. First, variables were mapped on the whiteboard. 
The facilitator was trying to stimulate the addition of more variables over critically reviewing each contribution, 
which led to a quickly expanding model. The second stage consisted of refining the “spaghetti” model constructed 
during the first stage, leading to a simpler and more comprehensible model. The third stage led to the refinement 
of the initial model, in which the participants indicated some missing elements, reviewed some of the links and 
discussed changing the names of some variables.  
This was the end of the first part of the GMB session, the “divergent” part, which led to the development 
of the so-called Scoping Model of Hospital Performance, which is available in Appendix 20. This model is a rather 
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extended and divergent version of the system at hand, combining all aspects and views, and including all the 
variables and links that all the participants came up with and agreed upon. This model is usually too big to analyse 
and get some useful and meaningful insights from. For this reason, some “convergence” is necessary in order to 
make the model smaller, more meaningful and more comprehensive, and in order to set the scope of the research 
and the boundaries of the system at hand. The Scoping Model of Hospital Performance was digitised by the 
researcher in Vensim Software through background modelling during the GMB session, and was presented to the 
participants after a short break.  
After the break, the convergent part of the GMB session started, with the facilitator moving to exercises 
and scripts that led participants prioritise the variables according to their significance for hospital performance. 
Participants were asked to think of variables that are less important or less relevant than others and variables which 
are implied by others and, thus, can be omitted without changing the “meaning” of the model. This was the last 
exercise of the first GMB session, which was completed with a minimised version of the Scoping Model of 
Hospital Performance. This version of the model was calibrated by the researcher in Vensim Software after the 
first GMB session (background modelling in between the GMB sessions). This last version of the Scoping Model 
of Hospital Performance and its evolution can be found in Appendix 20.  
The finalised version of the Scoping Model of Hospital Performance (available in in Appendix 20) was 
presented to the participants at the beginning of the second GMB session. After a brief presentation, participants 
were asked by the facilitator to look at the model and discuss in subgroups which of the variables are not influenced 
from the system of hospital performance (e.g., they were asked to find the variables that have only outgoing arrows 
but no incoming ones) and to indicate those variables as “external”. In this way, without even realising it, the 
participants set the scope of the research project and the boundaries of the model while maintaining a quite holistic 
view of hospital performance, according to Sterman’s (2002) suggestions. During this process of narrowing the 
scope, more and more emphasis was laid on maintaining the variables that are vital for the feedback structure. The 
variables characterised as “external” by the participants were then removed by the facilitator. 
This first part of the second GMB session led to the development of the first version of the so-called 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, which is a small but inclusive model that explains the current 
situation, the actual levels of hospital performance according to the participants’ perceptions. This model 
incorporates the performance management policies imposed by the Greek government during the healthcare 
reform, and could be used to explain the dynamics of the negative outcomes documented. It depicts the actual 
structure of the system at hand and explains the current low levels of hospital performance. It shows what has 
been happening until now and what will continue to happen if no actions are taken; if no different policies that 
would change the “structure” of the system are implemented.  
After the end of the sessions, the researcher performed a number of validation tests and seven 
disconfirmatory interviews to further refine and calibrate the model, and then translated this final version of the 
model in English. This finalised version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (presented in the figure 
below and available in Appendix 21) will form the basis of our DPM analysis and will be thoroughly analysed 




7.4 Policy Model of Hospital Performance 
During the last part of the second GMB session, participants were asked to model policies for performance 
improvement. First, they identified leverage points for policy interventions in the model and then, based on those 
intervention points, they came up with concrete policy ideas. As a last step, the participants voted and their policy 
ideas were rated according to their feasibility and expected impact. The ones that were rated higher were later on 
inserted in the model as policy structure by the researcher. 
 
Figure 19. Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance 
 
 
The Policy Model of Hospital Performance is exactly the same as the Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance, but extended to incorporate the policy structure. This model incorporates the performance 
management measures imposed by the Greek government but it depicts not only the actual structure of the system 
at hand, but also the changes in the system structure which are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, 
in order for the performance to improve. It explains what has been happening until now and what actions should 
be taken in the form of new policies that should be implemented in order for the current situation to change in the 
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future and for the hospital performance to improve. It is worth mentioning that many of the policy interventions 
that participants came up with to improve hospital performance are similar to the operational objectives identified 
in our documents analysis. The Policy Model of Hospital Performance is presented in the figure below and is also 
available in Appendix 22. 
 
 




7.5 - Evaluation of the GMB Sessions & Model by the Participants 
In order to have a subjective measure to evaluate the impact of the GMB sessions on the understanding of 
hospital performance by participant stakeholders, we followed Scott et al.’s (2015) suggestion of “augmenting 
survey results with more objective measures” and we used a pretest and a post-test, together with the CICC39 
questionnaire in order to have an objective measure of validating the outcomes of our GMB Sessions. 
We created the pretests (available in Appendix 12) and the posttests (available in Appendix 13) beforehand, 
and we gave them to the participants right before and right after the GMB sessions respectively to fill them in, so 
 
39 As a means of better relating, understanding and evaluating GMB process elements and their effects, Vennix et al. (1993, 2000) 
designed the CICC questionnaire, where each of the four letters represents one of the four scales of the questionnaire, namely: Consensus, 
Insight, Communication and Commitment to action (CICC). This questionnaire has been shown as an effective way to add validity to the 




that we would be able to observe and evaluate the differences in their answers. Both pretests and posttests consisted 
of the same two-pages, asking participants the exact same four questions, namely: to describe the main problem 
related to hospital performance that their department/division is currently facing; its causes; its consequences; and 
any actions for improvement they could think of.  
 
7.5.1 Initial Understanding of Hospital Performance: Findings from Preliminary Interviews & Pretests 
conducted before the GMB Sessions 
The pretest was a two-pages document (available in Appendix 12a in English) given to the participants 
before the GMB sessions, asking them to describe the main problem related to hospital performance that their 
department/division is currently facing; its causes; its consequences; and any actions for improvement they can 
think of. At the pretests, most participants wrote that the main problem is understaffing, or that understaffing is 
the cause of the low hospital performance. Although some of them mentioned some other challenges as well, it 
was clear that in general understaffing was considered responsible by the participants for the low performance. 
And since recruitment procedures in public hospitals are executed by the Ministry of Health and take many years 
to complete, hospital stakeholders seemed to believe that there is not much they can do to foster performance. The 
filled-in pretests (in Greek) can be found in Appendix 29. 
Although hospital staff mainly blamed the understaffing for all the negative outcomes, they seemed to 
recognise that administration and organisation of services plays an important role as well. Our participants also 
agreed that the new PM policies of the healthcare reform contributed to the reduction of hospital spending, and 
that a reduction in spending was in fact needed and important, but it has somehow negatively affected hospital 
performance as well.  
 
7.5.2 Final Understanding of Hospital Performance: Findings from CICC & Posttests conducted after the 
GMB Sessions 
The posttests (available in Appendix 13a in English) were again the same two-pages document given to the 
participants after the GMB sessions, asking them again to describe the main problem related to low hospital 
performance that their department/division is currently facing; its causes; its consequences; and any actions for 
improvement they can think of. As mentioned above, at the pretests almost all the participants wrote that the main 
problem is understaffing, or that understaffing is the cause of the low performance and that there is not much they 
can do to combat it, unless more staff is hired by the Ministry of Health. At the posttest, almost none of the 
participants wrote that understaffing was the main problem. In general, what they wrote at the posttests was much 
more comprehensive and elaborated than their initial opinion at the pretest. At the posttest, they recognised many 
different aspects leading to low performance, many different causes and -most importantly- they mentioned quite 
a few policies to mediate the problem of low hospital performance. This shows that the GMB sessions clearly 
helped them go deeper, look at the causes of low performance from different aspects and get a more comprehensive 
view of hospital performance than the one they had before the GMB sessions. The filled-in posttests (in Greek) 
can be found in Appendix 29. 
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During the GMB sessions, it turned out that understaffing was indeed part of the model - and part of the 
problem of low performance - but only “part” of it. The model showed clearly that the low performance is only 
partially influenced by the understaffing. Participants understood that the variables “doctor or nurse-to-patient 
ratio” and “actual number of nurses or doctors” were central to the model and, thus, what really matters is how 
many “active” nurses and doctors (i.e., the ones participating in the shifts schedule) are available and how many 
patients are admitted. Thus, there are many actions that can be taken to improve performance, e.g., admitting less 
patients; making more people “active” in the shifts schedule, etc. Those findings are validated also from the CICC40 
questionnaires (available in Appendix 14a in English) filled in by the GMB participants right after the GMB 
sessions, where participants wrote that, in general, they found the GMB sessions very useful for the understanding 
of the low hospital performance and for finding “good enough” solutions. The filled-in CICC questionnaires (in 
Greek) can be found in Appendix 29. 
 
7.6 Model Validation 
In this section we will discuss the triangulation and the other validation tests performed by the researcher 
after the GMB sessions in order to validate, calibrate and finalise the models. One of the most important elements 
of any model-building project is establishing model validity. It is important to note that this process is not in search 
for “hard” validation. There are two reasons for this. The first reason, rooted at the methodology used, is that no 
SD model is completely valid because all SD models are simplifications of reality and, thus, fail at representing 
reality in its riches (Sterman, 2002). SD models created with the GMB approach, in particular, are merely a 
representation of the mental models of the project participants (Vennix, 1996). The second reason is that the model 
validity should be considered in relation to the model purpose (Barlas, 1996). Hence, the validity of the model is 
dependent on the purpose of the model, so that a model is valid if it is useful in explaining the phenomenon under 
investigation.  
In the SD literature, two areas of validation are mentioned: the validation of structure and the validation of 
the behaviour of the model (Barlas, 1996). Since our model is a qualitative SD model (CLD), behavioural 
validation is not applicable, as that one refers only to quantitative SD models that can be used for simulations. 
Therefore, in the present study we only focused on validating the structure of the Conceptual and Policy CLD 
Models of Hospital Performance. Three model validation tests were applied: structure verification (Forrester & 
Senge, 1980), causal clarity and variable definition (Barlas, 1996; Burns & Musa, 2001) tests. Finally, we further 
validated our Conceptual and Policy CLD Models of Hospital Performance created by the stakeholders of the case 
hospital during the GMB sessions through triangulation techniques, using our findings from the Literature, 
Documents Analysis and the Disconfirmatory Interviews with hospital stakeholders of other Greek hospitals. 
 
 
40 As a means of better relating, understanding and evaluating GMB process elements and their effects, Vennix et al. (1993, 2000) 
designed the CICC questionnaire, where each of the four letters represents one of the four scales of the questionnaire, namely: Consensus, 
Insight, Communication and Commitment to action (CICC). This questionnaire has been shown as an effective way to add validity to the 




Structure Verification  
Structure verification aims at verifying the model structure through the comparison of the model with the 
existing knowledge (Forrester & Senge, 1980). The constructed model should not contradict what we already 
know about the system. In this GMB project, the model structure was based on mental models of participants who 
were stakeholders of a Greek public hospital. During the GMB sessions, their mental models were challenged by 
the mental models of the other participants during the discussions and the process resulted in a commonly agreed 
final model. Thus, we made sure that all of the variables exist in the real system and originated from the hospital 
stakeholders. 
Furthermore, most of those variables are well-known hospital performance indicators (e.g Bed Occupancy, 
Complications, Errors, Costs, Doctor or Nurse to Patient Ratio, Failure and Mortality Rates, Length of Stay, 
Waiting time in ER, etc). Many of them also came up during our scoping review of the international literature 
around PM, and some of them came up also during the critical review of the literature around the Greek Healthcare 
reform (e.g., informal payments, nosocomial infections rate, management capacity, facilities, patient satisfaction, 
etc). Furthermore, the findings of our literature review are in line with the model structure and the model insights, 
and are in line with the documented negative outcomes documented in the case hospital. Moreover, we specifically 
searched the international literature for variables and links that assimilate the ones included in our models. Indeed, 
we verified that all the variables exist in the literature and in reality (under the same or a slightly different name) 
and that all the causal links included in our model are mentioned (as a relation or correlation stated in the literature) 
in at least one published scientific paper or book.  
Finally, the adequacy of the boundary of the system has been adjusted several times, passing from a Scoping 
Model of Hospital Performance to the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, then to the Policy Model of 
Hospital Performance and finally to the Simplified Conceptual Model that we used for our analysis. Gradually, 
all the factors that were considered outside of the hospital jurisdiction were eliminated by the group of the GMB 
participants. The scope was further narrowed as some of the variables and links initially included in the model 
were eliminated during the disconfirmatory interviews. However, many of the variables eliminated are still 
implicitly present as constants (i.e., variables with fixed values) inside the model boundary even if not explicitly 
mentioned, as explained thoroughly in the variable definitions and explanations of each variable, which are 
available in Appendix 24. For example, the number of doctors and nurses is not one of the model variables; 
however, it is implicitly present in the model because it represents the denominator of the variable “actual number 
of doctors and nurses”. 
 
Causal Clarity 
A test of causal clarity assists the modeller in discerning whether a model tells the story as intended (Burns 
& Musa, 2001). We argue that our Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance is causally clear, for three reasons. 
First, all variables and all causal links are elicited from the participants stakeholders of the case hospital, and 
verified by them. Therefore, we can say that the model certainly tells the story of the participant stakeholders and 
of how they perceive the causes of hospital performance. The development of the CLD lasted two sessions, where 
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the first session was concerned with model expansion (divergence) and the second session was more focused on 
convergence, and on verifying each of the causal loops. Although not every participant was fully satisfied with 
details of the entire model, the loops that were present were clear and necessary to tell the story. Second, the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance was created during the GMB sessions from the participant 
stakeholders of the case hospital, and was further validated by seven other participant stakeholders from different 
hospitals in Greece, during disconfirmatory interviews. The last reason why the model has a clear causal story is 
that most of the participants expressed their gratitude to the researcher after the end of the GMB sessions and 
stated that the model gave them a new perspective through which to view hospital performance. They said they 
found the model sufficiently useful for future use in analysing and discussing hospital performance. This is easily 
inferred also by the pretests and the posttests of the participants, where it is clear that the understanding of hospital 
performance among the participants was highly increased after the GMB sessions. Finally, it is inferred also by 
the CICC questionnaires, where participants state that they found the GMB sessions very useful.  All those facts 
clearly show that the model fits its purpose of expressing dynamic causality of hospital performance, making it a 
clear model to be used by the participants but also by other hospital stakeholders and policy-makers in Greece. 
 
Variable Definition 
Variable Definition (Burns & Musa, 2001) is concerned with testing whether the model variables are 
formulated in a useful way; that is, in a measurable way. We argue that this is the case for our model, as much 
emphasis was put during the GMB sessions on the variables’ definition, explanations and measurability, as well 
as on the polarity and direction of the causal links of the variables. Hence, all causal links have a clear indication 
of the direction. The definitions of the variables is also considered to be sufficient as most of them are defined as 
“the amount of”, “the level of”, rates or ratios. Some variables however (like health-status for example) are quite 
intangible and could use some refinement in their expression and definition. However, we left them as they are as 
participants insisted that they represent what they should represent and no other alternative was collectively 
accepted by the group. The definitions and explanations of all the model variables and causal links of the 
Conceptual and the Policy Models of Hospital Performance can be found in Appendix 24. 
 
Triangulation 
Credibility and internal validity of our model (i.e., confidence in the 'truth' of the variables and links) was 
ensured through: (1) Triangulation41 (e.g., using many different data sources for ensuring the internal validity of 
our findings, including our findings from the preliminary and the disconfirmatory interviews, the GMB sessions, 
the documents analysis and the literature review). The narrative analysis of the open-access and closed-access 
documents which regarded the Health Ministry’s and hospital’s performance objectives were used in order to 
create the Policy Model of Hospital Performance, and some of our findings from the critical literature review were 
 
41 Triangulation involves using multiple data sources in an investigation to produce understanding. Rather than seeing 
triangulation as a method for validation or verification, qualitative researchers generally use this technique to ensure that an account is rich, 
robust, comprehensive and well-developed. For more details, see: http://www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html 
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used in order to validate the Conceptual as well as the Policy Model of Hospital Performance; (2)Negative case 
analysis42 and Member-checking43 (e.g., conducting disconfirmatory interviews to validate and increase 
confidence in the model, by “disconfirming” variables or links of the model created in the case hospital during the 
GMB sessions and deleting the causal relations and/ or variables upon which the interviewees disagreed).  
Transferability and external validity (i.e., proving that the findings are applicable in other situations as well) 
of our findings was ensured mainly by the rich, detailed qualitative data and the Thick Descriptions44 of all the 
model variables, links and loops, which allow the readers interpret the results and see if they can be generalized 
to other contexts. Although generalizability is not the purpose of qualitative analysis such as ours, we wanted our 
model to be “universal” for the Greek healthcare context and readily usable by other hospitals and policy-makers 
in Greece. For this reason, after building the model of hospital performance with the GMB participant stakeholders 
of the case hospital, we chose to conduct disconfirmatory interviews with seven different stakeholders from seven 
different public hospitals of different regions and cities of Greece (Heraklion Crete, Sitia, Thessaloniki, Athens, 
Giannena, Kavala, Kalamata).  Those individuals were again public hospital stakeholders who fall into the five 
main key-stakeholder categories (hospital managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients) and each one of 
them works or has been hospitalized in a different public hospital. During those interviews, we refined the CLD 
model of hospital performance according to the interviewees’ views, by deleting the causal relations and variables 
upon which the interviewees disagreed. In this way, we strengthened the external validity of our model and 
findings, and created a "convergent" and more “universal” version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance, including only the variables and loops which all stakeholders from all hospitals agreed upon and 
found relevant in their cases as well. Finally, we made sure that all the variables and links of our model are 
documented in the international and/ or the Greek literature (each variable and link is documented in at least one 
published academic paper), which is a further sign of transferability and external validity. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 corresponds to the first research question of our study, namely: How do stakeholders define 
hospital performance. To answer this question we conducted the GMB sessions in the case hospital, first in order 
to help hospital stakeholders gain a better understanding of the low hospital performance they experience in a 
more systematic way, and second to help them collectively - through structured activities and facilitated 
discussions - define it; show its trend (dynamic behaviour) in the hospital during the last decade in a diagram 
 
42 Negative Case Analysis is a process for refining an analysis until it can explain or account for a majority of cases. It may be 
used to revise, broaden or confirm the patterns emerging from data analysis and involves searching for and discussing elements of the data 
that do not support or appear to contradict patterns or explanations that are emerging from the data analysis. For more details, see: 
http://www.qualres.org/HomeNega-3694.html 
43 Member Checks is when data, analytic categories, interpretations and conclusions are tested with members of those groups 
from whom the data were originally obtained. This can be done both formally and informally as opportunities for member checks may arise 
during the normal course of observation and conversation. Typically, member checking is viewed as a technique for establishing to the 
validity of an account. Lincoln and Guba posit that this is the most crucial technique for establishing credibility. For more details, see: 
http://www.qualres.org/HomeMemb-3696.html 
44 Thick description is described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a way of achieving a type of external validity.  By describing a 
phenomenon in sufficient detail one can begin to evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are transferable to other times, settings, 
situations, and people. For more details, see: http://www.qualres.org/HomeThic-3697.html 
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(Reference Mode); and conceptualise it as a system, depicted as a qualitative system dynamics model of hospital 
performance (CLD - Causal Loop Diagram). The two final versions of this CLD Model (i.e., the Conceptual 
Model of Hospital Performance and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance available in Appendixes 21 and 
22 respectively), which are the main outputs of the GMB sessions, will form the basis of our research analysis and 
findings of the next chapters. 
Hospital performance was defined by the participant stakeholders as the provision of patient-centred care 
to the patient, with safety (for the patients and the staff); responsibility (adherence to protocols, proportions and 
procedures) and dignity (nice and clean facilities, access without waiting and without informal payments). The 
Reference Mode (available in Appendix 19) created and agreed upon by the participants showed that, despite the 
counterintuitive negative outcomes documented, the level of the overall performance in the case hospital has been 
slightly increasing (because of the gradual introduction of information systems and quality measures and 
protocols) after the healthcare reform, but is now stabilizing, as the overall performance is rather low according 
to the new, updated international standards. Appendix 19 provides evidence and further explanations on the 
Reference Mode created by the participants during the GMB sessions.  
Two different final versions of the model of hospital performance were created by the hospital stakeholders, 
the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance (available in 
Appendixes 21 and 22 respectively, and thoroughly described in terms of variables and links in Appendix 24), 
which will form the basis of our research analysis and results of the next chapters. Three model validation tests 
were applied: the structure verification (Forrester & Senge, 1980), the causal clarity and the variable definition 
(Barlas, 1996; Burns & Musa, 2001) tests.  Finally, we further validated the two CLD Models through 
triangulation techniques, using our findings from the literature, documents analysis and the disconfirmatory 
interviews with hospital stakeholders of other Greek hospitals. The Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance 
(which will be analytically discussed in chapters 8 and 9) is a CLD model that depicts the actual structure of the 
system at hand and can be used to explain the current low performance. It shows what has been happening until 
now, according to the participant stakeholders, and what will continue to happen if actions are not taken; if no 
different policies are implemented that would change the structure of the system. The Policy Model of Hospital 
Performance (which will be analytically discussed in chapter 11) is exactly the same as the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance, but extended to incorporate the policy structure, i.e., the changes in the system structure 
which are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, in order to improve performance. The Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance explains not only what has been happening until now, but also what actions should be 
taken in the form of new policies that should be implemented in order for the case hospital performance to improve.  
Furthermore, in this chapter we evaluated the value of the GMB sessions and of the CLD Models for the 
participants, by comparing the initial versus the final understanding of the participant stakeholders around hospital 
performance. More explicitly, we used our findings from the Preliminary Interviews & pretests conducted before 
the GMB sessions to report the initial understanding of hospital performance, and the findings from the CICC 
questionnaires and the posttests, conducted after the GMB sessions, to report the final understanding of hospital 
performance. At the pretests, almost all the participants wrote that the main cause of low performance is 
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understaffing and that, in order for the performance to improve, more staff should be hired by the Ministry of 
Health. At the posttest, what they wrote was much more comprehensive and elaborated than that, as they 
recognised many different aspects leading to low performance, many different causes and -most importantly- they 
mentioned quite a few policies to improve performance, which clearly proves the value of our approach, of our 
model and of the GMB sessions in augmenting their understanding around performance. The filled-in posttests 
(in Greek) can be found in Appendix 29. 
The model clearly showed that the low performance is only partially influenced by the understaffing. 
Participants understood that the variables “doctor or nurse-to-patient ratio” and “actual number of nurses or 
doctors” were central to the model and, thus, what really matters is how many “active” nurses and doctors (i.e., 
the ones participating in the shifts schedule) are available and how many patients are admitted. Thus, there are 
many actions that can be taken to improve performance, e.g., admitting less patients; making more people “active” 
in the shifts schedule, etc. Those findings are validated also from the CICC questionnaires (available in Appendix 
14a in English) filled in by the GMB participants right after the GMB sessions, where participants wrote that, in 
general, they found the GMB sessions very useful for the understanding of the low hospital performance and for 




CHAPTER 8 – CONCEPTUAL MODEL ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter 8 corresponds to the second research question of our study, namely: What are the main feedback 
loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders. In order to answer this question, in chapter 8 
we analyse the structure of a simplified version of the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance that the GMB 
participant stakeholders created, in terms of model loops. As the original model that our participants created 
(available in Appendix 21) contains a significant number of loops, and it is impossible to explicitly present and 
discuss all of them, the researcher created a simplified version by erasing some of the variables and causal links, 
in order to make it possible to identify and analyse the most basic feedback loops of the model. In section 8.1 we 
present this Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, we explain how we created it, and then we go 
on to present and explain the reinforcing and the balancing feedback loops identified in this Simplified Conceptual 
Model in the next two sections. The reader of this chapter should have in mind the Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance (available in Appendix 21) and turn to the models’ documentation (available in Appendix 24) every 
time that something is not clear. In Appendix 24, all the model variables and causal links of all the CLD models 
we created (Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, 
Policy Model of Hospital Performance) are analytically presented, explained and discussed. 
 
8.1 The Simplified Conceptual Model 
As the original Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance that participant stakeholders built includes a 
significant number of loops (as shown on Figure 21 below), it is not possible to explicitly present and discuss all 
of them. Moreover, when we add the policy structure to our model, the number of loops increases remarkably (see 
Figure 22). On Figures 21 and 22 it is shown how many loops each of the model variables participates in, which 
is automatically calculated by the Vensim Software. For this reason, we created a simplified version of the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance by erasing some of the variables and causal links and by keeping only 
the most important ones, in order to make it possible to analyse the most basic mechanisms of the model structure. 
In this section we will present and analyse all the loops of this Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance, by giving a name for each loop and showing the model variables that the loop includes. Then we 
will discuss if the loop is a reinforcing or a balancing one and we will analytically explain how each loop operates.  
In order to simplify the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, reduce its total number of loops and 
make it easier to analyse it properly, we erased the following four variables:  
(1) Bed Occupancy (i.e., the number of Admitted Patients multiplied by their Length of Stay (in days) during a 
certain period of time and divided by the number of Available Beds multiplied by that period of time in days) 
(2) Available Beds (i.e., the number of “active” beds depending on the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors) 
(3)  Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors (i.e., the number of “active” nurses or doctors who are placed at the 




Figure 21. Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance – Total Number of Loops: more than 36 
 
 





(4) Difficulty of Shift Schedule (i.e., the level of inconvenience of the staff’s Shifts and overnights Schedule).  
Although they are quite important, we decided to exclude them from the Simplified Conceptual Model as 
those four variables together form a subsystem which refers to internal processes of staffing and staff management; 
a subsystem which could be analysed separately, and then be added in the performance model as a separate branch. 
More specifically, Available Beds and Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors are two variables that convert a 
phenomenally constant number (i.e., the number of hospital beds and the numbers of doctors and of nurses) into 
a variable sum. The Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors is not stable but dynamically changes depending on the 
absences and the maternity or sick leaves of the doctors and nurses - which is influenced by the Difficulty of Shift 
Schedule. That is why we also excluded the variable Difficulty of Shift Schedule. Seemingly, the number of the 
Available Beds in clinics and ICUs as well as the number of available surgical banks is not stable, but it 
dynamically changes depending on the number of the “active” nurses and doctors, who are present at the hospital 
(not on some kind of leave) and are actively participating in the shifts and overnights schedule of the clinics. The 
fact that we exclude Available Beds and Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors from the Simplified Conceptual 
Model, leaves the model with two constant numbers in the place of those two variables, which makes it simpler 
to analyse. Bed Occupancy is excluded because it is highly connected to this staffing subsystem, and thus should 
better be integrated there. 
In order to further simplify the model, from the remaining variables we deleted six causal links. Although 
important, those six links represent processes that are either slow or not central to the issues of performance that 
our case hospital currently faces. Thus, omitting them did not make a decisive difference to the model, but it made 
it much more comprehensive and easier to analyse. Those six links that we deleted were the following: 
(1) Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols → Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital 
Forms 
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols leads to the 
increase of the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms in the long run. This is 
because the existence and adherence of guidelines & protocols in the hospital “pushes” in the long run for the 
specification and acquisition of the necessary medical equipment and for the standardisation of procedures 
(internal regulations; nurses' duties; work distribution and shift schedules that respect the necessary rests; safety 
measures, etc.) to be created and implemented. 
(2) Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols → Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio 
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols leads to the 
increase of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio. This is because the adherence to international guidelines “pushes” 
for the right proportions of doctors or nurses in respect to patients admitted to be respected (i.e., an Indicated 
Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio). 
(3) Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols → Errors 
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols leads to the 
decrease of Errors. This is because the higher the adherence to medical and nursing guidelines and protocols, the 
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more appropriate the patients handling will be, the more measures and precautions are taken by the hospital staff 
for the safety of the staff and of the patients and the more Errors will be avoided. 
(4) Errors → Nosocomial Infections Rate 
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that Errors lead to the increase of Nosocomial Infections 
Rate. This is because some of the medical and nursing staff’s Errors (e.g., improper sterilization of catheters and 
surgical equipment) directly causes infections (i.e., urinary tract infections and surgical site infections 
respectively) to the patients. 
(5) Management Capacity → Costs  
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that increased Management Capacity leads to the 
decrease of Costs in the long run. This is because increased Management Capacity of the permanent employees 
of the hospital would eliminate the need for extra personnel (i.e., personnel hired under fixed-term contracts of 
employment to help with the management responsibilities of the hospital managers that are not fulfilled) who is 
paid from the Approved Budget, creating one of the biggest sources of cost for the hospital. 
(6) Hospital Reputation → Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience 
The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agreed that a good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of 
Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience. This is because when a hospital has a good reputation, high quality 
doctors are attracted to come and work with the other considerably good doctors of the hospital, bringing their 
education, skills & experience to the hospital assets.  
 After eliminating all the above-mentioned variables and causal links, our Simplified Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance was formed, as shown on figure 23 (available also in Appendix 23). This simplified model 
is suitable for analysing and drawing some clear conclusions from, as it contains only eleven loops (seven 
reinforcing and four balancing ones), which we present and analyse in the next sections of this chapter. 
 
8.2 Reinforcing Loops 
A Feedback Loop in a system arises when a shift of a variable causes a circular shift in other variables and 
eventually feeds back to trigger further change in the initial variable. If that further change is in the same direction 
as the initial change, then the loop is known as “positive” or “reinforcing”. However, positive feedback loops are 
not always “good” for the hospital performance (Senge, 1990; Senge & Forrester, 1980). Furthermore, in system 
dynamics, and in systems’ analysis in general, the starting point of a system (i.e., the initial values of the variables 
that represent “stocks”, such as assets or resources) is important. Thus, we start our analysis of the reinforcing 
loops below from the fact that, currently, our case hospital is among the ones that have a good reputation, and thus 
it is currently facing increasing volumes of incoming patients, leading to increased waiting times and waiting lists. 
 
R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback Management 
(Approved Budget-Financial Resources-Hospital Spending) 
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A cut of the approved Hospital Budget leads to the decrease of Financial Resources available, which is quite 
intuitive as the higher the Approved Budget, the more money the hospital manager has in his disposition “legally” 
to allocate to the different departments and cover needs. Increased Financial Resources in turn lead to the increase 
of Hospital Spending, because the more the Financial Resources that hospital managers have in their disposition, 
the more they are motivated to spend. Increased Hospital Spending in turn leads to the increase of the Approved 
Budget in the long term, and the other way around (decreased Hospital Spending leads to the decrease of the 
Approved Budget in the long term). This happens because of the current policy of the Ministry of Health, according 
to which the budget of the next fiscal year is issued according to the past year’s spending. Given the current 
policies of Cutback Management in place, loop R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback Management is catastrophic 
for hospital performance in the long run, as it leads to a perpetual decrease of financial resources and purchasing 
power in the long run, leading to a lack of capacity by public hospitals to cover their needs. 
 





R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption 
(Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission - Waiting List for Surgery or Admission) 
Long Waiting Lists for Surgery or Admission lead to the increase of the Informal Payments for early 
Surgery/Admission.  This happens because, according to our participants, most of the patients do not like to wait 
long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most importantly because - depending also 
on the severity of their condition - they might feel that their health will deteriorate if they wait. Thus, they commit 
to paying the doctors out-of-pocket, thinking that they will not get timely and appropriate treatment unless they 
do it. Increased rates of Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission, in turn, lead back to the increase of the 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission. This is logical, as before calling a patient on the waiting list to be admitted 
for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure that there are surgical banks as well as 
beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If some patients are characterised as “urgent cases” and are 
being given priority after giving informal payments to doctors, then all the rest of the patients on the waiting list 
will have to wait more time than otherwise and, in the meanwhile, more patients are being placed on the waiting 
list, making it even bigger and increasing the average waiting time for all the patients on the list. Given the long 
waiting lists that are already in place in all Greek public hospitals as a result of the current policies, and given the 
widespread idea between patients that informal payments are necessary for a timely and proper treatment, loop 
R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption is catastrophic for public health in the long run, as it leads to a perpetual 
increase of private spending on healthcare and to the outspread of corruption between public hospital doctors. 
 
R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & 
Experience) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients who have no other specific preferences (i.e., preferences 
for a specific doctor, in which case they are obliged to visit the hospital where this doctor works and be treated 
there) for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. A high rate of Incoming Patients, in turn, leads 
to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients, because the more the Incoming Patients, the more will be the 
scheduled admissions, and the more will be the Admitted Patients. An increase of Admitted Patients in turn leads 
to the increase of Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience, as the more the patients that are admitted and under 
treatment, the more cases nurses and doctors have to work on, and the more experience and skills they will gain. 
Finally, increased Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience leads back to the increase of the Hospital Reputation 
in the long term, because the reputation of the doctors’ and nurses’ skills and experience builds on the Hospital 
Reputation through the word of mouth. Loop R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building leads to a perpetual increase 
of skills mix and reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the 
currently unsuccessful ones; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the 
Successful archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, loop R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building is beneficial for big, 
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urban hospitals that are generally better staffed and equipped, whereas catastrophic for the small, rural hospitals’ 
performance in the long run. 
 
R4 -   Length of Stay & Complications 
(Length of Stay – Complications) 
A longer Length of Stay leads to the increase of Complications. This is because Length of Stay augments the 
chances that Complications occur: the more time the inpatient is being treated, the more become the chances that 
he/she gets a nosocomial infection or that he/she becomes subject to an error of the medical staff. More 
Complications, in turn, lead back to an even longer Length of Stay. This is because Complications deteriorate the 
patient’s health state and oblige him/her to stay more time admitted until he/she recovers. Loop R4 -   Length of 
Stay & Complications highlights the need for a short Length of Stay to avoid complications. 
 
R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population 
(Multidrug Resistance in Population - Nosocomial Infections Rate) 
A high Nosocomial Infections Rate leads to the increase of Multidrug Resistance in Population. This is because 
the higher the Nosocomial Infections Rate, the more patients will be infected by resistant pathogens and – the ones 
who will not die – will be colonised and discharged. The more the colonised patients in the community, the higher 
the multidrug resistance in the general population, which, in turn, leads back to the further increase of Nosocomial 
Infections Rate. This is because the higher the Multidrug Resistance in Population, the more the colonised patients 
that will be admitted in the hospital and the more the possibilities that they will infect other patients there, pushing 
the Nosocomial Infections Rate higher than otherwise. Loop R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population 
highlights the need for limiting Nosocomial Infections Rate using appropriate measures, in order to reduce 
multidrug resistance in the general population. 
 
R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience 
- Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & 
Quality of Life - Patient Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients who have no other specific preferences (i.e., preferences 
for a specific doctor, in which case they are obliged to visit the hospital where this doctor works and be treated 
there) for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. A high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads 
to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients. This is because the more the Incoming Patients, the more will 
be the scheduled admissions, and the more will be the Admitted Patients. Increased Admitted Patients in turn lead 
to the increase of Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience, as the more the patients that are admitted under 
treatment, the more cases nurses and doctors have to work on, and the more experience and skills they will gain. 
Higher Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience lead to the increase of the Accurate Diagnosis & 
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Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care for patients, as the better the quality of doctors, the better the chances for a 
correct diagnosis and, subsequently, for an appropriate treatment; and the better the quality of nurses, the better 
the therapeutic care provided for the patient. Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care in turn 
leads to the increase of the Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because getting the right 
diagnosis means that patients are provided with the right treatment for their condition and will survive a fatal 
condition, or that they will be able to treat a condition that would deteriorate their quality of life if it remained 
undiagnosed or improperly treated. High Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life leads to the 
increase of Patient Satisfaction. Although patients cannot evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, 
they can - and they often do - evaluate the outcome of the treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., 
their overall level of health, pain and functionality after treatment in comparison to before treatment, and in 
comparison to other similar cases). High Patient Satisfaction in turn leads to the increase of the Hospital 
Reputation. This is because patients who are satisfied from their experience and treatment at a hospital are likely 
to return there for a future treatment regarding themselves or their family members, as well as to express this 
satisfaction to their contacts and spread this good opinion through word of mouth. Loop R6 – Clinical Efficiency 
& Hospital Reputation leads to a perpetual increase of clinical efficiency, accumulated intellectual and skills 
capital, reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently 
unsuccessful ones; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the Successful 
archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, loop R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation is beneficial for big, urban 
hospitals that are generally better staffed and equipped, whereas catastrophic for the small, rural hospitals’ 
performance in the long run. 
 
R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience 
- Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care - Length of Stay – Complications - Survival Rate 
/ Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - Patient Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients who have no other specific preferences (i.e., preferences 
for a specific doctor, in which case they are obliged to visit the hospital where this doctor works and be treated 
there) for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. A high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads 
to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients. This is because the more the Incoming Patients, the more will 
be the scheduled admissions, and the more will be the Admitted Patients. Increased Admitted Patients in turn lead 
to the increase of Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience, as the more the patients that are admitted under 
treatment, the more cases nurses and doctors have to work on, and the more experience and skills they will gain. 
Higher Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience lead to the increase of the Accurate Diagnosis & 
Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care for patients, as the better the quality of doctors, the better the chances for a 
correct diagnosis and, subsequently, for an appropriate treatment; and the better the quality of nurses, the better 
the therapeutic care provided for the patient. Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care leads to 
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the decrease of the Length of Stay, because getting the right diagnosis means that patients are provided with the 
right treatment for their condition right away, which means that they will get better soon and will be dismissed 
earlier. A shorter Length of Stay in turn leads to the decrease of Complications. This is because a longer Length of 
Stay augments the chances that Complications occur: the more time the inpatient is being treated, the more become 
the chances that he/she gets a nosocomial infection or that he/she becomes subject to an error of the medical staff. 
Less Complications in turn lead to the increase of Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because 
Complications during hospital treatment might cause long-term disabilities and chronic conditions to the patient. 
High Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life leads to the increase of Patient Satisfaction. 
Although patients cannot evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, they can - and they often do - 
evaluate the outcome of the treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., their overall level of health, 
pain and functionality after treatment in comparison to before treatment and in comparison to other similar cases). 
High Patient Satisfaction in turn leads to the increase of the Hospital Reputation. This is because patients who are 
satisfied from their experience and treatment at a hospital are likely to return there for a future treatment regarding 
themselves or their family members, as well as to express this satisfaction to their contacts and spread this good 
opinion through word of mouth. Exactly as Loop R6, Loop R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation leads to a 
perpetual increase of clinical efficiency, accumulated intellectual and skills capital, reputation for the already 
successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently unsuccessful ones; a well-known 
phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the Successful archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, loop 
R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation is beneficial for big, urban hospitals that are generally better staffed 
and equipped, whereas catastrophic for the small, rural hospitals’ performance in the long run. 
 
8.3 Balancing Loops 
A Feedback Loop in a system arises when a shift of a variable causes a circular shift in other variables and 
eventually feeds back to trigger further change in the initial variable. If that further change is in the opposite 
direction to the initial change, then the loop is called “negative” or “balancing”. However, negative feedback loops 
are not always “bad” for the hospital performance (Senge, 1990; Senge & Forrester, 1980).  As in the section 8.2, 
we start our analysis of the balancing loops below from the fact that, currently, our case hospital is among the 
ones that have a good reputation, and thus it is currently facing increasing volumes of incoming patients, leading 
to increased waiting times and waiting lists. 
 
B1 – Word of Mouth & Waiting Times 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services - Patient 
Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients, as a hospital with a good 
reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. A 
high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads to the increase of the Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services. This 
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is because the more the Incoming Patients at a certain period (e.g., a day in the ER), the more work for a fixed 
number of nurses and doctors will it be and – since they cannot all together be examined at once – the more they 
will need to wait. This applies not only to waiting in the Emergency Room (where Greek patients might need to 
wait for many hours or days to be examined) but also to the outpatient services of the hospital, where patients call 
in advance and book an appointment and might need to wait for months or even year(s) for the first appointment 
available. Longer Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services, in turn, leads to the decrease of Patient Satisfaction, 
which is quite logical as nobody likes long queues and long waiting times to be examined. Especially when it 
comes to being in the ER for an emergency, waiting can be fatal. Finally, low Patient Satisfaction leads to the 
decrease of the Hospital Reputation in the long run, because patients are likely to express their low satisfaction to 
their contacts through word of mouth, affecting the Hospital Reputation negatively. Loop B1 – Word of Mouth & 
Waiting Times leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and hospital reputation for the 
already successful hospitals in the long run; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the 
Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, Loop B1 – Word of Mouth & Waiting Times shows that, 
paradoxically, a good hospital reputation is both a blessing and a curse, doomed to be deteriorated because of the 
adverse effect of long waiting times that is inevitably generated in the hospital, causing the overall hospital 
performance to decrease. 
 
B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients' Needs 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task - Communication & Attendance to Patients' Needs - Patient Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. 
A high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients and this, in turn 
leads to the decrease of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio, because this ratio is formed by the number of active 
nurses or doctors (nominator) to the number of Admitted Patients (denominator) and, as the denominator increases, 
the ratio decreases. A low Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio leads to the decrease of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task, as the “active” doctors and nurses are less than they should, in respect to the number of patients. 
Those few workers are, however, the ones who have to carry the burden of all the admitted patients, which means 
that they have much more patients to treat during their 8-hours shift than they should have, thus the real time that 
they can devote to each patient decreases. Decrease of the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task in turn leads to 
the decrease of the Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs. This is because the more the net time 
that doctors and nurses have available to dedicate to each patient, the more “present” and “responsive” nurses and 
medical staff will be to each patients’ needs and the more the time they will spend with each one of them, 
answering their questions and giving them information and instructions regarding their condition, treatment and 
personal care. Less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs leads to the decrease of Patient 
Satisfaction, because a polite behaviour, a good communication and the attendance to their needs by the medical 
and nursing staff are largely what patients perceive as “good hospital treatment”. This is also what they usually 
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have in mind when evaluating their hospitalisation experiences in the various Patient satisfaction questionnaires, 
because patients are not able – unless they are doctors themselves - to evaluate the appropriateness of treatment 
and diagnosis, or the medical and scientific integrity of doctors and nurses. Finally, low Patient Satisfaction leads 
to the decrease of the Hospital Reputation, because patients are likely to express their low satisfaction to their 
contacts through word of mouth, affecting the Hospital Reputation negatively. Exactly as Loop B1, Loop B2 – 
Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients' Needs leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient 
satisfaction and hospital reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run; a well-known phenomenon 
in the system’s literature known as the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, Loop B2 – Patient 
Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients' Needs shows that, paradoxically, a good hospital reputation is both a 
blessing and a curse, doomed to be deteriorated because of the adverse effect of less attendance to patients' needs 
that is inevitably generated in the hospital, causing the overall hospital performance to decrease. 
 
B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task – Errors – Complications - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality 
of Life - Patient Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. 
A high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients and this, in turn 
leads to the decrease of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio, because this ratio is formed by the number of active 
nurses or doctors (nominator) to the number of Admitted Patients (denominator) and, as the denominator increases, 
the ratio decreases. A low Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio leads to the decrease of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task, as the “active” doctors and nurses are less than they should, in respect to the number of patients. 
Those few workers are, however, the ones who have to carry the burden of all the admitted patients, which means 
that they have much more patients to treat during their 8-hours shift than they should have, thus the real time that 
they can devote to each patient decreases. Decrease of the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task in turn leads to 
the increase of Errors. This is because the more the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task, the more the time 
that doctors and nurses have available to spend with each patient, answering his/her questions and giving him and 
his carers information and instructions regarding his/her condition, treatment and personal care from their 
experience. Subsequently, usual patients’ Errors which create Complications or unexpected readmissions will be 
avoided. Furthermore, the more the time medical and nursing staff spends with each patient, the better they will 
get to know and remember the condition of each patient and the less will be the medical and nursing staff’s Errors 
due to miscommunication or insufficient attendance to patients. Increase of Errors, in turn, lead to the increase of 
Complications. This is because personnel’s or patients’ and carers’ Errors (e.g., mistaken dosage of the right 
medicine or wrong medicine) directly cause Complications to the patient, sometimes serious or fatal ones. More 
Complications, thus, lead to the decrease of Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because 
Complications during hospital treatment might cause long-term disabilities and chronic conditions to the patient 
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– or even death. Low Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life leads to the decrease of Patient 
Satisfaction. Although patients cannot evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, they can - and they 
often do - evaluate the outcome of the treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., their overall level of 
health, pain and functionality after treatment, in comparison to before treatment, and in comparison to other similar 
cases). High Patient Satisfaction in turn leads to the increase of the Hospital Reputation. This is because patients 
who are satisfied from their experience and treatment at a hospital are likely to return there for a future treatment 
regarding themselves or their family members, as well as to express this satisfaction to their contacts and spread 
this good opinion through word of mouth. Exactly as Loop B1 and B2, Loop B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors 
leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and hospital reputation for the already successful 
hospitals in the long run; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Limits to Success 
archetype (Senge, 1990). Thus, Loop B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors shows that, paradoxically, a good 
hospital reputation is both a blessing and a curse, doomed to be deteriorated because of the adverse effect of more  
errors that is inevitably generated in the hospital, causing the overall hospital performance to decrease. 
 
B4 - Actual Time Available & Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task - Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols - Nosocomial Infections Rate – 
Complications - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - Patient Satisfaction) 
A good Hospital Reputation leads to the increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. 
A high rate of Incoming Patients in turn leads to the increase of the number of Admitted Patients and this, in turn 
leads to the decrease of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio, because this ratio is formed by the number of active 
nurses or doctors (nominator) to the number of Admitted Patients (denominator) and, as the denominator increases, 
the ratio decreases. A low Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio leads to the decrease of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task, as the “active” doctors and nurses are less than they should, in respect to the number of patients. 
Those few workers are, however, the ones who have to carry the burden of all the admitted patients, which means 
that they have much more patients to treat during their 8-hours shift than they should have, thus the real time that 
they can devote to each patient decreases. Decrease of the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task in turn leads to 
the decrease of Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. This is mainly because, in their mind, following guidelines 
is “a more time-consuming way of doing things”; thus, the more the time they have available to finish all their 
tasks during their shift, the more willing they are to allocate some time on following the guidelines – provided, of 
course, that they already know how to do that, and have been fully educated and trained to the implementation of 
those guidelines and protocols. Even if they know that they should be doing this task differently to be consistent 
with the guidelines, they might decide not to do it in the proper way, in order to earn some time and finish their 
shift on time. Low Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in turn leads to the increase of Nosocomial Infections 
Rate. This is because adherence to guidelines, measures, nursing and medical protocols ensures among others 
Appropriate Patients handling, appropriate Material & Waste Management, adequate staff’s vaccination coverage, 
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and other measures and precautions which could limit the spread of Nosocomial Infections Rate. High levels of 
Nosocomial Infections Rate lead to the increase of Complications, because the higher the Hospital’s Nosocomial 
Infections Rate, the more are the chances that a patient gets infected in a given time period. More Complications 
lead to the decrease of Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because Complications during 
hospital treatment might cause long-term disabilities and chronic conditions to the patient (or even death). Lower 
Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life in turn leads to the decrease of Patient Satisfaction, as 
patients often evaluate the outcome of the treatment and their quality of life after discharge, and satisfied patients 
are more likely to spread this good opinion through word of mouth, leading to better Hospital Reputation. Exactly 
as Loop B1, B2 and B3, Loop B4 - Actual Time Available & Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols leads to a 
gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and hospital reputation for the already successful hospitals 
in the long run; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Limits to Success archetype 
(Senge, 1990). Thus, Loop B4 - Actual Time Available & Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols shows that, 
paradoxically, a good hospital reputation is both a blessing and a curse, doomed to be deteriorated because of the 
adverse effect of limited adherence to guidelines & protocols that is inevitably generated in the hospital, causing 
the overall hospital performance to decrease. 
 
8.4 Conclusions 
Chapter 8 corresponds to the second research question of our study, namely: What are the main feedback 
loops driving hospital performance, as perceived by stakeholders. In order to answer this question, in chapter 8 
we analysed the structure of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, which is a simplified 
version (by means of deleting four model variables and six causal links) of the Conceptual Model of Hospital 
Performance that the participant stakeholders created during the GMB sessions. Exactly as the Conceptual Model 
of Hospital Performance, the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance also depicts the actual 
structure of the system at hand and can be used to explain the current low performance.  
Seven Reinforcing and four Balancing feedback loops were identified, named and discussed (available also 
in Appendix 23): R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback Management (Approved Budget-Financial Resources-
Hospital Spending); R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption (Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission - 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission); R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building (Hospital Reputation - Incoming 
Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience); R4 -  Length of Stay & Complications 
(Length of Stay – Complications); R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population (Multidrug Resistance in 
Population - Nosocomial Infections Rate); R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation (Hospital Reputation 
- Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience - Accurate Diagnosis & 
Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - Patient 
Satisfaction); R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation (Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted 
Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience - Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care 
- Length of Stay – Complications - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - Patient Satisfaction); 
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B1 – Word of Mouth & Waiting Times (Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Waiting Time in ER & 
Outpatient Services - Patient Satisfaction); B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients’ Needs (Hospital 
Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task - Communication & Attendance to Patients' Needs - Patient Satisfaction); B3 - Actual Time Available 
& Errors (Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task – Errors – Complications - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of 
Life - Patient Satisfaction); B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols (Hospital 
Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task - Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols - Nosocomial Infections Rate – Complications - Survival 
Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - Patient Satisfaction). 
Given the current policies of Cutback Management in place, loop R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback 
Management is catastrophic for hospital performance in the long run, as it leads to a perpetual decrease of financial 
resources and purchasing power in the long run, leading to a lack of capacity by public hospitals to cover their 
needs. Given the long waiting lists that are already in place in all Greek public hospitals, as a result of the current 
policies, and given the widespread idea between patients that informal payments are necessary for a timely and 
proper treatment, loop R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption is catastrophic for public health in the long run, as 
it leads to a perpetual increase of private spending on healthcare and to the outspread of corruption between public 
hospital doctors. Loop R4 -   Length of Stay & Complications highlights the need for a short Length of Stay to 
avoid complications. Loop R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population highlights the need for limiting 
Nosocomial Infections Rate using appropriate measures, in order to reduce multidrug resistance in the general 
population.  
Loop R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building leads to a perpetual increase of skills mix and reputation for 
the already successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently unsuccessful ones; a 
well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the Successful archetype (Senge, 
1990). Seemingly, Loop R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation leads to a perpetual increase of clinical 
efficiency, accumulated intellectual and skills capital, reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long 
run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently unsuccessful ones. Exactly as Loops R3 and R6, Loop R7 – 
Complications & Hospital Reputation leads to a perpetual increase of clinical efficiency, accumulated intellectual 
and skills capital, and reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease 
for the currently unsuccessful ones. Thus, loops R3, R6 and R7 are beneficial for big, urban hospitals that are 
generally better staffed and equipped, whereas catastrophic for the small, rural hospitals’ performance in the long 
run; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the Successful archetype 
(Senge, 1990).  
However, all the four balancing loops B1, B2, B3 and B4 lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of 
patient satisfaction and of hospital reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run; a well-known 
phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990). The balancing 
loops show that, paradoxically, a good hospital reputation is both a blessing and a curse, doomed to be deteriorated 
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because of the adverse effects of: (1) long waiting times; (2) less attendance to patients' needs; (3) more errors; 
and (4) limited adherence to guidelines & protocols, all of which are inevitably generated in hospitals with good 
reputation and increasing volumes of incoming patients, causing their overall performance to decrease. 
Apart from Appendix 23 (where the Simplified Conceptual Model and the loops are available), Appendix 
24 is supplementary to the understanding of this chapter. In Appendix 24 we analytically present and explain all 
the variables and causal links of the Conceptual, Policy and Simplified Models of Hospital Performance, as defined 
by the participants stakeholders. For each variable we give the definition that participants came up with; some 
more explanations, where needed; and the Causal Links of each variable. More specifically, in the section “Causal 
Links” of each variable in Appendix 24 we present the “Causes Tree” (i.e., the graphical representation of all the 
causal links that are coming towards the variable at hand) and the “Uses Tree” (i.e., the graphical representation 
of all the causal links that are going out from the variable at hand) and we explicitly analyse, explain and discuss 





CHAPTER 9 - DYNAMIC HYPOTHESES TO EXPLAIN THE NEGATIVE 
OUTCOMES OF THE GREEK HEALTHCARE REFORM DOCUMENTED AT THE 
CASE HOSPITAL 
 
Chapter 9 corresponds to the third research question of our study, namely: How can those feedback loops 
explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform. In order to answer this question, in 
chapter 9 we tried to explain each one of the seven main negative outcomes of the reform identified in the case 
hospital which we identified through the preliminary interviews and documents analysis in chapter 7 (i.e., Health 
Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low Safety; Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments; High Mortality 
Rates; Numerous Medical Errors; High Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant bacteria Infections Rates; Lack of 
Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols) with one dynamic hypothesis which we formed based on the model 
loops we identified in chapter 8. More specifically, in the section 9.1 we briefly present our key assumption and 
then in the section 9.2 we present and analyse the seven dynamic hypotheses derived from the feedback loops of 
the Simplified Conceptual Model that we presented in chapter 8 (available in the sections 8.2 and 8.3), and we 
show how each of the seven counterintuitive negative outcomes documented can be explained by those 
hypotheses. 
 
9.1 Key Assumption 
The research approach adopted was based on the assumption that hospital performance is a multi-loop, 
feedback system of interrelated elements, forming complicated dynamic mechanisms. In that sense, any 
performance management policy changes the structure of the system and affects many elements, causing 
simultaneously intended and unitended outcomes, trade-offs between them and between short-term and long-term 
effects.  
Understanding and analysing those mechanisms of the hospital performance system, based on the Simplified 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, enabled us to create a set of hypotheses which can explain all of the 
seven negative outcomes of the healthcare reform presented in chapter 6, which our literature review highlighted 
and our research revealed that they are present at the case hospital, namely: Health Workers’ and Patients’ 
perceptions of Low Service Quality and Safety; Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments; High Mortality 
Rates; Numerous Medical Errors; High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates; Low 
Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. Below we present and explain those dynamic 
hypotheses for each one of those seven unintended outcomes that our research highlighted. In order to test those 
hypotheses, however, a quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, as that would enable us to 
run simulations and test our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop dominance. Such a model is not 




9.2 Dynamic Hypotheses (DH) 
In this section we present and explain DH1 until DH7, which are the seven dynamic hypotheses we formed 
in order to explain the seven negative outcomes of the healthcare reform which are present at the case hospital, 
according to our findings presented in chapter 6, namely: Health Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low 
Service Quality and Safety; Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments; High Mortality Rates; Numerous 
Medical Errors; High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates; Lack of Clinical Guidelines 
and Treatment Protocols.  
Each of those seven negative outcomes is linked to one model variable as the most “indicative” model 
indicator to predict this outcome (e.g., the negative outcome Low Patient Satisfaction is linked to the model 
variable Patient Satisfaction as the most “indicative” model indicator to predict this outcome, and so on). Then, 
we formed our hypotheses based on two different ways of analysis: first, based on the model loops of the Simplified 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance and, second, based on the causal tree of each variable of the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. 
 
DH 1: Explaining Low Safety  
Safety is embedded in many of our model variables, including Complications, Errors and Nosocomial 
Infections Rate. Errors and Nosocomial Infections Rate, however, are discussed separately in the next paragraphs 
18.2.5 and 18.2.6, as those variables also reflect clinical effectiveness. Thus, in order to explain the low safety 
documented at the case hospital, we took as the most indicative indicators of this negative outcome the model 
variables Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life and Complications.  
 
Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life 
Patients' Survival Rate is, for our GMB participants, the rate at which hospitalised patients survive and get 
discharged from the hospital alive after their treatment, whereas Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life is, 
according to them, an indicator of the level of the patients’ health and quality of life after their hospital treatment, 
in respect to a reference level of health and quality of life based on their age and condition.  
One way of explaining the low safety documented at the case hospital, in terms of low Survival Rate / 
Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, is based on the model loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance. The variable Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life is included in four 
different loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is included in the loops B3 - Actual 
Time Available & Errors, B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, R6 – Clinical 
Efficiency & Hospital Reputation, and R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation. The loops B3 and B4 cause 
the Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life to decrease, whereas the Loops R6 and R7 cause it 
to increase. The CLD shows a fair mix between loops that reinforce hospital performance (either in a positive or 
negative direction) and loops that balance (control) it.  
153 
 
Since a CLD is a purely qualitative tool it does not indicate the strength of each loop, nor can it be used for 
inferring loop dominance or trend (dynamic behaviour) of variables. However, the Reference Mode (available in 
chapter 7.2 and in Appendix 19) indicates that in early 2020, at the moment of writing, hospital performance is 
stabilizing, indicating the dominance of the balancing loops. We could therefore suggest that the dominating loops 
responsible for the documented low Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life are loops B3 and 
B4. 
An additional way of explaining the low safety documented at the case hospital, in terms of low Survival 
Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, would be that of analysing the variable’s causal tree in the 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. In our model, Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of 
Life is a function of two other variables: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; and 
Complications. 
 
Figure 24. Causes Tree of the Variable: Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the 
Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life: 
(1) decreases as the Complications increase. This is because the more the Complications during the treatment, the 
more compromised the immune system of the patient gets and the more are his/her chances of death. Furthermore, 
a compromised immune system makes it easier for the patient to get infected by contagious pathogens in the 
hospital environment and raises even more his chances of failure of the treatment or death.  
(2) increases as the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care increases. This is because the 
more Accurate the Diagnosis and - subsequently - the more appropriate the treatment provided for his condition, 
the better for the patient’s outcome of the disease and the more his/her chances are to recover and to survive. 
 
   Complications 
Complications, according to our participants, is the rate at which unintended secondary diseases, conditions 
or infections occur during the treatment of Admitted Patients in the hospital, deteriorating their health status and 
causing them death or forcing them to stay more time admitted in order to recover.  
One way of explaining the low safety documented at the case hospital, in terms of the increased occurrence 
of Complications, is based on the model loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The 
variable Complications is included in four different loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more 
specifically it is included in the loops: B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, B4 - Actual Time Available and 
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality  of Life
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience







Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, R4 -   Length of Stay & Complications, R7 – Complications & Hospital 
Reputation. The loops B3, B4 and R4 cause Complications to increase, whereas the Loop R7 cause it to decrease. 
The CLD shows a fair mix between loops that reinforce hospital performance (either in a positive or negative 
direction) and loops that balance (control) it.  
Since a CLD is a purely qualitative tool it does not indicate the strength of each loop, nor can it be used for 
inferring loop dominance or trend (dynamic behaviour) of variables. However, the Reference Mode (available in 
chapter 7.2 and in Appendix 19) indicates that in early 2020, at the moment of writing, hospital performance is 
stabilizing, indicating the dominance of the balancing loops. We could therefore suggest that the dominating loops 
responsible for the high occurrence of Complications documented are loops B3 and B4. 
An additional way of explaining the low safety documented at the case hospital, in terms of the increased 
occurrence of Complications, would be that of analysing the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance. In our model, Complications is a function of three other variables: Length of Stay; Errors; 
and Nosocomial Infections Rate. 
 
Figure 25. Causes Tree of the Variable: Complications 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Complications: 
(1) increase as the Length of Stay increases. This is because Length of Stay augments the chances that a 
complication occurs: the more time the inpatient is being treated, the more become the chances that he/she gets a 
nosocomial infection or that he/she becomes subject to an error of the medical staff.  
(2) increase as the Nosocomial Infections Rate increases. This is because the higher the Hospital’s Nosocomial 
Infections Rate, the more are the chances that a patient gets infected in a given time period.  
(3) increase as the Errors increase. This is because personnel’s or patients’ and carers’ Errors (e.g., mistaken 
dosage of the right medicine or wrong medicine) directly cause Complications to the patients, sometimes serious 
ones.  
Therefore, according to DH1 safety is low at the case hospital because of the dominance of the loops B3 
and B4, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype 
(Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors and 
Complications
Errors
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Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to lower Survival Rate and 
Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life after treatment. 
 
DH 2: Explaining Low Patient Satisfaction  
In order to explain the low patient satisfaction documented at the case hospital, we took as the most 
indicative indicator of this negative outcome the model variable Patient Satisfaction. The variable Patient 
Satisfaction shows, according to our GMB participants, the level at which patients are satisfied with the overall 
experience and outcome of their hospital treatment.  
One way of explaining low patient satisfaction documented at the case hospital is based on the model loops 
of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The variable Patient Satisfaction is included in six 
different loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is included in the loops: B1 – Word 
of Mouth & Waiting Times, B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, B3 - Actual Time 
Available & Errors, B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, R6 – Clinical 
Efficiency & Hospital Reputation, R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation. The loops B1, B2, B3 and B4 
cause Patient Satisfaction to decrease, whereas the Loops R6 and R7 cause it to increase.  
Since a CLD is a purely qualitative tool it does not indicate the strength of each loop, nor can it be used for 
inferring loop dominance or trend (dynamic behaviour) of variables. However, the Reference Mode (available in 
chapter 7.2 and in Appendix 19) indicates that in early 2020, at the moment of writing, hospital performance is 
stabilizing, indicating the dominance of the balancing loops. We could therefore suggest that the dominating loops 
responsible for the high occurrence of Complications documented are the loops B1, B2, B3 and B4. 
An additional way of explaining low Patient Satisfaction documented at the case hospital would be that of 
analysing the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. In our model, Patient 
Satisfaction is a function of six other variables: Facilities; Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life; 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; and Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services. 
 
Figure 26. Causes Tree of the Variable: Patient Satisfaction 
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(1) increases as the Facilities increase.  Physical Facilities  (e.g., modern and nicely decorated patient rooms, 
restaurants, outdoor play areas for children, furniture, etc) and other amenities provided by the hospital (e.g., 
privacy and cleanness in rooms, toilets and common spaces; internet access for patients and guests, etc) and other 
similar amenities related to the physical facilities of the hospital and the comfort that they provides to patients are 
very important aspects of the patients’ hospitalisation experience and is largely what they have in mind when 
filling in patient satisfaction questionnaires.  
(2) increases as the Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs increases. A polite behaviour, a good 
communication and the attendance to their needs by the medical and nursing staff are largely what patients 
perceive as “good hospital treatment” and is what they have in mind when evaluating their hospitalisation 
experience in the patient satisfaction questionnaires. This happens because patients are not able – unless they are 
doctors themselves - to evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, or the medical and scientific 
integrity of doctors and nurses. 
(3) increases as the Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life increases. Although patients cannot 
evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, they can - and they often do - evaluate the outcome of the 
treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., their overall level of health, pain and functionality after 
treatment in comparison to before treatment). 
(4) decreases as the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission increases, because according to our participants, most 
of the patients do not like to wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most 
importantly because - depending also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that their health will 
deteriorate if they wait. 
(5) decreases as the Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services increases, which is quite logical as nobody likes 
long queues and long waiting times to be examined. Especially when it comes to being in the ER for an emergency, 
waiting can be fatal. 
(6) decreases as the Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission increase, as patients do not like being forced 
to pay out-of-pocket money for getting access to the public healthcare services which are supposed to be free of 
charge.  
Therefore, according to DH2 Patient Satisfaction is low at the case hospital because of the dominance of 
the loops B1, B2, B3 and B4, all of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and 
of hospital reputation in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission longer 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission, longer Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services and, finally, to lower 
Survival Rate and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life after treatment. 
 
DH 3: Explaining Informal Payments  
In order to explain the high rate of informal payments documented at the case hospital, we took as the most 
indicative indicator of this negative outcome the model variable Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission. 
The variable Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission shows, according to our GMB participants, the rate 
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of patients’ out-of-pocket, informal payments to public hospital doctors for scheduling their surgery or admission 
earlier, in order for them to avoid the long waiting time on the list. Since priority over the waiting list is given 
only to urgent cases, those patients get admitted in the hospital through the Emergency Department (ER) by getting 
characterised as “urgent cases”, in order to get priority and avoid waiting on the list for surgery or admission in a 
specialised unit or department. Our GMB participants called this phenomenon “the suitcase effect”, as those 
patients arrive in the ER with their suitcase, ready to be admitted. 
One way of explaining Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission documented at the case hospital, is 
based on the model loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The variable Informal 
Payments is included in one loop of the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is included in the 
loop R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption, which causes Informal Payments to increase. Indeed, our analysis 
showed that in early 2020, at the moment of writing, informal payments in the hospital are increasing, indicating 
the existence of a reinforcing loop. 
An additional way of explaining Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission would be that of analysing 
the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. In our model, Informal Payments for 
early Surgery/Admission is a function of the variable: Waiting List for Surgery or Admission. 
 
Figure 27. Causes Tree of the Variable: Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the rate of 
Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission increases as the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission increases.  
This happens because, according to our participants, most of the patients do not like to wait long times for having 
an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most importantly because - depending also on the severity of 
their condition - they might feel that their health will deteriorate if they wait. Thus, they commit to paying the 
doctors out-of-pocket money, thinking that they will not get timely and appropriate treatment unless they do it. 
Therefore, according to DH3 Informal Payments are high at the case hospital because of loop R2, which 
leads to a perpetual increase of private spending and to the outspread of corruption between the case hospital 
doctors, given the good reputation of the case hospital and the long waiting lists that are already in place. This 
phenomenon is sustained by the current policies in place, which favour the creation of long waiting lists, but is 
also sustained by factors external to the case hospital and to our model, such the relative tolerance of the Ministry 
of Health and of the authorities, and the widespread idea between patients in Greece that informal payments are 
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DH 4: Explaining High Mortality Rates 
In order to explain the high mortality rates of the case hospital, we took as the most indicative indicator of 
this negative outcome the model variable Failure & Mortality Rates. Mortality Rate is, according to our GMB 
participants, the rate at which hospitalised patients die during their treatment in the hospital or soon after that. 
Failure Rate is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which the hospital fails to provide the patient with 
the optimal treatment for his/her condition and age.  
One way of explaining the high mortality rates of the case hospital is based on the model loops of the 
Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The variable Failure & Mortality Rates, however, is 
included in zero loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model. Nevertheless, the causal tree of the variable Failure 
& Mortality Rates is exactly the same as the causal tree of the variable Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & 
Quality of Life. Those two variables, Failure & Mortality Rates on the one hand and Survival Rate / Patients’ 
Health Status & Quality of Life on the other hand are behaving exactly in the opposite way. Thus, if the survival 
rate is increasing, mortality rates are decreasing, and the other way around. Subsequently, we can examine the 
loops where the variable Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life is included, in order to infer the 
behaviour of the variable Failure & Mortality Rates. 
The variable Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life is included in four different loops of 
the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is included in the loops B3 - Actual Time Available & 
Errors, B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital 
Reputation, and R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation. The loops B3 and B4 cause the Survival Rate / 
Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life to decrease, whereas the Loops R6 and R7 cause it to increase. The CLD 
shows a fair mix between loops that reinforce hospital performance (either in a positive or negative direction) and 
loops that balance (control) it.  
Since a CLD is a purely qualitative tool it does not indicate the strength of each loop, nor can it be used for 
inferring loop dominance or trend (dynamic behaviour) of variables. However, the Reference Mode (available in 
chapter 7.2 and in Appendix 19) indicates that in early 2020, at the moment of writing, hospital performance is 
stabilizing, indicating the dominance of the balancing loops. We could therefore suggest that the dominating loops 
responsible for the documented low Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life – and subsequently, 
for the high Failure & Mortality Rates - are loops B3 and B4. 
An additional way of explaining the high mortality rates of the case hospital would be that of analysing the 
variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. In our model, Failure & Mortality Rates 
is a function of two other variables: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care and 
Complications. 
As shown on the Causes Tree below, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Failure & 
Mortality Rates: 
(1) increase as the Complications increase. This is because the more the Complications during the treatment, the 
more compromised the immune system of the patient gets and the more are his/her chances of death. Furthermore, 
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a compromised immune system makes it easier for the patient to get infected by contagious pathogens in the 
hospital environment and raises even more his chances of failure of the treatment or death.  
(2) decrease as the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care increases. This is because the 
more accurate the diagnosis and - subsequently - the more appropriate the treatment provided for his condition, 
the better for the patient’s outcome of the disease and the more his/her chances to recover and to survive. 
 
Figure 28. Causes Tree of the Variable: Failure & Mortality Rates 
 
 
Therefore, according to DH4 Failure & Mortality Rates are high at the case hospital because of the 
dominance of the loops B3 and B4, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the 
Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits 
to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, 
more Errors and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to higher 
Failure & Mortality Rates. 
 
DH 5: Explaining Numerous Medical Errors 
In order to explain the numerous medical errors documented at the case hospital, we took as the most 
indicative indicator of this negative outcome the model variable Errors. By Errors our participants mean any 
unintended human action, omission, negligence, miscommunication, misunderstanding or misperception 
performed by the hospital doctors, nurses, health workers, or by the patients and their carers which might turn out 
to be harmful for the staff’s, the patient’s or the other patients’ health and well-being.  
One way of explaining the numerous medical errors documented at the case hospital, is based on the model 
loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The variable Errors is included in one loop 
of the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is included in the loop B3 - Actual Time Available 
& Errors, which causes Errors to increase in the long run. 
An additional way of explaining the numerous medical errors documented at the case hospital would be 
that of analysing the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. In our model, Errors 
is a function of three other variables: Actual Time Available per Patient/Task; Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols; and Difficulty of Shift Schedule. 
As shown on the Causes Tree below, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Errors:  
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(1) decrease as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is because the more the Actual Time 
Available per Patient/Task, the more the time that doctors and nurses have available to spend with each patient, 
answering his/her questions and giving him and his carers information and instructions regarding his/her condition, 
treatment and personal care from their experience. Subsequently, usual patients’ Errors which create complications 
or unexpected readmissions are avoided. Furthermore, the more the time medical and nursing staff spends with 
each patient, the better they will get to know and remember the condition of each patient and the less the medical 
and nursing staff’s Errors due to negligence, miscommunication, misunderstanding or misperception will be.  
(2) decrease as the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols increases, because the more the adherence to guidelines 
and medical protocols, the more appropriate the patients’ handling will be; the more will be the measures and 
precautions taken for the safety of staff and patients, and the more Errors will be avoided.  
(3) increase as the Difficulty of Shift Schedule increases. This is because the more difficult the shift schedule is – 
meaning that the necessary rests are not respected - the more tired and sleepy the health workers might feel during 
their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them to commit Errors. 
 
Figure 29. Causes Tree of the Variable: Errors 
 
 
Therefore, according to DH5 Medical Errors are increasing at the case hospital because of the loop B3 
which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of 
the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), 
resulting at higher Difficulty of Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, less Proper Communication & Attendance 
to Patients’ Needs and, finally, to more Errors. 
 
DH 6: Explaining High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates 
In order to explain the high nosocomial and multidrug-resistant bacteria infections rates documented at the 
case hospital, we took as the most indicative indicator of this negative outcome the model variable Nosocomial 
Infections Rate. By Nosocomial Infections Rate our GMB participants mean the actual rate of infections 
(potentially of multidrug resistant bacteria) acquired by the patients while being hospitalised, or by their carers 
and the hospital staff.  
One way of explaining the high nosocomial and multidrug-resistant bacteria infections rates documented at 
the case hospital is based on the model loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The 
Errors
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variable Nosocomial Infections Rate is included in two different loops in the Simplified Conceptual Model, and 
more specifically it is included in the loops R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population, and B4 - Actual 
Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. Both loops R5 and B4 cause Nosocomial Infections 
Rate to increase.  
An additional way of explaining the high nosocomial and multidrug-resistant bacteria infections rates 
documented at the case hospital would be that of analysing the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of 
Hospital Performance. In our model, Nosocomial Infections Rate is a function of three other variables: Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols; Multidrug Resistance in Population; and Errors. 
 
Figure 30. Causes Tree of the Variable: Nosocomial Infections Rate 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Nosocomial 
Infections Rate: 
(1) increases as the Multidrug Resistance in Population increases. This is because the higher the Multidrug 
Resistance in the general population, the more will be the colonised patients admitted in the hospital and the more 
the possibilities that they will infect other patients there, pushing the Nosocomial Infections Rate higher than 
otherwise. 
(2) increases as the Errors increase, because some of the medical and nursing staff’s Errors (e.g., improper 
sterilization of catheters and surgical equipment) directly cause infections (i.e., urinary tract infections and surgical 
site infections respectively) to the patients. 
(3) decreases as the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols increases, as adherence to guidelines, measures, nursing 
and medical protocols ensures among others appropriate patients handling; appropriate material & waste 
management; adequate staff’s vaccination coverage; and other measures and precautions which limit the spread 
of Nosocomial Infections Rate. 
Therefore, according to DH6 Nosocomial Infections Rate is increasing at the case hospital because of the 
loops R5 and B4, both of which cause it to increase in the long run, resulting at more Complications and higher 
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DH 7: Explaining Low Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols 
In order to explain the low adherence to clinical guidelines and treatment protocols at the case hospital, we 
took as the most indicative indicator of this negative outcome the model variable Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols. By Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols participant stakeholders mean the level at which the doctors 
and nurses as well as the rest of the paramedic staff follow the measures and procedures that are imposed by the 
national and international medical and nursing protocols and guidelines.  
One way of explaining the lack of sufficient clinical guidelines and treatment protocols at the case hospital 
is based on the model loops of the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. The variable Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols is included in one loop in the Simplified Conceptual Model, and more specifically it is 
included in the loop B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, which causes 
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols to decrease.  
An additional way of explaining the lack of sufficient clinical guidelines and treatment protocols at the case 
hospital would be that of analysing the variable’s causal tree in the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance. 
In our model, Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is a function of three other variables: Availability of 
Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; Difficulty of Shift Schedule; and Actual Time Available 
per Patient/Task.  
 
Figure 31. Causes Tree of the Variable: Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols: 
(1) increases as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is mainly because, in their mind, 
following guidelines is “a more time-consuming way of doing things”; thus, the more the actual time they have 
available to finish all their tasks during their shift, the more willing they are to allocate some time on following 
the guidelines - provided of course that they already know how to do that, and have been sufficiently educated 
and trained to the implementation of those guidelines and protocols.  
(2) decreases as the Difficulty of Shift Schedule increases. This happens for a number of reasons. First of all, the 
more difficult the shift schedule is – meaning that the necessary rests are not respected - the more tired and sleepy 
the health workers might feel during their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them not to follow 
the guidelines properly. Secondly, when the shifts schedule is such that the necessary rests are not respected, 
department managers are not willing to create and implement an Internal Regulation as they are not sure they will 
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be able to comply to it, given the circumstances, and non-compliance to such a regulation might result in legal 
sanctions personally for them as department managers. Another reason is that the more difficult their shift schedule 
is, the less rest they get, the more tired they feel and the more negatively their well-being and personal life is 
affected. This results in limited motivation for effective work, as well as to limited time and willingness to get 
more education and training. Lack of education and training, in turn, could mean lack of knowledge and/or 
capacity to implement protocols/guidelines and lack of awareness of the importance and the risks associated with 
the non-adherence to them. 
(3) increases as the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms increase. This is 
because breaking down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties makes it easier for 
the medical staff to follow them, while having in place the necessary Medical & Technical Equipment and ICT 
support to implement those procedure makes it possible to follow those procedures in the time they have available, 
as they make the work of the medical and nursing staff much faster. 
Therefore, according to DH7 Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is low at the case hospital because of 
the loop B4 which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at increased Difficulty of 
Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, low Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms 
and, finally, to low Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. 
 
9.3 Conclusions 
Chapter 9 corresponds to the third research question of our study, namely: How can those feedback loops 
explain the documented negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform. In order to answer this question, in 
chapter 9 we tried to explain each one of the seven main negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform 
identified in the case hospital through the preliminary interviews and documents analysis in chapter 6 with one 
dynamic hypothesis which we formed based on the model loops (explained in chapter 8) and the causal tree of the 
corresponding model variable (available in Appendix 24).  
More specifically, out of all the unintended negative outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform documented 
in the literature that we presented in the section 6.1.4, in the section 6.2 we found the following seven negative 
outcomes to be present at the case hospital, according to the documents’ analysis, the preliminary interviews and 
GMB sessions with the participant stakeholders of our case hospital: (1) Health Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions 
of Low Safety; (2) Low Patient Satisfaction; (3) Informal Payments; (4) High Mortality Rates; (5) Numerous 
Medical Errors; (6) High Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant bacteria Infections Rates; and (7) Low Adherence to 
Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. Then, we used the feedback loops of the Simplified Conceptual 
Model that we explained in chapter 8 (available in the sections 8.2 and 8.3) in order to derive seven Dynamic 
Hypotheses (DH) that could explain each of those seven counterintuitive negative outcomes documented. 
We found that Health Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low Safety are mostly associated with the 
variables “Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life” and “Complications” of our model, and can 
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be explained by the dominance of the balancing loops B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, and B4 - Actual Time 
Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, both of which cause those two variables to decrease 
(Dynamic Hypothesis 1). Low Patient Satisfaction can be explained by the interaction between the loops B1 – 
Word of Mouth & Waiting Times, B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, B3 - Actual Time 
Available & Errors, B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, which cause Patient 
Satisfaction to decrease, and the Loops R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation, R7 – Complications & 
Hospital Reputation, which cause it to increase (Dynamic Hypothesis 2). The existence of Informal Payments can 
be explained by the Loop R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption, which causes it to increase (Dynamic Hypothesis 
3). High Mortality Rates can be explained by the Loops B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, and B4 - Actual 
Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, which cause “Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status 
& Quality of Life” to decrease, and thus Mortality Rates to increase (Dynamic Hypothesis 4). Numerous Medical 
Errors can be explained by the Loop B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors, which causes Errors to increase 
(Dynamic Hypothesis 5). High Nosocomial & Multidrug-resistant bacteria Infections Rates can be explained by 
the loops R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population, and B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols, both of which cause Nosocomial Infections Rate to increase.  (Dynamic Hypothesis 
6). Low Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols can be explained by the loop B4 - Actual Time 
Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols, which causes Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols to 
decrease (Dynamic Hypothesis 7). 
According to DH1, safety is low at the case hospital because of the dominance of the loops B3 and B4, 
both of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient 
and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 
1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors and Complications, 
longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to lower Survival Rate and Patients’ Health 
Status & Quality of Life after treatment. 
According to DH2, Patient Satisfaction is low at the case hospital because of the dominance of the loops 
B1, B2, B3 and B4, all of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and of hospital 
reputation in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission longer 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission, longer Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services and, finally, to lower 
Survival Rate and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life after treatment. 
According to DH3, Informal Payments are high at the case hospital because of loop R2, which leads to a 
perpetual increase of private spending and to the outspread of corruption between the case hospital doctors, given 
the good reputation of the case hospital and the long waiting lists that are already in place. This phenomenon is 
sustained by the current policies in place, which favour the creation of long waiting lists, but is also sustained by 
factors external to the case hospital and to our model, such the relative tolerance of the Ministry of Health and of 
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the authorities, and the widespread idea between patients in Greece that informal payments are necessary for a 
timely and proper treatment. 
According to DH4, Failure & Mortality Rates are high at the case hospital because of the dominance of 
the loops B3 and B4, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time 
Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success 
archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors 
and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to higher Failure & 
Mortality Rates. 
According to DH5, Medical Errors are increasing at the case hospital because of the loop B3 which leads 
to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at higher 
Difficulty of Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs 
and, finally, to more Errors. 
According to DH6, Nosocomial Infections Rate is increasing at the case hospital because of the loops R5 
and B4, both of which cause it to increase in the long run, resulting at more Complications and higher Multidrug 
Resistance in Population. 
According to DH7, Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is low at the case hospital because of the loop B4 
which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient in the 
long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at increased Difficulty of Shift Schedule 
for nurses and doctors, low Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms and, finally, to 
low Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. 
In order to test those hypotheses, however, a quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, 
as that would enable us to run simulations and test our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop 




CHAPTER 10 – THE DPM CANVAS: AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF 
HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Chapter 10 corresponds to the fourth research question of our study, namely: What are the main strategic 
resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main performance drivers that are 
impacting intermediate products and end results. In order to answer this question, in chapter 10 we performed the 
DPM analysis to identify those resources, drivers and indicators and show their role in the hospital performance 
management and measurement. More specifically, in the section 10.1 we used the DPM instrumental view to 
identify Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and End Results of hospital performance. Then we moved on 
to operationalise the instrumental view from Static to Dynamic in the section 10.2, as the “time” factor is important 
for our analysis, and is not easy to grasp by the static instrumental DPM view. In the section 10.3 we cascade the 
DPM instrumental view from the hospital level to a divisional level, in order to understand the contribution of 
each one of the four hospital divisions of the case hospital which we mentioned in chapter  6.2 (the Medical, the 
Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical division) on the End Results (i.e., the final hospital 
services produced) and allow the division managers to start concentrating on the core intermediate, administrative 
products that divisions are required to deliver on the process that leads to the final end-results. This assessment 
provides the ground for the objective view of DPM, which is analysed in the section 10.4, used to map the ultimate 
and intermediate services value chain provided to both external and internal users of the case hospital. In the 
section 10.5 we present the subjective DPM view, which is a synthesis of the instrumental and the objective view, 
and requires that performance measures (i.e., the drivers and end-results associated with the delivery of products) 
are made explicit, and are then linked to the goals and objectives of decision-makers of the case hospital, which 
we identified in chapter 6, section 6.2.1, through our documents analysis. Finally, in the section 10.6 we summarise 
by combining the three DPM Views, and we discuss the insights that the DPM analysis offers us for a sustainable 
PM in Greek public hospitals in general, and in the case hospital in particular. 
 
10.1 The DPM Instrumental View 
There are three complementary, interconnected views in designing a DPM system for the sustainable 
enhancement of hospital services, which we will analytically present and discuss: the DPM instrumental view; the 
DPM objective view and the DPM subjective view (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 71-72). In order to implement the DMP as 
an approach to improve hospital performance in a sustainable way, the DPM instrumental view must first be 
applied (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 72-76). The instrumental view suggests that alternate methods for improving 
performance should be made clear. The analysis of the instrumental view helps the synthesis of key performance 
indicators of the overall hospital performance to be framed. In this respect, it is possible to identify both the end-
results and their corresponding Performance Drivers. In order to impact Performance Drivers, each hospital 
division must build, maintain and use a sound endowment of Strategic Resources that are systemically connected 
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to each other. Therefore, each strategic resource can provide the foundation for maintaining others in the system 
of hospital performance. 
 
10.1.1 Strategic Resources (SR) 
The first step in this process would be to identify Strategic Resources. Indicators of Strategic Resources in 
our model are the model variables that are related to human, financial, technological and other resources. In our 
model those are: Financial Resources; Facilities; ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment; Doctors’ and Nurses’ 
Skills & Experience; Hospital Reputation; Management Capacity; and Multidrug Resistance in Population. 
The key in this analysis is to understand that the hospital can purchase the physical resources (i.e., Financial 
Resources; Facilities; ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment) but it cannot purchase Management Capacity or 
Hospital Reputation, for example. Such intangible resources are equally important as the physical resources for 
the overall hospital performance; however, they cannot be purchased.  Instead, they are built by internal 
management and clinical processes of the hospital. In our model, those resources are: Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills 
& Experience; Hospital Reputation; Management Capacity; and Multidrug Resistance in Population. 
 
10.1.2 End Results (ER) 
The next step would be to identify End Results. According to Bianchi (2016, p.81), “resource measures 
should not be confused with performance measures. There is a means versus ends relationship between the two”. 
Indicators of End Results, thus, are the model variables that are related to products and services but also to intended 
and unintended effects, consequences and by-products of the hospital function at large. In our model those are: 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Admitted Patients; Costs; Errors; Failure & 
Mortality Rates; Hospital Spending; Investments; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & 
Outpatient Services; Complications; Incoming Patients, Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; 
Nosocomial Infections Rate; Patient Satisfaction; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life. 
End-results should be further categorised into outputs and outcomes, to facilitate our DPM analysis. 
According to Bianchi (2016, pp.76) “Output measures are workload (or volume) indicators. Outcome measures 
depict the aptitude of the recorded outputs to provide the users with the desired service levels, or to generate a 
change in the endowment of strategic resources shared by different institutions in a region. Also, the previously 
said first layer end-results—affecting both liquidity and equity, and strategic resources generated by management 
routines— are outcome measures. [...]. Outcome measures imply that a longer time horizon and broader system 
boundaries are adopted to measure and manage them, in respect to output indicators”. 
According to this definition, outputs refer to the direct, short-term, tangible and measurable results while 
outcomes refer to some rather long-term results, effects and consequences which are usually non-measurable and 
not easily observable. In our model, the outputs identified include: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of 
Therapeutic Care; Admitted Patients; Costs; Errors; Failure & Mortality Rates; Hospital Spending; Investments; 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services; and the outcomes include: 
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Complications; Incoming Patients, Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Nosocomial Infections Rate; 
Patient Satisfaction; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life. 
 
10.1.3 Performance Drivers 
The last step in this process would be to identify Performance Drivers. According to Bianchi (2016), 
Performance Drivers can be calculated in terms of the ratios between the company's Strategic Resources and a 
target, which can often be articulated in terms of either stakeholder expectations or perceived historical 
organizational performance. Indicators of performance in our model are the model variables that are expressed as 
ratios between the actual performance of a given variable (nominator) and a denominator described in our model 
as a standard (or normal or desired) value for performance of this variable, calculated in relation to either the 
perceived past performance, or the desires of stakeholders, or international benchmarks, or the performance of 
other hospitals, or in relation to the implementable goals of the hospital (budget values). In our model those 
performance indicators are: Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors; Actual Time Available per Patient/Task; 
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; Approved Budget; Available Beds; Bed 
Occupancy; Difficulty of Shift Schedule; Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio; and Length of Stay. 
As those performance indicators could constitute both Performance Drivers and performance indexes, 
another major thing that we considered during our analysis was to separate Performance Drivers (PD) from 
Performance Indexes (PI), which is a common problem in DPM. According to Bianchi (2016, p.83) “Performance 
indexes are synthetic measures of the quality or state of a system. Like Performance Drivers, they are usually 
expressed as ratios. While drivers affect end-results or other Performance Drivers, indexes do not affect any 
specific performance measure. They rather gauge a synthetic expression of specific aspects regarding 
performance. Therefore, while Performance Drivers are relevant measures for performance management, 
performance indexes can be relevant for performance measurement only”. Thus, in order to decide whether or 
not each of those indicators constitutes a performance driver or a performance index, we checked if in our model 
each of those indicators affect end-results or other Performance Drivers.  
As shown in our models (i.e., the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance and the Policy Model of 
Hospital Performance available in Appendixes 21 and 22 respectively), all the performance indicators identified 
are directly affecting End Results or other Performance Drivers. This means that they are all Performance Drivers.  
 
10.2 The DPM Dynamic View: Operationalizing the Instrumental View from Static to Dynamic 
Our analysis so far, in accordance with the DPM framework (Bianchi, 2016, p.81) has emphasized on both 
end-results and Performance Drivers. All End-results, both outputs and outcomes, may only be influenced by 
Performance Drivers in the medium/long term. This means that there is a time delay between the moment that 
managers start manipulating a performance driver until the moment that a change in end-results will be 
documented. The “time” factor thus is important for our analysis, and is not easy to grasp by the static instrumental 
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DPM view. Thus, we need to operationalize the instrumental view from Static to Dynamic, and create the 
Dynamic, Resource-Based View of hospital performance. 
As Bianchi (2016, p.81) mentions, “a shift of mind is needed when a dynamic view of performance 
management is adopted”. As a first step to this transition, we tried to systematically categorise the model variables 
of the Policy Model of Hospital Performance into the categories of the DPM framework (Strategic Resources, 
End Results, Performance Indicators) taking into account the Donabedian (1988) framework as well. Thus, we 
created three subgroups: 
1. Indicators of Strategic Resources (marked with brown colour). In this category we put all the model 
variables that correspond to the structure measures of hospital performance, i.e., measures related to human, 
financial, technological and other resources.  
2. Indicators of End Results (marked with green colour). In this category we put all the model variables that 
correspond to output and outcome measures of hospital performance, i.e., measures related to clinical outputs and 
patients’ level of health and satisfaction.   
3. Indicators of Performance Drivers (marked with orange colour). In this category we put all the model 
variables that correspond to the process measures of hospital performance, i.e., measures related to patients-
providers contacts and relations.  
Below on Figure 33 we see the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance after the categorisation of all 
the model variables in order to fall into one of those categories. Then we did the same thing for the Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance, in order to have a more holistic view of the system at hand. On Figure 34 we see the 
Policy Model of Hospital Performance after the categorisation of all the model variables in order to fall into one 
of those categories. End-results may only be influenced by Performance Drivers in the medium/long term. 
Performance Drivers, however, can be influenced and changed in the short run. The dynamic view helps us see 
that immediately, as the links that have a symbol with a double line mean that a major delay is involved in this 
process.  
Both End-Results and Performance Drivers are required for the DPM system, as they provide decision-
makers with signs of potential future shift in End Results. This helps the hospital managers interpret and calculate 
the consequences of an incident or the implications of a policy; show possible discrepancies on performance; and 
try to mitigate it. For this reason, performance measures could be helpful to foresee possible changes in the 
financial or clinical end-results of the hospital. When framed in a wider sense than budgetary control, transaction 
cost drivers can provide policy makers with valuable information for strategic planning, such as the opportunity 
to identify trade-offs in time (e.g., higher Costs for Investments and managerial capacity utilisation Costs in the 
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10.3 Cascading the DPM Instrumental View from the Hospital Level to the Divisional Level 
As we analysed in chapter 6.2, the case hospital - as most hospitals in Greece - consists of four divisions: 
the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical division. All four divisions are equal 
to each other, and each one has its own independent structure, departments and department supervisors, 
independent units, independent offices and staff. Obviously, not all of those departments, offices and units directly 
provide care to patients. Many of them are supporting the units that directly provide care to patients (e.g., the 
blood analysis laboratories) or conduct certain administrative and back-office operations (e.g., administrative 
offices, payroll and human resources department, etc.). Those units produce intermediate products to the 
advantage of the units, departments and divisions which produce the “final” products and services for patients. 
Consequently, in respect to the final products and services, it is possible to define a system of intermediate products 
arising from the mechanisms being carried out by each decision-making unit whose “clients” are internal to the 
hospital, i.e., other hospital units, departments or divisions. 
 





Understanding the effect of back-office units on the final hospital services produced, especially in the public 
hospital, is an integral step towards better hospital performance, efficiency and transparency. Thus, there is the 
need to change our focus from the hospital level to the divisional level. Cascading the DPM instrumental view 
from the hospital level to a divisional level can allow the division managers to start concentrating on the core 
intermediate, administrative products that divisions are required to deliver on the process that leads to the final 
end-results, the outputs and outcomes. This assessment provides the ground for the DPM objective view. 
To do that, we should first identify administrative products, i.e., the measurable results of the tasks 
performed by both the back office and the front office units. As we mentioned in chapter 10.1.2, end-results in our 
model are: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Admitted Patients; Costs; Errors; Failure 
& Mortality Rates; Hospital Spending; Investments; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER 
& Outpatient Services; Complications; Incoming Patients, Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; 
Nosocomial Infections Rate; Patient Satisfaction; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life. Now 
we will categorise those end-results dividing them between final end-results (i.e., products and services provided 
to patients) and intermediate end-results (i.e., products and services provided by some users, departments or units 
to other users, departments or units inside the hospital).  
 





In our model, final end-results include: Incoming Patients; Admitted Patients; Accurate Diagnosis & 
Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Failure & Mortality Rates; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting 
Time in ER & Outpatient Services; Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Survival 
Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life; Nosocomial Infections Rate, whereas intermediate end-results 
include: Costs; Errors; Hospital Spending; Investments; Complications. On Figure 34 below the DPM 
instrumental view in a Divisional Level is summarised. 
 
Figure 35. The DPM Instrumental View on a Divisional Level 
 
10.4 The DPM Objective View 
Cascading the DPM instrumental view from the Hospital level to a Divisional level provided the ground for 
the DPM objective view, which is analysed in this section, and is used to map the ultimate and intermediate services 
value chain provided to both external and internal users of the case hospital. Although we will not go much into 
detail for each department and unit of the case hospital, as something like that would be out of the scope and 
purposes of the current study, we will show the procedure and steps that should be followed from division 
managers, department and unit managers in order for them to map the ultimate and intermediate services value 
chain of their division, department or unit. 
One of the premises of the DPM analysis is that the usual emphasis of the goals and success metrics entirely 
on the performance of the hospital clinics and patient front-office - which are directly treating and handling 
patients - and on the services directly provided by those departments is myopic, and can contribute to 
inconsistencies in the division of liability inside the hospital as well. This is because back-office units will not be 
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kept responsible for the effect of their results provided to other units, and therefore their added value and 
contribution to the final performance and quality of healthcare services provided to patients will not be measured. 
As a consequence, the implementation of a sustainable performance management system requires a 
complete mapping of the ultimate and intermediate products value chain provided to both external and internal 
users. It also requires that the underlying mechanisms, domains of accountability, dedicated resources and policy 
levers be rendered clear. These requirements can be defined as an objective view of performance management. 
The recognition of "products" and their associated macro-processes that characterize the objective view 
improves the capacity of the policy planners and stakeholders to increase the emphasis of the Performance Drivers 
initially outlined at the corporate/divisional and departmental level, according to the instrumental view. By 
following this perspective, it is possible to consider not just what performance metrics each department should 
focus on and improve, in order to contribute to organizational results, but also how this can be made possible. The 
identification of macro-processes gives a suitable degree of synthesis through the objective view. 
Identifying macro-processes often encourages an emphasis on cascading organizational Performance 
Drivers at the operational level through an instrumental view. The variables describing macro-processes of care 
and of the hospital function in our model are three mainly: Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols; Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs"; and Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ 
Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping. For each of those macro-processes and for each division, 
department or unit of the hospital, a different DPM objective view analysis could be prepared. 
Below on Figure 36 we present an example of such an analysis, on a divisional level, focusing mainly on 
the third macroprocess refered above, namely Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of 
Forms & Electronic Record Keeping.  
 





In Figure 36 the performance driver Actual Time Available per Patient/Task is cascaded into four other 
Performance Drivers, one for each division or subdivision, namely: time allocated to Investments’ purchase 
(responsibility of the administrative subdivision); time allocated to Costs’ management (responsibility of the 
financial subdivision); time allocated to Investments’ planning and specification (responsibility of the medical, 
nursing and technical divisions, in respect to whether the investment concerns medical or nursing equipment);  
time allocated to supporting and training users in ICT systems and to the use of new technologies (responsibility 
of the technical division). Those cascaded Performance Drivers, in turn, lead to the achievement of a number of 
intermediate results inside the different divisions or subdivisions (i.e., new Investments in equipment, new 
Facilities and ICT; new advancements planned and specified; increase of ICT systems utilisation; reduction of 
Costs and Hospital Spending. Some of those intermediate products then feedback to increase or decrease Strategic 
Resources.  
 
10.5 The DPM Subjective View 
According to Bianchi (2016, pp. 135) the DPM subjective view provides a synthesis of the instrumental and 
the objective view because it makes explicit, as a function of the pursued results, both the activities to undertake 
and the related objectives and performance targets to include in plans and budgets for each decision area. This 
view requires that performance measures - i.e., drivers and end-results - associated with the delivery of products 
are made explicit, and are then linked to the goals and objectives of decision-makers. End Results depend on the 
actions of the decision-makers, and provide a standard to be used for establishing priorities and goals in each 
division, department or unit. The actions and procedures to which those goals contribute should be aligned to the 
associated performance measures through a coherent action plan, by which resources are distributed to the 
organisation; the available policy levers for each decision area are rendered clear; and the accountability for the 
intended outcomes is directed to the responsible managers or workers. The remaining key problem concerns the 
need to clearly define performance measures to be assigned to decision-making areas for performance assessment 
in the budgeting and control processes. 
As mentioned in chapter 6.2.1, according to the relevant internal documents collected and analysed 
(available in Appendixes 16 and 17) most of the goals of the Nursing and Administrative Divisions could not be 
considered “performance goals”, as they were quite general and not explicit; they did not entail any time horizon; 
and, most importantly, they did not include any performance target. Thus, they cannot be considered as a helpful 
guide or tool for effective performance management. The risks associated with inappropriate goal-setting have 
also been studied, in particular by concentrating on behavioural inconsistencies that might be created for decision-
makers (Bianchi, 2016). 
For a successful DPM implementation, there is a need for concrete, measurable, attainable, appropriate and 
time-related goals (Bianchi, 2016). As mentioned in chapter 6.2.1, through the documents’ analysis we identified 
four goals which we consider a bit more specific and - although they also did not entail any time horizon or any 
performance target - could be considered as a good start for our DPM subjective view analysis. Those goals were:  
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(1) Standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units 
(2) Standardization of clinical procedures 
(3) Use of an Information System in the Interdepartmental Communication 
(4) Applying digital signature and electronic document management 
Hereunder, we combine our findings from the documents’ analysis presented in chapter 6.2 with the 
description of those goals as set by the division managers (available in Appendixes 16 and 17) and we inform 
them with the findings from our DPM instrumental and objective analysis so far, in order to identify the activities 
and resources which are needed for the achievement of each of those four goals.  
 
(1) Standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units 
According to the internal documents available in Appendix 16, actions for the achievement of this goal will 
be oriented towards the simplification of the procedures and the modernization of the management of nursing 
information, with the main criterion being quality assurance. Nursing forms concern internal communication of 
the nursing department (nursing history, patient’s nursing accountability, departmental accounting, hospitalization 
card, work schedule, medical instruction sheet, etc.) and external communication with other nursing departments 
and with other units of the hospital (technical, administrative, medical units). According to the internal documents 
of the nursing division, the resources that division managers consider essential for the achievement of this goal 
are:  Financial Resources concerning the supply of forms or the purchase of a computer-based program for the 
electronic application of some of them, after finalization and approval of the nursing forms, for a complete or 
partial application. 
This goal (Standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units) corresponds to the 
model variable Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record 
Keeping, and specifically refers to the macro-process of Digitalisation of Procedures and Forms. Digitalisation 
of Procedures and Forms is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which  the managers of the hospital’s 
administrative, nursing and medical units and departments are working towards modernising and digitising the 
administrative procedures and the forms of their department/unit with the support of ICT, by creating digital 
nursing and medical forms - hopefully integrated into the hospital’s information system (ERP) - in order for the 
patients’ information to be easily, accurately and quickly filled in, signed and distributed in other units and 
departments of the hospital.  
Subsequently, the nursing division managers of our case hospital believe that for the achievement of this 
goal (Standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units) only Financial Resources are 
necessary, whereas our DPM analysis (see Figure 36) shows that the macro-process of Digitalisation of 
Procedures and Forms requires other resources too, such as ICT and Management Capacity. 
 
(2) Standardization of clinical procedures 
According to the internal documents available in Appendix 16, the use of standardised clinical procedures 
in patient care is considered important for the effective and safe clinical practice; for the reduction of nosocomial 
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infections and costs; for the control, monitoring and evaluation of health professionals’ work; as well as for 
increasing patients’ trust in the delivery of nursing services. According to the internal documents of the nursing 
division, the resources that division managers consider essential for the achievement of this goal are: voluntary 
work and regular extra working hours for the development of the procedures, which should be financially covered. 
This goal (Standardization of clinical procedures) corresponds to the model variable Standardisation & 
Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping, and specifically refers to the 
macro-process of Standardisation of Procedures. Standardisation of Procedures is, according to our GMB 
participants, the rate at which the managers of the hospital’s administrative, nursing and medical units and 
departments are continuously getting informed and updated on the national and international guidelines and 
protocols regarding quality and safety during the delivery of care, and are “translating” those guidelines and 
protocols into easy, simple and standard procedures that their subordinates have to follow during the delivery of 
their (medical or nursing) practice.  
Subsequently, the nursing division managers of our case hospital believe that for the achievement of this 
goal (Standardization of clinical procedures) only extra working hours and Financial Resources for them to be 
financially covered are necessary, whereas our DPM analysis (see Figure 36) shows that the macro-process of 
Standardisation of Procedures requires other resources too, such as ICT and Management Capacity. 
 
(3) Use of an Information System in the Interdepartmental Communication 
According to the internal documents available in Appendix 16, the use of an Information System in the 
Interdepartmental Communication within the nursing unit and among other units is necessary for the rapid 
distribution of information and the reduction of printed communication and paper usage, which will lead to cost 
reduction. According to the internal documents of the nursing division, the resources that division managers 
consider essential for the achievement of this goal are:  Support from the Department of Organization and 
Informatics Department, including users’ training for the correct and safe use of the information system, as well 
as the modernization of the technical equipment in all hospital sections and units. 
This goal (use of an Information System in the Interdepartmental Communication) corresponds to the model 
variable Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping, 
and specifically refers to the macro-process Surveillance of Procedures. Surveillance of Procedures is, according 
to our GMB participants, the rate at which the managers of the hospital’s administrative, nursing and medical units 
and departments are inspecting and monitoring the adherence to those standard procedures by their subordinates. 
 
(4) Applying digital signature and electronic document management 
According to the internal documents available in Appendix 17, digital signature and electronic document 
management is considered to help reduce operating Costs and enhance efficiency by reducing bureaucratic 
structures and man-hours, while enhancing transparency. It is an appropriate method for better operation of public 
services, which ensures speed - transparency - efficiency - cost reduction. Its application is based on two 
parameters: the economic parameter (reduction of man-hours, paper costs, etc.); and the administrative parameter 
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(reduction of the administrative time delays). According to the internal documents’ analysis, the resources that are 
essential for the achievement of this goal are:  voluntary work of regular employees, and extra Financial Resources 
for a support company’s fee. 
This goal (Applying digital signature and electronic document management) corresponds to the model 
variable Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms, and more specifically it refers to 
the availability of the ICT system. By Availability of ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms participants 
mean the level at which the necessary Equipment, IT Systems, Digital Communication Systems and Standard 
Procedures are available, accessible, easily useable by the hospital staff, as well as that their use is being monitored 
and supported by the supervisors and managers. With this variable our GMB participants recognise the importance 
not only of the existence but also of the informed and active use of all those resources (Equipment, IT Systems, 
Digital Communication Systems, Standard Procedures), which they consider vital for their work and critical for 
the quality of healthcare services provided to the patients.  
As far as those four goals are concerned, our DPM analysis informs the nursing division managers’ 
statement with one more strategic resource, essential for achieving all those goals, namely Management Capacity, 
which is an intermediate product built with time by the public workers. According to our analysis, the performance 
driver of Management Capacity is the Actual Time Available that division managers and department managers 
have during their shift to devote to this goal. This is because Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ 
Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping in our model is a function of the variable: Management 
Capacity. The participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Standardisation & Surveillance of 
Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping increases as the Management Capacity 
increases. This is because breaking down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties 
requires adequate management competencies and specific, up-to-date knowledge.  
 
10.6 Conclusions 
Chapter 10 corresponds to the fourth research question of our study, namely: What are the main Strategic 
Resources impacting hospital performance measures and what are the main Performance Drivers that are 
impacting intermediate products and end results. In order to answer this question, in chapter 10 we performed the 
DPM analysis to identify those resources, drivers and indicators (summarised on Figure 32) and showed their role 
in the hospital performance management and measurement. More specifically, we used the Dynamic Performance 
Management Analysis in order to:  (1) identify Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and End Results of 
hospital performance and show their role in the hospital performance management and measurement; (2) show 
how the time factor influences the overall hospital performance;  (3)  understand the contribution of each one of 
the four hospital divisions (the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & Financial and the Technical division) 
on the End Results (i.e., the final hospital services produced); (4) allow the division managers to start concentrating 
on the core intermediate, administrative products that divisions are required to deliver on the process that leads to 
the final end-results; (5) map the ultimate and intermediate services value chain provided to both external and 
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internal users of the case hospital; (6) make performance measures (i.e., the drivers and end-results associated 
with the delivery of products) explicit, and are then link them to the goals and objectives of decision-makers of 
the case hospital; (7) discuss the insights that the DPM analysis offers us for a sustainable Performance 
Management in Greek public hospitals in general, and in the case hospital in particular. 
Using the DPM instrumental view, we found that the drivers of hospital performance, according to our 
GMB participants, are: Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors; Actual Time Available per Patient/Task; Availability 
of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; Approved Budget; Available Beds; Bed Occupancy; 
Difficulty of Shift Schedule; Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio; and Length of Stay. All those indicators are expressed 
as ratios between the actual performance of the corresponding variable (nominator) and a denominator described 
in our model as a standard (or normal or desired) value for performance, calculated in relation to either the 
perceived past performance, or the desires of stakeholders, or international benchmarks, or the performance of 
other hospitals, or in relation to the implementable goals of the hospital (budget values). We showed that in order 
to impact Performance Drivers, each hospital division (i.e., the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & 
Financial and the Technical division) must build, maintain and use a sound endowment of Strategic Resources 
that are systemically connected to each other. Therefore, each strategic resource can provide the foundation for 
maintaining others in the system of hospital performance. In our model, those Strategic Resources are the 
variables: Financial Resources; Facilities; ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment; Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & 
Experience; Hospital Reputation; Management Capacity; and Multidrug Resistance in Population. The key in this 
analysis is to understand that the hospital can purchase the physical resources (i.e., Financial Resources; Facilities; 
ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment) but it cannot purchase Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience; Hospital 
Reputation; Management Capacity. Those intangible resources are equally important as the physical resources for 
the overall hospital performance; however, they cannot be purchased.  Instead, they are built by internal 
management and clinical processes of the hospital, and are called intermediate products of hospital performance.  
Cascading the DPM instrumental view from the hospital level to a divisional level allows the division 
managers to start concentrating on the core intermediate, administrative products that divisions are required to 
deliver on the process that leads to the final end-results, the outputs and outcomes. To do that, we should first 
identify End Results and divide them between final end-results (i.e., products and services provided to patients) 
and intermediate end-results (i.e., products and services provided by some users, departments or units to other 
users, departments or units inside the hospital). In our model, final end-results include: Incoming Patients; 
Admitted Patients; Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Failure & Mortality Rates; 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services; Patient Satisfaction; Informal 
Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life; Nosocomial 
Infections Rate, whereas intermediate end-results include: Costs; Errors; Hospital Spending; Investments; 
Complications. On Figure 35 the DPM instrumental view in a Divisional Level is summarised. 
This assessment provided the ground for the DPM objective view, which we used to map the final and 
intermediate services value chain provided to both external and internal users of the case hospital, focusing on the 
macro-processes of hospital performance, which we found to be mainly three: Adherence to Guidelines & 
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Protocols; Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs; and Standardisation & Surveillance of 
Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping. For each of those macro-processes and for 
each division, department or unit of the hospital, a different DPM objective view analysis could be prepared. 
Although we did not go much into detail for each department and unit of the case hospital, as something like that 
would be out of the scope and purposes of the current study, we provided an example of such an analysis on a 
divisional level, of the procedure and steps that should be followed from division managers, department and unit 
managers in order for them to map the ultimate and intermediate services value chain of their division, department 
or unit, available on Figure 36. 
Outputs refer to the direct, short-term, tangible and measurable results, while outcomes refer to some rather 
long-term results, effects and consequences which are usually non-measurable, not easily observable, but most 
important than outputs for the overall hospital performance. In our model, the outputs identified included: 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Admitted Patients; Costs; Errors; Failure & 
Mortality Rates; Hospital Spending; Investments; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & 
Outpatient Services; and the outcomes included: Complications; Incoming Patients, Informal Payments for early 
Surgery/Admission; Nosocomial Infections Rate; Patient Satisfaction; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & 
Quality of Life.  
All the End Results, both outputs and outcomes, may only be influenced by Performance Drivers in the 
medium/long term. This means that there is a time delay between the moment that managers start manipulating a 
performance driver until the moment that a change in end-results will be documented. The “time” factor, thus, is 
rather important for our analysis, but not easy to grasp by the static, instrumental DPM view. Thus, we needed to 
operationalize the instrumental view from Static to Dynamic, and create the Dynamic, Resource-Based View of 
hospital performance. Using the DPM dynamic view, we showed how the End Results, Strategic Resources and 
Performance Drivers are interrelated in the Conceptual and the Policy Models of Hospital Performance (available 
in Figures 33 and 34 respectively), in order to have a more holistic view of the system of hospital performance. 
End-results may only be influenced by Performance Drivers in the medium/long term. Performance Drivers, 
however, can be influenced and changed in the short run. The dynamic view helps us see that immediately, as the 
links that have a symbol with a double line mean that a major delay is involved in this process.  
Finally, the DPM subjective view provided a synthesis of the instrumental and the objective view because it 
made explicit, as a function of the pursued results, both the activities to undertake and the related objectives and 
performance targets to include in plans and budgets for each decision area. However, for a successful 
implementation there was a need for concrete, measurable, attainable, appropriate and time-related performance 
goals. As mentioned in chapter 6.2.1, through the documents’ analysis we identified four such goals of the case 
hospital managers, i.e., (1) Standardization of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units; (2) 
Standardization of clinical procedures; (3) Use of an Information System in the Interdepartmental Communication; 
and (4) Applying digital signature and electronic document management. We combined our findings from the 
documents’ analysis presented in chapter 6.2 with the description of those goals as set by the division managers 
(available in Appendixes 16 and 17) and we informed them with the findings from our DPM instrumental and 
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objective analysis so far, which allowed us identify the activities and the resources that are needed for the 
achievement of each of those four goals. In that respect, we found that – apart from the “tangible” strategic 
resources identified by the managers of the case hospital as essential in the achievement of each of those four 
goals - Management Capacity, which is an intermediate product built with time by the public workers, was equally 
necessary.  
The identification of Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and intermediate End Results, as well as 
the different views that our DPM analysis provided (i.e., instrumental, dynamic, subjective, objective) are equally 
important, as they provide hospital decision-makers with signs of potential future shift in End Results. The DPM 
analysis that we conducted can help public hospital managers in Greece interpret and calculate the consequences 
of an incident or the implications of a policy; show possible discrepancies on performance; and try to mitigate it. 
For this reason, the performance measures we identified could be helpful to foresee possible changes in the 
financial and clinical results of the case hospital, as well as of other public hospitals in Greece. When framed in a 
wider sense than budgetary control, transaction cost drivers can provide policy makers with valuable information 
for strategic planning, such as the opportunity to identify trade-offs in space and in time (e.g., higher costs for 
investments and for managerial capacity building in the short-run, versus investments in equipment, ICT, and 
facilities that would increase performance in the long run). Thus, the performance management policies adopted 
at the case hospital during the healthcare reform ( i.e., structure and process reforms undertaken) and their overall 
impact for Greek public hospitals’ outputs and outcomes, can now be examined through a different “lenses” by 
the hospital managers; lenses that will allow them overcome the counterintuitive, negative outcomes documented, 
which are inherent to the system of hospital performance, and align the hospital’s and the different division’s and 
departments’ goals and actions to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness, along with better hospital service 






CHAPTER 11 – DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 11 corresponds to the fifth research question of our study, namely: What are the practical 
implications of the study for policy design in Greek public hospitals. In order to answer this question, in chapter 
11 we summarise and discuss - using the existing literature - our findings and insights that the CLD model and the 
DPM analysis provided us with, for the sustainable enhancement of the case hospital performance. More 
specifically, in the section 11.1 we summarise and discuss our findings from chapter 6, regarding the traditional 
PM systems we found to be used at the case hospital. In the section 11.2 we summarise and discuss our findings 
from chapters 6 and 7, regarding the seven unintended consequences of the Greek healthcare reform that we 
outlined at the case hospital. In the section 11.3 we summarise our findings from chapters 8 and 9 and we offer an 
explanation for each of those seven unintended consequences, first by using the seven Dynamic Hypotheses we 
articulated based on the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, and second using the Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance themes. In the section 11.4 we show how hospital managers can overcome those 
unintended consequences of traditional PM systems in public hospitals, using the DPM analysis that we conducted 
in chapter 10. Finally, in the section 11.5 we offer the research contributions of our study and their practical 
implications for policy design in Greek public hospitals.  
 
11.1 Traditional Performance Management at the Case Hospital 
In this section we summarise and discuss our findings from chapter 6, regarding the traditional PM systems 
used at the case hospital.  We found that goal-setting was the main PM strategy followed by the case hospital, 
provided by Law N4369/16, and that it is still today not properly implemented. Managers seem to treat 
performance objectives as completely separated from performance and quality, and to consider them as totally 
outside of their everyday tasks. Those findings of the preliminary interviews and documents analysis were 
validated from the findings of the pretests, conducted before the GMB sessions (presented in chapter 7.5).  
Goal-setting was the main PM strategy followed by the case hospital, as provided by Law N4369/16. 
Indeed, the international literature on PM shows that goal setting is at the heart of the PM concept, as it is included 
in almost all the definitions of PM given from practitioners and scholars. For instance, Vignieri (2018) defines 
PM as “a management style aimed at setting goals and ensuring that such targets are achieved through a planning 
and control cycle”, while Vainieri, Noto, et al. (2020) also recognise that it is by setting goals and by assigning 
and distributing resources and providing guidance to managers in order to reach those goals that PM becomes 
possible.  
Despite the goal-setting procedure that took place in the hospital during the last year, and despite the 
existence of written statements of clear objectives in the nursing and administrative divisions, we found that goal 
setting according to Law N4369/16 is until today not properly implemented at the case hospital. In our view, one 
of the reasons for this was that most of the “goals’’ set by the nursing and administrative divisions that our 
documents’ analysis identified could not be considered as performance goals, but rather as the extension of the 
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hospital’s mission. They were general and not explicit; they did not entail any time horizon and - most importantly 
- they did not include any performance target. However, for a successful PM implementation, there is a need for 
concrete, measurable, attainable, appropriate and time-related goals (Bianchi, 2016). Literature has demonstrated 
that organisations with specific goals, targets and priorities are doing better, and - as goal-setting in the public 
sector is much more vague than in the private sector (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005) - this relative uncertainty hinders 
performance. Setting specific targets and making expectations explicit is required by public sector managers to 
help workers properly grasp what needs to be done, and contributes to better results (Lee, 2019).  
Furthermore, we found that - other than the division managers - no other employees or doctors and nurses 
were part of the goal setting process. However, this is vital for a proper implementation of the goals set. In fact, 
one of the most distinctive managerial competencies identified in the literature refers to the capacity to design the 
vision, mission and the long-term strategic goals; along with the effective diffusion of all those goals inside the 
healthcare organisation for the empowerment of the staff. Thus, information sharing, engagement of mid and low-
level managers and the ability of top managers to engage low-level managers and communicate efficiently the 
goals and strategies is found to lead to better hospital performance (Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019). Most importantly, 
the engagement of doctors is found to be critical for the success of any PM system in healthcare (Botje et al., 2016; 
Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018) and in order to engage clinicians, hospital managers need to provide them with 
appropriate, structured and continuous flows of information on performance outcomes, priorities and operational 
goal-setting (Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019).  
Nevertheless,  we identified four goals set by the division managers of the Administrative and the Nursing 
divisions, which were a bit more specific and - although they also did not entail any time horizon or any 
performance target - were considered as a good start for the DPM analysis that we conducted: (1) standardization 
of the nursing forms of the nursing departments and units; (2) standardization of clinical procedures; (3) use of an 
information system in the interdepartmental communication; and (4) application of the digital signature and of 
electronic documents management. It is worth mentioning that those four goals also came up during the GMB 
sessions and were integrated in the CLD model that the participants built. Many of the policy interventions that 
participants came up with during the GMB sessions to improve hospital performance are similar to those four 
operational goals identified in our documents analysis. However, the preliminary interviews that we conducted 
with four of the participant stakeholders -including the two division managers- revealed that no further actions 
were taken in order to accomplish those objectives, neither by the managers nor from the employees of the two 
divisions.  The interviewees seemed to treat those division goals as completely separated from what they consider 
to be performance and quality, and to consider them as totally outside of their everyday tasks; as something “more” 
to do, for which they hardly have any time to devote. Indeed, research on PM shows that if the objectives set have 
no connection with the real challenges and problems, and if employees are not part of the goal-setting procedure, 
then there is no stable base for pursuing goals and for improving performance (Bianchi, 2016).  
Furthermore, according to our analysis, division managers might have ended up setting “easy” and “doable” 
objectives most of which, however, have little or no impact on performance.  This view is confirmed by a number 
of studies on “budgetary slacks” and “performance failures” in public organizations (Ajibola & Akinniyi, 2013; 
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Andrews et al., 2006; Yılmaz et al., 2014) and support our view that goal-setting, the main PM strategy followed 
at our case hospital, might have been manipulated by managers. Such paradigms of “deviant behaviour” in the 
public healthcare sector reported by PM scholars include manipulation of goal-setting, by establishing too easy 
goals and working just to reach those goals, ignoring other, potentially more important factors (Bevan & Hood, 
2006; Chang, 2007; Fryer et al., 2009). Supportive corporate environments, combined with specific priorities and 
missions, are crucial for inspiring workers to succeed, and are where management play an essential role in 
determining the culture of the company (Moynihan & Pandey, 2004; Peters & Bianchi, 2020). Adherence to 
organizational requirements and reporting is essential in the public sector to maintain oversight and accountability, 
with national and other regulations permeating the biggest part of the public agency's processes (Kalgin et al., 
2018). All those findings reveal that PM was not successfully implemented in the case hospital and it certainly 
did not bring any tangible results for the hospital performance.  
Hospital performance was defined by the participant stakeholders of the case hospital as “the provision of 
patient-centred care to the patient, with safety (for the patients and the staff); responsibility (adherence to 
protocols, proportions and procedures) and dignity (nice and clean facilities, reduced waiting times and no 
informal payments)”. This definition is in line with the IOO definitions of performance, presented in chapter 2.1.1. 
IOO definitions focus more on input, output and outcome, rather than on economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(Bianchi, 2013, 2016). As we discussed in chapter 2.1.1, academics tend to define PM as a procedure, whereas 
practitioners tend to define PM as a toolbox of practices aimed at enhancing employee productivity (Lee, 2019). 
The definition that our participants gave consists of three components: safety, responsibility and dignity. In that 
sense, as the safety and responsibility components refer to procedures, we would say that our participants’ 
definition is close to the academic definitions of PM, and even closer to that of Madlabana et al. (2020) who 
distinguish PM practices from PM methods, as the actual application and use of a PM method as opposed to 
theories relating to it. Furthermore, our participants’ definition agrees with the widespread notion that performance 
seems to reflect the capacity of an organisation to produce sustainable outcomes with emphasis on both the quality 
of the process and the quality of the results (Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Moreover, the three components of our 
participants’ definition (safety, responsibility, dignity) reflect, in some degree, the dimensions of quality as 
perceived by users of a service, which are: Reliability, Empathy, Responsiveness. Assurance, Tangibility (Fayek, 
1996; Parasuraman et al., 1985).  
After goal-setting, the primary goal of traditional approaches to improving performance in Greek public 
hospitals, including our case hospital, is to hand out questionnaires and collect information from patients regarding 
their experience. In our case hospital, this information is gathered by the quality department and is kept there. 
After collecting and analysing those questionnaires, the department prepares an annual report which is handed in 
to the hospital directors. After that, our research showed that in our case hospital no further actions are taken to 
enhance performance. This is quite logical, as the patients' reflections might be helpful in showing possible areas 
for improvement, but are certainly not enough to determine what actions should be taken exactly, how they should 
be implemented and who should be involved.  
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The historical trend of the hospital performance in the case hospital was depicted by our GMB participant 
stakeholders in a diagram over time called Reference Mode (available in Appendix 19). The Reference Mode 
created and agreed upon by the participants showed that the level of the overall performance in the case hospital 
has been slightly increasing after the healthcare reform and is now stabilizing. This, however, might be just a 
misperception of the participant stakeholders. According to Werner et al. (2008b) performance measures may be 
correlated with improved performance for two different reasons: first, because measuring by itself directly 
improves performance on the activities that are measured, and second because those measures might act as 
indicators of the performance of other activities that - although not directly measured - they also contribute to the 
improvement of the overall performance. In their study, Werner et al. found proof that process measures of quality 
indeed act as intermediate indicators of performance of unmeasured outcomes, which are more important than the 
measured ones, in the sense that their impact on overall performance and quality of healthcare services is bigger 
(Werner et al., 2008b). This misperception of increased performance by the participants is further validated by the 
rest of our research findings, which outlined many unintended consequences at the case hospital and clearly 
showed that performance at the case hospital deteriorated, as a consequence of the PM policies implemented 
during the Greek healthcare reform, which are discussed in the next section.   
 
11.2 Outlining the Unintended Consequences of the Greek Healthcare Reform at the Case Hospital 
In this section we summarise and discuss our findings from chapters 6 and 7, regarding the negative 
outcomes of the Greek healthcare reform on the case hospitals’ performance. In chapter 6 (section 6.1) we 
critically reviewed the Greek healthcare reform and found that the Performance Management policies introduced 
in Greek public hospitals after the reform influenced the structure and process of the delivery of care, such as 
personnel, equipment and management systems; as well as the outputs and outcomes, such as patient satisfaction 
and mortality rates. Hospital salaries, payments, administration, procurement and monitoring were largely 
addressed by the reform, and the hospital function was mainly affected negatively by: the serious cuts in the 
salaries of healthcare personnel, which caused  job-dissatisfaction; the low nurses-to-patient ratios which became 
lower after the reform and resulted in many of them applying for early retirement, leaving the remaining ones to 
work overtime in order to cover all necessary shifts with fewer resources (e.g., drugs and sterilized equipment) 
and with fewer days-off; the new obligations for reporting and accounting (i.e., double-entry hospital accounting 
system, regular publication of audited balance sheets, use of a uniform coding system for medical supplies, 
introduction of hospital payments via the diagnosis-related group system, introduction of e-forms to hospital 
accounting) which resulted in increased workload for the remaining personnel; the fact that the vast majority of 
public hospitals remain without clear performance objectives, planning or control, despite the existence of an 
explicit legislative framework for goal-setting (Law N4369 /16) ; and the fact that the vast majority of public 
hospitals still operate without actual quality control of procedures and services, despite the existence of governing 
& regulating bodies for performance and quality assurance (i.e., Ministry of Health, Health Regions, National 
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Quality Institutions, Quality Committees of Public Hospitals) (Aiken et al., 2012; Economou et al., 2017; 
Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; Mitropoulos et al., 2018). 
Although it might still be early to judge the long-term outcomes of the reform, the early signs from the 
limited research that exists are alarming. Researchers agree that there were negative consequences of the crisis, 
the austerity measures and the healthcare reform not only on the Greek populations’ health (e.g., mental health 
problems, suicides, epidemics, deterioration of self-rated health, otorhinolaryngologic disorders, etc) but also on 
the healthcare system (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Our literature review showed that after the healthcare 
reform, in Greek public hospitals: hospital service quality significantly deteriorated, as reported both by nurses 
and patients; hospital safety worsened and became poor or failing, as reported both by nurses and patients; nurses’ 
burnout, job dissatisfaction, and intention to leave their work skyrocketed; patient satisfaction decreased; waiting 
lists and waiting times increased; communication with nurses and doctors was considered inadequate by the 
patients; the rate of under-the-table (informal) payments increased; hospital-related mortality rates increased; 
medical errors significantly increased; nosocomial and multidrug-resistant bacteria infections rates were 
extremely high; diffusion of clinical guidelines and treatment protocols remained weak (Aiken et al., 2012; 
Economou et al., 2017; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; Mitropoulos et al., 2018).  
Many of those findings were supported by our case study and by the findings from the preliminary 
interviews and documents analysis at the case hospital, which also confirmed that hospital service quality and 
performance has paradoxically deteriorated during the last decade (2010-2020) as a consequence of the new 
performance management policies implemented in the case hospital during the Greek healthcare reform (OECD 
& EU, 2020; OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 
2014). Those conclusions agree with the findings of many other researchers who studied the results and impact of 
the Greek healthcare reform. The trade-off between the short-term, seemingly positive effect of cost-reduction 
versus the long-term, catastrophic impact of the Greek healthcare reform has been well-documented by many 
authors (Economou et al., 2017; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). According to Keramidou and Triantafyllopoulos 
(2018), for example, the reform seems to have undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of hospitals, and the 
ability of public hospitals to provide the best clinical outcomes possible with minor iatrogenic risks, according to 
their capacity.  Thus, they concluded that “there is a need for reforms aimed at the achievement of productivity 
gains, responsibility, and transparency in the management of productive resources, by enabling health 
organisations to reduce their costs without a deterioration in the quality of care”. A systematic review of the 
literature published from January 2009 to March 2013 around the consequences that the financial crisis has had 
for health and healthcare in Greece also concluded that “the recent efforts to reform the Greek National Health 
System have been focusing mainly on short-term effects by reducing expenditure, while the measures imposed 
seem to have dubious long-term consequences for Greek public health and healthcare” (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 
2014). Seemingly, Economou et al. (2017) writes that “While the preponderance of reforms implemented so far 
have focused on reducing costs, there is a need to develop this focus into longer-term strategic reforms that 
enhance efficiency, while guaranteeing the delivery of health services and improving the overall quality of care”.   
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The seven negative consequences of the Greek healthcare reform outlined in our case hospital are also in 
line with the international literature around PM reforms in the healthcare sector. The motives for the emergence 
of the NPM, the related reform initiatives and the degree to which they are successfully applied internationally 
has been widely researched, along with the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis on the roadmap for public 
policy change (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). However, according to the researchers, there is no universal recipe for 
successful public management reforms, and none of the NPM practices can be considered “universal”. Multiple 
control variables have been explored for their effect to performance and for their relevance to the effectiveness of 
modern public management practices, such as for example fiscal arrangements and their effect on the quality of 
public services (Cheng et al., 2020), but when inappropriately applied or incompetently implemented, they can 
lead to significant disadvantages (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Bivona, 2010, 2015; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Fryer 
et al., 2009; Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Ferrè, et al., 2019; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020). Many other researchers 
agree that in the healthcare sector, financial indicators are not enough to describe the overall performance of 
hospitals, because of the many particularities of healthcare that is not found in other sectors of production and 
services (Ravish, 2018; Wright & Hershman, 2013). 
Based on the hospital’s internal documents, the preliminary interviews with four of the participating 
stakeholders and the pretests that they were asked to fill in before the GMB sessions, our research (presented in 
chapter 6) showed that the PM policies introduced during the Greek healthcare reform had a negative impact on 
many aspects of Greek hospitals’ performance in general, and on our case hospital’s performance in particular. 
The new policies undeniably contributed to the reduction of hospital spending, but they simultaneously contributed 
to the deterioration of hospital service quality. More specifically, our research at the case hospital outlined the 
seven following negative outcomes of the reform policies to be present at the case hospital, according to the 
participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions: (1) Low Quality and Safety of Services perceived by health workers 
and patients; (2) Low Patient Satisfaction; (3) Informal Payments; (4) High Mortality Rates; (5) Numerous 
Medical Errors; (6) High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates; (7) Low adherence to 
Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. Furthermore, in chapter 7 we presented the CLD models of hospital 
performance (i.e., the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance) 
which were the result of the collective discussions and activities with the participant stakeholders of our case 
hospital during the GMB sessions (i.e., hospital managers, doctors, nurses, paramedics and patients).  
In contrast to most PM models that use KPIs, our model variables included Strategic Resources, End 
Results and Performance Drivers and showed the dynamic relationships between all of them, in accordance with 
the DPM framework (Bianchi, 2016). Our models, as we already explained, are qualitative System Dynamics 
Models called Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs), which contain variables and causal links and are used to display a 
sequence of cause-and-effect relationships between variables of a system (Forrester, 1961; Minyard et al., 2018; 
Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1989, 2000). A CLD is a way to systematically identify feedback loops (i.e., 
circular processes of a system where outputs are fed back into inputs), but more importantly it displays the shared 
narrative of the participants. Interestingly, we found that many of our variables are similar to famous KPIs which 
are widely used in PM of hospitals worldwide. Rahimi et al. (2017), for example, attempted to identify and 
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organise in a comprehensive way the most suitable key performance indicators (KPIs) for hospitals, using first an 
extensive literature review that identified 218 hospital performance indicators, and then the experts’ panel and the 
delphi method to select the 22 most critical ones, which they subsequently divided into four categories based on 
the four BSC perspectives. Those 22 KPIs included, among others, the: average Length of Stay, the Bed 
Occupancy, the mean Length of Stay in the emergency department, the Mortality Rate, the bed turnover, the 
discharge rate, the  (ER) waiting time, the hospital infection rate, the clinical Errors, the Patient Satisfaction, the 
cost of drags and materials, the personnel Costs, the staff turnover, and the Facilities for families and visitors. It 
is obvious that there are many similarities between those KPIs and our model variables, which strengthens the 
validity of our models and of our model findings. Furthermore, we found that many of our model variables (i.e., 
Patient Satisfaction, Informal Payments, Failure &Mortality Rates, Errors, Nosocomial Infections, Adherence to 
Guidelines and Protocols) are identical (in terms of names and definitions given by the participants) to the seven 
unintended negative outcomes documented at the case hospital, which also strengthens the validity of our findings. 
Hereunder we discuss those seven unintended consequences of the reform outlined, based on the existing literature 
and the CLD models that our stakeholders created. 
 
(1) Low Quality and Safety of Services perceived by Health Workers and Patients  
Those findings are largely confirmed by the literature around the negative consequences of the Greek 
healthcare reform. For example, three years after the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece, Aiken et al. 
(2012) conducted a study of cross-sectional surveys of nurses and patients in 12 European countries and the United 
States. The cross-sectional survey showed patterns of extremely high patients’ perceived unsafety in Greek public 
hospitals. More specifically, it showed incredibly low patients’ ratings of the hospitals in Greece, as well as the 
lowest rate of patients willing to recommend their hospital between all countries in the study (53% in Greece, 
compared to 78% in Switzerland that had the lowest score). This study also showed incredibly low quality of care 
as reported by Greek nurses, compared to all other countries. More specifically, 47% of the nurses in Greece 
reported poor or fair quality of care; the highest percentage compared to all other countries in the study, with 
Ireland having the lowest one (11%). Furthermore, one fifth of the respondent nurses gave their hospitals a poor 
or a failing safety grade. (Aiken et al., 2012). Furthermore, Greece had the first place in the rating of nurse-reported 
burnout (78% in Greece, compared to 10% in the Netherlands that had the lowest score), job dissatisfaction (56% 
in Greece, compared to 11% in the Netherlands that had the lowest score) and intention to leave (49% in Greece, 
compared to 14% in the US that had the lowest score). According to the authors “nurses in Greece reported a 
particularly high level of nurse burnout, dissatisfaction, and intention to leave; nearly half of them described their 
wards as providing poor or fair quality of care, and almost one fifth gave their hospitals a poor or failing safety 
grade” (Aiken et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, according to the Eurobarometer studies of the European Commission during the last decade, 
as presented in Economou et al. (2017), Greek citizens’ perceived unsafety in hospital care seems to be the highest 
in the EU, with as high as 83% of respondents in 2010 (the highest rate in the EU) and 78% in 2014 (the second 
highest rate in the EU) feeling that they will probably get harmed during hospital treatment. Greek citizens seem 
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to blame mostly clinical ineffectiveness, medical errors and hospital-acquired infections for their negative 
judgements regarding unsafety during hospitalisation (Economou et al., 2017), which largely confirms our 
findings from the CLD models’ analysis. Finally, all those negative perceptions and assessments of patients and 
citizens seem to have worsened during the years after the crisis, with Greece showing the largest overall 
deterioration in citizens’ assessment in the EU between 2009 and 2014 (Economou et al., 2017, p.140), a fact that 
is in line with our findings of the documents’ analysis, pretests and preliminary interviews at the case hospital. 
 
Figure 37. Latent Variables and Measurement Items for Hospital Performance. Adapted from: Keramidou & 
Triantafyllopoulos (2018, p. 357). 
 
 
Another nationwide survey conducted in 110 (out of the total of 124) Greek public hospitals, with 1872 
patients discharged from those hospitals as participants, showed that the public hospital service quality as 
perceived by patients had a decreasing trend during the recession and still is at a medium level of 66.2 / 100 
(Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018). More specifically, those results showed that those 110 public hospitals 
were less effective at providing high-quality services during the economic crisis: in the 0–100 scale, the overall 
level of perceived hospital service quality was 68 between 2007–2008 (before the economic crisis and the 
implementation of the healthcare reform measures) and dropped to 65.7 between 2009–2014 (the years after the 
economic crisis and the reform implementation). The authors created a model with hierarchical structure for scale, 
in order to identify and explain separately different dimensions of care.  We could say that their research - although 
based on patients’ perceptions and not on clinical data - is somehow closer to the reality than other similar studies 
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of patient satisfaction and perceptions because their hierarchical model was capable of representing “…criteria of 
high quality at a higher level of abstraction and relate them to the main dimensions of care at a lower level of 
abstraction, thus mediating the influence of good-quality criteria on the overall service quality” (Keramidou & 
Triantafyllopoulos, 2018). Their model included three dimensions of care (facilities, process and outcomes), in 
agreement with the Donabedian categorisation (structure, process and outcomes) and six criteria of high service 
quality as determinants of structure, process and outcome quality. According to their framework, access influences 
perceptions of facilities or structure quality; competency and reliability influence perceived outcome quality; and 
understanding, responsiveness, and communication influence perceived process quality. Their study showed that 
after the reform all the three dimensions of care decreased, with the smallest reduction being documented in 
process quality, and the largest reduction in outcome quality; a reduction mainly attributed to the reduction in 
reliability and competency as perceived by patients. This is partly in line with our findings, as reliability and 
competency could be expressed by the variables Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience of our CLD models 
which, however, is shown to have increased in our case hospital; nevertheless, this might not be the case for 
smaller hospitals in Greece, which were more thoroughly affected by the reform measures and thus might have 
experienced a deterioration in terms of skills mix of their staff. 
 
(2) Low Patient Satisfaction 
Although Patient Satisfaction is not necessarily an accurate indicator of quality of care (Mitropoulos, et al., 
2018), several Eurobarometer studies have highlighted the high patient dissatisfaction in Greece, with 73% of the 
respondents in 2014 thinking that the quality of public hospital services is worse than in other EU countries.  The 
cross-sectional survey by Aiken et al. (2012) also showed similar patterns of high patient dissatisfaction in Greece, 
as we mentioned in the previous section. 
Patients are generally dissatisfied with the quality and responsiveness of health care, including the 
widespread, under-the-table (informal) payments; the weak primary care and the absence of a referral system; the 
long waiting lists and the inadequate geographical coverage. Research has showed that all those pre-existing 
problems were magnified by the recession and the impact of the austerity measures (Economou et al., 2017, p. 
134), which is probably what led to a decreasing trend of patients’ perceptions of adequate hospital services quality 
during 2007-2014 (Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018). This is supported by our study, as informal payments 
and long waiting lists came up in our research and were included in our model as factors that deteriorate Patient 
Satisfaction. 
Furthermore, a recent nationwide, inpatient survey in Greek public hospitals after the healthcare reform 
indicated that the communication with nurses is the most salient predictor of the overall patients’ satisfaction, 
followed by the communication with doctors and the hospital environment (cleanliness and quietness), while 
certain patient (age and health status) and hospital or institutional (type and location) characteristics also contribute 
significantly to patients’ perceived overall satisfaction (Mitropoulos et al., 2018). Communication and 
responsiveness to patients needs and many of the latent variables and measurement items identified by Keramidou 
and Triantafyllopoulos (2018) agree with our model variables and definitions that the participant stakeholders of 
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our GMB sessions gave, presented in Appendix 24, which is something that validates our models and supports 
our results. 
 
(3) Informal Payments  
Corruption, in the form of the widespread, under-the-table informal payments, constitutes one of the biggest 
challenges of the Greek healthcare system, raising serious concerns about accessibility and barriers to health care 
services. Studies have shown that under-the-table payments for the provision of hospital services – all of which 
are supposed to be free of user charges - mainly take the form of informal payments to physicians (usually 
surgeons) so that patients can bypass waiting lists or ensure more attention from doctors and, assumingly, better 
quality of care, while the frequency of such payments reported is at least one in every three patients (Economou 
et al., 2017, p. 62; Souliotis et al., 2016). Those findings are in line with our results, as the variable informal 
payments, and the definition that the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions gave to it, presented in 
Appendix 24, largely agree with the literature. 
Seemingly, Souliotis et al. (2016) found that under-the-table payments take place in approximately 32.4 % 
of public hospital admissions. Out of the 2741 individuals that took part in their survey, almost two thirds of the 
ones who had consumed health services over the past 12 months admitted having made informal payments, and 
that those under-the-table payments had a substantial impact on their household budgets and living conditions. 
The study revealed that informal payments were most frequently made upon request of the public health worker 
(usually a physician) and prior to the service provision, in order to bypass waiting times or receive better quality 
care, which agrees with our the causal links of our model variable informal payments, presented in Appendix 24, 
as well as with our findings regarding informal payments.  
Souliotis et al. (2016), however, state that in some cases payments were made after the treatment, without 
prior request of the public health worker or out of gratitude, which reveals the well-established “culture” of 
informal payments in Greece that contributes and sustains this negative effect. Although informal payments were 
present long before the financial crisis, their study showed that after the healthcare reform “there is a growing 
unwillingness of citizens to pay informally and an increasing demand for these payments as a prerequisite for 
access to services or to redeem services provided” (Souliotis et al., 2016). According to their estimations, under-
the-table payments amounted to almost €1.5 billion in 2012, representing 28% of the total private expenditure on 
health in that year (Souliotis et al., 2016). Furthermore, new types of informal payments emerged as a consequence 
of the healthcare reform, and of some of the measures taken. For example, because of the measures taken to 
combat overprescribing, it became harder for patients seeking medication to get their prescriptions. ESY-
contracted physicians took advantage of the situation and started charging an additional, under-the-table fee for 
prescribing; a service that is supposed to be free of user charges. In 2015, more than 47% of patients reported 
having made an informal payment ranging from €10 to €20 to ESY-contracted doctors in order to get a prescription 
(Economou et al., 2017, p. 62; Souliotis et al., 2016). 
 
(4) High Mortality Rates 
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Until today, data regarding patient safety and quality of hospital services in Greece are very limited, due to 
the lack of monitoring systems in public hospitals and the absence of nationwide registries (Economou et al., 2017; 
OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). However, there is some evidence that the 
healthcare reforms - which in public hospitals aimed mainly at cost saving and increased efficiency - had some 
adverse effects on the quality of healthcare services, and concerns have been raised regarding deteriorating 
standards of medical care because of the severe cuts (Economou et al., 2017, p.122; Karamanoli, 2012; Karidis et 
al., 2011).  
In line with our findings, mortality rates seem to have increased after the healthcare reform. More 
specifically, mortality from treatable causes (an indicator that reveals shortcomings in diagnosis and treatment) 
and infant mortality rate (an indicator that is sensitive to both the quality of health care and socioeconomic 
conditions) has shown signs of worsening (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019, 
pp. 3-5). More specifically: As shown on Figure 38, Greece’s mortality rates from treatable causes was decreasing 
but reversed after 2000 for both men and women, reaching 95 for men and 93 for women per 100 000 population 
respectively in 2016, and hitting just above the EU average.  
 
Figure 38. Mortality Rates in Greece and the EU.  
Source: Economou et al. (2017). 
 
 
Infant mortality rate, on the other hand, was steadily decreasing until 2007 as shown on figure 39; remained 
constant between 2007-2009 at 3.1 per 1 000 live births; and increased to 3.9 between 2015-17, surpassing the EU 
average of 3.6 Then it peaked at 4.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2016 and reduced to 3.5 (just below the EU 
average) in 2017 (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019, p. 5).  
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Another major study has shown that amenable mortality in Greece (an indicator that reflects quality and 
timeliness of medical care) experienced a small but significant increase in the years after the economic crisis, 
although it had been declining until then (Karanikolos et al., 2018).  
Those findings are in line with our model results that revealed that Failure and Mortality rates at the case 
hospital are increasing, as a result of the policies implemented after the reform. 
 
 
Figure 39. Infant Mortality Rates in Greece between 2000-2017. Source: Economou et al. (2017). 
 
 
(5) Numerous Medical Errors 
In line with our findings, research shows that medical errors are present in Greek public hospitals and that 
the invasive medical specialties show the highest rates of adverse events (Riga et al., 2014), despite the fact that 
there is no central national authority to which medical errors can be reported and, thus, only a small portion of 
adverse events are detected (Economou et al., 2017, p. 62). For example, a major study found that there was a 
significant increase in mortality from adverse events during medical treatment (an indicator that reflects the rate 
of medical mistakes during hospital treatment) after the onset of the economic crisis in Greece, causing more than 
200 additional deaths per month which, according to the authors, “might reflect the effects of deterioration in 
quality of care during economic recessions” and  “could be explained by the serious shortages of medical staff 
and burnout among health workers in Greece”(Laliotis et al., 2016). Those statements agree with our CLD model 
which links errors to the doctor & nurse-patient ratios, showing that the relative lack of doctors and nurses in 
relation to the admitted patients in clinics leads to the creation of more errors. 
 
(6) High Nosocomial & Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates 
Our CLD models’ structure and findings are largely in line with the literature around the negative 
consequences of the Greek healthcare reform regarding the high nosocomial infections rates. What is rather 
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alarming, though, is that the rate of hospital-acquired infections, also known as nosocomial infections rate (one of 
the main quality indicators recognised internationally) in Greek hospitals is the highest in the EU and hits twice 
as high as the EU average, with one in ten patients developing this condition (OECD & European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies, 2019, p. 15). Furthermore, Greece is the second country (after Italy) with the highest 
score in multidrug-resistant bacteria infections in the EU, resulting in over 1 600 deaths per year (Cassini et al., 
2019; OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019, p. 15).  
 
(7) Low Adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols 
Our CLD models’ structure agree with the existing literature that links nosocomial infections to adherence 
to clinical guidelines and treatment protocols. For example, in order to tackle the high rate of nosocomial 
infections, the Greek Ministry of Health has been lately trying to ally with medical associations in order to develop 
and introduce clinical guidelines and treatment protocols in routine medical practice (OECD & European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019, p. 15). The Hellenic Society of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
created 25 new guidelines between 2013-2014, while some nursing protocols have been developed by the nursing 
faculties of Greek universities (Economou et al., 2017, pp. 121-122). Despite those efforts, still today diffusion 
and use of guidelines and protocols in Greek public hospitals unfortunately remains weak (OECD & European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019, p. 15). This again largely agrees with our findings, which 
highlight the low adherence to clinical guidelines and treatment protocols as one of the causes of the high 
nosocomial infections rate documented at the case hospital.  
All those seven negative outcomes that our research highlighted at the case hospital, and which the literature 
confirms, are explained in the next section using insights from the CLD models that our participants created. 
 
11.3 Explaining the Unintended Consequences of the Greek Healthcare Reform at the Case 
Hospital 
Model Loops & Dynamic Hypotheses (Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance) 
In this section we summarise and discuss our findings from chapters 8 and 9, regarding the seven Dynamic 
Hypotheses that we formed based on the Simplified Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance in order to explain 
the seven negative outcomes of the reform outlined at the case hospital. More specifically, in chapter 8, eleven 
feedback loops (seven reinforcing and four balancing) were identified, named and discussed. We found that, given 
the current policies of Cutback Management in place, loop R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback Management is 
catastrophic for hospital performance in the long run, as it leads to a perpetual decrease of financial resources and 
purchasing power in the long run, leading to a lack of capacity by public hospitals to cover their needs. Given the 
long waiting lists that are already in place in all Greek public hospitals, as a result of the current policies, and 
given the widespread idea between patients that informal payments are necessary for a timely and proper 
treatment, loop R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption is catastrophic for public health in the long run, as it leads 
to a perpetual increase of private spending on healthcare and to the outspread of corruption between public hospital 
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doctors. Loop R4 -   Length of Stay & Complications highlights the need for a short Length of Stay to avoid 
complications. Loop R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population highlights the need for limiting 
Nosocomial Infections Rate using appropriate measures, in order to reduce multidrug resistance in the general 
population.  
Furthermore, we found that Loop R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building leads to a perpetual increase of 
skills mix and reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the 
currently unsuccessful ones; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success to the 
Successful archetype (Senge, 1990). Seemingly, Loop R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation leads to a 
perpetual increase of clinical efficiency, accumulated intellectual and skills capital, reputation for the already 
successful hospitals in the long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently unsuccessful ones. Exactly as 
Loops R3 and R6, Loop R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation leads to a perpetual increase of clinical 
efficiency, accumulated intellectual and skills capital, and reputation for the already successful hospitals in the 
long run, and to a perpetual decrease for the currently unsuccessful ones. Thus, loops R3, R6 and R7 are beneficial 
for big, urban hospitals that are generally better staffed and equipped, whereas catastrophic for the small, rural 
hospitals’ performance in the long run; a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Success 
to the Successful archetype (Senge, 1990).  
Finally, we found that all the four balancing loops B1, B2, B3 and B4 lead to a gradual decrease and 
stabilisation of patient satisfaction and of hospital reputation for the already successful hospitals in the long run; 
a well-known phenomenon in the system’s literature known as the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990). The 
balancing loops show that, paradoxically, a good hospital reputation is both a blessing and a curse, doomed to be 
deteriorated because of the adverse effects of:  long waiting times; less attendance to patients' needs; more errors; 
and limited adherence to guidelines & protocols, all of which are inevitably generated in hospitals with good 
reputation and increasing volumes of incoming patients, causing their overall performance to decrease.  
Such trade-offs between cost-reduction versus the long-term catastrophic impact on healthcare outcomes 
has been well-documented by many authors, and are supported by our literature review which identified a number 
of serious, unintended negative outcomes for hospitalised patients and personnel of public hospitals (Economou 
et al., 2017; Karamanoli, 2012; Karidis, et al., 2011; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; OECD & European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). Furthermore, similar trade-offs between short-term, 
seemingly positive effects of implemented policies and long-term, catastrophic outcomes are common in the 
systems literature as systems archetypes (Meadows, 2008; Meadows, Behrens, et al., 1974; Meadows, Meadows, 
et al., 1972; Senge, 1990). According to Senge (1990) systems archetypes are patterns of counterintuitive, 
recurring behaviour in organizations that have, most of the time, negative outcomes in the long term. The Success 
to the Successful archetype usually occurs when the two or more players are competing over limited resources, 
and the one that was initially the better performer is the one that continues to receive a comparatively higher 
distribution of resources at the expense of the other players (Senge, 1990). On the other hand, the Limits to Success 
archetype occurs when a policy initially produces promising results, because of the dominance of (one or more) 
reinforcing loops, but in the long term it approaches a limit that - no matter how much effort or resources managers 
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use – inevitably slows down the organisation’s performance, because of the dominance of (one or more) balancing 
loops (Senge, 1990). 
In fact, according to our findings, the balancing loops seem to be dominating at the moment at the case 
hospital, leading to the seven negative outcomes documented and in line with those two “archetypes” found in the 
systems literature. The seven Dynamic Hypotheses (DH) that we formed based on the feedback loops and the 
causal trees of the corresponding model variable can explain each of the seven counterintuitive negative outcomes 
documented at the case hospital. Those Dynamic Hypotheses are the explanations that we offer in order to explain 
why those seven counterintuitive outcomes occurred at the case hospital and in other hospitals in Greece. We call 
them Dynamic Hypotheses instead of “explanations” because in order to sufficiently test and prove them, a 
quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, as that would enable us to run simulations and test 
our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop dominance. Such a model is not included in the present 
study, but is recommended for future research.  
Thus, the seven negative outcomes documented at the case hospital are explained, according to our Dynamic 
Hypotheses, as follows: Safety and service quality is low at the case hospital because of the dominance of the 
loops B3 and B4, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time 
Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success 
archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors 
and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to lower Survival Rate 
and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life after treatment (Dynamic Hypothesis 1). Patient Satisfaction is low 
at the case hospital because of the dominance of the loops B1, B2, B3 and B4, all of which lead to a gradual 
decrease and stabilisation of patient satisfaction and of hospital reputation in the long run, as in the Limits to 
Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more 
Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission longer Waiting List for Surgery or Admission, longer Waiting 
Time in ER & Outpatient Services and, finally, to lower Survival Rate and Patients’ Health Status & Quality of 
Life after treatment (Dynamic Hypothesis 2). Informal Payments are high at the case hospital because of loop R2, 
which leads to a perpetual increase of private spending and to the outspread of corruption between the case hospital 
doctors, given the good reputation of the case hospital and the long waiting lists that are already in place. This 
phenomenon is sustained by the current policies in place, which favour the creation of long waiting lists, but is 
also sustained by factors external to the case hospital and to our model, such the relative tolerance of the Ministry 
of Health and of the authorities, and the widespread idea between patients in Greece that informal payments are 
necessary for a timely and proper treatment (Dynamic Hypothesis 3). Failure & Mortality Rates are high at the 
case hospital because of the dominance of the loops B3 and B4, both of which lead to a gradual decrease and 
stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at less Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs, more Errors and Complications, longer Length of Stay, higher 
Nosocomial Infections Rate, and, finally, to higher Failure & Mortality Rates (Dynamic Hypothesis 4). Medical 
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Errors are increasing at the case hospital because of the loop B3 which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation 
at a low level of the Actual Time Available per Patient and of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in the long 
run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at higher Difficulty of Shift Schedule for nurses 
and doctors, less Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs and, finally, to more Errors (Dynamic 
Hypothesis 5). Nosocomial Infections Rate is increasing at the case hospital because of the loops R5 and B4, both 
of which cause it to increase in the long run, resulting at more Complications and higher Multidrug Resistance in 
Population (Dynamic Hypothesis 6). Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is low at the case hospital because of 
the loop B4 which leads to a gradual decrease and stabilisation at a low level of the Actual Time Available per 
Patient in the long run, as in the Limits to Success archetype (Senge, 1990), resulting at increased Difficulty of 
Shift Schedule for nurses and doctors, low Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms 
and, finally, to low Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols (Dynamic Hypothesis 7). In the next section, we will 
further discuss and support those findings based on the Policy Model of Hospital Performance and the existing 
literature. 
 
Model Themes (Policy Model of Hospital Performance) 
In this section we discuss the insights that the Policy Model of Hospital Performance created by the GMB 
participant stakeholders offers us. As this model contains a significant number of feedback loops, in chapter 8 the 
researcher created a simplified version of the model in order to make it possible to identify and analyse the basic 
feedback loops. Because of this simplification, many insights of the original model were not included in our 
analysis. For this reason, in this section we will present and discuss the four themes that emerged from the original 
Policy Model of Hospital Performance that our participants created (available in Appendix 22); explain some of 
the insights that those four themes provide us with; and discuss their implications for the hospital performance 
and for the design of better, context-specific and more quality-oriented performance management policies in Greek 
public hospitals.  
Through the sessions we identified four main interrelated themes that are inherent to hospital performance, 
which are reflected in all our CLD models: Financing& Assets; Patient Satisfaction-related Processes; Managerial 
& Staffing Processes; and Outcomes &Clinical Efficiency. All those themes are represented in our Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance by a number of variables, and all four themes are interrelated with each other. Hereunder 
we present and discuss them using the existing literature. 
 
  (1) Financing & Assets 
The first theme identified refers to the connection between financing, costs, spending and investments in 
assets (i.e., facilities, equipment and ICT). The model variables that belong to this theme are: Approved Budget; 
Costs; Facilities; Financial Resources; Hospital Spending; ICT; Investments; Medical & Technical Equipment.  
This theme reflects the premise that when there are more Financial Resources available, there will be more 
Investments in assets, and because of the budgetary control PM policies implemented, this can only happen if 
Costs of consumables, materials, pharmaceuticals and services are lower than the Approved Budget. In fact, as we 
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mentioned in our literature review in chapter 2, the first healthcare reforms worldwide mainly focused on 
improving performance in terms of achieving better financial results; setting goals and responsibilities across the 
hierarchical structure of healthcare organisations; and maximising outputs, such as number of patients treated and 
services provided (Noto et al., 2020; Vainieri, Noto, et al., 2020).  Budgetary Control was one of the first PM tools 
introduced during the reforms of the public healthcare sector worldwide, and is still widely used by many 
countries, including Greece (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020). Particularly since the onset of the 2008 
financial and economic crisis, many governments started introducing cutback management policies, i.e., policies 
which are contributing to a transition towards lower levels of activity and resources usage (Noto et al., 2020). In 
our view, this is exactly what the Greek healthcare reform was all about.  
There are three main cutback management approaches: linear cuts, targeted cuts and the quest for 
productivity and efficiency gains (Ongaro et al., 2015; Pollitt, 2010). In our view, Greece has implemented 
targeted cuts, as some hospitals have suffered bigger cuts than others affected by the same policy according to the 
literature (Aiken et al., 2012; Economou et al., 2017; Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018; Mitropoulos et al., 
2018), which confirms our findings regarding the prevalence of the Success to the Successful archetype (Senge, 
1990). As we mentioned in section 6.1.1, our literature review showed that after the healthcare reform, the annual 
budget of each healthcare entity (i.e., hospitals, health centres) is proposed by the relevant YPE (and then approved 
by the Ministry of Health) at the end of the previous fiscal year, based on the Hospital Spending of that same year, 
which is a measure that was adopted in an attempt to “sanitise” public spending by limiting expenses and gradually 
cutting off hospital budgets since the economic crisis and the austerity measures were initiated in 2009-2011. The 
Ministry’s way to implement budgetary control is by checking the past year’s spending and, according to that, 
issue the same or a slightly lower budget for the next year. Our Policy Model of Hospital Performance confirms 
this finding, and clearly shows that the Approved Budget increases as the past year’s Hospital Spending increases.  
Furthermore, in section 6.1.1 we mentioned that as charges for health services are calculated on the basis 
of a complicated reimbursement system and the reimbursement fees for the services have not been updated for 
years, hospitals and other public services run huge deficits every year, which are usually covered by the state 
budget in retrospect (Maniadakis, 2012). Our GMB participants confirmed this finding and mentioned that hospital 
managers can negotiate with the Ministry a slightly higher – or at least, a not lower budget – for the next year on 
the basis of the current (past year’s) spending. Furthermore, they can sometimes justify budget overruns as 
“absolutely necessary” for the safety of patients and staff. Administrative limitations of the public system and 
legislation, though, makes such actions risky as any budget overrun is considered illegal by the current legislation 
and could lead to the managers’ personal prosecution. Nevertheless, if they do not “illegally” overrun the budget 
during the current year, it is almost certain that next year their budget will be even lower, and so on.  
For those reasons, according to our participants, priority is given at covering first the most essential needs 
(medicine, materials, etc) during the year, and then - at the end of the year and according to what is already spent 
- think about investing in medical or technical equipment. To this end, our Policy Model of Hospital Performance 
showed that the higher the costs of the non-durable goods and services, the lower the budget that will be allocated 
to potential Investments. Furthermore, at the end of the year and even if a hospital manager has the intention to 
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overcome the budget - and is willing to take the personal responsibility and risk to allow the extra spending - 
Management Capacity and capability of the administrative staff of the hospital to quickly absorb funds accordingly 
is not always guaranteed, according to our participants. Even if there are funds available for Investments, no 
Investments can be made without sufficient Management Capacity, as the procedures of supply management in 
public hospitals involve a lot of bureaucracy and know-how by department managers and the administrative 
personnel. Our research showed that capacity building is highly dependent on the actual time that managers have 
available during their shift. 
 
Figure 40. Performance Theme 1: Financing & Assets 
 
 
Thus, our research findings are confirmed by the research that shows that investments in Greek public 
hospitals have dramatically reduced during the last decade, after the budgetary control policies were implemented 
(Economou et al., 2017; OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). Investments in 
Medical & Technical Equipment are generally considered critical as modern and advanced Medical & Technical 
Equipment leads to more Accurate diagnosis & appropriate therapeutic care, according to our Policy Model of 
Hospital Performance.  Biomedical equipment technology is continuously being invented and improved and, as 
obvious, older machines are usually more invasive, less accurate and safe and come with limited capabilities and 
capacity in respect to more modern ones. Technical equipment, on the other hand, is associated with patients’ 
safety during treatment by the participants.  
Furthermore, according to our model the usage of information systems and digital communication can 
support the intradepartmental and the interdepartmental communications, and make the work of doctors, nurses 
and administrative staff much more effective and faster, compared to the way that they work now (i.e., filling in 
most of the paperwork and medical forms by hand and sending the hard copies back and forth to other departments 
for the communication of patients’ details and exams results). This is in line with Vainieri, Noto, et al. (2020) who 
claim that PM Systems in public hospitals include not only the software and hardware used to store, monitor and 
process clinical data, but also the protocols, the practices, tools and methods used by clinicians, nurses, health 
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workers and administrative staff to handle patient flows; to admit and discharge patients; to record and 
communicate with other departments and/or other entities outside the hospital. However, such systems according 
to our GMB participants “should be created for the users and thinking of the users, in order to make their life 
easier, not harder”. Our participants agreed that most of the time, users and department managers are not involved 
in the procedure of creating an IT application, which results in delivering applications which are not useful for 
users.  Furthermore, even a user-friendly and useful, in that sense, application is difficult in the beginning for most 
users. Thus, IT support staff should be present after an intervention together with the staff, and help them learn 
how to use it. In line with our model and findings, the need for a user-friendly hospital data-management software 
that incorporates accurate electronic records of patients and robust data gathering tools is outlined by Botje et al. 
(2016) as necessary for the monitoring of hospital performance indicators and for the deduction of reliable 
conclusions, both for external and internal users.  
Those findings are in line with Song and Tucker (2016) who discussed common barriers to Successful 
Implementation of PM Reforms in healthcare institutions. They identified four categories of barriers: barriers 
related to the internal environment, mainly insufficient physicians’ and senior managers’ support; barriers 
inhibited to  the external environment, such as the legal environment, negative press about medical errors, 
payments and profitability; barriers related to the implementation process, e.g., when the final users of a new 
technology were not the ones who asked for it, when there is no reliable feedback on the progress and results of 
the reform available to the implementation team, and when there is insufficient training and technical support for 
the new process or technology to the staff ; and to the reform itself, i.e., when it is overly complicated, and when 
the necessary infrastructure is not in place (Song & Tucker, 2016). Among others, Klein and Knight (2005) also 
mention that when the PM reform is on a new technology and it was decided by the managers rather than by the 
users (top-down), then: (1) users/workers were not part of the design of the new PM System and there are more 
chances that it will be unreliable, defective or not that helpful to them, and (2) users were not the ones who asked 
for the new technology; thus, they will reject it and continue doing the work as they used to. 
Finally, as most of the Greek public hospitals were constructed more than 40 years ago, the standards 
according to which they were designed and built do not respond to today's needs. The spatial distribution (e.g., 
the structure of examination rooms, the space autonomy of some departments like the ER, etc) was also mentioned 
by our GMB participants as important for the efficient handling of patients, and could also be achieved by 
Investments in renovation projects. However, Investments in physical Facilities are scarce in Greek public 
hospitals after the reform because of the budget limitations (Economou et al., 2017), a finding that is confirmed 
by our study. According to the participants, priority is given during the year at covering only the most essential 
needs of the hospital services (i.e., medicine, materials, extra personnel, etc) and then at the end of the year - and 
according to the budget limitations and the part that is already spent - managers decide upon possible Investments, 
giving priority, however, to Investments in Medical & Technical Equipment which are generally considered more 





(2) Managerial Efficiency & Capacity-Building Processes 
The second theme identified refers to the managerial and capacity-building processes, and reflects the 
connection between the resources that the healthcare staff has available (i.e., the time and tools they have available) 
and the outputs that they produce.  The model variables that belong to this theme are: Accurate Diagnosis & 
Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors; Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task; Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols; Admitted Patients;  Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard 
Procedures & Digital Forms; Available Beds;  Bed Occupancy; Difficulty of Shift Schedule; Doctor or Nurse-
Patient Ratio; Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience; Errors; Management Capacity; Proper Communication 
& Attendance to Patients’ Needs;  Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & 
Electronic Record Keeping.  
This theme reflects the premise that when there are more resources available to the healthcare staff (i.e., 
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms), the staff will be more productive; they 
will most likely adhere to Guidelines & Protocols; and commit less Errors. However, productivity of the 
healthcare staff is influenced by their mental and physical health, training opportunities and job experience and 
this all highly depends on the hospital staff’s capacity in respect to the volumes of Incoming Patients, which 
trigger a number of counterintuitive, negative outcomes for the hospital staff reflected on a number of performance 
indicators in our Policy Model of Hospital Performance, such as: Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors, Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task, Available Beds, Bed Occupancy, Difficulty of Shift Schedule, Doctor or Nurse-
Patient Ratio. Hereunder we will further analyse some of them. 
The variable Actual Number of “Nurses or Doctors” was named like that because it represents two different 
numbers: The Actual Number of Doctors and the Actual Number of Nurses in the hospital, both of which are 
found to be critical for the analysis of the system of hospital performance. Our model is created by different kinds 
of participant stakeholders; thus, it is built in a way that it incorporates different views and it facilitates different 
kinds of analyses for different purposes and stakeholders. Depending on our perspective (i.e. if we are using the 
model to analyse nurse-related dynamics or doctor-related dynamics), the variable Actual Number of Nurses or 
Doctors represents either the actual number of nurses or the actual number of doctors. One major factor to consider 
is the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors vs the Nominal Number of Nurses or Doctors. By naming this variable 
“Actual Number” of Nurses or Doctors participants make a clear distinction between the “nominal number” and 
the “actual number” of nurses and of doctors available in the hospital. The nominal number refers to the number 
of doctors and nurses that the hospital has “on paper”, and this is the number that the hospital’s management and 
the Ministry of Health has at hand and based on which they plan new recruitments. The “actual” number, however, 
is the number of “active” nurses and doctors, who are placed at the clinics – and not in the outpatient services of 
the hospital- directly treating patients and participating in the shifts and overnights schedule. This “actual” number 
is always lower than the nominal one, because of a variety of justified absences and longer or shorter periods of 
leaves of the medical staff (e.g., leaves for education reasons, parental or other personal reasons, health-related 
reasons, burn-out and sickness, birth leaves, temporary placements in other hospitals and health services to cover 
special needs there, etc.). 
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According to our GMB participants, nursing staff is the most problematic in this respect, with the biggest 
gap between the nominal and the actual numbers of active staff, for a number of reasons. We will mention some 
of the most important ones here, as described by our GMB participants; however, all of those reasons were left 
outside our scope of research and beyond the boundaries of our model. First of all, there is a big number of 
“inactive” nurses in Greek public hospitals, usually older nurses with chronic diseases (often musculoskeletal 
disorders, caused from the past years of hard nursing work) who are placed in the outpatient clinics and services 
of the hospital doing “light” work, such as administrative work or helping doctors in their outpatient clinics 
practice for administrative tasks, microsurgeries, etc. Secondly, from the potentially “active” nurses (i.e., nurses 
who are young and healthy enough to be placed in the clinics and deliver the “hard” work, directly treating patients 
and participating in the shifts schedule) the majority are women in their reproductive age, who are away (on 
maternal and other leaves) for around two years on average every time they give birth and who are not substituted 
while away.  
Those findings are confirmed by the literature around the measures of the Greek healthcare reform, which 
shows that nurses were disproportionately affected by those measures, probably because the nurse-to-patient ratio 
was already low in Greek public hospitals ((Economou et al., 2017; OECD & European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, 2019). The new measures meant that graduate nurses would remain unemployed for up to 
four years upon graduation and that emergency nurses would have to work overtime, with fewer resources (e.g., 
drugs and sterilized equipment), with fewer days-off and lower salary than before the crisis, and with the prospect 
to work more years to receive a lower pension, which led many of them - together with many other healthcare 
workers - apply for early retirement (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Furthermore, Greece has the highest number 
of doctors along with the lowest number of nurses per capita among OECD countries, which causes operational 
and service distortions and supplier-induced demand phenomena (OECD & European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, 2019). The undersupply of nurses is particularly pressing in Greek public hospitals 
according to Economou et al. (2017), which is confirmed by our findings.  
Seemingly, the variable Actual Time Available per “Patient/Task” was named so because it represents two 
different numbers: the Actual Time Available per Patient and the Actual Time Available per Task in the hospital, 
both of which are found to be critical for the analysis of the system of hospital performance. As mentioned above, 
our model is created by different kinds of participant stakeholders, thus it is built in a way that it incorporates 
different views and it facilitates different kinds of analyses for different purposes and stakeholders. Depending on 
our analysis (i.e., if we are using the model to analyse clinical efficiency-related dynamics or managerial 
efficiency-related dynamics), the variable Actual Time Available per Patient/Task represents either the actual time 
that nurses and/or doctors have available per patient, or the actual time that the administrative staff or the 
department managers has available per task. 
One major factor to consider is the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task vs the Nominal Time Available per 
Patient/Task. By naming this variable “Actual” Time per Patient/Task, participants make a clear distinction 
between the “nominal time” and the “actual time” available during the shift of nurses, doctors and administrative 
staff. More specifically, the nominal time available during their shift is always eight hours as provided by law in 
203 
 
Greek public hospital. Thus, the nominal time per Patient/Task is always 8 hours divided by the number of patients 
(for doctors and nurses) or tasks (for administrative staff and managers) that they have under their responsibility 
and need to finish during their shift. On the other hand, the actual time available during their shift is the net time 
that the healthcare staff has available to spend on doing their own work/tasks, i.e. treating patients (for doctors 
and nurses) and doing their work/tasks (for administrative staff or managers), without counting the time they spend 
on: doing other people’s tasks; waiting for technical problems to be fixed; waiting and not be able to do their tasks 
because of administrative delays and other delays that occur; searching for medicine or material that are not in 
place and they need to find and use; filling in administrative papers and forms; and any other kind of issues that 
they need to work on and resolve before starting doing their own tasks, which prevents them from getting their 
work done in due time. This actual time available is not stable and it varies depending on organisational factors, 
special circumstances of every hospital and department. Thus, the “Actual Time Available per Patient/Task” is the 
actual time that healthcare staff has available during their shift (which is not stable, as we explained above) divided 
by the number of patients (for doctors and nurses) or tasks (for administrative staff) that they have under their 
responsibility and need to finish during their shift.  
 
Figure 41. Performance Theme 2: Managerial Efficiency & Capacity-Building Processes 
 
 
 Another major factor to consider is that the increase of Actual Time Available per Patient/Task leads to the 
increase of Management Capacity. This is because the managers’ capacity to fulfil their long-term management 
duties depends on the part of the actual time that they have available during their shift to devote to those 
management tasks. When their time is mostly spent on administrative and clinical duties (which are usually more 
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urgent and more short-term and present-oriented), the time left for management duties (which are usually less 
urgent and more long-term and future-oriented) decreases and they are not able to build Management Capacity in 
the long term. More specifically:  
Doctors and nurses who are supervisors or managers of their department in Greek public hospitals have 
clinical duties, administrative (short-term) duties and management (long-term) responsibilities, with the priority 
being given to the urgent clinical and administrative tasks which are related to the patients treatment and safety. 
When staff is overwhelmed by the limited actual time available, supervisors need to devote most of their worktime 
doing clinical and administrative work to help their subordinates, such as: helping in patients treatment, supporting 
staff, trying to make the shifts schedule as good as possible for all nurses and doctors, resolving conflicts and other 
problems that occur because of the limited actual time available. In this way, the time that doctors and nurses with 
a supervising role have available during their shift to focus on long-term management duties (e.g., for 
Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping; 
Surveillance of the increase of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols; Quality and safety controls, etc) 
decreases.   
The same thing applies to the managers and supervisors of the administrative personnel. During their 8-
hours shift, they also have both operational (short-term) and strategic (long-term) responsibilities and goals, with 
the priority being given to the everyday, operational tasks. When staff is overwhelmed by the limited actual time 
available, supervisors need to devote most of their time doing operational (short-term) tasks, such as: reporting on 
problems; supporting staff; substituting missing employees; resolving conflicts and other problems that occur 
because of the limited actual time available. In this way, the time that administrative personnel with a supervising 
role has available during their shift to focus on strategic (long-term) work (i.e., Standardisation & Surveillance of 
Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping) decreases. 
Furthermore, according to our participants Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols increases as the Actual 
Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is mainly because, in their view, following guidelines is “a more 
time-consuming way of doing things”, and thus the more the actual time they have available to finish all their 
tasks during their shift, the more willing they are to allocate some time on following the guidelines - provided of 
course that they already know how to do that, and have been educated and adequately trained to the 
implementation of those guidelines and protocols. Even if they know that they should be doing this task differently 
to be consistent with the guidelines, they might decide not to do it in the proper way, in order to earn some time 
and finish their shift on time. Moreover, some of the participant stakeholders mentioned that the more the actual 
time they perceive that they have available, the more relaxed they feel and the more probable it is that they will 
remember to stick to the guidelines. On the other hand, when they perceive that the actual time available during 
their shift is less than what they need, they feel under stress/pressure and in those conditions their mind might 
focus on finishing the core tasks and responsibilities, rather than on doing them properly by following exactly the 
guidelines.  
Moreover, our research showed that Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols decreases, as the Difficulty of 
Shift Schedule increases. This happens for a number of reasons. First of all, the more difficult the shift schedule is 
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– meaning that the necessary rests are not respected - the more tired and sleepy the health workers might feel 
during their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them not to follow the guidelines properly. 
Secondly, when the shifts schedule is such that the necessary rests are not respected, department managers are not 
willing to create and implement an Internal Regulation, which would increase adherence to guidelines by 
specifying the necessary medical equipment, duties, procedures, work distribution and maximum/minimum ratios 
to be respected, such as nurses to patient and doctors to patient ratios. Another reason is that the more difficult 
their shift schedule is, the less rest they get, the more tired they feel and the more negatively their well-being and 
personal life is affected. This results in limited motivation for effective work, as well as in limited time and 
willingness to get more education and training. Lack of education and training, in turn, could mean lack of 
knowledge and/or capacity to implement protocols/guidelines and lack of awareness of the importance and the 
risks associated with the non-adherence to them. 
Those findings are in line with the international literature around health workers’ motivation, commitment 
and performance, which has been described as a significant factor of the overall hospital performance (WHO, 
2012, 2016). The shortage of skilled healthcare staff in public hospitals, especially in low-income countries, and 
the  extra burden that this shortage creates to the available staff; the fragmentation and lack of coordination of the 
healthcare services; the ineffective use of resources; and the low quality of clinical data collection and management 
have been identified, among others, as co-determinants of health-workers’ performance (Mensah et al., 2016; 
Suifan, 2019; WHO, 2012, 2016; Zaadoud et al., 2018). Especially for the Greek public healthcare personnel, the 
impact of the Greek healthcare reform on their personal well-being was quite strong, as they experienced 15% 
cuts in all public sector salaries, abolishment of the thirteenth and fourteenth monthly salary, 10% cuts in their 
pensions and increase in their retirement age (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Furthermore, limiting recruitment 
of healthcare personnel led to understaffing of all public institutions.  Subsequently, hospitals, such as all other 
public bodies, were constrained to operate with 10–40% fewer workers whose salary had been cut by 40% in total 
(Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). For most public institutions, such as public hospitals, the most vital resource is 
their human resources: their skills, experience and expertise; their managerial capacity for problem-solving and 
policy implementation (Arnaboldi et al., 2015). In health and social services, NPM reforms have resulted in 
increased workload, with fewer and demotivated staff, increasing levels of stress and fatigue, high absenteeism 
and labour turnover, while the bureaucracy of the audit society, in which boxes must be ticked to demonstrate 
compliance with targets is continuing to grow (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Funnell, 2015; Kaupa et al., 2020). 
Finally, according to the GMB participants, the number of Available Beds does not refer to the physical 
number of beds as facilities, but to the number of “active” beds depending on the number of “active” doctors and 
nurses available. In other words, the number of Available Beds in clinics and ICUs as well as the number of 
available surgical banks is not stable, but it dynamically changes depending on the actual number of “active” 
nurses and doctors. As each admitted patient occupies one of the Available Beds, the number of Admitted Patients 
equals the number of covered beds in the clinic in which he/she is admitted, and in the hospital.  Thus, the 
maximum number of Admitted Patients at a certain moment in time cannot be higher than the number of Available 
Beds in the clinic in which he/she is admitted and in the hospital. In 2015 there were 4.3 hospital beds per 1000 
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population according to the statistics of the World Health Organisation45 and in 2017 the number dropped to 4.2 - 
somewhat below the EU average of 5.0 - but physical and human resources are not equally distributed, both 
geographically and in terms of skills mix (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). 
Of the 283 hospitals existing in 2014 (excluding military and prison hospitals), around 60% of all beds were 
located in Attica (which includes the capital city of Athens) and in central Macedonia (where Thessaloniki, 
Greece’s second largest city, is located). Furthermore, the high intransparency and discontinuity of the system 
creates accessibility issues (Economou et al., 2017).  
 
 
(3) Patient Satisfaction-Related Processes 
The third theme identified refers to the connection between Patient Satisfaction, Hospital Reputation and 
the effects of patient volumes on waiting times. The model variables that belong to this theme are: Hospital 
Reputation; Incoming Patients; Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Patient Satisfaction; Waiting List 
for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services. Patient Satisfaction increases as Facilities, 
proper communication and attendance to their needs and survival rates increase, as a result of other processes in 
the system.  
This theme reflects the premise that when Patient Satisfaction is high, and in turn Hospital Reputation 
increases, then the volumes of Incoming Patients increase and some positive effects (e.g., Doctors’ and Nurses’ 
Skills & Experience increase) but also a number of counterintuitive, negative outcomes will follow, both for the 
hospital staff (as we saw in theme number two) and for patients (e.g., long waiting lists for surgery or admission, 
long waiting times in ER and outpatient services of the hospital, informal payments), which will finally cause 
Patient Satisfaction to decrease. 
The rate of Incoming Patients increases as the Hospital Reputation increases. Obviously, a hospital with a 
good reputation is more likely to be chosen by patients for their routine controls or for a minor surgery or treatment. 
Furthermore, according to our participants, some patients are attracted to the hospital because of a specific doctor, 
thus they are obliged to visit the hospital where this doctor works and be treated there. Since almost all public 
hospitals have the same Facilities, patients in Greece most of the time choose a doctor - not a hospital - for an 
important surgery or the treatment of a chronic disease, and they choose based on the doctor’s reputation which is 
spread through word-of-mouth (i.e., they ask friends, relatives or other doctors for advice on “who is a good 
doctor for that kind of treatment/surgery”). In those cases, the reputation of the hospital doctors’ skills and 
experience is what attracts patients at the hospital, and in the long term this also builds on the Hospital Reputation 
through the word of mouth. For that reason, we did not include in our model a separate causal link for this element, 
but we indirectly imply and include this element in the causal link between Hospital Reputation and Incoming 
Patients.  
 
45 See: https://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-GRC?lang=en 
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Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience increase as the Admitted Patients increases. This is logical, as 
more Admitted Patients means more patients under treatment, and the more patients there are, the more cases 
doctors and nurses have to work on, gaining more experience and skills. However, Waiting Time in ER & 
Outpatient Services also increases as the Number of Incoming Patients increases - especially in the ER. This is 
because the more the Incoming Patients at a certain period (e.g., a day in the ER), the more work for a fixed 
number of nurses and doctors will it be and – since they cannot all together be examined at once – the more they 
will need to wait. This applies not only to waiting in the Emergency Room (where patients might need to wait for 
many hours or days to be examined) but also to the outpatient services of the hospital, where patients call in 
advance and book an appointment and might need to wait for months or even year(s) for the first appointment 
available. Those waiting lists are very hard to eliminate, according to our model, as their existence is inherent to 
the system of hospital performance, and thus they are resistant to policies that target them. Those findings are 
supported by the international literature on common “pitfalls” in healthcare institutions. Bevan and Hood (2006), 
for example, mention the case of waiting lists for surgery in public hospitals in England, which the government 
tried to reduce by starting measuring the average time in the list and linking hospital managers’ performance on 
those measurements. The managers indeed succeeded to improve the waiting times but this improvement was 
made on the cost of the real patients’ needs, by giving priority to simple surgeries and making the patients with 
significant surgeries (such as hip replacements) wait longer than before. 
 





Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission are, according to our participants, the rate of patients’ out-
of-pocket, informal payments to public hospital doctors for scheduling their surgery or admission earlier, in order 
for them to avoid the long waiting time on the list. Since priority over the waiting list is given only to urgent cases, 
those patients get admitted in the hospital through the Emergency Department (ER) by getting characterised as 
“urgent cases”, in order to get priority and avoid waiting on the list for surgery or admission in a specialised unit 
or department. Our GMB participants called this phenomenon “the suitcase effect” as those patients arrive in the 
ER with their suitcase, ready to be admitted. The rate of Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission increases 
as the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission increases.  This happens because, according to our participants, most 
of the patients do not like to wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most 
importantly because - depending also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that their health will 
deteriorate if they wait. Thus, they commit to paying the doctors out-of-pocket money, thinking that they will not 
get timely and appropriate treatment unless they do it. Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission, in turn, 
leads to the further increase of the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission. This is logical, as before calling a patient 
on the waiting list to be admitted for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure that 
there are surgical banks as well as beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If some patients are 
characterised as “urgent cases” and are being given priority after giving informal payments to doctors, then all the 
patients on the waiting list will have to wait more time than otherwise and, in the meanwhile, more patients are 
being placed on the waiting list, increasing the average waiting time for all the patients on the list. Finally, Informal 
Payments for early Surgery/Admission leads to the decrease of Patient Satisfaction, which is quite logical as 
patients do not like being forced to pay out-of-pocket money for getting access to the public healthcare services 
which are supposed to be free of charge. Those findings are supported by the study of Souliotis et al. (2016) which 
revealed that informal payments in Greek public hospitals are most frequently made upon request of the public 
health worker (usually a physician) and prior to the service provision, in order to bypass waiting times or receive 
better quality care. Other examples of such deviant behaviours reported in the international literature include: 
accident and traumatised patients not entering the ER but waiting in the ambulances, so that the waiting time in 
the ER does not exceed the targeted one; trolleys in corridors being considered as beds, so as to present higher 
numbers of admitted patients  (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Chang, 2007; Fryer et al., 2009) and  informal payments to 
public doctors with long waiting lists, who are starting to eliminate patients from the waiting list by seeing them 
privately and personally gaining out-of-pocket money from those patients for doing what should be done in a 
public care setting without an extra charge for the patients (Fryer et al., 2009; Ranade, 1994).  
 
(4) Outcomes & Clinical Efficiency 
The last theme identified is comprised of clinical outputs and outcomes, and shows how clinical outputs 
and outcomes (which are the end-products of the hospital function and are influenced by all the processes that we 
mentioned above, i.e., the financial, managerial, and patient satisfaction-related ones) feed back to the system of 
performance and, in turn, influence all processes (i.e., the financial, managerial, and patient satisfaction-related 
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ones). The model variables that belong to this theme are: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic 
Care; Complications; Failure & Mortality Rates; Length of Stay; Multidrug Resistance in Population; Nosocomial 
Infections Rate; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life. 
Although the scale of public hospitals and primary care entities and the complexity of financial management 
of the public sector leads public service entities to rely their PM Systems solely on budgetary control, experience 
has proven that this strategy is rather narrow-sighted, provides rough cost control as it ignores all the non-financial 
aspects of performance, and may contribute to adverse effects (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Noto et al., 2020), which is 
in line with our findings. Furthermore, in our case hospital – as in other public hospitals in Greece - the budgetary 
control was accompanied by the lack of ability to refine the historical-based budget setting practices by introducing 
activity-based measures, which essentially compromised the rigour of the budgetary control as a PM tool 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Moreover, the accomplishment of budgetary balance may be seen as a kind of progress, 
but in reality it is a constraint, according to the researchers, and it certainly is not synonymous neither to the 
provision of quality services, nor to the efficiency or effectiveness of the health organisation’s operation 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Research has demonstrated many cases where the implementation of linear and targeted 
cutback management policies might have created several unintended consequences for the efficiency of health 
systems, public governance and economic growth (International Monetary Fund, 2015; Legido-Quigley et al., 
2016; Noto et al., 2020; Stuckler et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 43. Performance Theme 4: Outcomes & Clinical Efficiency 
 
 
As we mentioned in chapter 6.1.1, apart from the permanent staff of ESY who are directly paid a fixed 
salary by the central government, the Ministry of Health gives the option to the health entities which need extra 
personnel to hire them under fixed-term contracts of employment and pay them from the entity’s Approved Budget. 
The restrictions in the recruitment of healthcare personnel after the Greek healthcare reform, which resulted at 
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serious understaffing of our case hospital and at serious cuts in the salaries of the healthcare personnel, triggered 
job-dissatisfaction, low morale and increased job leaves and absences, but they also led to hiring extra personnel 
under fixed-term contracts of employment to cover the urgent needs, which had to be paid from the hospital’s 
Approved Budget. This severely augmented the costs, and prohibited investments according to our CLD model. 
The exact same mechanism is recorded in Italy. Noto et al. (2020) analysed data of a regional health authority in 
Italy and found that, while Italian regional health services have succeeded to minimize workforce expenses – 
achieving the performance target set – management of their overall expenses was not completely addressed. 
Overall, the initiative adopted by the central government had the consequence of restricting the decision-making 
power of the regional authorities, motivating them to transfer funds from manpower to the procurement of extra 
services (Noto et al., 2020).   
Our research showed that an Internal Regulation would not only be serving as a tool to increase adherence 
to guidelines and protocols, but would also serve as a “protective shield” for the nurses or doctors of the 
department, by prohibiting the Nurse-Patient and Doctor-Patient Ratios from going above a maximum. However, 
our findings from the preliminary and the disconfirmatory interviews revealed that most department managers are 
not willing to create and implement such a regulation out of fear; fear of the extra responsibilities that this would 
bring and fear of exposure of potential mistakes. Bevan and Hood (2006) in their study presented similar evidence 
from the public healthcare sector in England. According to their findings, English public health service authorities 
and officials that are gathering performance data do not use them in practice for performance improvement 
purposes; paradoxically, all those measurements are completely detached from the real decision-making; selective 
reporting is a persistent temptation for public healthcare organisations managers; and fear of  exposure of mistakes 
committed and of the criticism or the legal consequences that might follow creates incentives for gaming, 
manipulating or distorting the information and data gathered. Seemingly, Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) mention 
the example of a UK Hospital Trust where “the overreliance of senior staff on the hospital’s PMS led to an 
organizational culture focused on doing the system’s ‘business’ (e.g., hitting performance targets), resulting in 
patient neglect and high mortality rates. Paradoxically, a system aimed at facilitating the delivery of high-quality 
patient care and healthy lives, ended up creating the opposite results”. The authors raise awareness that this case 
is not an unusual one, and that similar negative effects are reported in the PM literature and practice (Franco-
Santos & Otley, 2018), which is highly supported by our research findings as well.  
 
11.4 Overcoming the Unintended Consequences of the Greek Healthcare Reform at the Case 
Hospital: Applying the DPM Approach for a Sustainable Improvement of Hospital Performance  
In this section we summarise and discuss our findings from chapter 10, regarding the application of the 
DPM framework at the case hospital in order to overcome the unintended negative outcomes of the traditional PM 
approaches implemented after the Greek healthcare reform. Thus, this chapter will discuss a non-conventional 
conceptual and methodological framework, the DPM framework, to assist hospital managers at designing 
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successful interventions for the sustainable enhancement of the hospital’s overall performance and for the 
provision of quality-services to patients, leading to improvement of patient satisfaction, health and quality of life.  
In order to deal with the unintended consequences of the reform outlined in the previous chapters, policy-
makers and hospital managers should wear “proper lenses” to view the low performance and the low patient 
satisfaction reported; to interpret the negative consequences arising from the PM systems and policies 
implemented during the Greek healthcare reform; to explain the feedback structure underlying performance; and 
to define alternative strategies to change the PM structure and policies. To this end, our Policy Model of Hospital 
Performance and its analysis using the DPM framework has been used to promote an interpretation of: (1) how 
End Results (i.e., outputs and outcomes of the hospital services) are influenced by Performance Drivers; (2) how 
those Performance Drivers can be influenced by policy levers to control Strategic Resources’ accumulation and 
depletion mechanisms; and (3) how the Strategic Resources, in turn, affect End Results, including not only the 
outputs of hospital services but - priorly and most importantly - their long-term outcomes, such as the patient 
satisfaction and patients’ health and well-being. 
Using the DPM instrumental view, we found that the drivers of hospital performance, according to our 
GMB participants, are: Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors; Actual Time Available per Patient/Task; Availability 
of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; Approved Budget; Available Beds; Bed Occupancy; 
Difficulty of Shift Schedule; Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio; and Length of Stay. All those indicators are expressed 
as ratios between the actual performance of the corresponding variable (nominator) and a denominator described 
in our model as a standard (or normal or desired) value for performance, calculated in relation to either the 
perceived past performance, or the desires of stakeholders, or international benchmarks, or the performance of 
other hospitals, or in relation to the implementable goals of the hospital (budget values). We showed that in order 
to impact Performance Drivers, each hospital division (i.e., the Medical, the Nursing, the Administrative & 
Financial and the Technical division) must build, maintain and use a sound endowment of Strategic Resources 
that are systemically connected to each other. Therefore, each strategic resource can provide the foundation for 
maintaining others in the system of hospital performance. In our model, those Strategic Resources are the 
variables: Financial Resources; Facilities; ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment; Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & 
Experience; Hospital Reputation; Management Capacity; and Multidrug Resistance in Population. The key in this 
analysis is that hospital managers understand that the hospital can purchase the physical resources (i.e., Financial 
Resources; Facilities; ICT; Medical & Technical Equipment) but it cannot purchase Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills 
& Experience, Hospital Reputation, or Management Capacity. Those intangible resources are equally important 
as the physical resources for the overall hospital performance; however, they cannot be purchased.  Instead, they 
are built by internal management and clinical processes of the hospital, and are called intermediate products of 
hospital performance.  
Cascading the DPM instrumental view from the hospital level to a divisional level allows the division 
managers to start concentrating on the core intermediate, administrative products that divisions are required to 
deliver on the process that leads to the final end-results, the outputs and outcomes. To do that, hospital managers 
should first identify End Results and divide them between final end-results (i.e., products and services provided 
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to patients) and intermediate end-results (i.e., products and services provided by some users, departments or units 
to other users, departments or units inside the hospital). In our model, final end-results included: Incoming 
Patients; Admitted Patients; Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Failure & Mortality 
Rates; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services; Patient Satisfaction; 
Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life; 
Nosocomial Infections Rate, whereas intermediate end-results include: Costs; Errors; Hospital Spending; 
Investments; Complications.  
In the case hospital, we found that after that the official goal-setting took place, no further actions were 
taken to pursue those goals, as there was no consensus on the areas of improvement. Everyone somehow seemed 
to believe that his department is doing well, and the problem roots are in another department or, generally, in the 
understaffing. But even in those departments where managers moved on to implement some interventions, such 
interventions typically concentrated only on the performance of the front-line operations of the hospital, such as 
on nurses, doctors and patients’ office employees who were in direct contact to patients. However, those people 
are people who work in the last segment of a much longer service distribution structure: the “value chain” of the 
public hospital services. Such approaches are common in the PM literature, and are found to increase the likelihood 
of introducing a narrow-sighted strategy, which can give rise to a sense of discontent and loss of enthusiasm of 
the employees of the front-line units (Bianchi, 2016, pp. 174-175) which, in our case, are doctors and nurses. This 
can be tackled by the case hospital managers by using the DPM objective view to map the final and intermediate 
services value chain provided to both external and internal users of the case hospital, and by focusing on the 
macro-processes of hospital performance which we found to be mainly three: Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols; Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs; and Standardisation & Surveillance of 
Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping. For each of those macro-processes and for 
each division, department or unit of the hospital, a different DPM objective view analysis could be prepared by 
the department managers. Although we did not go much into detail for each department and unit of the case 
hospital (as something like that would be out of the scope and purposes of the current study) we provided an 
example of such an analysis on a divisional level, of the procedure and steps that should be followed from division 
managers, department and unit managers in order for them to map the ultimate and intermediate services value 
chain of their division, department or unit.  
Outputs refer to the direct, short-term, tangible and measurable results, while outcomes refer to some rather 
long-term results, effects and consequences which are usually non-measurable, not easily observable, but most 
important than outputs for the overall hospital performance. In our model, the outputs identified included: 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; Admitted Patients; Costs; Errors; Failure & 
Mortality Rates; Hospital Spending; Investments; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; Waiting Time in ER & 
Outpatient Services; and the outcomes included: Complications; Incoming Patients, Informal Payments for early 
Surgery/Admission; Nosocomial Infections Rate; Patient Satisfaction; Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & 
Quality of Life.  
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The usage of an outcome-based approach of PM is recently highlighted to frame and determine the desirable 
results of the policies implemented so as to enable policymakers not just to recognize short-term but also long-
term effects (Bianchi, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2017; Bianchi & Montemaggiore, 2008; Bianchi & Peters, 2016; 
Bivona et al., 2019; Borgonovi et al., 2018). In fact, outcome-based PM in the public sector -unlike traditional PM 
approaches - uses systems theory to grasp performance dynamics and their long-term effects on outcomes 
(Bianchi, 2015; Bianchi & Montemaggiore, 2008; Bianchi & Peters, 2016). In accordance to this research, we 
found that all the End Results, both outputs and outcomes of our case hospital, can only be influenced by 
Performance Drivers in the medium or long term. This means that there is a time delay between the moment that 
the hospital managers start manipulating a performance driver until the moment that a change in End Results will 
be documented. The “time” factor, thus, is rather important, but not easy to grasp by the static, instrumental DPM 
view. Thus, hospital managers need to operationalize the instrumental view from Static to Dynamic, and create 
the dynamic, resource-based view of hospital performance. Using the DPM dynamic view, we showed how the 
End Results, Strategic Resources and Performance Drivers are interrelated in the Conceptual and the Policy 
Models of Hospital Performance (available in Figures 33 and 34 respectively), in order for hospital managers to 
have a more holistic view of the system of hospital performance.  
Both End Results and Performance Drivers are required for the DPM implementation, as they provide 
hospital managers and healthcare decision-makers with signs of potential future shift in End Results. This helps 
the them interpret and calculate the consequences of an incident or the implications of a policy, because they can 
easily observe possible discrepancies on performance in advance, and thus they have the chance to act upon it 
early in time. Thus, performance measures could be helpful to foresee possible changes in the financial or clinical 
End Results of the hospital. For example, when framed in a wider sense than budgetary control, the performance 
drivers of transaction costs can provide policy makers with valuable information for strategic planning, such as 
the opportunity to identify trade-offs in time (e.g., higher costs for Investments and managerial capacity utilisation 
costs in the short-term versus Investments in equipment, ICT, facilities that would increase performance in the 
long run).  
Finally, the DPM subjective view provided the managers of our case hospital with a synthesis of the 
instrumental and the objective view. This view requires that performance measures (i.e., the drivers and end-results 
associated with the delivery of hospital services) are made explicit, and are then linked to the goals and objectives 
of the case hospital, which we identified in chapter 6.2.1 through our documents analysis. More specifically, in 
chapter 6.2.1 we identified four goals which we consider a bit more specific and - although they also did not entail 
any time horizon or any performance target - could be considered as a good start for the DPM analysis in the case 
hospital. Using the DPM subjective view we made sure that those goals were re-written as a function of the pursued 
results, including both the activities to undertake and the related objectives and performance targets to include in 
plans and budgets for each decision area. To this end, we combined our findings from the documents’ analysis 
presented in chapter 6.2 with the description of those goals as set by the division managers (available in 
Appendixes 16 and 17) and we informed them with the findings from our DPM instrumental and objective analysis 
so far, which allowed us identify the activities and the resources that are needed for the achievement of each of 
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those four goals. In that respect, we found that – apart from the “tangible” strategic resources identified by the 
managers of the case hospital as essential in the achievement of each of those four goals, Management Capacity 
was equally necessary. Management Capacity is an intermediate product built over time by the public workers. 
According to our analysis, the performance driver of Management Capacity is the actual time that division 
managers and department managers have available during their shift to devote to this goal. This is because, in our 
model, Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping is a 
function of the variable Management Capacity.  
Our research and findings are in line with an increasing stream of research highlighting the need for a DPM 
approach to overcome common barriers and improve performance in the public sector (Bianchi, 2010, 2012, 2015, 
2016; Bianchi et al., 1998, 2013; Bivona, 2013; Bivona & Montemaggiore, 2010; Cosenz & Noto, 2016). In 
accordance to that research, our study shows that assuming that enhancement of Patient Satisfaction could only 
be the product of the attempts rendered by the front-line level units and employees (i.e., front-office administrative 
personnel, nurses and doctors) may be deceptive. In our view, those entities are 'clients' of other departments and 
units operating at higher levels of authority, as supported by Bianchi (2016, pp. 174-175). Our research is in line 
with his findings, in that the data gathered from questionnaires in our case hospital provided just a limited 
contribution to hospital managers in respect to the development of sustainable patient satisfaction initiatives. 
Planning of such initiatives should consider in the first place: (1) the process of healthcare services provision and 
the exact points where to intervene in this process; (2) the framework for the allocation of tasks, responsibilities 
and expertise that is affecting the process of public hospital services production; and (3) who should be liable for 
the successful implementation of the intervention and the achievement of sustainable outcomes, explicitly and 
implicitly, related to the healthcare services provided. 
 
11.5 Research Contributions 
In this section we summarise our key findings and we outline the research contributions of our study and 
their practical implications for policy design in Greek public hospitals. The overall aim of this PhD research study 
was to contribute to the understanding of the performance of healthcare organisations by showing how to 
empirically conceptualise a comprehensive, context-specific model of hospital performance as perceived by 
hospital stakeholders, and by using this model to explain the counterintuitive, negative outcomes of performance 
management policies on hospital performance in order to help policymakers design better, quality-oriented 
performance management policies and reforms. Following a systemic approach, the selected case study - which 
is a real hospital in the Greek Healthcare system - allowed us to investigate the causing mechanisms of the negative 
consequences of the Greek healthcare reform on the performance of the case hospital. In doing so, we framed our 
analysis using the Dynamic Performance Management methodology.  
Two different versions of a CLD Model of hospital performance (i.e., the Conceptual and the Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance, available in Appendixes 21 and 22 respectively) were the main outputs of the GMB 
sessions conducted with hospital stakeholders as participants, and formed the basis of our analysis and research 
215 
 
findings. The Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance is a CLD model that depicts the actual structure of the 
system of hospital performance and was used to explain the current low levels of hospital performance and the 
seven unintended outcomes documented at the case hospital. The Policy Model of Hospital Performance is an 
extended version of the former model which incorporates the policy structure, i.e., the policy interventions which 
are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, in order for the hospital performance to improve.  
Subsequently, this theory-oriented research project contributed to the broader field of performance 
management in the public sector by addressing the gap in knowledge regarding the possible causing mechanisms 
of the negative, counterintuitive outcomes of traditional performance management policies on hospital 
performance, and it did that by shedding light on how the hospital performance is perceived by hospital 
stakeholders and what mechanisms drive its dynamic behaviour (i.e., its trend over time).  
Furthermore, our study had a dual external objective with two main components: a scientific/theoretical 
contribution and a practical implication. First, this research made a theoretical contribution to the public 
governance academic discussion, and in particular to the literature around Performance Management in the Public 
Health Sector, by building a comprehensive Conceptual and Policy Model of Hospital Performance that 
encompasses feedback mechanisms related to hospital performance and by using this model to explain the 
dynamic impact of performance management policies in Greece on the actual hospital performance. More 
specifically, out of all the unintended negative outcomes of the reform documented in our literature review, we 
found the seven following negative outcomes to be present at the case hospital, according to the participant 
stakeholders of our GMB sessions: Health Workers’ and Patients’ perceptions of Low Service Quality and Safety; 
Low Patient Satisfaction; Informal Payments; High Mortality Rates; Numerous Medical Errors; High Nosocomial 
& Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria Infections Rates; Low adherence to Clinical Guidelines and Treatment Protocols. 
Then, based on the model, we came up with seven Dynamic Hypotheses to explain those negative effects. Those 
Dynamic Hypotheses are the explanations that our research offers to the international literature in order to explain 
why those seven counterintuitive outcomes occurred at the case hospital and, possibly, in other hospitals in Greece. 
We call them Dynamic Hypotheses instead of “explanations” because in order to sufficiently test and prove them, 
a quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, as that would enable us to run simulations and 
test our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop dominance. Such a model is not included in the 
present study, but is recommended for future research. Thus, our study will hopefully open the way for researchers 
worldwide to use this approach in order to assess hospital performance management policies from an outcome-
based perspective.  
The Conceptual and the Policy Models of Hospital Performance provided us with a number of other 
insights that are helpful for stakeholders and decision-makers. For example, we showed that Availability of 
Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms are the key to increased Actual Time Available for hospital 
managers, which allows them build Management Capacity in the long term. Management Capacity is, according 
to our participants, the level of management competencies, management support systems and working 
environment / procedural improvements that the supervisors and managers of departments (i.e., the administrative 
managers and the nurses and doctors who are supervisors or managers of their department or unit) have built or 
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achieved. Our research showed that Management Capacity is probably the most important intermediate result of  
the hospital function, and is usually neglected by hospital managers and policy makers in Greece who usually 
focus their reform policies on hospital outputs (i.e., the short-term results for patients). 
Among the major insights of the Policy Model of Hospital Performance is that building Management 
Capacity was also the key to Investments planning and implementation, as well as to the Standardisation & 
Surveillance of Procedures, the Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping, which in turn contributes 
to increased Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols and to increased Clinical Efficiency and hospital outcomes 
(i.e., the long-term results for patients). Management Capacity also refers to the competencies of the department 
managers to quickly identify and specify needs and then absorb funds accordingly, in order to proceed to the 
Investments making. This is because the procedures of supplies management in public hospitals involve a lot of 
bureaucracy, and require specific knowledge and many work-hours from management personnel for the 
specification of the technical requirements of the investment, which is also subject to legal and other administrative 
restrictions. Increased Management Capacity built by the permanent employees of the hospital would also 
eliminate the need for extra personnel (i.e., personnel hired under fixed-term contracts of employment to help with 
the management responsibilities of the hospital managers that are not fulfilled) who is paid from the Approved 
Budget, creating one of the biggest sources of cost for the hospital which, in turn, hinders Investments because of 
the budget restrictions.  
Furthermore, our research showed that an Internal Regulation would not only be serving as a tool to increase 
adherence, but would also serve as a “protective shield” for the nurses or doctors of the department, by prohibiting 
the Nurse-Patient Ratio and the Doctor-Patient Ratio by going above a maximum. As department managers 
cannot affect neither the number of doctors and nurses hired (because they are hired by the state, in certain times, 
irrespectively of the urgent needs of each hospital) nor the number of patients admitted to the hospital, the only 
weapon they could have to prevent those ratios from going higher than they should is the creation of such a 
regulation. In this way, department managers would be able to control how many patients are being admitted to 
their department according to the current number of nurses and doctors. However, our research study showed that 
most department managers in public hospitals are not capable (as that would need solid, up-to-date knowledge 
and understanding of the national and international guidelines and protocols, as well as continuous education and 
training) or not willing (as it would create much more responsibilities and time-consuming, administrative work 
for themselves in an everyday basis and would need personal sacrifices and dedication) of creating such a 
regulation. Thus, in many cases an internal regulation is perceived as a threat rather than as a weapon by the 
hospital managers.  
The present study also made a practical contribution for policy-makers of the public healthcare sector in 
Greece, by supplying them with the Policy Model of Hospital Performance, which could help them redesign the 
existing performance management policies. First of all, although understaffing is usually blamed for all 
inefficiencies by hospital workers and stakeholders, our model showed that the Actual Time Available per 
Patient/Task is what really matters – not the staff number per se – and this is influenced by many other factors 
internal to the system of hospital performance. Furthermore, in Greek public hospitals the current financing system 
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is completely separated from performance indicators and prohibits Investments, which is something that negatively 
affects clinical efficiency and many other indicators related to patients’ and workers’ health and safety.  Moreover, 
our model showed that informal payments and corruption - a major inefficiency of the Greek National Health 
System - will not stop until other structural changes in the system cause the waiting lists for surgeries or admission 
to decrease. Finally, we showed that the current Information Systems and ICT infrastructures in Greek public 
hospitals are non-adequate; the medical equipment is in many cases old and scarce; and the lack of specific work 
distribution, standard procedures and duties are usually the case; all factors that make health workers’ everyday 
work more time-consuming and decrease their Actual Time Available during the shift. Thus, higher diffusion of 
information systems and of standard clinical procedures, based on protocols and guidelines, should be given a 
priority when designing future policies.  
The DPM framework provided a systemic perspective of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced performance 
in the public healthcare sector, and it enabled us to identify the critical success factors leading to better hospital 
performance. It revealed the drivers of performance and their effect on outputs and outcomes, and it showed us 
how those outputs interact with hospital resources, causing the overall performance of health services to increase 
or to deteriorate (value destruction or value creation). The DPM analysis can therefore help a proactive and 
learning-oriented performance management.  This is especially important for public healthcare organisations such 
as public hospitals, as they function in dynamic, complex systems, where normative, static, non-systemic and 
incremental approaches to performance management solely provide an “illusion” of control, contributing to 
unsustainable growth and crisis. 
The three DPM views (i.e., instrumental, dynamic, subjective, objective) outlined in our study have a 
complementary function. The objective view determines what the objectives of performance improvement should 
be; the instrumental view illustrates how to impact this objective; and the subjective view emphasizes who should 
be made accountable for carrying out actions aimed at developing and managing Strategic Resources, in order to 
impact Performance Drivers and achieve this objective, in order to address the demands of patients efficiently and 
effectively. In the planning phase, after the administrative products have been identified, the combination of the 
three views illustrated how it is important to go back and describe the underlying procedures and operations, and 
then develop the goals and objectives within each field of responsibility. These goals must be aligned with the 
outcomes and indicators that can be obtained by actions aimed at maintaining the strategic resource system. Both 
Strategic Resources and End Results can reflect when the hospital is able to fulfil the demands and efficiently 
handle the volumes of internal (i.e., investments, standardised procedures, available equipment, ICT and facilities) 
and of external clients (i.e., volumes of incoming and admitted patients and patient demands). 
The identification of Strategic Resources, Performance Drivers and intermediate End Results, as well as 
the different views that our DPM analysis provided (i.e., instrumental, dynamic, subjective, objective) are equally 
important for policy design, as they provide hospital decision-makers with signs of potential future shift in End 
Results and allows them to react in advance. The DPM analysis that we conducted can help public hospital 
managers in Greece interpret and calculate the consequences of an incident or the implications of a policy; show 
possible discrepancies on performance; and try to mitigate it. For this reason, the performance measures we 
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identified could be helpful to foresee possible changes in the financial and clinical results of the case hospital, as 
well as of other public hospitals in Greece. When framed in a wider sense than budgetary control, Performance 
Drivers can provide policy makers and public hospital managers in Greece with valuable information for strategic 
planning, such as the opportunity to identify trade-offs in space and in time (e.g., higher costs for investments and 
for managerial capacity building in the short-run, versus investments in equipment, ICT, and facilities that would 
increase performance in the long run). Thus, the performance management policies adopted at the case hospital 
during the healthcare reform and their overall impact for Greek public hospitals’ outputs and outcomes, can now 
be examined through a different “lenses” by the hospital managers; lenses that will allow them overcome the 
counterintuitive, negative outcomes documented, which are inherent to the system of hospital performance, and 
that will help them align the hospital’s and the different division’s and departments’ goals and actions to achieve 





CHAPTER 12 – LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In chapter 12 a number of recommendations for future research are identified, along with a number of 
limitations. In addition to the limitations related to the research methodology and design, described in chapter 5.5, 
this chapter discusses the limitations stemming from the scope of the present research and the model boundary, 
the implementation of the DPM approach in the case hospital and the coronavirus situation that affected it. 
 
12.1 Process Limitations due to the Coronavirus Emergency 
The Coronavirus Emergency largely affected our research planning and procedures, comprising one of the 
biggest challenges and limitations that the researcher had to manage. The covid-19 crisis burst out during our 
research implementation and threatened to defile all our efforts; to get the GMB sessions cancelled; and delay our 
research implementation indefinitely. Luckily, the relationship which the researcher had already built with the 
participants and the gatekeeper, as well as the legal bounds that she invoked (i.e., all the authorisations were 
already in place) materialised and the GMB sessions were conducted as planned, despite the difficulties, just a 
few weeks before the coronavirus total lockdown in Greece. However, the fact that the researcher was coming 
from abroad, and the fact that a possible case of Covid-19 was identified in the hospital on the day of the second 
GMB session were facts that created a certain tension in the hospital and among the participants; caused 
disruptions during the second GMB session; and resulted to half of the participants leaving the GMB session soon 
after it began, which might has affected the quality of our results.  
Moreover, the lockdown that followed and the measures undertaken by the Greek government later on 
prohibited further visits to the case-hospital or to other hospitals; inhibited the possibility to continue the snowball 
sampling; and forced us use convenient sampling in order to identify seven more participants for the 
disconfirmatory interviews. Even though those disconfirmatory interviews were conducted with seven 
stakeholders from seven different hospitals in Greece, still our results are difficult to say whether or not they can 
be generalised and whether they are applicable to other public hospitals in Greece and/or abroad. Future research 
would enable further validation of our findings through triangulation, e.g., by giving the data to other researchers 
to analyse them (Turner et al., 2014) and by repeating the GMB sessions with larger participant groups, ideally 
from different hospitals in Greece, and later on even from different countries, in order to refine our CLD model 
using disconfirmatory techniques (Andersen et al., 2012) and derive a universal, generalizable Conceptual Model 
of Hospital Performance. 
Furthermore, the follow-up of the GMB participants became difficult, because of the coronavirus crisis, the 
hospital overload and the public fear and uncertainty that this unusual situation evoked. Due to the corona crisis, 
the third GMB session that would be organised later on to discuss the results of the project with hospital executives 
and policy-makers, and would focus on the implementation of the DPM framework created by the researcher, was 
not materialised. This is something that prohibited our model from being implemented at the case hospital.  
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Minyard et al. (2018) identified seven preconditions for successful implementation of SD projects in 
Healthcare: clearly identified problem for model use; clearly defined geography for the model; influence of 
members; sponsorship; championing the process; managing the data; and continued model use. In our research 
project, only some of them are present, and more specifically the: clearly identified problem for model use; clearly 
defined geography for the model; and influence of members.  In order to have greater chances of making an impact 
and be implemented at a national level, this research should be sponsored by the Ministry of Health and be repeated 
with executives of the ministry, to ensure Sponsorship, Championing the process, Managing the data and 
Continued model use. 
Finally, following Scott et al.’s (2015) suggestion of moving from single cases to multiple cases in GMB 
projects, future empirical studies could adapt our research design and use a comparative, multiple-case-study 
approach to explore hospital performance mechanisms and dynamics.  Focusing on many different hospital cases, 
and conducting GMB sessions in different European countries, would enable comparative research into the 
systemic view of hospital performance as perceived by stakeholders in Europe. By including hospital stakeholders 
from different countries and by conducting GMB sessions in different hospitals and settings, this research would 
lead to a more validated, universal and context-free representation of hospital performance through 
disconfirmation (Andersen et al., 2012). 
 
12.2 Limitations arising from the System Boundary and Research Scope 
Firstly, the fact that in chapter 8.1 we simplified the original Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, 
although necessary for the analysis as we thoroughly explained in chapter 8.1, constitutes a limitation. A number 
of other limitations arise from the system boundary we adopted and, thus, from the elements that we left outside 
of our scope of the research. Such elements are related to potential model variables and model links that were 
mentioned by the participants during the GMB sessions but were not included in the final model; thus, they were 
left out of the scope of this research. Hereunder we present the most important ones. 
1. Actual Time Available per Patient/Task: GMB participants also mentioned that during their shift, nurses 
often need to cover tasks of other health workers who are lacking because of the general understaffing (e.g., 
assistants, secretaries, messenger bearers, etc), which limits their Actual Time Available per Patient even further. 
Furthermore, most participants agreed that insufficient Actual Time Available per Patient leads to the increase of 
Unplanned Readmissions Rate. However, we did not include Unplanned Readmissions Rate as a variable in our 
final model because, as we discuss beneath, in paragraph 6 (regarding Complications) of this section. 
2. Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols: Our GMB participants agreed that Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols also depends on the previous education as well as the ongoing education that nurses and doctors take. 
Lack of education and training could mean lack of knowledge and/or capacity to implementat protocols/guidelines 
and lack of awareness of the importance and the risks associated with the non-adherence to them. Although 
education is not included in our model as a separate variable, it is implied that Difficulty of Shift Schedule means 
less opportunities for education of the medical and nursing staff. The more difficult their shift schedule is, the less 
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rest they get, the more tired they feel and the more negatively their well-being and personal life is affected. This 
results in limited motivation for effective work, as well as in limited time and willingness to get more education 
and training.  
Furthermore, according to the GMB participants, Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is subject to 
personality factors (i.e., responsibility, sense of duty, carelessness), personal factors (i.e., physical and mental 
health, well-being, burn-out, personal and social life) and organisational factors (i.e., work satisfaction, salary, 
good relationships with colleagues, workplace conflicts and the hospital’s system of incentives, such as bonuses, 
rewards or punishments associated with compliance to guidelines, which in most public hospitals in Greece is 
completely absent). If compliance to guidelines could affect the health workers’ evaluation and potential 
promotion, it might would motivate them to comply. All those elements were part of the Scoping Model of 
Hospital Performance, but were finally excluded from the Conceptual and the Policy Model of Hospital 
Performance because they complicated the model and made it impossible to analyse. Although they are quite 
important, we decided to exclude them as those variables refer to internal processes of staffing and staff 
management; a subsystem which could be analysed separately, and then be added in the performance model as a 
separate branch. 
3. Approved Budget: Some of the participants mentioned that in small, rural hospitals with low occupancies 
there might be a link between Bed Occupancy and Approved Budget, as hospital managers or department managers 
manipulate Bed Occupancy (by intentionally keeping patients more than needed in the hospital, in order to boost 
up the average Length of Stay and subsequently the Bed Occupancy) in order to base an argument for predicting 
even higher Bed Occupancy for the next year and negote with the Ministry a slightly higher – or at least, a not 
lower – budget. However, as this might not always be the case in smaller hospitals, and it is certainly not the case 
in bigger hospitals of the central cities and towns of Greece, we left this element outside our model and scope of 
research. 
4. Length of Stay: Participants mentioned that the average Length of Stay and, subsequently, the Bed 
Occupancy in pathologic and acute care clinics increases because of older patients who get admitted and stay for 
long periods in the hospitals, as a result of lack of primary care centres and other community services for the 
elderly. 
5. Failure & Mortality Rates: Failure and Mortality Rates largely depend on the patient’s condition per se; 
how serious or fatal it is and how rare it is. Furthermore, in a cancer clinic or in a cancer hospital, the mortality 
rates are expected to be much higher than in other clinics or other kinds of hospitals. However, this does not affect 
the dynamics that we are trying to capture (i.e., the mortality rates of the clinic or of the hospital compared to other 
similar clinics or hospitals), and thus this element was left outside of our model. 
6. Complications: Some of the participants mentioned that Complications decrease as the Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs increases, because by spending more time with patients, 
answering their questions and giving them information and instructions regarding their condition, treatment and 
personal care, the more usual patients’ Errors which create Complications or unexpected readmissions would be 
avoided. Furthermore, a higher Unplanned Readmissions Rate would, in turn, lead to an increase of Incoming 
222 
 
Patients, because patients who were already admitted and discharged are coming back as new Incoming Patients, 
boosting the Incoming Patients rate higher than it would be otherwise. Although the Unplanned Readmissions 
Rate might indeed be affected by many of the elements of the hospital quality system and thus by many of the 
variables of our model, we left this variable outside of our scope of research because we did not have enough 
information from the GMB sessions to properly analyse all the causal links associated with Unplanned 
Readmissions Rate to include it. 
7. Costs: Our model implicitly recognises as cost-bearing only those expenses which involve the use of a 
real resource and which are directly translated into spending and are paid by the hospital’s annual budget. 
However, in reality there are many other sources of Costs in the production of hospital services that are not directly 
translated into spending (e.g., the cost of the usage of personnel work hours; the depreciation of the equipment, 
etc) or that are “hidden”, in the sense that they do not involve the usage of a physical resource (i.e., the opportunity 
cost of bed‐days). 
8. Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs: Our GMB participants seem to distinguish 
between Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs on the one hand and Proper Behaviour (i.e., 
kindness, friendly attitude, good mood) towards patients on the other hand as two different things that might not 
always go together. However, we left this distinction out of our scope of research. 
9.  Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping: 
Participants agreed that apart from the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task, managers’ education, personal 
initiative and dedication largely defines the level of the staff’s commitment to the organisational change and to 
initiatives regarding the Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic 
Record Keeping.  
10.  Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services: Participants agreed that much of the delay in the ER could 
be avoided if there were adequate ICT systems in place; if the paramedics personnel was adequate, so that patients 
would be transferred back and forth to the emergency room without delay; if there was more support staff available 
at the ER, handling patients, children and relatives of the patients and other problems that arise, so that  nurses 
would not lose time on those issues; if triage was implemented correctly; if the ER had spatial autonomy and the 
spatial distribution and structure of the ER examination rooms was different, so as to accommodate more efficient 
handling of patients.  
11. Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience: Our participants recognised three main sources of doctors’ 
and nurses’ professional quality: (1) character/personality, (2) education and (3) experience; all of which co-define 
their skills. We left the personal factors and the education outside of our scope of research, thus in our model the 
doctors’ and the nurses’ skills depend only on their experience, i.e., the total number of patients they have treated 
in their life.  
Furthermore, by mentioning “scientific quality” and “strictly medical” skills, our participants made a clear 
distinction here between the scientific competence, on the one hand, and the social competence and charisma, on 
the other hand, of the doctor or the nurse, which also affects the overall quality of the services that doctors and 
nurses provide. For example, the reputation of the hospital doctors -which is spread through word of mouth and 
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attracts more Incoming Patients at the hospital – is, according to our participants, a product of both their medical 
skills and their communication charisma. However, this charisma is again a personal factor and is not included in 
our scope of research and in our model. 
 
12.3 Recommendations for Future Research  
Our research study led to the development of a qualitative, CLD model. The CLD shows a fair mix between 
loops that reinforce performance (either in a positive or negative direction) and loops that balance (control) it. 
However, not all links and loops in the model are of the same significance for the real system. Thus, the dynamic 
behaviour of the model depends not only on the structure per se, but also on the significance of each building 
block of this structure, i.e., the relative significance of each loop. Since a CLD is a purely qualitative tool, it does 
not indicate the strength of each loop, nor can it be used for inferring dynamic behaviour (i.e., the trend of hospital 
performance). Further research is needed to understand the relative significance of all links and loops, in order to 
be able to predict the dynamic behaviour (trend) of the system.  
Understanding and analysing the mechanisms of the hospital performance system, based on the Simplified 
Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance, enabled us to create a set of hypotheses which can explain all of the 
seven negative outcomes of the healthcare reform presented in chapter 6, which our literature review highlighted 
and our research revealed that are present at the case hospital. In order to test those hypotheses, however, a 
quantified SD model (a stock-flow diagram) would be needed, as that would enable us to run simulations and test 
our hypothesis in different scenarios to analyse the loop dominance. Future research could enable the validation 
of our findings by transforming our CLD model into a Stock-and-Flow Diagram (i.e., a quantitative SD model 
that allows simulation) for verification of the dynamic hypotheses that our study identified through simulation. In 
order for this to happen, future research should first of all focus on conducting more interviews and/or GMB 
sessions with hospital stakeholders for the validation and simplification of our CLD model through 
disconfirmation, so that it becomes small enough to be quantifiable and transformable into a Stock and Flow 
model. After that, research could focus on the quantitative data that should be drawn from the literature to be used 
for the model indicators and initial values of the model variables. 
Furthermore, our model is context-specific and focused on the Greek public sector, as our primary data 
were drawn from a Greek public hospital. Involving hospital stakeholders from different countries and/or from 
different sectors (i.e., private sector and public sector hospitals) would allow future researchers identify the part 
of the model that is universal for hospital performance, and the part of it that is applicable only in the public sector 
ones. Such a model could then be compared to other models and inform the international literature around hospital 
performance. 
Moreover, our study focused on the documented negative consequences of the Greek Healthcare reform, 
that followed the financial crisis of 2008. Future studies could follow the same research design and focus on the 




Finally, our CLD model was developed by different kinds of participant stakeholders (i.e., doctors, nurses, 
managers, other health workers and patients), thus it incorporates different views and it is designed to facilitate 
different kinds of analyses for different purposes and stakeholders. It would be interesting for further researchers 
to focus on one specific area and use the model to analyse e.g., only nurse-related dynamics, or doctor-related 
dynamics, or patient-related dynamics. Such concentration on one profession within the hospital, or on one 
research area (e.g., on one of the model themes that we identified in chapter 11.2.2) would further validate our 
results and would enable for some of the elements and findings that we left outside of our model boundary in this 
study to be endorsed and further researched. Such research attempts would also lead to smaller, more accurate and 
validated CLD models that could more easily be quantified and transformed into Stock-and-Flow Diagrams for 
simulation. Adopting such a research focus, and using the DPM approach for the analysis of those models, would 
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Dear participant in the modelling session(s), 
 
 
This questionnaire evaluates the use of Group Model Building (GMB) in exploring the mechanisms of 
Performance in the hospital. 
 
This questionnaire addresses the urgency of the problem of low performance, results of the modelling 
session(s), the effects of different aspects of the session(s), quality of the modelling-process and suggestions for 
future sessions. We politely invite you to answer these questions as best as you can. The results of this 
questionnaire will be used to improve the procedure that was used: Group Model-Building. Before addressing the 
sessions we would like to ask you for some background information. 
 
All information will be treated confidentially.  
 
My date of birth is..........  . 
I am a member of this organisation (hospital) since .......................... . 
My function/appointment in this organisation (hospital) is ...............................  . 
 
 






Results of the modelling process 
 
The following questions aim primarily at the discussions that were held while making the causal models, in 
the reports (with questions) between sessions as well as during the meetings.  These questions also refer to the 
results of the analysis of data and simulations. The answers on the following questions fall in one of five categories: 




agree nor disagree (a/d) 
disagree (d) 

















  1. My insight into the problem has increased due to the modelling 
process. 
     
  2. I think that, because of these meetings, we have reached a shared 
vision of the problem. 
     
  3. I support the conclusions/findings that were drawn during the 
modelling process, in general terms. 
     
  4. The modelling process has given me more insight into the cohesion 
between the elements that compose the problem. 
     
  5. The causal diagrams that were developed were the result of the 
integration of diverse opinions and ideas of the participants. 
     
  6. If I, with some people from my organisation, were to use the same 
approach in planning, and in dealing with problems, all persons would loyally 
follow this plan to its natural conclusions. 
     
  7. As a result of the modelling process it is still unclear to me what the 
causes of the problem, that play behind the scenes, are. 
     
 8. The modelling process aided in the understanding of the opinions of 
the other participants. 
     
 9. We could not reach a consensus.      
10. The use of causal diagrams has clarified the communication between 
participants about the problem. 
     
11. Our opinions are closer due to the modelling process.      
12. I will uphold the conclusions/findings of these meetings in front of 
other members of my organisation. 
     
13. The modelling process has given me more insight into the feedback 
processes that play a role in the problem. 
     
14. The modelling process has given me little insight into the opinions 
and ideas about the problem of other participants. 
     
15. Some persons dominated the discussions.      
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 16. The modelling process has not given me insight into the possibilities 
that my organisation has in 'steering' the problem. 
     
17. I will try to convince others in my organisation of the importance of 
these conclusions. 
     
18. Using modelling in approaching the problem is efficient.      





If you compare these meetings, using causal diagrams, with normal meetings or conferences in which you 

















1. give more insight  compared with normal meetings?      
2. give more quickly insight compared with normal meetings?      
3. result in a better communication between participants?      
4. give more quickly rise to a shared vision between participants?      
5. give rise to a better shared vision between participants?      
6. give more quickly rise to commitment of participants?      





Effects of different elements of Group Model Building 
 
The meetings consisted of several aspects which may have contributed in different ways to the overall effect 
of the meetings. In the following questions you are asked to specify how much an aspect contributed to the overall 
effect. You can do this by scoring each element on a scale of -5 to +5, in which: 
 
 -5 = was of no use whatsoever, obstructed the sessions; 
 0 = did not obstruct, but was of no use either; 





-5 to +5 
1. The fact that the diagrams were projected/recorded in a way that was visible to 
everybody. 
 
2. The fact that an outsider was accompanying as a 'group facilitator'.  
3. The opportunity for open and extensive discussion.  
4. The use of causal diagrams.  
5. Written reports (with questions) between sessions.  
6. Gathering the data needed for the quantitative model.  
7. Analysing the data.  







Quality of the Group Model Building project 
 
The following questions aim at the quality of the modelling process. By 'problem' we again refer to the 

















  1. The current situation of my organisation was well mapped.      
  2. The description of the situation to be reached was correct.      
  3. In the modelling process the right definition of the problem was used.      
  4. In the modelling process all relevant information was used.      
  5. The analysis of the information was correct.      
  6. All issues or problem areas that needed attention were investigated      
  7. In the modelling process not all useful solutions were discussed.      
  8. In the modelling process the pros and cons of possible solutions were 
attended to. 
     
  9. The choice of the most promising solution was based on sound 
arguments. 
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Suggestions for future sessions 
 
The following questions can be of great use in planning future sessions. 
 
 

















































Αγαπητέ/ή συμμετέχων/ουσα στη συνεδρία ομαδικής μοντελοποίησης, 
 
 
Αυτό το ερωτηματολόγιο αξιολογεί τη χρήση της μεθόδου ομαδικής μοντελοποίησης (GMB) στη 
διερεύνηση των μηχανισμών ποιότητας ενός νοσοκομείου. 
 
Αυτό το ερωτηματολόγιο εξετάζει τον επείγοντα χαρακτήρα του προβλήματος που διακυβεύεται, τα 
αποτελέσματα των συνεδριών μοντελοποίησης, τις επιπτώσεις των διαφόρων πτυχών της κάθε συνεδρίας, την 
ποιότητα της διαδικασίας μοντελοποίησης και τις προτάσεις για μελλοντικές συνεδρίες. Σας προσκαλούμε 
ευγενικά να απαντήσετε στις ερωτήσεις αυτές όσο καλύτερα μπορείτε. Τα αποτελέσματα αυτού του 
ερωτηματολογίου θα χρησιμοποιηθούν για τη βελτίωση της μεθόδου ομαδικής μοντελοποίησης  που 
χρησιμοποιήθηκε (Group Model Building – GMB). Προτού ξεκινήσετε να αξιολογείτε τις συνεδρίες, θα θέλαμε 
να σας ζητήσουμε ορισμένες βασικές πληροφορίες. 
 
Όλες οι πληροφορίες είναι εμπιστευτικές. 
 
Η ημερομηνία γέννησής μου είναι ........... 
Είμαι μέλος αυτής της οργάνωσης (Νοσοκομείο) από ........................... 
Η θέση/δουλειά μου σε αυτόν τον οργανισμό (Νοσοκομείο) είναι ................................ 
 
 




Αποτελέσματα της διαδικασίας μοντελοποίησης 
 
Τα ακόλουθα ερωτήματα αποσκοπούν κυρίως στις ομαδικές συζητήσεις που διεξήχθησαν κατά την 
διάρκεια των συνεδριών μοντελοποίησης. Αυτά τα ερωτήματα αναφέρονται επίσης στα αποτελέσματα της 
ανάλυσης δεδομένων και των προσομοιώσεων. Οι απαντήσεις για τις ακόλουθες ερωτήσεις εμπίπτουν σε μία από 




συμφωνώ απόλυτα (5) 
συμφωνώ (4) 
δε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ (3) 
διαφωνώ (2) 
διαφωνώ έντονα (1) 
 

















  1. Η οπτική μου για το πρόβλημα έχει αυξηθεί λόγω της διαδικασίας 
μοντελοποίησης. 
     
  2. Πιστεύω ότι, εξαιτίας αυτών των συνεδριών, έχουμε φτάσει σε μια 
κοινή οπτική για το πρόβλημα. 
     
  3. Συμφωνώ με τα αποτελέσματα / συμπεράσματα που προέκυψαν κατά 
τη διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης, σε γενικές γραμμές. 
     
  4. Η διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης μου έδωσε μια καλύτερη εικόνα για τη 
σύνδεση μεταξύ των στοιχείων που συνθέτουν το πρόβλημα. 
     
  5. Το μοντέλο που αναπτύχθηκε ήταν αποτέλεσμα της ενσωμάτωσης 
διαφορετικών απόψεων και ιδεών των συμμετεχόντων. 
     
  6. Εάν εγώ και άλλοι στην οργάνωση χρησιμοποιούσαμε την ίδια 
προσέγγιση στο σχεδιασμό και στην αντιμετώπιση των προβλημάτων μας, όλοι 
θα ακολουθούσαν πιστά αυτό το σχέδιο στα φυσικά συμπεράσματά του. 
     
  7. Ως αποτέλεσμα της διαδικασίας μοντελοποίησης δεν είναι ακόμα 
σαφές για μένα ποιες είναι οι βαθιές αιτίες του προβλήματος. 
     
 8. Η διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης με βοήθησε στην κατανόηση των 
απόψεων των άλλων συμμετεχόντων. 
     
 9. Δεν επιτεύχθηκε καμία συμφωνία επι των πραγμάτων.      
10. Η χρήση του μοντέλου βοήθησε στην επικοινωνία μεταξύ των 
συμμετεχόντων σχετικά με το πρόβλημα. 
     
11. Οι απόψεις μας είναι πιο κοντά λόγω της διαδικασίας 
μοντελοποίησης. 
     
12. Θα υποστηρίξω τα συμπεράσματα/πορίσματα/αποφάσεις αυτών των 
συναντήσεων μπροστά σε άλλα μέλη της οργάνωσής μου. 
     
290 
 
13. Η διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης μου έδωσε περισσότερες πληροφορίες 
για τις διαδικασίες ανατροφοδότησης (μπούμερανγκ/λούπες) που παίζουν ρόλο 
στο πρόβλημα. 
     
14. Η διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης μου έδωσε ελάχιστη εικόνα των 
απόψεων και των ιδεών των άλλων συμμετεχόντων για το πρόβλημα. 
     
15. Ορισμένα μόνο άτομα κυριάρχησαν στις συζητήσεις.      
16. Η διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης δεν μου έδωσε αρκετές πληροφορίες 
για τις δυνατότητες που έχει η οργάνωσή μου για να βελτιώσει το πρόβλημα. 
     
17. Θα προσπαθήσω να πείσω και άλλους στην οργάνωσή μου για τη 
σημασία αυτών των συμπερασμάτων. 
     
18. Η χρήση μοντέλων για την προσέγγιση του προβλήματος είναι 
αποτελεσματική. 
     




Εαν συγκρίνουμε τις συνεδρίες μοντελοποίησης οπου χρησιμοποιήσαμε μοντέλα, με τις κανονικές 
ομαδικές συναντήσεις/συνεδριάσεις/συζητήσεις/meetings στις οποίες είστε συνηθισμένοι,  για παρόμοια 


















1. Προσφέρουν περισσότερες γνώσεις σε σχέση με τις κανονικές 
συναντήσεις εργασίας; 
     
2. Προσφέρουν ταχύτερα ενόραση  σε σχέση με τις κανονικές 
συναντήσεις εργασίας; 
     
3. Οδηγούν σε καλύτερη επικοινωνία μεταξύ των συμμετεχόντων;      
4. Οδηγούν ταχύτερα σε μια κοινή οπτική μεταξύ των 
συμμετεχόντων; 
     
5. Δημιουργούν μια καλύτερη κοινή οπτική μεταξύ των 
συμμετεχόντων; 
     
6. Οδηγούν ταχύτερα σε μια κοινή δέσμευση των συμμετεχόντων;      





Επιδράσεις των διαφορετικών  στοιχείων/πτυχών της μεθόδου Ομαδικής Μοντελοποίησης  
 
Οι συνεδρίες μοντελοποίησης συνδυάζουν διάφορα στοιχεία/πτυχές οι οποίες μπορεί να έχουν συμβάλει 
με διαφορετικούς τρόπους στο συνολικό αποτέλεσμα των συνεδριών. Στις ακόλουθες ερωτήσεις σας ζητείται να 
διευκρινίσετε κατά πόσο μια πτυχή συνέβαλε στο συνολικό αποτέλεσμα. Μπορείτε να το κάνετε αυτό 
βαθμολογώντας κάθε στοιχείο/πτυχή σε μια κλίμακα από -5 έως +5, στην οποία: 
 
-5 = δεν είχε καμιά χρησιμότητα, εμπόδισε τις συνεδρίες. 
0  = δεν εμπόδισε, αλλά δεν ήταν καθόλου χρήσιμη. 
+5 = συνέβαλε πολύ. 
 score 
-5 to +5 
1. Το γεγονός ότι το μοντέλο προβάλλεται / καταγράφεται με τρόπο ορατό για 
όλους. 
 
2. Το γεγονός ότι ένα άτομο εξω απο την οργάνωση λειτούργησε ως 
«διευκολυντής ομάδας». 
 
3. Η ευκαιρία για ανοιχτή και εκτενή συζήτηση επι του προβλήματος.  
4. Η χρήση του μοντέλου.  
5. Γραπτές αναφορές (με ερωτήσεις) μεταξύ των συνεδριών.  
6. Συγκέντρωση των δεδομένων που απαιτούνται για το ποσοτικό μοντέλο.  
7. Ανάλυση των δεδομένων.  
8. Προσομοίωση, χρησιμοποιώντας το ποσοτικό μοντέλο.  
        9.    Άλλα, ........  
 
 
Ποιότητα των συνεδριών μοντελοποίησης 
 
Οι ακόλουθες ερωτήσεις έχουν ως στόχο την αξιολόγηση της ποιότητας της διαδικασίας μοντελοποίησης. 
Με τη λέξη 'πρόβλημα' αναφερόμαστε και πάλι στον ορισμό του προβλήματος που χρησιμοποιήθηκε στη 

















   1. Η παρούσα κατάσταση της οργάνωσής μου χαρτογραφήθηκε καλά.      
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   2. Η περιγραφή της επιθυμητής κατάστασης που πρέπει να επιτευχθεί 
ήταν σωστή. 
     
   3. Στη διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης χρησιμοποιήθηκε ο σωστός ορισμός 
του προβλήματος. 
     
   4. Στη διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης χρησιμοποιήθηκαν όλες οι σχετικές 
πληροφορίες. 
     
   5. Η ανάλυση των πληροφοριών ήταν σωστή.      
   6. Όλα τα ζητήματα ή οι προβληματικοί τομείς που έχριζαν προσοχής, 
διερευνήθηκαν. 
     
   7. Στη διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης δεν συζητήθηκαν όλες οι χρήσιμες 
λύσεων. 
     
   8. Στη διαδικασία μοντελοποίησης επεξεργασθήκαμε τα 
πλεονεκτήματα και τα μειονεκτήματα των πιθανών λύσεων. 
     
   9. Η επιλογή της πιο ελπιδοφόρας λύσης(εων) βασίστηκε σε υγιή 
επιχειρήματα. 
     





Προτάσεις για μελλοντικές συνεδρίες 
 










































Σας ευχαριστώ και πάλι θερμά για τη συνεργασία σας. 













































































Appendix 19: Reference Mode of the Case Hospital Performance 
 
 
The Reference Mode created and agreed upon by the participants showed that, despite the counterintuitive 
negative outcomes documented, the level of the overall performance in the case hospital has been slightly 
increasing after the healthcare reform and is now stabilizing. Overall, it seems that during the last decade and 
despite the austerity measures, participants feel that the level of hospital performance remains stable and there 
was even a slight increase. One of the reasons mentioned for this was that there started to be controls and 
performance measurements by the ministry during the last decade, that there was not before. However, participants 
feel that it is difficult to keep increasing further the performance, given the measures and the performance 
management policies implied.  For the future, their prediction is that it will either stagnate at this level or improve 
slightly. Thus, the hoped scenario showed a gradual growth of the hospital performance during the next decade, 
while the feared scenario represented the expectations by the participants of a less significant growth or a 
stagnation of the hospital performance during the years to come, a trend that is already ongoing during the years 










Appendix 20: Scoping Model of Hospital Performance (Divergent CLD version) 
 
 





The Scoping Model of Hospital Performance is a rather extended and divergent version of the system at 
hand, combining all aspects and views and including all the variables and links that all the participants came up 
with and agreed upon. This model is usually too big to analyse and get some useful and meaningful insights from. 
For this reason, some “convergence” is necessary in order to make the model smaller, more meaningful and more 
comprehensive, and in order to set the scope of the research and the boundaries of the system at hand. The Scoping 
Model of Hospital Performance was digitised by the researcher in Vensim Software (background modelling during 












After the break, the convergent part of the GMB session started, with the facilitator moving to exercises 
and scripts where participants should think of which variables are less important or less relevant than others; which 
variables are implied by others and could be omitted without changing the “meaning” of the model, etc. This was 
the last exercise of the first GMB session, which was completed with a minimised version of the scoping model. 
This version of the model was calibrated by the researcher in Vensim Software (background modelling in between 
the GMB sessions), and was presented to the participants at the beginning of the second GMB session. 
 
 











Appendix 21: Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (Convergent CLD version) 
 
The Conceptual and the Policy Model of Hospital Performance incorporates the performance management 
policies imposed by the Greek government during the Healthcare Reform and could be used to explain the 
dynamics of the negative outcomes. It depicts the actual structure of the system at hand, and explains the current 
levels of hospital performance. It shows what has been happening until now and what will continue to happen if 








Appendix 22: Policy Model of Hospital Performance (Convergent CLD version with Policy Structure) 
 
The Policy Model of Hospital Performance is exactly the same as the Conceptual and the Policy Model 
of Hospital Performance, but extended to incorporate the policy structure (i.e., the pink variables and the pink 
causal links). The Policy Model of Hospital Performance incorporates the performance management measures 
imposed by the Greek government but depicts not only the actual structure of the system at hand, but also the 
changes in the system structure which are necessary, according to our participant stakeholders, in order to change 
the current situation. It explains what has been happening until now and what actions should be taken in the form 
of new policies that should be implemented in order for the current situation to change in the future and for the 
hospital performance to improve. It worth mentioning that most of the policy interventions that participants came 














R1 – Budgetary Control & Cutback Management 
(Approved Budget-Financial Resources-Hospital Spending) 
 
R2 – Informal Payments & Corruption 
(Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission - Waiting List for Surgery or Admission) 
 
R3 - Doctors' and Nurses' Skills Building 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience) 
 
R4 -   Length of Stay & Complications 




R5 – Multidrug Resistance in the General Population 
(Multidrug Resistance in Population - Nosocomial Infections Rate) 
 
R6 – Clinical Efficiency & Hospital Reputation 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience - 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality 
of Life - Patient Satisfaction) 
 
R7 – Complications & Hospital Reputation 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience - 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care - Length of Stay – Complications - Survival Rate / 






B1 – Word of Mouth & Waiting Times 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services - Patient Satisfaction) 
 
B2 – Patient Satisfaction & Attendance to Patients’ Needs 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual Time 
Available per Patient/Task - Communication & Attendance to Patients' Needs - Patient Satisfaction) 
 
B3 - Actual Time Available & Errors 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual Time 
Available per Patient/Task – Errors – Complications - Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life - 
Patient Satisfaction) 
 
B4 - Actual Time Available and Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols 
(Hospital Reputation - Incoming Patients - Admitted Patients - Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio - Actual Time 
Available per Patient/Task - Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols - Nosocomial Infections Rate – Complications 




Appendix 24: Models’ Documentation (Definitions and Explanations of Model Variables and Causal Links) 
 
In this appendix we will analytically present and explain all the variables and causal links of the Policy 
Model of Hospital Performance, as defined by the participants stakeholders. For each variable we will give the 
definition, some more explanations if needed and the Causal Links of the variable. More specifically, in the section 
Causal Links we will present the “Causes Tree” (i.e., the graphical representation of all the causal links that are 
coming towards the variable at hand) and the “Uses Tree” (i.e., the graphical representation of all the causal links 
that are going out from the variable at hand) and we will explicitly analyse, explain and discuss all the causal links 
between the variable at hand and the other variables in the model.   
 
1. Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care 
 
By Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care participant stakeholders mean the rate of 
hospital doctors’ accurate diagnoses to Incoming Patients and subsequently the level of appropriate Therapeutic 
Care delivered to the patients, based on that diagnosis. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care is a function of two other 




As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Accurate 
Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care : 
-increases as the Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience increases. This is quite obvious and intuitive, 
as the more educated, skilled and experienced doctors and nurses are, the more probable is that they are going to 
provide  patients with more accurate diagnosis and appropriate care. 
-increases as the hospital’s Medical & Technical Equipment increases. This is because the more modern 
and more advanced and up-to-date the medical and biomedical equipment of a hospital is, the more tools the 
doctors and nurses have to diagnose patients accurately and treat them correctly and safely. Biomedical equipment 
technology is continuously being invented and improved. Older machines are usually more invasive, less accurate 
and safe and come with limited capabilities and capacity in respect to more modern ones. Technical equipment is 
associated with patients’ safety during treatment, thus modern technical equipment would make the hospital a 
safer place not only for the patients but also for the health workers. Furthermore, old medical and technical 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience
Admitted Patients
Hospital Reputation
Medical & Technical EquipmentInvestments
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equipment and machinery in hospitals are more problematic due to the fact that they are in use for a long time, 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Accurate 
Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care leads to the: 
-decrease of the Length of Stay, because getting the right diagnosis means that patients are provided with 
the right treatment for their condition right away, which means that they will get better soon and will be dismissed 
earlier. 
-decrease of the Failure & Mortality Rates, because getting the right diagnosis means that patients are 
provided with the right treatment for their condition and will avoid death, if their condition is fatal 
-increase of the Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because getting the right diagnosis 
means that patients are provided with the right treatment for their condition and will survive a fatal condition, or 
be able to treat a condition that would deteriorate their quality of life if it remained undiagnosed or improperly 
treated. 
 
2. Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors 
 
According to our participants, the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors is the number of “active” nurses or 
doctors who are placed at the clinics, directly treating patients and participating in the shifts and overnights 
schedule of their clinic. 
 
Causal Links 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Actual 
Number of Nurses or Doctors decreases, as the Difficulty of the Shift schedule increases. This is because the more 
difficult the Shifts’ schedule gets, the more the necessary rests are not respected; thus, the more tired and burned-
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care





Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life Patient Satisfaction
Actual Number of Nurses or DoctorsDifficulty of Shift Schedule(Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors)
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out doctors and nurses will feel, and the more probable is that they will take advantage of justified absences, sick 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a low Actual 
Number of Nurses or Doctors leads to the:  
-increase of the Difficulty of Shift Schedule. This is because the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors 
represents the number of the “active” staff placed at the clinics treating patients and participating in the shifts and 
overnights schedule. The lower their number gets, the less people are the ones who have to adequately cover all 
shifts in the schedule that should normally be covered by more people. In order for fewer people to cover all shifts, 
they need to work overtime, long-hours shifts and not respect the necessary rests between shifts, which increases 
the difficulty of the shifts schedule for all the staff. 
-decrease of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio. This is because the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors is 
the nominator of this Ratio, thus the lower their number, the lower the ratio. 
-decrease of the Available Beds. According to the GMB participants, the number of Available Beds does 
not refer to the physical number of beds as Facilities, but at the number of “active” beds depending on the number 
of “active” doctors and nurses available. In other words, the number of Available Beds in clinics and ICUs as well 
as the number of available Surgical Banks is not stable, but it dynamically changes depending on the actual number 
of “active” nurses and doctors.  
 
 
3. Actual Time Available per Patient/Task 
 
According to our participants, the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task is the net time that the hospital 




In our model, Actual Time Available per Patient/Task is a function of two other variables: Availability of 
Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; and Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio. 
Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors
Available Beds Bed Occupancy
Difficulty of Shift Schedule
(Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors)
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, Actual Time Available per Patient/Task: 
-increases as the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms increases. This is 
because having modern medical equipment in place makes the work of the medical staff easier, faster and much 
more effective, while breaking down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties and 
using IT Systems support and digital communication to implement those procedures  makes their work much more 
effective and fast, compared to the way that they work now ( i.e., filling in most of the paperwork and medical 
forms by hand and sending the hard copies back and forth to other departments for the communication of patients’ 
details and exams results).  
-increases as the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio increases. A high Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio means 
that there are more “active” doctors or nurses per patient than they should or could, which means that each doctor 
or nurse has less patients to treat during their shift, and less tasks to fulfil than they would have otherwise, thus 
the actual time they have available for each patient increases. Seemingly, a low Nurse-Patient or Doctor-Patient 
Ratio means that the “active” doctors and nurses are less than they should, in respect to the number of patients, 
which means that they have much more patients to treat during their 8-hours shift than they should have, thus they 
have many more tasks to fulfil than they would have otherwise and the actual time they have available for each 
patient decreases.  
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that increase of 
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task leads to the: 
- increase of Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. This is mainly because, in their mind,  following 
guidelines is “a more time consuming way of doing things”, and thus the more the time they have available to 
finish all their tasks during their shift, the more willing they are to allocate some time on following the guidelines-  
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provided of course that they already know how to do that, and have been educated and trained to the 
implementation of those guidelines and protocols. Even if they know that they should be doing this task differently 
to be consistent with the guidelines, they might decide not to do it in the proper way, in order to earn some time 
and finish their shift on time.  
Moreover, some of the participant stakeholders mentioned that the more the actual time they perceive that 
they have available, the more relaxed they feel and the more probable it is that they will remember to stick to the 
guidelines. On the other hand, when they perceive that the actual time available during their shift is less than what 
they need, they feel under stress/pressure and in those conditions their mind might focus on finishing the core 
tasks and responsibilities, rather than on doing them properly by following exactly the guidelines.  
-increase of Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs. This is because the more the net time 
that doctors and nurses have available to dedicate to each patient, the more “present” and “responsive” nurses and 
medical staff will be to each patients’ needs and the more the time they will spend with each one of them, 
answering their questions and giving them information and instructions regarding their condition, treatment and 
personal care. 
-increase of Management Capacity. This is because the managers’ capacity to fulfil their long-term 
management duties depends on the part of the actual time that they have available during their shift to devote to 
those management tasks. When their time is mostly spent on administrative and clinical duties (which are usually 
more urgent and more short-term and present-oriented), the time left for management duties (which are usually 
less urgent and more long-term and future-oriented) decreases and they are not able to build Management Capacity 
in the long term.  
-decrease of Errors. This is because the more the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task, the more the time 
that doctors and nurses have available to spend with each patient, answering his/her questions and giving him and 
his carers information and instructions regarding his/her condition, treatment and personal care from their 
experience. Subsequently, usual patients’ Errors  which create Complications or unexpected readmissions will be 
avoided. Furthermore, the more the time medical and nursing staff spends with each patient, the better they will 
get to know and remember the condition of each patient and the  less the medical and nursing staff’s  Errors due 
to miscommunication or insufficient attendance will be.  
 
 
4. Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols 
 
By “Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols” participant stakeholders mean the level at which the doctors 
and nurses as well as the rest of the paramedic staff follow the measures and procedures that are imposed by the 





In our model, Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols is a function of three other variables: Availability of 
Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms; Difficulty of Shift Schedule; and Actual Time Available 
per Patient/Task. The level of Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols in our model can be from 0 to 1, where 0 




As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the 
Adherence to guidelines &protocols : 
-increases as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is mainly because, in their mind,  
following guidelines is “a more time consuming way of doing things”, and thus the more the actual time they have 
available to finish all their tasks during their shift, the more willing they are to allocate some time on following 
the guidelines-  provided of course that they already know how to do that, and have been educated and trained to 
the implementation of those guidelines and protocols.  
-decreases, as the Difficulty of Shift Schedule increases. This happens for a number of reasons. First of all, 
the more difficult the Shift schedule is – meaning that the necessary rests are  not respected - the more tired and 
sleepy the health workers might feel during their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them not 
to follow the guidelines properly. Secondly, when the shifts schedule is such that the necessary rests are not 
respected, department managers are not willing to create and implement an Internal Regulation. Another reason 
is that the more difficult their shift schedule is, the less rest they get, the more tired they feel and the more 
negatively their well-being and personal life is affected. This results in limited motivation for effective work, as 
well as to limited time and willingness to get more education and training. Lack of education and training, in turn, 
could mean lack of knowledge and/or capacity to implement protocols/guidelines and lack of awareness of the 
importance and the risks associated with the non-adherence to them. 
-increases as the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms increase. This is 
because breaking down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties makes it easier for 
the medical staff to follow them, while having in place the necessary Medical & Technical Equipment and ICT 
support to implement those procedure makes it possible to follow those procedures in the time they have available, 
as they make the work of the medical and nursing staff much faster. 
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As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Adherence 
to Guidelines & Protocols leads to the: 
-decrease of Nosocomial Infections Rate. This is because adherence to guidelines, measures, nursing and 
medical protocols ensures among others Appropriate Patients handling, appropriate Material & Waste 
Management, adequate staff’s vaccination coverage, and other measures and precautions which in turn limit the 
spread of Nosocomial Infections Rate. 
-decrease of Errors. This is because the more the adherence to guidelines and medical protocols, the more 
Appropriate the Patients handling, the more measures and precautions are taken by the hospital staff for the safety 
of the staff and the patients and usual Errors are avoided.  
-increase of the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms in the long run. This 
is because the existence and adherence of guidelines & protocols in the hospital  “pushes” in the long run for the 
specification and acquisition of the necessary medical equipment and for the standardisation of procedures ( 
internal regulations; nurses' duties; work distribution and shift schedules that respect the necessary rests; safety 
measures, etc.) to be created and implemented. 
-increase of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio (Number of Nurses or Doctors / Admitted Patients). This is 
because the adherence to international guidelines “pushes” for the right proportions of doctors or nurses in respect 
to patients admitted to be respected (i.e., Indicated Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio).  
 
5. Admitted Patients 
 
Admitted Patients are, according to the participants, the number of Incoming Patients who already got 
examined in the Emergency Department or in the outpatient services of the hospital and are now admitted to one 
of the hospital clinics or units for surgery, ICU or other operation or treatment.  
 
Explanations 
As each admitted patient occupies one of the Available Beds, the number of Admitted Patients equals the 
number of covered beds in the clinic in which he/she is admitted, and in the hospital.  Thus, the maximum number 
of Admitted Patients at a certain moment in time cannot be higher than the number of Available Beds (i.e., the 
number of “active” beds depending on the number of “active” doctors and nurses available) in the clinic in which 
he/she is admitted and in the hospital.  
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Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Admitted 
Patients: 
-increase as Incoming Patients increase. This is quite intuitive, as the higher the volume of the Incoming 
Patients, the higher the number of patients that will need to be admitted. 
-decreases, as the Bed Occupancy increases. This is because the higher the Bed Occupancy, the more 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that increase of 
Admitted Patients leads to the: 
-increase of Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience. This is logical, as the more the patients that are 
admitted under treatment, the more cases nurses and doctors have to work on, and the more experience and skills 
they will gain.  
-decrease of the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio. This is because the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio is the 
number of active nurses or doctors (nominator) to the number of Admitted Patients (denominator). Thus, as the 
denominator increases, the ratio decreases.  
-increase of Bed Occupancy. This is because Bed Occupancy is the rate of covered beds, which equals the 
Admitted Patients (nominator), to the Available Beds (denominator) for a certain period of time. Thus, as the 
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6. Approved Budget 
 
By Approved Budget participants mean the amount of state money which is pre-approved by the Greek 
Ministry of Health on an annual basis to be in the disposition of the hospital in order to cover its needs.  
 
Explanations 
This is a financial budget which is supposed to be used for all kinds of needs and expenses of the hospital 
for one fiscal year, apart from the wages of the regular employees (i.e., all permanent public workers, including 
doctors, nurses, paramedic and administrative staff) which are directly paid by the central government.  
At the end of each fiscal year and based on the Hospital Spending of this year, the Greek Ministry of Health 
approves and declares the approved financial budget of each hospital to be at their disposition for the next fiscal 
year. However, reimbursements are given on the basis of the total spending, meaning that if the total spending is 
less than the Approved Budget during the fiscal year, the remaining amount of pre-Approved Budget funds just 
gets lost, and does not slip to the next fiscal year.  
Although public hospitals in Greece might have some earnings from other sources (i.e., rent services, 
collection of interest rates or medical bills from foreign citizens, etc) most of the Greek public hospitals’ Financial 










As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Next 
Year's Approved Budget: 
-increases as the past year’s Hospital Spending increases. This is because the Ministry of Health has been 
trying to gradually cut off hospital budgets since the economic crisis and the austerity measures were initiated in 
2009-2011, in an attempt to “sanitise” public spending. The Ministry’s way to do that is checking the past year’s 
spending and according to that, issue the same or a slightly lower budget for the next year.  
 
 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Approved 
Hospital Budget leads to the: 
-increase of Financial Resources available, which is quite intuitive as the higher the Approved Budget, the 
more money the hospital manager has in his disposition “legally” to allocate to the different departments and cover 
needs. 
 
7. Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms 
 
By Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms participants mean the level at 
which the necessary Equipment, IT Systems, Digital Communication Systems and Standard Procedures are 
available, accessible, easily useable by the hospital staff, as well as that their use is being monitored and supported 
by the supervisors and managers. 
 
Explanations 
With this variable our GMB participants recognise the importance not only of the existence but also of the 
informed and active use of all those resources (Equipment, IT Systems, Digital Communication Systems, Standard 
Procedures), which they consider vital for their work and critical for the quality of healthcare services provided to 




In our model, Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms is a function of four 
other variables: Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols; Medical & Technical Equipment; ICT; and Standardisation 
& Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping. The level of Availability of 
Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms in our model can be from 0 to 1, where 0 equals to no 
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms: 
-increases as the Medical & Technical Equipment increases. This is quite intuitive, as the more the 
equipment bought, the more the equipment available. The scarcity of medical equipment in the ER or in the clinics 
– even of cheap equipment, such as thermometers and oximeters – now largely exists and creates huge delays. 
Having advanced medical equipment in place makes the work of the medical staff easier, faster and much more 
effective.  
-increases as the ICT increases. This is again quite intuitive, as the more the ICT systems developed and 
implemented, the more the ICT systems available.  The usage of Information Systems and digital communication 
can make the work of doctors, nurses and administrative staff much more effective and fast, compared to the way 
that they work now (i.e., filling in most of the paperwork and medical forms by hand and sending the hard copies 
back and forth to other departments for the communication of patients’ details and exams results). However, such 
systems should be created for the users and thinking of the users, in order to make their life easier, not harder. 
Most of the times, users and department managers are not involved in the procedure of creating an IT or ICT 
application, which results in delivering applications which are not useful for users.  Furthermore, even a user-
friendly and useful, in that sense, application seems difficult in the beginning for most users. Thus IT support staff 
must be placed at the beginning for some time after an intervention is introduced, together with the managers and 
staff, in order to support and help them learn how to use it.  
-increases as the Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic 
Record Keeping increases. The more the guidelines and protocols “translated” into easy, simple and standard 
procedures, the greater the availability of those standard procedures for the staff to follow them during the delivery 
of their (medical or nursing) practice and for the managers to surveil them. Breaking down guidelines and 
protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties and creating digital nursing and medical forms - integrated 
into the hospital’s information system (ERP), in order for the patients’ information to be easily, accurately and 
quickly filled in, signed and distributed in other units and departments of the hospital  - makes it easier for the 
medical staff to follow and use them, while having in place the necessary medical equipment and IT Systems 
support to implement those procedure makes it possible to follow those procedures in the time they have available. 
-increases as the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols increases. This is because  supposing that following 
guidelines and protocols was obligatory for hospitals, that would “force” department managers devote time and 
do the necessary Investments in medical and technical equipment and have it in place; create and utilise the IT 
applications necessary; specify duties, procedures, work distribution and the indicated  (maximum/minimum) 
ratios to be respected, such as nurses to patient and doctors to patient ratios. All those things would then become 
the priority, and not a long-term goal which is always let aside because priority is given to the every-day, practical 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Availability 
of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms leads to the: 
-increase of the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task. This is because having advanced medical 
equipment in place makes the work of the medical staff easier, faster and much more effective, while breaking 
down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties and using IT Systems support and 
digital communication to implement those procedures  makes their work much more effective and fast, compared 
to the way that they work now ( filling in most of the paperwork and medical forms by hand and sending the hard 
copies back and forth to other departments for the communication of patients’ details and exams results). 
Currently, the non-existent or non-adequate Information Systems and ICT infrastructure, the old and scarce 
medical equipment and the lack of specific work distribution, standard procedures and duties makes their everyday 
work much more time-consuming and decrease their actual time available. 
-increase of the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols. This is because breaking down guidelines and 
protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties makes it easier for the medical staff to follow them, while 
having in place the necessary medical equipment and IT Systems support to implement those procedure makes it 
possible to follow those procedures in the time they have available, as they make the work of the medical staff 
much faster. Thus, they are more willing to follow the guidelines if they have all the materials and equipment that 
they need to do it, as well as the necessary time available to do it.  
 
8. Available Beds 
 
By Available Beds participants mean the number of “active” beds depending on the number of “active” 
doctors and nurses available.  
 
Causal Links 




As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Available 
Beds: 
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-increase, as the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors increase. This is because there are certain regulations 
that define how many doctors or nurses there should be per acute bed or per surgical bank, for example.  
Subsequently, department managers announce how many “active” or “available” beds they have according to the 
staffing conditions of their department. Those restrictions, however, are not universally and equally respected by 
all the Greek public hospitals there is a wide variation between different clinics and departments as well. 
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a decrease 
in the Available Beds leads to the: 
-increase of the Bed Occupancy. This is because Bed Occupancy is the rate of covered beds, which equals 
the Admitted Patients (nominator), divided by the Available Beds (denominator) for a certain period of time. Thus, 
as the denominator “Available Beds” decreases, the rate increases.  
 
9. Bed Occupancy 
 
Bed Occupancy Rate is for our GMB participants a measure of utilization of the available bed capacity, and 
is calculated by the number of covered beds, which equals the number of Admitted Patients (nominator) multiplied 
by their Length of Stay (in days) during a certain period of time (i.e., one years’ time) and divided by the number 




In our model, Bed Occupancy is a function of three other variables: Admitted Patients; Available Beds; and 
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Bed 
Occupancy: 
-increases as the Length of Stay increases. This is because Bed Occupancy is a rate which gets higher when 
many beds are covered for longer time. Thus, the higher the stay, the longer the period that the bed is covered by 
the patient and the higher the Bed Occupancy rate. 
-increases as the Admitted Patients increases. This is because Bed Occupancy is a rate which gets higher 
when many beds are covered for longer time. Thus, the higher the number of Admitted Patients, the higher the 
number of covered beds in a given period of time, and the higher the Bed Occupancy rate. 
-decreases as the Available Beds increase. This is because Available Beds is in the denominator of the Bed 






As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that high Bed 
Occupancy rate leads to the: 
-decrease of the Admitted Patients. This is because the higher the Bed Occupancy, the more “selective” the 
doctors will be in admitting a patient, and the less the Admitted Patients will be than otherwise. 
-increase of the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission. This is logical, as before calling a patient from the 
waiting list to be admitted for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure that there are 
surgical banks as well as beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If all the Available Beds are 
covered, all patients on the waiting list have to wait more time and, in the meanwhile, more patients are being 





Complications, according to our participants, is the rate at which unintended secondary diseases, conditions 
or infections occur during the treatment of Admitted Patients in the hospital, deteriorating their health status and 
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Complications: 
-increase as the Length of Stay increases. This is because Length of Stay augments the chances that a 
complication occur: the more time the inpatient is being treated, the more become the chances that he/she gets a 
nosocomial infection or that he/she becomes subject to an error of the medical staff.  
-increase as the Nosocomial Infections Rate increases. This is because the higher the Hospital’s Nosocomial 
Infections Rate, the more are the chances that a patient gets infected in a given time period.  
-increase as the Errors increase. This is because personnel’s or patients’ and carers’ oErrors (e.g., mistaken 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Complications lead to the: 
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-increase of the Length of Stay. This is because Complications deteriorate the patient’s health state and 
oblige him/her to stay more time admitted until he/she recovers.  
-increase of Failure & Mortality Rates, because Complications during hospital treatment might cause death.  
-decrease of Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life, because Complications during 




As Cost our participants intend the expenses made by the hospital in one fiscal year for the supply of all 
kinds of hospital services and non-durable goods which are borne by the hospital budget, such as  medicine, 
materials, cleaning services, etc. 
 
Explanations 
The expenses for supplies which concern durable goods are described by a different variable called 
“Investments” (i.e., advancements in Facilities, equipment and ICT). Furthermore, the variable cost does not 
include hospital expenses which are not borne by the hospital budget (i.e., expenses directly paid by the Ministry 
of Health or other government entities, such as the wages of the regular employees - doctors, nurses, paramedic 
and administrative permanent staff - who are directly paid by the central government, for example). 
 
Causal Links 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Costs: 
-increase as the Length of Stay increases. This is because longer stay means usage of more materials and 
medication, more diagnostic tests and biochemical examinations, all of which create extra cost per patient for the 
hospital, than there would be otherwise.  
-increase as the Management Capacity decreases. This is because limited Management Capacity leads to 
the need of extra administrative personnel (i.e., personnel hired under fixed-term contracts of employment to help 
with the management responsibilities of the hospital managers that are not fulfilled) that is paid from the Approved 
Budget, creating extra cost and an extra burden for the budget of the hospital.  
Costs
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As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that higher Costs 
lead to the: 
-decrease of Investments. This is because priority is given at covering first the most essential needs in non-
durable goods (i.e., medicine, materials, etc)  and services  (i.e.,cleaning services) that are necessary for the 
everyday function of the hospital, and then towards the end of the fiscal year - and according to what is already 
spent - managers think about investing on medical or technical equipment, Facilities and ICT infrastructure. Thus, 
higher Costs of services and non-durable goods mean that not a lot of Financial Resources are left for Investments.  
 
12. Difficulty of Shift Schedule 
 
As Difficulty of Shift Schedule our participants mean the level of inconvenience (i.e., long, ten or twelve-
hours-shifts; overtime work; excessive weekly work hours; night work; rotating shifts that do not respect the 
necessary rests in between; etc.) of the staff’s Shifts and overnights Schedule. 
 
Explanations 
This level variates between doctors, nurses and paramedic staff and between the different departments and 
hospital units, as the different health workers’ categories and units/departments all have different shift schedules.  
This level of  Difficulty of Shift Schedule can be from 0 to 1 in our model, where 0 equals to no difficulty at 
all, as perceived by the health workers (i.e., the number of active doctors or nurses are more than enough to cover 
all shifts in the shifts schedule; they can take a day off whenever they want to, thus no conflicts or problems arise 
between them; all the necessary rests between shifts are respected and they are never alone in the shift, nor do 
they need to work overtime  in order to adequately cover all shifts) and 1 equals to perfect difficulty perceived by 
the staff, meaning that it seems to them almost impossible to adequately cover all shifts (i.e., the number of active 
doctors or nurses is not enough to adequately cover all shifts in the shifts schedule; they need to work almost every 
day of the week; they cannot take a day off when they need it, but instead the nursing service “gathers” their days 
off to be given to them sometime in the future and thus many conflicts and problems arise between them on a 
daily basis; the necessary rests between shifts are not respected; doctors or nurses are most of the time alone in 














As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Difficulty 
of the Shift Schedule: 
-increases as the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors decreases. This is because the Actual Number of 
Nurses or Doctors represents the number of the “active” staff placed at the clinics treating patients and 
participating in the shifts and overnights schedule. The lower their number gets, the less people are the ones who 
have to adequately cover all shifts in the schedule that should normally be covered by more people. In order for 
fewer people to cover all shifts, they need to work overtime, long-hours shifts and not respect the necessary rests 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Difficult 
Shift Schedule leads to the: 
-decrease of the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors. This is because the more difficult the Shifts’ schedule 
is, without respecting the necessary rests, the more tired and burned-out  doctors and nurses will feel, and the more 
probable is that they will take advantage of more justified absences and make use of sick leaves and other types 
of leaves. This will decrease even more the actual number of “active” staff, available to participate in the shifts 
schedule. 
-decrease of the adherence to guidelines and protocols. This happens for a number of reasons. First of all, 
the more difficult the Shift schedule is – meaning that the necessary rests are  not respected - the more tired and 
sleepy the health workers might feel during their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them not 
to follow the guidelines properly. Secondly, when the shifts schedule is such that the necessary rests are not 
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respected, department managers are not willing to create and implement an Internal Regulation. Another reason 
is that the more difficult their shift schedule is, the less rest they get, the more tired they feel and the more 
negatively their well-being and personal life is affected. This results in limited motivation for effective work, as 
well as to limited time and willingness to get more education and training. Lack of education and training, in turn, 
could mean lack of knowledge and/or capacity to implement protocols/guidelines and lack of awareness of the 
importance and the risks associated with the non-adherence to them. 
-increase of Errors. This is because the more difficult the Shift schedule is – meaning that the necessary 
rests are  not respected - the more tired and sleepy the health workers might feel during their (especially night) 




13.Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio 
 
By Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio our GMB participants mean the ration of the actual number of “active” 
nurses or doctors (nominator) who are placed at the clinics and are participating at the shifts and overnights 
schedule and directly treating patients, divided by the number of Admitted Patients (denominator) at a certain 
moment in time.  
 
Explanations 
We named this variable “doctor or nurse” because it represents two different ratios: theDoctor-Patient Ratio 
and the Nurse-Patient Ratio, both of which are found to be critical for the analysis of the system of hospital 
performance. Our model is created by different kinds of participant stakeholders, thus it is built in a way that it 
incorporates different views and it facilitates different kinds of analyses for different purposes and stakeholders. 
Depending on our analysis every time (i.e. if we are using the model to analyse nurse-related dynamics or doctor-
related dynamics), the variable Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio represents either the actual number of nurses or the 
actual number of doctors (nominator) divided by the number of Admitted Patients (denominator).  
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio is a function of three other variables: Actual Number of Nurses 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Doctor 
or Nurse-Patient Ratio: 
-increases as the Actual Number of Nurses or Doctors  increases. This is because the Actual Number of 
Nurses or Doctors is the nominator of the ratio, thus the higher their number the higher the ratio. 
-increases as the Adherence to Guidelines &Protocols  increases. This is because  national and/or 
international Guidelines provide indicated values of those ratios which should be respected for the patients’ safety. 
Adherence to those Guidelines would mean strictly not surpassing the indicated value of the ratio (i.e., the 
Indicated Doctor-Patient Ratio or Nurse-Patient Ratio for a specific clinic, unit or department).  
-decreases as the Admitted Patients  increases. This is because the Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio is the 
number of nurses or doctors (nominator) to the number of Admitted Patients, which equals the number of Admitted 
Patients (denominator). Thus, as the denominator “Admitted Patients” increases, the ratio decreases. 
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a low Doctor 
or Nurse-Patient Ratio  leads to the: 
-decrease of the Actual Time available during work hours. This is because a low Nurse-Patient or Doctor-
Patient Ratio means that the “active” doctors and nurses are less than they should, in respect to the number of 
patients. Those few people are however the ones who have to carry the burden of all the patients, which means 
that they have much more patients to treat during their 8-hours shift than they should have, thus the actual time 
that they can devote to each one patient decreases.  
 
14. Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience 
 
"Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience" is, according to our participant stakeholders, the overall level 
of the medical and nursing skills and experience owned by the doctors and the nurses of the hospital respectively. 
 
Explanations 
Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio
Actual Number of Nurses or DoctorsDifficulty of Shift Schedule
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms




Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Errors
Management Capacity
Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients' Needs
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According to our participants, this variable reflects the overall level of the “scientific quality” of the 
hospital’s medical and nursing staff, which in turn affects the scientific quality of the services they deliver i.e., the 




In our model, Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience is a function of two other variables: Hospital 
Reputation; and Admitted Patients. 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Doctors' 
and Nurses' Skills &Experience : 
-increase as the Hospital Reputation  increases. This is because when a hospital has a good reputation, high 
quality doctors and nurses are attracted to work in it, bringing their education, skills and experience to the 
Hospital's assets.  
-increase  as  the Admitted Patients increases. This is logical, as more Admitted Patients means more patients 
under treatment, and the more patients there are, the more cases doctors and nurses have to work on, gaining more 
experience and skills.  
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Doctors’ 
and Nurses’ Skills & Experience leads to the: 
-increase of the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care for patients, which is quite 
logical as the better the quality of doctors, the better the chances for a correct diagnosis and, subsequently, for an 
appropriate treatment; and the better the quality of nurses, the better the therapeutic care provided for the patient. 
-increase of the Hospital Reputation, in the long term. This is because the reputation of the doctors’ and 









(Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience)
Patient Satisfaction
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Failure & Mortality  Rates
Length of Stay
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality  of Life
Hospital Reputation




By “Errors” our participants mean any unintended human action, omission, negligence,  
miscommunication, misunderstanding or misperception performed by the hospital doctors, nurses, health workers, 
or by the patients and their carers which might turn out to be harmful for the staff’s, the patient’s or the other 




In our model, Errors is a function of three other variables: Actual Time Available per Patient/Task; 




As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Errors: 
-decrease as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is because the more the Actual Time 
Available per Patient/Task, the more the time that doctors and nurses have available to spend with each patient, 
answering his/her questions and giving him and his carers information and instructions regarding his/her condition, 
treatment and personal care from their experience. Subsequently, usual patients’ Errors  which create 
Complications or unexpected readmissions will be avoided.  
Furthermore, the more the time medical and nursing staff spends with each patient, the better they will get 
to know and remember the condition of each patient and the  less the medical and nursing staff’s  Errors due to 
negligence, miscommunication, misunderstanding or misperception will be.  
-decrease as the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols increases. This is because the more the adherence to 
guidelines and medical protocols, the more Appropriate the Patients handling, the more measures and precautions 
are taken by the hospital staff for the safety of the staff and the patients and usual Errors are avoided. 
-increase as the Difficulty of Shift Schedule increases. This is because the more difficult the Shift schedule 
is – meaning that the necessary rests are  not respected - the more tired and sleepy the health workers might feel 
during their (especially night) shifts, and the more probable is for them to commit Errors. 
 
Errors
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
(Actual Time Available per Patient/Task)
(Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms)
(Difficulty of Shift Schedule)





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Errors  lead 
to the: 
-increase of Complications. This is because personnel’s or patients’ and carers’ Errors (e.g., mistaken 
dosage of the right medicine or wrong medicine) directly cause Complications to the patient, sometimes serious 
ones. 
-increase of Nosocomial Infections Rate. This is because some of the medical and nursing staff’s Errors 
(e.g., improper sterilization of catheters and surgical equipment) directly cause infections (i.e., urinary tract 




By Facilities the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions mean the physical Facilities of the hospital’s 
buildings and surrounding places, such as examination rooms, waiting rooms, doctors’ offices, patients rooms, 
restaurants, outdoor play areas for children, furniture, etc; including aspects such as privacy, decoration and 
cleanness in rooms, toilets and common spaces; internet access for patients and guests; and other similar amenities 
related to the physical Facilities of the hospital and the comfort that the hospital Facilities provides to patients.  
 
Causal Links 









Failure & Mortality Rates
Length of Stay
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life
Nosocomial Infections Rate
(Complications)







-increase as the Investments increase.The more the managerial and Financial Resources allocated to 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that better 
Facilities lead to the: 
-increase of Patient Satisfaction. Physical Facilities  (e.g., modern and nicely decorated patient rooms, 
restaurants, outdoor play areas for children, furniture, etc) and other amenities provided by the hospital (e.g., 
privacy and cleanness in rooms, toilets and common spaces; internet access for patients and guests, etc) and other 
similar amenities related to the physical Facilities of the hospital and the comfort that the hospital Facilities 
provides to patients are very important aspects of the patients’ hospitalisation experience and is largely what they 
have in mind when filling in Patient satisfaction questionnaires.  
 
 
17. Failure & Mortality Rates 
 
Mortality Rate is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which hospitalised patients die during their 
treatment in the hospital or soon after that. 
Failure Rate is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which the hospital fails to provide the patient 
with the optimal treatment for his condition and age. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Failure & Mortality Rates is a function of two other variables: Accurate Diagnosis & 
Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; and Complications. 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Failure 
& Mortality Rates: 
Facilities Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation
Failure & Mortality Rates
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience







-increase as the Complications increase. This is because the more the Complications during the treatment, 
the more compromised the immune system of the patient gets and the more are his/her chances of death. 
Furthermore, a compromised immune system makes it easier for the patient to get infected by contagious 
pathogens in the hospital environment and raises even more his chances of failure of the treatment or death.  
-decrease as the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care increases. This is because the 
more Accurate the Diagnosis and - subsequently - the more appropriate the  treatment provided for his condition, 
the better for the patient’s outcome of the disease and the more his/her chances to recover and to survive. 
 
18. Financial Resources 
 
By Financial Resources participants mean the total amount of money that the hospital has available in order 
to cover all its expenses for the supply of durable and nondurable goods and services in one fiscal year.  
 
Explanations 
Although public hospitals in Greece might have some earnings from other sources (i.e., rents οf services, 
use of privately owned real estates, collection of interest rates or medical bills from foreign citizens, donations, 
etc) most of the Greek public hospitals’ Financial Resources come from the state, and is limited to the amount of 
the annual Approved Budget. 
 
Causal Links 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Financial 
Resources : 
-increase as the Approved Hospital Budget increases, because the funding of greek Public Hospitals comes 
mainly from the state, and is limited to the amount of the approved annual budget devoted to them by the ministry 
of health.  
 
 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that increased 
Financial Resources lead to the: 
-increase of Hospital Spending, because the more the Financial Resources that hospital managers have in 
their disposition, the more they are motivated to spend. This happens because the main source of Financial 
Resources is the annual budget, and at the end of the year any remains of the budget just get lost; they do not pass 
from one fiscal year to the next. Thus,  the more the Financial Resources that hospital managers have in their 
disposition, the more they are motivated to spend. 
-increase of Investments. This is because the more the Financial Resources that hospital managers have in 
their disposition, the greater the part that will remain for Investments after covering first the most essential needs 
in non-durable goods (i.e., medicine, materials, etc)  and services  (i.e.,cleaning services). 
 
19. Hospital Reputation 
 
By Hospital Reputation  participants mean the perception of the hospital’s overall level of quality and safety 
which is spread by word of mouth and established in society, reflecting the quality of services and the level of 
safety that this hospital provides in respect to other hospitals of the same kind.  
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Hospital Reputation is a function of two other variables: Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & 
Experience; and Patient Satisfaction. 
 
Financial Resources









As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Hospital 
Reputation : 
-increases as the Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience increases. This is because almost all public 
hospitals have the same Facilities thus patients in Greece most of the time choose a doctor - not a hospital - for an 
important surgery or the treatment of a chronic disease, and they choose based on the doctor’s reputation which is 
spread through word-of-mouth. The reputation of the doctors’ skills and experience, thus, is what attracts patients 
at the hospital,  and in the long term it also builds on the Hospital Reputation through the word of mouth.  
-increases  as  the Patient Satisfaction increases. This is because patients who are satisfied from their 
experience and treatment at a hospital are likely to return there for a future treatment regarding themselves or their 
family members, as well as to express this satisfaction to their contacts and spread this good opinion through word 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a good 
Hospital Reputation leads to the: 
-increase of Doctors’ and Nurses’ Skills & Experience. This is because when a hospital has a good 
reputation, high quality doctors are attracted to come and work with the other considerably good doctors of the 
hospital, bringing their education, skills & experience to the Hospital assets.  
-increase of the rate of Incoming Patients. Obviously, a hospital with a good reputation is more likely to be 
chosen by  patients who have no other specific preferences (i.e, preferences for a specific doctor, in which case 
Hospital Reputation
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they are obliged to visit the hospital where this doctor works and be treated there) for  their routine controls or for 
a minor surgery or treatment. 
 
20. Hospital Spending 
 
By Hospital Spending participants mean the total amount of money spent in one fiscal year for the supply 
of all kinds of hospital services and goods (durable and non-durable goods) which are borne by the hospital budget. 
 
Explanations 
This variable does not include hospital expenses which are not borne by the hospital budget but are directly 
paid by the Ministry of Health or other government entities or NGOs (e.g., the wages of the regular employees, 
who are directly paid by the central government; medical equipment acquired through donation or charity, etc). 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Hospital Spending  is a function of the variable: Financial Resources 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Hospital 
Spending   : 
-increases as the Financial Resources increase, because the more the Financial Resources that hospital 
managers have in their disposition, the more they are motivated to spend. This happens because the main source 
of Financial Resources is the annual budget, and at the end of the year any remains of the budget just get lost; 
they do not pass from one fiscal year to the next. Thus,  the more the Financial Resources that hospital managers 
have in their disposition, the more they are motivated to spend. 
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that increased 
Hospital Spending   leads to the: 
-increase of the Approved Budget in the long term, and the other way around (decreased Hospital Spending 
leads to the decrease of the Approved Budget in the long term). This happens because of the current policy of the 
Ministry of Health, according to which the budget of the next fiscal year is issued according to the past year’s 
spending. 
 
Hospital SpendingFinancial ResourcesApproved Budget





By ICT which stands for Information and Communications Technology our participants mean all kinds of 
Information and Communication technology infrastructure installed in the hospital to support any of the activities 
of the doctors, nurses, technical and administrative staff, including software (i.e., ERP systems, programs, 
applications, databases, etc,) and hardware (i.e., computers, servers, scanners and printers, etc.).  
 
Explanations 
Participants exclude from this variable the Medical & Technical Equipment (biomedical, medical and 









As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that ICT: 
-increase as the Investments increase. The more the managerial and Financial Resources allocated to 
Investments in ICT, the more ICT software and hardware will be bought and installed. 
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that advanced 
ICT leads to the: 
- increase of the variable Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms,  as more 
ICT software and hardware will be in place to be used by the staff, making the administrative work and procedures 







ICT Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
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22. Incoming Patients 
 
By Incoming Patients our participants mean the rate at which people are reaching the Emergency 
Department or the outpatients services of the hospital in order to be examined.  
 
Explanations 
This includes not only the patients who physically reach the Emergency Department (urgent cases), but also 








As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the rate 
of Incoming Patients : 
-increases as the Hospital Reputation increases. Obviously, a hospital with a good reputation is more likely 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a high rate 
of Incoming Patients leads to the: 
-increase of the number of Admitted Patients. This is because the more the Incoming Patients, the more will 
be the scheduled admissions, and the more will be the Admitted Patients. 
-increase of the Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services. This is because the more the Incoming Patients 
at a certain period (e.g., a day in the ER), the more work for a fixed number of nurses and doctors will it be and – 
since they cannot all together be examined at once – the more they will need to wait. This applies not only to 
waiting in the Emergency Room (where patients might need to wait for many hours or days to be examined) but 
Incoming PatientsHospital Reputation





Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience
Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services Patient Satisfaction
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also to the outpatient services of the hospital, where patients call in advance and book an appointment and might 
need to wait for months or even year(s) for the first appointment available.  
 
 
23. Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission 
 
Definition 
Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission are, according to our participants,  the rate of patients’ out-
of-pocket, informal payments to public hospital doctors for scheduling their surgery or admission earlier, in order 
for them to avoid the long waiting time on the list. 
 
Explanations 
Since priority over the waiting list is given only to urgent cases, those patients get admitted in the hospital 
through the Emergency Department (ER) by getting characterised as “urgent cases”, in order to get priority and 
avoid waiting on the list for surgery or admission in a specialised unit or department. Our GMB participants called 





In our model, Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission is a function of the variable: Waiting List for 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the rate 
of Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission: 
-increases as the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission  increases.  This happens because, according to our 
participants, most of the patients do not like to wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary 
treatment, but most importantly because - depending also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that 
their health will deteriorate if they wait. Thus, they commit to paying the doctors out-of-pocket money, thinking 
that they will not get timely and appropriate treatment unless they do it. 
 
Informal Payments for Early Surgery/AdmissionWaiting List for Surgery or Admission
Bed Occupancy




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Informal 
Payments for early Surgery/Admission leads to the: 
-increase of the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission. This is logical, as before calling a patient on the 
waiting list to be admitted for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure that there are 
surgical banks as well as beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If some patients are characterised 
as “urgent cases” and are being given priority after giving informal payments to doctors, then all the patients on 
the waiting list will have to wait more time than otherwise and, in the meanwhile, more patients are being placed 
on the waiting list, making it even bigger and increasing the average waiting time for all the patients on the list. 
-decrease of Patient Satisfaction, which is quite logical as patients do not like being forced to pay out-of-





As Investments our participants intend the expenses made by the hospital in one fiscal year for the supply 
of durable goods which are borne by the hospital budget, such as advancements in Facilities, equipment and ICT. 
 
Explanations 
The expenses for the supply of all kinds of hospital services and non-durable goods which are borne by the 
hospital budget are described by a different variable called “Costs” (i.e., medicine, materials, cleaning services, 
etc). Furthermore, the variable Investments does not include any expenses for Investments which are not borne by 
the hospital budget (i.e., expenses directly paid by the Ministry of Health or other government entities or NGOs, 
such as equipment acquired through donation or charity, for example). 
 
Causal Links 
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Investments : 
-increase as the Financial Resources increase. This is because the more the Financial Resources that 
hospital managers have in their disposition, the greater the part that will remain for Investments after covering first 
the most essential needs in non-durable goods (i.e., medicine, materials, etc)  and services  (i.e.,cleaning services). 
-increase as the Management Capacity increases. This is because even if there are funds available for 
Investments, no Investments can be done without sufficient Management Capacity, as the procedures of supply 
management in public hospitals involve a lot of bureaucracy and know-how by department managers and the 
administrative personnel.  
-decrease as the Costs increase. This is because the higher the Costs for covering the most essential needs 
in non-durable goods (i.e., medicine, materials, etc)  and services  (i.e.,cleaning services), the less the Financial 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Investments  
lead to the: 
-increase of Facilities. The more the Investments on physical Facilities, the more and the better the physical 
Facilities will be.  
-increase of Medical & Technical Equipment. The more the Investments on Equipment, the more modern 
and advanced the hospital’s Medical & Technical Equipment will be. 
-increase of ICT . The more the Investments in ICT, the better and the more advanced and powerful the ICT 







Management CapacityActual Time Available per Patient/Task
Investments
Facilities Patient Satisfaction
ICT Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Medical & Technical Equipment
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
(Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms)
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25. Length of Stay 
 
The Length of Stay is, according to our participants, the time period (counted in days) that a patient stayed 
admitted in the hospital (i.e., from the day he/she was admitted until the day he/she got discharged or died). 
Explanations 
The Length of Stay, thus, does not include neither the waiting time that the patient might have waited in the 
Emergency Department or Outpatient Services before getting examined, nor the time that the patient was being 
examined by the hospital doctors. Furthermore, it does not include the time that -after being examined and 
diagnosed- the patients might have waited on a waiting list before being admitted for surgery, ICU or another 
operation or treatment. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Length of Stay is a function of two other variables: Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness 
of Therapeutic Care; and Complications. 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Length 
of Stay: 
-decreases as the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care increases, because getting 
the right diagnosis means that patients are provided with the right treatment for their condition right away, which 
means that they will get better soon and will be dismissed earlier. When the diagnosis is wrong, patients do not 
respond to the treatment and need to stay more in the hospital in order to run more screenings and examination 
and come to a better diagnosis, before starting another treatment. 
-increases as the Complications increase. This is because Complications deteriorate the patient’s health state 




Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience








As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a high 
Length of Stay leads to the: 
-increase of Complications. This is because Length of Stay augments the chances that Complications occur: 
the more time the inpatient is being treated, the more become the chances that he/she gets a nosocomial infection 
or that he/she becomes subject to an error of the medical staff.  
-increase of Costs, This is because longer stay means usage of more materials and medication, more 
diagnostic tests and biochemical examinations, all of which create extra cost per patient for the hospital, than there 
would be otherwise.  
-increase of Bed Occupancy. This is because Bed Occupancy is a rate which gets higher when many beds 
are covered for longer time. Thus, the higher the stay, the longer the period that the bed is covered by the patient 
and the higher the Bed Occupancy rate. 
 
26. Management Capacity 
 
Management Capacity is, according to our participants, the level of management competencies, 
management support systems and working environment / procedural improvements that the supervisors and 
managers of departments (i.e., the administrative managers and the nurses and doctors who are supervisors or 
managers of their department or unit) have built or achieved. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Management Capacity is a function of the variable Actual Time Available per Patient/Task. 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Management Capacity : 
-increases as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is because the managers’ capacity 
to fulfil their long-term management duties depends on the part of the actual time that they have available during 
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duties (which are usually more urgent and more short-term and present-oriented), the time left for management 
duties (which are usually less urgent and more long-term and future-oriented) decreases and they are not able to 
build Management Capacity in the long term. More specifically:  
Doctors and nurses who are supervisors or managers of their department in Greek Public Hospitals have 
clinical duties, administrative (short-term) duties and management (long-term) responsibilities, with the priority 
being given to the urgent clinical and administrative tasks which are related to the patients treatment and safety. 
When staff is overwhelmed by the limited actual time available, supervisors need to devote most of their work 
time doing clinical and administrative work, such as: helping in patients treatment, supporting staff, trying to make 
the shifts schedule as good as possible for all nurses and doctors, resolving conflicts and other problems that occur 
because of the limited actual time available. In this way, the time that doctors and nurses with a supervising role 
have available during their shift to focus on long-term management duties (i.e., Standardisation & Surveillance 
of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping; Surveillance of the increase of the 
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols; Quality and safety controls, etc) decreases.   
The same thing applies to the managers and supervisors of the administrative personnel. During their 8-
hours shift, they also have both operational (short-term) and strategic (long-term) responsibilities and goals, with 
the priority being given to the everyday, operational tasks. When staff is overwhelmed by the limited actual time 
available, supervisors need to devote most of their time doing operational (short-term) tasks, such as: reporting on 
problems; supporting staff; substituting missing employees; resolving conflicts and other problems that occur 
because of the limited actual time available. In this way, the time that administrative personnel with a supervising 
role have available during their shift to focus on strategic (long-term) work (i.e., Standardisation & Surveillance 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that increased 
Management Capacity leads to the: 
-increase of Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record 
Keeping. This is because breaking down guidelines and protocols into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties 
requires adequate management competencies and specific, up-to-date knowledge. Furthermore, digitalising and 
including those forms in the information system in a way that registration and treatment procedures can be easily 
accessed by many departments (without violating privacy issues), and in a way that inserting and communicating 
data will become easier and less time consuming for users, needs a lot of work from the administrative and IT 
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-increase of Investments. This is because the procedures of supplies management in public hospitals involve 
a lot of bureaucracy, and require specific knowledge and many work-hours from management personnel for the 
specification of the technical requirements of the investment, which is also subject to legal and other administrative 
restrictions. Management Capacity here refers to the competencies of the department managers to quickly identify 
and specify needs, and then absorb funds accordingly. 
-decrease of Costs in the long run. This is because increased Management Capacity of the permanent 
employees of the hospital would eliminate the need for extra personnel (i.e., personnel hired under fixed-term 
contracts of employment to help with the management responsibilities of the hospital managers that are not 
fulfilled) that is paid from the Approved Budget, creating one of the biggest sources of cost for the hospital.  
 
27. Medical & Technical Equipment 
 
Medical & Technical Equipment is, according to the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions, the sum 
of all the biomedical, medical and technical/mechanical equipment and machinery which belongs to the hospital 
clinics and outpatient services.  
 
Explanations 
Participants exclude from this category the Information and Communication technology infrastructure 
installed in the hospital including software (i.e., ERP systems, programs, applications, databases, etc,) and 
hardware (i.e., computers, servers, scanners and printers, etc.), as this is described by another variable named ICT, 








As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Medical 
& Technical Equipment : 
-increases as the Investments increase.  The more the managerial and Financial Resources allocated to 
Investments in Medical & Technical Equipment, , the more advanced Medical & Technical Equipment will be 
bought and installed. 









As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that modern and 
advanced Medical & Technical Equipment leads to: 
- more accurate diagnosis and more appropriate therapeutic care. This is because the more modern and more 
up-to-date the medical and biomedical equipment of a hospital is, the more tools the doctors and nurses have to 
diagnose patients accurately and treat them effectively and safely. Biomedical equipment technology is 
continuously being invented and improved and, as obvious, older machines are usually more invasive, less 
accurate and safe and come with limited capabilities and capacity in respect to more modern ones. technical 
equipment is associated with patients’ safety during treatment. 
-increase of the variable Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms,  as more 
Medical & Technical Equipment will be in place to be used by the staff, making the work of doctors, nurses and 
the supporting technical staff faster, easier, safer, more effective and efficient.  
 
 
28. Multidrug Resistance in Population 
 
By Multidrug Resistance in Population, our participants mean the level at which multidrug-resistant 











Medical & Technical Equipment
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Failure & Mortality Rates
Length of Stay
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Multidrug Resistance in PopulationNosocomial Infections Rate
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Errors
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Multidrug 
Resistance in Population: 
-increases as the Nosocomial Infections Rate increases. This is because the higher the Nosocomial Infections 
Rate, the more patients will be infected by resistant pathogens and – the ones who will not die – will be colonised 
and will be discharged. The more the colonised patients in the community, the higher the Multidrug Resistance in 
the general population.  
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Multidrug 
Resistance in Population  leads to the: 
-increase of Nosocomial Infections Rate. This is because the higher the Multidrug Resistance in the general 
population, the more the colonised patients that will be admitted in the hospital and the more the possibilities that 
they will infect other patients there, pushing the Nosocomial Infections Rate higher than otherwise. 
 
29. Nosocomial Infections Rate 
 
By Nosocomial Infections Rate our GMB participants mean the actual rate of infections (potentially of 




Although there are some indicators that are used by hospitals, the exact rate is impossible to be directly, 
accurately and promptly estimated and monitored.  
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Nosocomial Infections Rate is a function of three other variables: Adherence to Guidelines & 
Protocols; Multidrug Resistance in Population; and Errors. 
 
 
Multidrug Resistance in Population Nosocomial Infections Rate
Complications
(Multidrug Resistance in Population)
Nosocomial Infections Rate
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Difficulty of Shift Schedule
Errors
(Actual Time Available per Patient/Task)
(Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols)
(Difficulty of Shift Schedule)
Multidrug Resistance in Population(Nosocomial Infections Rate)
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As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Nosocomial Infections Rate: 
-increases as the Multidrug Resistance in Population  increases. This is because the higher the Multidrug 
Resistance in the general population, the more the colonised patients that will be admitted in the hospital and the 
more the possibilities that they will infect other patients there, pushing the Nosocomial Infections Rate higher than 
otherwise. 
-increases as the Errors increase. This is because some of the medical and nursing staff’s Errors (e.g., 
improper sterilization of catheters and surgical equipment) directly cause infections (i.e., urinary tract infections 
and surgical site infections respectively) to the patients. 
-decreases  as  the Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols  increases. This is because adherence to guidelines, 
measures, nursing and medical protocols ensures among others Appropriate Patients handling, appropriate 
Material & Waste Management, adequate staff’s vaccination coverage, and other measures and precautions which 
in turn limit the spread of Nosocomial Infections Rate. 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that a high 
Nosocomial Infections Rate  leads to the : 
-increase of Complications. This is because the higher the Hospital’s Nosocomial Infections Rate, the more 
are the chances that a patient gets infected in a given time period.  
-increase of Multidrug Resistance in Population. This is because the higher the Nosocomial Infections Rate, 
the more patients will be infected by resistant pathogens and – the ones who will not die – will be colonised and 
will be discharged. The more the colonised patients in the community, the higher the Multidrug Resistance in the 
general population.  
 
30. Patient Satisfaction 
 
Patient Satisfactionis , according to our GMB participants, the level at which patients are satisfied with the 
overall experience and outcome of their hospital treatment.  
 
Explanations 
In our model, this level can be from 0 to 1, where 0 equals to a very negative experience and/or outcome of 





Failure & Mortality Rates
Length of Stay
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life
Multidrug Resistance in Population (Nosocomial Infections Rate)
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In our model, Patient Satisfaction is a function of six other variables: Facilities; Informal Payments for 
early Surgery/Admission; Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs; Survival Rate / Patients’ 
Health Status & Quality of Life; Waiting List for Surgery or Admission; and Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient 
Services. 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Patient 
Satisfaction: 
-increases as the Facilities increase.  Physical Facilities  (e.g., modern and nicely decorated patient rooms, 
restaurants, outdoor play areas for children, furniture, etc) and other amenities provided by the hospital (e.g., 
privacy and cleanness in rooms, toilets and common spaces; internet access for patients and guests, etc) and other 
similar amenities related to the physical Facilities of the hospital and the comfort that the hospital Facilities 
provides to patients are very important aspects of the patients’ hospitalisation experience and is largely what they 
have in mind when filling in Patient satisfaction questionnaires.  
-increases as the Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs increases. A polite behaviour, a 
good communication and the attendance to their needs by the medical and nursing staff are largely what patients 
perceive as “good hospital treatment” and is what they have in mind when evaluating their hospitalisation 
experience in the Patient satisfaction questionnaires. This happens because patients are not able – unless they are 
doctors themselves - to evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, or the medical and scientific 
integrity of doctors and nurses. 
-increases as the Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life increases. Although patients 
cannot evaluate the appropriateness of treatment and diagnosis, they can and they do evaluate the outcome of the 
treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., their overall level of health, pain and functionality after 
treatment in comparison to before treatment). 
-decreases as the Waiting List for Surgery or Admission increases because, according to our participants, 
most of the patients do not like to wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most 
importantly because - depending also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that their health will 
deteriorate if they wait. 
-decreases  as  the Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services increases, which is quite logical as nobody 
likes long queues and long waiting times to be examined. Especially when it comes to being in the ER for an 
emergency, waiting can be fatal. 
Patient Satisfaction
FacilitiesInvestments
Informal Payments for Early Surgery/Admission(Waiting List for Surgery or Admission)
Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients' NeedsActual Time Available per Patient/Task
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Complications
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission
Bed Occupancy
(Informal Payments for Early Surgery/Admission)
Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient ServicesIncoming Patients
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-decreases as the Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission increase, which is quite logical as patients 
do not like being forced to pay out-of-pocket money for getting access to the public healthcare services which are 
supposed to be free of charge.  
 
 
As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that high Patient 
Satisfaction  leads to the: 
-increase of the Hospital Reputation. This is because patients who are satisfied from their experience and 
treatment at a hospital are likely to return there for a future treatment regarding themselves or their family 
members, as well as to express this satisfaction to their contacts and spread this good opinion through word of 
mouth, affecting the Hospital Reputation positively.  
 
31. Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs 
 
Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs is, according to our GMB participants, the level 
at which doctors, nurses and healthcare staff timely, promptly and adequately respond to the Admitted Patients’ 
needs during their stay and adequately communicate with them regarding their diagnosis and treatment.  
Causal Links 
In our model, Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs is a function of the variable: Actual 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs : 
-increases as the Actual Time Available per Patient/Task increases. This is because the more the net time 
that doctors and nurses have available to dedicate to each patient, the more “present” and “responsive” nurses and 
medical staff will be to each patients’ needs and the more the time they will spend with each one of them, 
answering their questions and giving them information and instructions regarding their condition, treatment and 
personal care. 
 
Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience
Incoming Patients
Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients' NeedsActual Time Available per Patient/Task
Availability  of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Doctor or Nurse-Patient Ratio
Proper Communication & Attendance to Patients' Needs Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation
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As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Proper 
Communication & Attendance to Patients’ Needs  leads to the: 
-increase of Patient Satisfaction. A polite behaviour, a good communication and the attendance to their 
needs by the medical and nursing staff are largely what patients perceive as “good hospital treatment” and is what 
they have in mind when evaluating their hospitalisation experience in the Patient satisfaction questionnaires. This 
happens because patients are not able – unless they are doctors themselves - to evaluate the appropriateness of 
treatment and diagnosis, or the medical and scientific integrity of doctors and nurses. 
 
32. Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping 
 
Standardisation of Procedures is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which the managers of the 
hospital’s administrative, nursing and medical units and departments are continuously getting informed and 
updated on the national and international guidelines and protocols regarding quality and safety during the delivery 
of care, and are “translating” those guidelines and protocols into easy, simple and standard procedures that their 
subordinates have to follow during the delivery of their (medical or nursing) practice.  
Surveillance of Procedures is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which  the managers of the 
hospital’s administrative, nursing and medical units and departments are inspecting and surveilling the adherence 
to those standard procedures by their subordinates. 
Digitalisation of Procedures and Forms is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which  the 
managers of the hospital’s administrative, nursing and medical units and departments are working towards 
modernising and digitising the administrative procedures and the forms of their department/unit with the support 
of ICT, by creating digital nursing and medical forms - hopefully integrated into the hospital’s information system 
(ERP) - in order for the patients’ information to be easily, accurately and quickly filled in, signed and distributed 
in other units and departments of the hospital. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record 
Keeping is a function of the variable: Management Capacity. 
 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping: 
-increases as the Management Capacity increases. This is because breaking down guidelines and protocols 
into steps of Standard Procedures & Duties requires adequate management competencies and specific, up-to-date 
knowledge.  
 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that 
Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record Keeping leads to the: 
-increase of the Availability of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms. This is because the 
more the guidelines and protocols that are “translated” into easy, simple and standard procedures, the greater the 
availability of those standard procedures for the staff to follow them during the delivery of their (medical or 
nursing) practice and for the managers to surveil them.  
 
33. Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life 
 
Survival Rate is, according to our GMB participants, the rate at which hospitalised patients survive and get 
discharged from the hospital alive after their treatment. 
Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life is, for our GMB participants, an indicator of the level of the 
patients’ health and quality of life after their hospital treatment, in respect to a reference level of health and quality 
of life based on their age and condition.  
 
Explanations 
In our model, this level of the patients’ health and quality of life after their hospital treatment  can be from 




In our model, Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life is a function of two other variables: 
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care; and Complications. 
 
As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the 
Survival Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life: 
-decrease as the Complications increase. This is because the more the Complications during the treatment, 
the more compromised the immune system of the patient gets and the more are his/her chances of death. 
Furthermore, a compromised immune system makes it easier for the patient to get infected by contagious 
pathogens in the hospital environment and raises even more his chances of failure of the treatment or death.  
Standardisation & Surveillance of Procedures/ Digitalisation of Forms & Electronic Record KeepingAvailab lity  of Equipment, ICT, Standard Procedures & Digital Forms
Actual Time Available per Patient/Task
Adherence to Guidelines & Protocols
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality  of Life
Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care
Doctors' and Nurses' Skills & Experience







-increase as the Accurate Diagnosis & Appropriateness of Therapeutic Care increases. This is because the 
more Accurate the Diagnosis and - subsequently - the more appropriate the  treatment provided for his condition, 




As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that the Survival 
Rate / Patients’ Health Status & Quality of Life leads to the: 
-increase of Patient Satisfaction. Although patients cannot evaluate  the appropriateness of treatment and 
diagnosis, they can and they do evaluate the outcome of the treatment and their quality of life after discharge (i.e., 
their overall level of health, pain and functionality after treatment in comparison to before treatment). 
 
34. Waiting List for Surgery or Admission 
 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission is, according to our GMB participants, the average time that patients 
-after being examined and diagnosed- have to wait before getting admitted for a Surgery or Admission in one of 
the hospital clinics or the ICU. 
 
Explanations 
The Waiting List for Surgery or Admission, thus, does not include neither the waiting time that the patient 
might have waited in the Emergency Department or Outpatient Services before getting examined, nor the time 
that the patient was being examined by the hospital doctors. 
 
Causal Links 
In our model, Waiting List for Surgery or Admission  is a function of two other variables: Bed Occupancy; 




As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Waiting 
List for Surgery or Admission : 
Survival Rate / Patients' Health Status & Quality of Life Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation





Informal Payments for Early Surgery/Admission(Waiting List for Surgery or Admission)
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-increases as the Bed Occupancy increases.  This is logical, as before calling a patient from the waiting list 
to be admitted for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure that there are surgical 
banks as well as beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If all the Available Beds are covered, all 
patients on the waiting list have to wait more time and, in the meanwhile, more patients are being placed on the 
waiting list, making it even bigger and increasing the average waiting time for all the patients on the list. 
-increases as the Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission increases. This is logical, as before calling 
a patient on the waiting list to be admitted for a surgery, transplant or ICU, administrative staff needs to make sure 
that there are surgical banks as well as beds available in ICU and at the corresponding clinic. If some patients are 
characterised as “urgent cases” and are being given priority after giving informal payments to doctors, then all the 
patients on the waiting list will have to wait more time than otherwise and, in the meanwhile, more patients are 
being placed on the waiting list, making it even bigger and increasing the average waiting time for all the patients 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that longer 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission  leads to the: 
-increase of the Informal Payments for early Surgery/Admission.  This happens because, according to our 
participants, most of the patients do not like to wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary 
treatment, but most importantly because - depending also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that 
their health will deteriorate if they wait. Thus, they commit to paying the doctors out-of-pocket money, thinking 
that they will not get timely and appropriate treatment unless they do it. 
-decrease of Patient Satisfaction, because, according to our participants, most of the patients do not like to 
wait long times for having an elective surgery or a necessary treatment, but most importantly because - depending 
also on the severity of their condition - they might feel that their health will deteriorate if they wait. 
 
35. Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services 
 
Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services is, according to our GMB participants, the average time that 
patients have to wait before getting examined in the Emergency Room or in the Outpatient Services of the hospital. 
 
Explanations 
Waiting List for Surgery or Admission
Informal Payments for Early Surgery/Admission
(Patient Satisfaction)
(Waiting List for Surgery or Admission)
Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation
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In the Emergency Room the waiting time varies from some minutes to several hours or days, while in the 
outpatient services of the hospital patients call in advance and book an appointment and might need to wait for 
months or even year(s) for the first appointment available.  
 
Causal Links 





As shown on the Causes Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that Waiting 
Time in ER & Outpatient Services : 
-increases as the Number of Incoming Patients increases - especially in the ER. This is because the more 
the Incoming Patients at a certain period (e.g., a day in the ER), the more work for a fixed number of nurses and 
doctors will it be and – since they cannot all together be examined at once – the more they will need to wait. This 
applies not only to waiting in the Emergency Room (where patients might need to wait for many hours or days to 
be examined) but also to the outpatient services of the hospital, where patients call in advance and book an 





As shown on the Uses Tree above, the participant stakeholders of our GMB sessions agree that longer 
Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services leads to the: 
-decrease of Patient Satisfaction, which is quite logical as nobody likes long queues and long waiting times 





Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient ServicesIncoming PatientsHospital Reputation
Waiting Time in ER & Outpatient Services Patient Satisfaction Hospital Reputation
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Appendix 25: The Scale of the Research Project - Main and Secondary Activities undertaken  
 
1.TOPIC FINDING  
Read about strategies for finding a topic; Research possible topics; Check out the topic area; Assess 
feasibility of research topic, and relevance with the PhD Objectives and with the researcher’s skills; Brainstorm 
precise Research Questions (RQs); Meet with supervisor to discuss the RQs; Plan the next stages. 
 
2.LITERATURE REVIEW  
-Preliminary Literature Review: Attendance of specialised courses on Public Management at the University 
of Palermo, Italy; Read text books and journal articles; Critique the sources; Select material for the final Literature 
Review; Prepare a summary of the Literature Review for the research proposal. 
-Intermediate Literature Review: Attendance of specialised courses on Performance Measurement at the 
University of Palermo, Italy; Read text books and journal articles; Synthesise theories and create a preliminary 
Research Hypothesis and Conceptual Model; Select material for the final Literature Review; Inform the summary 
of the Literature Review for the research proposal; Make amendments as the research progresses. 
-Final  Literature Review: Read more recently published journal articles; Finalise the Research Hypothesis 
and the Conceptual Model;  Create Preliminary CLD model derived from the literature review, to be used during 
the interviews; Select material for the final Literature Review; Inform the summary of the Literature Review for 
the research proposal; Make amendments as the research progresses; Evaluate all sources in the review; Update 
the bibliography; Finalise and write up the Literature Review. 
 
3.RESEARCH PROPOSAL DRAFTING 
Finalise RQs; Agree the RQs and the scope of research with the tutor; Adapt the Literature Review for the 
research proposal; Think around methods and methodological decisions; Critique Methodology; Select Methods; 
Decide sampling and research population; Inform research planning and plan the next stages; Learn how to use 
the referencing in Word; Finalise the proposal; Agree the Proposal with the tutor. 
 
4.METHODOLOGY LEARNING (THROUGH INTENSE COURSEWORK) 
Attendance of specialised courses on System Dynamics at the University of Bergen, Norway; Attendance 
of specialised courses on Performance Measurement at the University of Palermo, Italy; Attendance of specialised 
courses on Group Model Building at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Read textbooks and academic 
articles on System Dynamics Modeling, Group Model Building and Research Methodology; Critique 
Methodology and inform methodological decisions; Reflect on the effectiveness of the methods; Update the 
bibliography and write up the methodology part of this thesis. 
 
5.RESEARCH DESIGN, PLANNING & PREPARATION 
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RESEARCH PLANNING, LEGAL AUTHORISATIONS, APPROVALS & ETHICS: Investigate and get 
informed on the legal procedures for research approval and ethics approval; Address ethical issues and prepare 
ethical statement; Prepare ethics protocol; Prepare the formal request for permission to conduct research inside a 
Greek hospital, addressing the Hospital’s Board of Directors; Prepare the formal request for research approval and 
Ethics approval, addressing the hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee; Inform and finalise research design 
and planning; Create Gantt chart of the detailed research plan and plan the next stages. 
-STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS, IDENTIFICATION OF CASE HOSPITAL & PREPARATION OF 
MATERIAL: Undertake a stakeholder analysis to identify which stakeholder groups should participate in each 
stage of the research; Develop the “Call for participants”; Send out the “call for participants”; Identify the Case 
Hospital; Submit the formal  request for a permission to conduct research to the Hospital’s Board of Directors; 
Submit the formal request for research approval and Ethics approval to the hospital’s Research and Ethics 
Committee; Prepare and submit additional documentation to  the Research and Ethics Committee of the hospital; 
Receive research approval and Ethics approval; Adapt the Preliminary CLD model derived from the literature 
review, to be used during the interviews; Create the Interview guide; Create the GMB presentation & agenda. 
-IDENTIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS, COMMUNICATIONS & PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR THE RESEARCH:  Develop the “Telephone contact guide”; Identify potential participants and use 
the  “Telephone contact guide” to recruit them; Establish contact, trust and preliminary agreements with potential 
participants; Finalise participants and establish dates, times and practicalities of the GMB interviews and GMB 
sessions; Send out GMB agenda and reminders to participants. 
 
6.DATA COLLECTION (Interviews, GMB sessions)  
Documents gathering & initial documents analysis; Inform Interview Guide and GMB presentation with 
insights from the initial documents analysis; Send out and receive signed informed consents from participants; 
Carry out preliminary interviews; Inform the preliminary CLD model with insights from the interviews; Carry out 
Group Model Building sessions; Primary validation of the results; Ensure data is fully collected and secured. 
 
7.DATA ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
-Create the Scoping Model of Hospital Performance (Divergent CLD version) 
-Create the Conceptual Model of Hospital Performance (Convergent  CLD version);  
-Undertake DPM analysis, based on the Convergent version of Hospital Performance CLD;  
-Model Analysis & Validation: 1.Direct Structure Tests (Structure-Confirmation Test,Parameter-
Confirmation Test, Direct Extreme- Condition Test, Dimensional consistency Test), 2.Indirect Structure Tests 
(Extreme-Condition Test, Behavior sensitivity Test, Boundary adequacy Test, Phase relationship Test), 
3.Behavior Tests (Reference Mode Test);  
-Create model stories, Support stories with data, evidence, graphs; Check the clarity and support of the data 





8.THESIS DRAFTING  
Write up discussion; Finish writing up previous sections; Add in front, contents, abstract etc; Add contents, 










Appendix 26: Risk Assessment, Measures and Precautions undertaken for the protection of participants 
 
In this appendix, our extensive risk assessment, as well as the measures and precautions undertaken based 
on this risk assessment for the protection of the participants in terms of potential harm, voluntary participation, 
informed consent, privacy, identity, confidentiality, etc, are analytically presented and analysed. Following 
Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130), an informal risk assessment was undertaken by the researcher in order to identify 
and consider during the research design phase any potential harm for the participants and the participating 
organisation resulting from the research. This informal risk assessment was conducted by means of thinking about 
a whole range of questions and ‘What if ’ scenarios in connection with the research proposal and design.  
More specifically, the ‘What if ’ scenarios and questions that our informal risk assessment involved 
following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130), are summarised as follows: 
1) In respect to potential harm to participants:   
-What kinds of harm are reasonably foreseeable? What precautions will be taken to prevent these occurring?  
-Has authorization been obtained for access to potential participants?  
-What measures will be taken to guarantee the anonymity of participants? Will anonymity be guaranteed in 
terms of any reported findings from the research? 
-What assurances about confidentiality will be given? How will data security be safeguarded? Who will 
have access to the data files? What assurances can be given about non-disclosure of information to third parties? 
-How will the research avoid undue intrusion into personal lives? How will it respect participants’ rights to 
privacy? 
-Are there any aspects of the proposed research that might entail a threat to the interests of participants? 
Have these been described and have they been defended bearing in mind the extent of the potential harm involved? 
2) In respect to voluntary participation and informed consent:  
-How will consent be obtained? What kind of consent will be required? Will a consent form be used? How 
will this be administered? 
-Will the research require written consent or not? 
-When and where will potential participants be provided with a ‘participant’s information document’? 
-Will potential participants be formally notified of their right to withdraw? 
-Are there any considerations about equality, fairness, and justice that arise in connection with the selection 
of participants for the research? 
Based on the above risk assessment, the researcher undertook a number of measures and precautions to 
minimise the risk for participants and assure ethical integrity. Following Denscombe (2012, pp.128-130), those 
measures can be categorised as follows: 
 
1) Preventing harm:  
Research is conducted at the workplace of most participants (i.e., the case hospital), involving some of their 
co-workers and colleagues and regarding work-related issues. Thus, only some kind of moral or professional harm 
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could be reasonably anticipated for the participants, stemming from the fact that they will participate in open 
discussions during the GMB sessions involving work issues. To prevent this from occurring, we designed the 
research in a way that we first sent a “call for participants” to hospital managers by email. 
We contacted the ones who replied to us by telephone, informing them about the research and asking them 
to act as gatekeepers.  As gatekeeper, the interested participant would lead us through snowball sampling to the 
rest of the participants, and would be the main contact person for the researcher. The researcher would cooperate 
with the gatekeeper during the selection of participants for the interviews and the GMB sessions, in order to ensure 
that the participant stakeholders who were selected have already cooperation and relationships between them well-
established, and share some kind of minimum commitment to fostering performance in their departments. This 
would prevent us from involving participants with hidden agendas that would potentially create conflicts of 
interest during the GMB sessions which could lead to professional harm of some of the rest of the participants or 
of the organisation as a whole. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent any financial harm of the participants or of the organisation as a whole, 
within the additional documents submitted to the Hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee was a statement 
signed by the researcher stating that the hospital will not be financially burdened in any way by the research study. 
 
2) Respecting privacy:  
Once we identified the case hospital through the interest presented by the potential gatekeeper, we first 
officially submitted a formal request to the Hospital’s Board of Directors for permission to conduct research inside 
the hospital. Because of the sensitive data the research involved, we were asked to submit a formal request for 
research approval and ethics approval to the hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee, providing them with 
additional documents, in order for them to be able to give an opinion to the Board of Directors. Those documents 
were submitted on time and both the Scientific Council, acting as a Research and Ethics Committee, and the Board 
of Directors gave their consent to conduct the research. Thus, the privacy rules of the hospital were respected. 
Within those additional documents was the Research proposal, the Ethics Protocol and the Interview guide 
translated in Greek. Those documents were available upon request to all the participants as well. Also, as 
mentioned before, we selected the gatekeepers based on their response to a “call for participants”, thus based on 
their personal interest, voluntary participation and informed consent. Then, the gatekeeper would lead us through 
snowball sampling to other potential participants, who would also be selected based on their response rate to our 
call, thus based on their personal interest, voluntary participation, free and informed consent.  
Furthermore, during the first telephone contact with each participant, as well as in the beginning of the 
interviews and the GMB sessions, the researcher informed the participants that: 
-The data is confidential and anonymous, meaning no names, hospital titles, participant names etc. will be 
mentioned, and will only be used for research purposes.  
-Interviews will be tape-recorded and then analysed only by the interviewer- researcher to inform a model 
of hospital performance she is preparing. She will be the only person who has access  to the interview data. Literal 
quotations and paraphrasing will be used in order to justify the model building, but any identifiable information 
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(name, function, position, company title, etc.) will be changed. Participants will receive the final draft of the thesis 
where literal quotations exist, before submission, and they will have the right to correct or delete any of the 
quotations that they do not want to be included in the thesis. Only the final text will be included in the thesis, after 
changes in identifiers and additional corrections of participants. 
-You will be asked to sign an informed consent form and a data privacy form. The first one is for me to 
make sure you agree to participate in this research on your own will, and the second one is for you to make sure 
that all your personal details, all your sayings and data are safe. It is also very important to remember that even 
after signing those forms, you can still change your mind and withdraw from participating at any moment, if you 
feel that you do not want to participate anymore for any reason. 
Moreover, during the first telephone contact with each participant, and after explaining a bit more about the 
research following the telephone contact guide, the researcher gave to them time to think about it and told them 
that “If you are still interested in participating, we can arrange an appointment (date, time & place) at your 
convenience for the interview. You can take some time to think about it and let me know”, as well as that “even 
after you agree, you can still change your mind and withdraw from participating at any moment, if you feel that 
you do not want to participate anymore for any reason”. Then, at the beginning of the scheduled interviews and 
GMB sessions, the researcher checked again with the participants, before getting started that they still wish to 
participate, by saying to them  “I know that when we spoke you agreed to take part in the interview, but I just want 
to check that you are still ok with it”.  
In all those ways, we assured that participants were fully informed, fully aware of what they were getting 
involved in and free to participate voluntarily. Thus,  their privacy rights were respected and maintained, and 
intrusion into their personal lives was avoided.  
 
3) Protecting identities:  
Potential risks were found to arise mainly from the nature of the data collected (personal data). Thus, the 
need for assuring security of collected data, and the need for keeping anonymity when disseminating findings was 
found as crucial. The researcher developed a plan for minimising those risks and guarantee anonymity, involving 
actions such as: replacing the name of the hospital by “the hospital” in all the transcripts and documents and 
informing the research proposal, the interview, the telephone guide and all the materials accordingly, as well as 
by not revealing the names of the participants in any way. 
Furthermore, during the telephone contact as well as in the beginning of the interviews and the GMB 
sessions, the researcher informed the participants that: 
-The data is confidential and anonymous, meaning no names, hospital titles, participant names etc. will be 
mentioned, and will only be used for research purposes.  
-Interviews will be tape-recorded and then analysed only by the interviewer- researcher to inform a model 
of hospital performance she is preparing. She will be the only person who has access to the interview data. Literal 
quotations and paraphrasing will be used in order to justify the model building, but any identifiable information 
(name, function, position, company title, etc.) will be changed.  
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-Participants will receive the final draft of the thesis where literal quotations exist, before submission, and 
they will have the right to correct or delete any of the quotations that they do not want to be included in the thesis. 
Only the final text will be included in the thesis, after changes in identifiers and additional corrections of 
participants. 
Finally, within the additional documents submitted to the Hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee there 
was a statement signed by the researcher stating that  the names of the hospital and of the participants will not be 
exposed while reporting the findings from the research, neither for the writing of the thesis nor for any 
publications. Those documents were made available to all the participants as well.  
 
4) Gaining consent:  
Consent was obtained directly from the potential participants, in physical form. Free and informed consent 
was required, and a consent form was created and used. During the preparation phase and the preliminary 
agreements with the participants, a physical consent form was sent to them by email, and they were asked to read 
it, sign it and return it scanned. Only after the researcher had received the signed form by the potential participant, 
was he considered as a participant. Participants were informed that, in any case, they can change their mind at any 
moment and decide to not participate. Then right before the interviews and the GMB sessions, the participants 
that showed up were again handed out the same consent form and were asked to sign it again, if they still wished 
to participate in the research and had not changed their minds. 
Within the additional documents submitted to the Hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee was a 
University Certificate of Attendance, certifying the attendance of the researcher into a PhD position in the 
University of Palermo and her research topic. Those documents were made available to all the participants as well, 
upon request. Furthermore, although the researcher first contacted the gatekeeper and then each participant 
separately, after all participants were selected the researcher started an open communication via emails with the 
whole group of participants, in order to send out her credentials and research information, consent forms, privacy 
forms, material, GMB session agenda, etc,  and to organise the dates and time for the GMB sessions with the 
group. In this way, the details of the researcher and her institution were not only double-checked in advance by 
the Hospital’s Research and Ethics Committee, but also available for participants to verify it online, thus any 
suspicions of deception or misrepresentation by the researcher were avoided.  
 
5) Respecting confidentiality:  
When dealing with personal data, it is important to consider data privacy, data protection and data security 
issues during all the stages of data management, such as during the research preparation and arrangements, during 
the data collection, the data analysis and the data storage. Following the guidelines provided by the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands46, we undertook the following measures: 
 
46 See: https://www.ru.nl/rdm/planning-research/data-management-paragraph/ 
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Regarding Data Privacy47, the researcher undertook the following measures of data minimisation: the 
personal data collected was limited to only the data directly and absolutely necessary to achieve the goals of the 
research project. Thus, the documents and the data collected from the medical records of the hospital’s Information 
System will contain aggregated information in the form of graphs and performance indicators, and not explicit 
data of medical records and personal  data of patients. In this way, the patients will not be identifiable in the data 
collected. Furthermore, the researcher minimised the amount of personal data collected from the research 
participants, and this minimum amount of personal data collected from the participants to the interviews and GMB 
sessions were summarised in the following table. The only identifiable subjects from the data collected for our 
research are the participants, and all the personal data involved were mentioned only inside this table and nowhere 
else, in order to ensure anonymity. Finally, as the researcher was the only person who has access to the data files, 
risks of exposure are minimised.  
 
Name  




Role in  
respect to  
hospital  
performance 




Dates &  
Times  for  
communications 





 for the research 
              
              
              
        
 
 
Data security refers to the risks that digital data are prone to, like hacking or cyber-attacks, especially when 
there is a lack of security. In our research, those risks stem from a potential exposure of the email communications 
with the participants, and of the table above with their personal details. Regarding Data Security48, the researcher 
undertook the following measures of data minimization:  
-Made exclusive use of the Radboud University email account for all private email communications with 
participants, as well as the university network drive to store the table with the participants’ personal details, and 
all the documents and statistical records collected from the Hospital. Radboud University suggests that “while 
research is ongoing, data is stored on the campus network. Safe and secure storage is guaranteed by the IT 
security and safety protocols of the campus network. In addition, it is proposed that Surfdrive (for non-personal 
 
47 See: https://www.ru.nl/rdm/collecting-data/data-privacy/ 
48 See: https://www.ru.nl/rdm/collecting-data/data-security/ 
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data) or the campus network (for (sensitive) personal data) can be used to exchange between researchers during 
the project. If it is not possible to store the data directly on the campus network, data is stored encrypted on a 
local device (laptop) and transferred to the campus network as soon as possible”49.  
-Encrypted all Email communications. 
-Used VPN connection of the Radboud university to ensure safe data transfer between the university 
network drive and the researcher’s home computer. 
-As outlined above, all Facilities necessary to store and share research data are available at Radboud 
University. No further Facilities were necessary. 
Regarding Data Protection50, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the Data Protection Act 
2018 (DPA 2018) contains all the general rules that the data processing must meet in Europe. The researcher 
followed all those rules and guidelines during the research study, in order to assure that data security will be 
safeguarded, and that the data protection and data privacy are secured in accordance with the European laws and 
standards. Furthermore, within the additional documents submitted to the Hospital’s Research and Ethics 
Committee was a statement signed by the researcher stating that the terms of personal data protection will be 




49 See: https://www.ru.nl/rdm/planning-research/data-management-paragraph/ 
50 See: https://www.ru.nl/privacy/english/ and https://eugdpr.org/ 
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απόδοσης στα δημόσια νοσοκομεία: Η Μέθοδος Δυναμικής
διαχείρισης απόδοσης για τη βελτίωση της ποιότητας των
νοσοκομειακών υπηρεσιών "
ΜΕΘΟΔΟΛΟΓΙΑ (CASE STUDY)
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Συνεδρίες Ομαδικής Μοντελοποιησης 
(Richardson and Andersen, 1995; Vennix, 1996; 
De Gooyert, 2016, 2018; De Gooyert, Honingh, & Van Genugten, 2019) 
Μ Ι Α
Ε Ν Α Λ Λ Α Κ Τ Ι Κ Η
Τ Ω Ν  Κ Ο Ι Ν Ω Ν
" Σ Υ Ν Α Ν Τ Η Σ Ε Ω Ν
Ε Ρ Γ Α Σ Ι Α Σ "
F A C I L I T A T I O N
Ο Ι  Λ Υ Σ Ε Ι Σ
Ε Ρ Χ Ο Ν Τ Α Ι  Α Π Ο
Τ Ο Υ Σ  Μ Ε Σ Α
Α Π Ο Τ Υ Π Ω Σ Η  &
Α Π Ο Θ Η Κ Ε Υ Σ Η
Ο Μ Α Δ Ι Κ Η Σ
Γ Ν Ω Σ Η Σ  Σ Ε








Τ Ω Ν  ( Π Ο Λ Ι Τ Ι Κ Ω Ν ,  Ε Τ Α Ι Ρ Ι Κ Ω Ν ,  Δ Ι Ο Ι Κ Η Τ Ι Κ Ω Ν  Κ Τ Λ )
Α Π Ο Φ Α Σ Ε Ω Ν  Τ Ε Λ Ι Κ Α  Δ Ε Ν  Υ Λ Ο Π Ο Ι Ο Υ Ν Τ Α Ι
Δ Ε  Φ Τ Α Ν Ε Ι  Ν Α  Ξ Ε Ρ Ε Ι Σ  Τ Η  Σ Ω Σ Τ Η  Λ Υ Σ Η
Γ Ι Α  Ν Α  Τ Η Ν  Κ Α Ν Ε Ι Σ  Ν Α  Υ Λ Ο Π Ο Ι Η Θ Ε Ι
Δομή
Σ Κ Ο Π Ο Σ
Να κατανοήσουμε καλύτερα το πρόβλημα
και τις αιτίες/συνέπειες του προβλήματος 
Δ Ο Μ Η
Δομημένες ομαδικές δραστηριότητες &
συζητήσεις
Μ Ο Ν Τ Ε Λ Ο Π Ο Ι Η Σ Η
Για καλύτερη κατανόηση, κοινή γλώσσα/
οπτική, αποδοχή και συναίνεση/
συμφωνία επι του προβλήματος
Ομάδα 
Α Γ Γ Ε Λ Ι Κ Η
Facilitator
Α Ν Α Σ Τ Α Σ Η Σ
Modeler
Ο Λ Ο Ι  Ε Σ Ε Ι Σ
Experts
ΚΑΝΟΝΕΣ
ΟΧΙ ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΕΣ ΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ &
ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΜΟΙ
Οι δηλώσεις συζητούνται για το περιεχόμενό
τους. Δεν είναι σημαντικό ποιος το λέει αλλά το τι
λέει.
ΕΝΕΡΓΟΣ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΟΧΗ
Καλείσθε να παρευρεθείτε και στις δύο
συνεδρίες και να αφιερώσετε την
αμέριστη προσοχή και συμμετοχή σας.
ΕΜΠΙΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ
Τίποτα από όσα θα ειπωθούν δεν θα βγει προς τα
έξω με τη  μορφή αποκλειστικών δηλώσεων ή
"κουτσομπολιού". 
ΜΟΝΤΕΛΑ
Π Ο Ι Ο Τ Ι Κ Α  S D  M O N T E Λ Α
C A U S A L  L O O P  D I A G R A M S  ( C L D )
Για χαρτογράφηση και καλύτερη
κατανόηση του προβλήματος
Π Ο Σ Ο Τ Ι Κ Α  S D  M O N T E Λ A
S T O C K & F L O W  M O D E L S  ( S F D )
Για προβλέψεις, δοκιμές και εύρεση βέλτιστων
τρόπων αντιμετώπισης & πολιτικών
Δ Υ Ν Α Μ Ι Κ Ω Ν  Σ Υ Σ Τ Η Μ Α Τ Ω Ν
S Y S T E M  D Y N A M I C S  ( S D )
MIT SLOAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
(Forrester, 1958; 1961; Richardson & Pugh,
1981; Sterman, 1989; 2000).
ΜΟΝΤΕΛΑ SD
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ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 3'  -  ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
Δώστε έναν δικό σας ορισμό της
ποιότητας υπηρεσιών των Μονάδων





ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΣΕ ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Κατά τη διάρκεια ποιας περιόδου
αναπτύχθηκε το πρόβλημα στην ποιότητα
των υπηρεσιών των μονάδων
Εμφραγμάτων/ΜΝ/ΜΕΘ; 





ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΣΕ ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Ζωγραφίστε μια καμπύλη που να δείχνει
πως εξελίχθηκε & πως αναμένεται να






ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΟΜΑΔΑ
Ζωγραφίστε επάνω στο διάγραμμα μια
άλλη καμπύλη που να δείχνει ΠΩΣ ΙΔΑΝΙΚΑ
ΘΑ ΘΕΛΑΤΕ να εξελιχθεί η ποιότητα κατά















Η ερευνήτρια, η Διδ. Διατριβή, Η έρευνα στο Λαϊκό
Η ΜΕΘΟΔΟΣ 




ΕΞΕΡΕΥΝΩΝΤΑΣ ΤΙΣ ΑΙΤΙΕΣ ΤΟΥ
ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ
Παράγοντες Επιρροής, Αιτιώδεις Σχέσεις, Λούπες
ΟΡΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ
Ορισμός, Ιστορικό, Καμπύλη Αναφοράς, Χάσμα
ΣΤΟΧΟΣ:
Να κατανοήσουμε τις










ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
Καταγράψτε σε χαρτάκια όσες μεταβλητές
θεωρείτε σχετικές με την ποιότητα των
υπηρεσιών των μονάδων Εμφραγμάτων/
ΜΝ/ΜΕΘ.
Παρουσίαση: 20'
θετική ή αρνητική σχέση
Tip:
"Όσο









ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 30'  -  ΟΜΑΔΑ
Βάλτε πάνω-πάνω τις μεταβλητές που
θεωρείτε πιο σημαντικές.
Παρουσιάστε στην ομάδα μία μεταβλητή,
και συνδέστε την (ΘΕΤΙΚΟΣ Η ΑΡΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ
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Κύκλο ι  Ανάδρασης
(Feedback  Loops )
Αυτοενισχυόμενες (+)  ή












ΣΤΟ ΜΟΝΤΕΛΟ ΜΑΣ (1)
ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
Προσπαθήστε να βρείτε ή να δημιουργήσετε λούπες στο μοντέλο
 
Tip: Μπορείτε να προσθέσετε ενδιάμεσες μεταβλητές, που δεν
υπάρχουν αυτή τη στιγμή στο μοντέλο.
ΨΑΧΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΙΣ ΛΟΥΠΕΣ
ΣΤΟ ΜΟΝΤΕΛΟ ΜΑΣ (2)
ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 10'  -  ΣΕ ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Συζητήστε τις λούπες που βρήκατε, κάντε αλλαγές ώσπου να




ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 20'  -  ΟΜΑΔΑ
Επιλέξτε μία λούπα ο καθένας και περιγράψτε με δικά σας λόγια
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ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΣΗ
ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ATOMIKA
-Τι καινούργιο μάθατε σήμερα; Το πρώτο που
σας έρχεται στο μυαλό.
 
-Ποιο είναι το πιο σημαντικό μέρος του
μοντέλου για εσάς; Γιατί;
 
-Ποιο είναι το πιο αντιφατικό/ενδιαφέρον/























2Η ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΑ ΜΟΝΤΕΛΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ -  28/02/2020


























Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΟΣ 






ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ









Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
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ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ










είναι η παροχή εξατομικευμένης
φροντίδας υγείας προς τον ασθενή, με:
- ασφάλεια (για τον ασθενή και για το
προσωπικό)
- υπευθυνότητα (τήρηση πρωτοκόλλων,
αναλογιών και διαδικασιών)
- αξιοπρέπεια (καλές υποδομές,



















θετική ή αρνητική σχέση
Tip:
"Όσο









Κύκλο ι  Ανάδρασης
(Feedback  Loops )
Αυτοενισχυόμενες (+)  ή













ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
Προσπαθήστε να βρείτε ή να δημιουργήσετε λούπες στο μοντέλο
 
Tip: Μπορείτε να προσθέσετε ενδιάμεσες μεταβλητές, που δεν
















ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 20'  -  ΟΜΑΔΑ
Επιλέξτε μία λούπα ο καθένας και περιγράψτε με δικά σας λόγια

























Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΟΣ 






ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ







...δηλαδή, μια μικρή αλλαγή σε αυτή τη μεταβλητή




Μια μεταβλητή στο μοντέλο μας που έχει




1)Μεταβλητή που μπορούμε ΜΟΝΟΙ ΜΑΣ να επηρεάσουμε 
(π.χ. υλικές αντί άυλες μεταβλητές)
 
2)Αιτία και όχι Σύμπτωμα
 
3)Μακροπρόθεσμα και όχι Bραχυπρόθεσμα αποτελέσματα
ΒΡΕΙΤΕ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ
ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΣΗΣ
ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
Καταγράψτε σε χαρτάκια σημεία παρέμβασης του
μοντέλου για τη βελτίωση της ποιότητας των
υπηρεσιών των μονάδων Εμφραγμάτων/ΜΝ/ΜΕΘ.
ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΩΝ
ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΣΗΣ
ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΣΕ ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Επιλέξτε τα 3 πιο κρίσιμα, κατά τη γνώμη σας,
σημεία παρέμβασης του μοντέλου, για τη βελτίωση






ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 5'  -  ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Κολλήστε τα χαρτάκια με τις στρατηγικές κάτω απο τα
κρίσιμα Σημεία Παρέμβασης στον πίνακα που πιστεύετε






Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΟΣ 






ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ








Βαθμολογήστε τις  στρατηγικές με βάση:
χαμηλό υψηλό
1 2 3 4 5






ΣΕ ΤΡΙΑΔΕΣ -  5 '
ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ
Βαθμολογήστε τις  στρατηγικές με βάση:
χαμηλό υψηλό
1 2 3 4 5









Βαθμολογήστε τις  στρατηγικές με βάση:
χαμηλό υψηλό
1 2 3 4 5










Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΟΣ 






ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ








ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 10'  -  ΔΥΑΔΕΣ
Επιλέξτε μια από τις στρατηγικές και κάντε ένα αναλυτικό πλάνο
επόμενων ενεργειών για την επίτευξή της, που θα περιέχει τα





ΧΡΟΝΟΣ 10'  -  ATOMIKA
Επιλέξτε μία στρατηγική και περιγράψτε με






Το πρόβλημα, Αιτίες & Συνέπειες του προβλήματος
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΟΣ 






ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ & ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ





























-Κάτι που σας έμεινε και θα θυμάστε; Το πρώτο
που σας έρχεται στο μυαλό 
ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ
15' -ΑΤΟΜΙΚΑ
ΣΑΣ
ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΥΜΕ
ΘΕΡΜΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ
ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ
























































Scanned with CamScanner
Scanned with CamScanner
Scanned with CamScanner
Scanned with CamScanner
Scanned with CamScanner
























